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1. 1. Thesis position 
Ethno-religious violence has been a notable phenomenon across the globe in the 
post-Cold War period. In the Balkans, the former Soviet Union and Africa, as well as 
in South and South-east Asia, people have been fighting in the name of their ethnic 
identity and because of their religious convictions (Huntington, 1993: 22-38; Seul, 
1999: 553-569). Irrespective of background, people have killed, and destroyed the 
belongings of, those categorized as the enemy to defend the interests of their own 
group. Peasants, fishermen, students and others who have never previously taken 
up arms have received brief military training and joined members of the own group 
on the battlefield; others have contributed to their group’s interest indirectly, with 
moral and material support. In some cases, support has come from individuals or 
groups beyond the borders of the region, province and or even country involved. 
Ethno-religious violence erupted in Indonesia when the authoritarian regime 
of the Indonesian New Order began to lose its grip on power. A survey conducted by 
Varshney et al. (2004; 2011:19-49) showed a trend of increasing violence between 
1990 and 2003. This survey recorded 3,608 cases of violence, resulting in the deaths 
of 10,758 people across the Indonesian archipelago. Events reached a peak in 2000, 
with 722 incidents, while the highest number of victims of ethno-religious violence 
was recorded in 1999, when 3,546 people died. (This figure is based on news and 
journalists’ reports and remains an estimate; violence in remote areas that was not 
covered by the mass media was not taken into account.) In addition, as reported by 
the Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2010), 
1,259,481 people in Indonesia were internally displaced in 2001 because of violent 
conflict.
This ethno-religious violence involved physical attacks that devastated the 
infrastructure of the affected groups, such as their religious buildings and icons. In 
1995 and 1996, violence broke out in Situbondo, Kebumen and Tasikmalaya after 
a long period of harmonious coexistence. Chinese properties became the target of 
attacks and several churches were burnt down. The riots were seen as a reflection of 
the deterioration of religious relations between Christians and Muslims at the time, 
because anti-Chinese unrest had never previously focused on their religious icons. 
This violence against Chinese was continued widely in Jakarta, Solo and Medan in 
1997 (Purdey, 2006). 
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Waves of ethnic violence also took place in West and Central Kalimantan 
between Dayak and Madurese in 1996-1997 and 2001 (de Jonge and Nooteboom, 
2006). In the Moluccas, where ethnicity is closely related to religious allegiance, the 
violence escalated across the region in 1999, sharply dividing people along religious 
lines. It took several years to simmer down, and only did so when the government 
intervened to mediate a peace accord between the representative leaders of the two 
religious groups. However, although mass attacks became less frequent, sporadic 
violence still occurred after the peace agreement had been signed.1 Shortly before 
and after data was gathered for this research, violent clashes between Muslims and 
Christians occurred in Ambon city. On 11 September 2011, after the burial ceremony 
of a Muslim ojek driver who was allegedly stabbed to death by Christians, there 
were clashes between Muslims and Christians in the downtown area. This resulted 
in the death of three people; dozens were wounded and about a hundred houses 
were burnt down (ICG, 2011). About three months later, further clashes occurred 
in Air Mata Cina neighbourhood, where Muslim and Christian residents are divided 
by a 2-metre-wide stream. Crowds of people from both sides gathered to engage in 
fighting. However, it did not escalate into large-scale violence (ICG, 2012).
Scholars have examined ethno-religious violence in Indonesia via a wide range 
of studies. Some have focused on its historical roots, while others have paid more 
attention to its impact. They have presented various arguments from different 
perspectives while looking at its context and escalation. Some have paid attention to 
the legacy of violence from the colonial era and the authoritarian state (Colombijn and 
Lindblad, 2002), the contestation of power in times of political transition (Bertrand, 
2004), the competition of local contenders for resources (Van Klinken, 2006) and 
the global growth of terrorism networks (Sidel, 2006; ICG, 2006). Most studies have 
concentrated on historical factors, the dynamics of structural transformation and the 
elites who have competed for power as the elements that have led to the emergence 
of collective violence. Individual attitudes at grassroots level, such as those of 
villagers, religious communities or students who have supported the violence, have 
been factored in less, if not neglected, in their analyses. 
Few studies have connected the macro-societal context with the micro-level 
of individual psychological process. Green and Seher (2003) indicate a gap between 
macro-level investigations and studies that focus on attitudes and/or behaviour. 
On the one hand, macro-level investigations that consider the economic, political 
1 The peace agreement was reached on 12 February 2002 in Malino, South Sulawesi. It was 
called Malino 2 after a similar peace agreement signed by Muslim and Christian group lead-
ers from Poso on 20 December 2001, which ended their lethal conflict. This peace accord 
was initiated and facilitated by the central government of Indonesia, alongside other efforts 





and social bases for violence tend to ignore the psychological processes underlying 
individual action. These studies rarely attempt to measure these constructs, or to 
demonstrate individual-level relationships between attitudes and actions (Fearon 
and Latin, 2000). On the other hand, behavioural literature tends to become a form 
of cognitive science, whose proponents seldom attempt to create links via attitudinal 
measures outside the laboratory (Sears, 1986; Ashmore et al., 2001:7). As behavioural 
literature becomes more detached from political action, so its conceptual debates 
become divorced from macro-political analyses of collective violence. This disjuncture 
results in a lack of comprehensive analysis in the study of collective violence, since 
individual motivation remains insufficiently addressed.     
This thesis explores the support for ethno-religious violence that is considered 
to fuel social tensions in intergroup relations. It examines the relationship between 
ethno-religious identification and the ways in which people support different levels of 
violence perpetrated by their own group, such as protest, intimidating demonstrations, 
the destruction of property, or the injuring or killing of people belonging to other 
ethno-religious groups. It conducts micro-level analyses of individuals’ support for 
ethno-religious violence by taking into account individual-level determinants, while 
also paying attention to contextual factors such as the majority/minority positions of 
the groups involved. Support for ethno-religious violence is viewed as a dimension 
of the exclusionary reactions that arise from rational intergroup competition and the 
dynamics of ethno-religious identification.
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured in six chapters. Chapter One presents research issues, 
the setting and history of Ambon and Yogyakarta as research sites, and research 
questions. In Chapter Two, we delineate theories, a conceptual model and preliminary 
hypotheses. Next, Chapter Three contains data collection and measurements; we 
describe the procedures used for data collection, representativeness of samples, 
standardized measurements, the data collection process and the development of 
the topic list. Chapter Four exposes the social location of support for ethno-religious 
violence. It is revealed via bivariate analyses between ethno-religious identification, 
other independent determinant variables and support for intergroup violence. In 
order to construct the scales for measurement, we run rigorous data reduction prior 
to the analysis of variance and mean comparison. Chapter Five presents multivariate 
regression analyses, in which the results become the basis for the theoretical 
evaluations. In this chapter, we describe the analysis procedure and make an 
assessment of the hypotheses derived from the previous theory. The triangulation of 
the quantitative and qualitative analyses is also presented in Chapter Four and Five 
in order to enrich and to validate the results of the study. Chapter Six summarizes 
and discusses the overall findings of the study, by highlighting the crucial questions, 
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empirical answers, innovation and progress, as well as by identifying new research 
issues.    
1.2. Research issue
Collective violence involves shared identities, be they ethnic, religious or a 
combination of the two. Tilly (2003:75) specifically indicates that the activation of 
boundaries between groups opens the way for collective violence to take place, by 
shaping particular identities that can be distinguished from each other. The process 
might damage social interactions, which in turn creates conditions for violence. 
Ethno-religious violence occurs with the activation of ethnic and religious boundaries 
because of the strong identification that individuals make with their in-groups, such 
that it leads them to support intergroup conflict and violence (Seul, 1999; Ashmore 
et al, 2001:229-231; Orellana, 2009: 265). 
This study focuses on support for ethno-religious violence. It refers to the 
approval of the instrumental use of violence in a variety of forms by people who 
identify themselves as members of a particular group, in order to achieve economic, 
political, social or cultural objectives in relation to another group (Tilly, 2003; Baron & 
Richardson, 1994). The support can take different forms, such as condoning abusive 
language and hate speech in public; supporting aggressive rallies and intimidating 
demonstrations, approving destruction of property of other groups (material harm); 
and justification for injuring or even killing others (corporal harm) (Berkowitz 1993). 
It involves physical and/or psychological pain. Support for ethno-religious violence 
works in two dimensions: the domain to which people’s support refers (achievement 
of economic, political, social, cultural objectives of the group); and the level of 
intensity of the violence supported (Sterkens et al, 2009). 
1.2.1. Support for ethno-religious violence as latent conflict
We consider support for ethno-religious violence to be a ‘latent conflict’, which 
means that it is a condition of social tension arising from a dysfunctional social 
system. Latent conflict does not always result in manifest violence. It is not really or 
actually visible, but it is empirically observable when people are asked appropriate 
questions. It exists in longstanding group competition over scarce resources, or 
in unequal access to political power. The term ‘latent conflict’ is adapted from 
Robert Merton’s concept of latent function, in which he refers to unintended and 
unrecognized consequences of individual or group activities which serve in part the 
functional system of social relations (Merton, 1968: 330). Support for intergroup 
violence is considered to be a latent conflict because the support that people give 
to their in-groups leads to stereotyping of, prejudice about or discrimination against 
out-groups. In other words, support for intergroup violence creates major rifts 




Ethnicity and religion as roots of (latent) conflict have become a focus for scholarly 
attention in recent decades. There are three major theoretical perspectives that try 
to explain it: primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist. Primordialist theories 
view ethnic identity as something inherited at birth, thus making the boundaries 
between groups immutable. Ethnic conflict is the unavoidable consequence when 
people defend, sustain or propagate their own kinship group, their own cultural 
traditions or their way of life. Instrumentalist theories see ethnic conflict as the 
product of individuals’ pursuit of private interests. Individuals choose to take part in 
ethnically based economic groups in order to acquire economic goods, or participate 
in political movements to realize political goals. Constructivist theories pay particular 
attention to the social and historical contexts that shape, transform and delineate 
the ethnic boundaries that are inflaming a given conflict. These include historical 
processes such as modernization, decolonization, the structuring of colonial states 
and the weakening of central political institutions (Green and Seher, 2003:520-521; 
Bertrand, 2004:10-11; Wimmer, 2008: 971)
In recent studies on the role of religion in conflict and violence, religious 
differences are found to be more important than ethnic differences as a social 
division that can develop into conflict. There are two fundamental reasons why 
religious differences can generate conflict to an even greater extent than other 
social cleavages. First, some aspects of religion lead naturally to divergence, such as 
the conviction that followers must unconditionally accept certain interpretations of 
sacred texts, or the fact that religious identities seem to be less negotiable because 
of their reference to transcendence or ‘ultimate reality’. Second, religious differences 
imply different ways of understanding the world, social relationships and so on (Seul, 
1999: 564; Reynal-Querol, 2002: 31-32). Compared to ethnicity, religion seems to be 
more salient to recent conflicts in Indonesia because religious group identification 
enables people to garner greater support from the global network of fellow believers 
(Sidel, 2006; Steward, 2009: 14).
1.2.2. Support for intergroup violence and ethno-religious identification
The relationship between ethno-religious identification and out-group prejudice has 
been a subject of considerable attention in the social sciences for a long time. The 
concept of ethnocentrism is the prominent idiom to describe this phenomenon, 
which refers to in-group favouritism and out-group derogation. William Sumner 
(1906) pinpointed ethnocentrism as an inevitable and universal consequence of 
the existence of social groups. At the individual level, Adorno and his colleagues 
(1950) argued that individuals characterised by strong, intense, uncritical and 
even sometimes irrational in-group attachment and glorification also show more 
prejudice towards out-groups and minorities. Although some scholars disagree 
with the hypothesis of ethnocentrism, arguing that in-group identification does 
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not necessarily result in out-group hostility, recent studies show their reciprocal 
relationship (cf. Duckit, 2006:151-153).
Support for ethno-religious violence may arise as an effect of ethno-religious 
identification. In this sense, the term ethno-religious identification is used to describe 
the socio-psychological process whereby self-image and perception of group 
membership is constructed. Ethno-religious identification is a feature of individual 
representation since it gives a referential reservoir from which categorization of self 
(in-group) and other (out-group) is derived. The identification gets stronger via the 
competition and conflict that polarize group and power differentials. In this regard, 
increased competition and out-group threat develops ethno-religious identification 
and induces out-group hostility (Brewer, 2001b: 26-28; Mitchell, 2005).
In Indonesia, ethnic identification is apparent in relations between natives 
(pribumi) and Chinese, but in areas such as the Moluccas, religious identification 
seems particularly strong. Here, for instance, the colonial government used to 
favour the indigenous Christians as their vehicles for local middle-class bureaucracy; 
Muslims therefore felt discriminated against by the local authorities. When conflict 
arose in 1999, religious identification seemed more salient than ethnic markers. 
Muslim groups suspected the Christian Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS), in exile in 
the Netherlands, of backing the Christian groups2. Prejudice was also bolstered by 
the deployment of Muslims from Java and Makassar to the Moluccas as jihadists 
(Hasan, 2002: 165-167; 2005: 195-228).
Ethno-religious identification has the power to motivate people to support 
intergroup violence; it acts as a unifying force, drawing people to support their groups 
on the basis of solidarity. Although ethnic and religious identification often overlap, 
there are several differences between them in relation to support for intergroup 
violence; the characteristics of leaders and followers, along with the organization 
used to mobilize support, are areas in which these differences are apparent (Yamin, 
2008; Steward, 2009; Orellana, 2009: 266-277).
Religious organizations in Indonesia seem to be more prepared than 
ethnic organizations to mobilize support for intergroup violence. Some religious 
organizations have developed effective channels of support for specific groups, 
especially in shifting from purely religious to more political functions. Jihad Fighters, 
the Forum for Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet (Forum 
Komunikasi Ahl Sunnah wal-Jama’ah, FKAJ), Islamic Defender Fronts (Front Pembela 
Islam, FPI) or Indonesian Mujahideen Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) 
2 Most RMS members were Mollucans who resisted the integration of the region into the 
Republic of Indonesia in 1949 out of fear that it would disadvantage them. For a discussion 




have been among the religious organizations in Indonesia involved in violent conflicts 
in Ambon, while officially, their presence in the area was intended only to ‘help’ 
Muslim groups (Hasan, 2005: 112-116; Wilson, 2008). Although ethnic groups may 
also have formal organizations such as The Unity of Madurese Family (Ikatan Keluarga 
Madura, IKAMA), Betawi Brotherhood Forum (Forum Betawi Rempug, FBR), The 
Unity of South Sulawesi Family (Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi Selatan, KKSS), and so 
on, these seem to be less militant when it comes to actual participation in violent 
conflict.
Whether violent conflict is started and escalated by elites, or constitute a 
mass phenomenon, has been the subject of scholarly debate. Many earlier studies 
by Kapferer (1988), Prunier (1995), Davidson (2005) and Wilson (2008) have 
emphasized the greater role of elite groups, religious charismatic leaders or ethnic 
entrepreneurs in channelling public support for ethno-religious violence. While 
these studies are vital in terms of accounting for how conflicts become heightened 
– via the construction of more antagonistic identities and group mobilization – they 
are insufficient to explain individuals’ involvement. A number of other studies have 
indicated that the motivations of ordinary people for joining conflict differ from those 
of the elite. Rape, looting, thefts that occur during periods of collective violence 
show the complexities of individual motivation (Deng, 1995; Woodward, 1995). To 
enrich these earlier studies, individual motivation and support for ethno-religious 
conflict as a result of in-group identification will be examined in this study.   
1.2.3. Relative group size and perceived threat
The minority or majority positioning of ethno-religious groups influences their 
support for ethno-religious violence, an assumption that relates to the relative 
numerical composition of ethno-religious groups and the power relations between 
them. Groups with fewer members are defined as minorities and numerically larger 
groups as majorities. Power and social status are often used as criteria for defining 
minority and majority groups (Tajfel, 1981 c.f . Lücken and Simon, 2005:397). In 
this study, power is defined as the degree of control of a particular group over its 
allocation of resources and that of out-groups (Sachdev and Bourhis, 1991:3) while 
social status refers to the relative position of groups, on the basis of valued dimensions 
of comparison (Tajfel and Turner, 1986:19). Differential access to power between 
groups is the most important determinant of discrimination and stratification, while 
the distinction of group status indicates power differentials in a society. The minorities 
are usually subordinate low-status groups, while the majorities have dominant 
status. The difference in size between ethno-religious groups partly determines their 
subordinate or dominant position, which in turn can lead to support for exclusionary 
attitudes (Eitzen, 1967:78-79; Coenders et al., 2004).
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Muslims and Christians in Indonesia demonstrate a power differential between 
majority and minority. In terms of numbers, Muslims form the majority and Christians 
the minority. In spite of this, Muslim leaders were felt to have been treated as a 
minority from 1945 to the 1990s because both the Sukarno and Suharto regimes 
attempted to suppress Islamic political movements (Wertheim, 1986). However, 
Muslims began to reinforce their position as the dominant religious majority after 
the downfall of the authoritarian Suharto regime. Muslims reformed existing laws 
and endorsed new ones with an Islamic emphasis, such as those on the regulation 
of places of worship, the national education system, anti-pornography laws and the 
enactment of sharia in several regions of the country. The dominant status of the 
Muslim majority in the state institution led the rights of Christian and other religious 
minorities in legal, political and cultural fields to be neglected (Salim, 2007: 115-119; 
Sterkens and Hadiwitanto 2015).
The relationship between minority/majority positions and discriminatory 
attitudes in Western countries has been examined repeatedly. Studies suggest that 
‘the relative size of the subordinate (out-group) population increases competition 
(whether actual or perceived) between minority (out-group) and majority (in-group) 
members, over societal and economic resources. Competition and the perceived 
threats of competition increase, in turn, hostility, antagonism and the need and 
motivation for discrimination’ (Semyonov et al., 2004: 683). In a study conducted 
in Europe, Scheepers et al. (2002a) revealed that exclusionary views and anti-
minority sentiments tend to be more pronounced in countries in which there is a 
heavy concentration of foreigners. In contrast, Evans and Need (2002) found that 
the relative size of foreign populations had no effect on attitudes toward minority 
rights in East European countries. However, more recent research in these countries 
has shown out-group size to have an effect on opposition to civil rights for minorities 
(Coenders et al., 2004 and 2009).
The exclusion of minority populations is strongly related to the perceptions of 
the majority (Sachdev and Bourhis, 1991). Research on attitudes towards foreigners 
among Germans reinforces the presumption that they adopt exclusionary attitudes 
towards migrant minorities. When German citizens believe that foreigners exert a 
negative impact on various aspects of social life, they are of the opinion that foreigners 
should not obtain equal social, political and economic rights. While the actual size of 
the foreign population has no effect on perceived threat or exclusionary attitudes, 
the perceived size strongly predicts views on the (unequal) treatment of foreigners. 
The higher the perceived size of the foreign population, the more pronounced the 
sense of threat, and the stronger the support for exclusionary practices (Semyonov 





The exclusionary behaviour of majorities can give rise to collective action by 
minorities. Hecter and Okamoto (2001) found the emergence of collective action 
among minority groups to be a result of social identification on the micro level, in 
which distinctive identities were strongly related to perceived threat, and on the 
macro level in terms of (a) failed nationalist collective action to provide insurance, 
welfare and other kinds of private goods; (b) widespread demand for autonomy or 
outright independence and (c) the opportunity to act collectively on behalf of one’s 
ethnic group. In other words, where there are strong inequalities and discrimination, 
ethno-religious identification encourages collective action.
In relation to state institutions being sites of negotiation between the majority 
and minority, Bertrand (2004: 40) argues that ethnic and religious identities 
become a stronger potential source for mobilization when groups feel threatened. 
When groups are not represented by, or are even excluded from state governance, 
they become increasingly alienated and marginal. Minorities that are subject to 
discrimination tend to resist the dominant power of the majority. Gurr (1993) affirms 
that mobilization of minority groups happens as a result of grievances due to political, 
cultural and economic discrimination. The ethno-religious identification which 
anchors the bounded identities of particular ethno-religious groups is often used as 
an instrument to demand justice, or greater freedom from deprived marginality and 
political discrimination. 
1.2.4. Research setting 
The research sites of this study are the cities of Ambon and Yogyakarta. The following 
description briefly delineates the ethno-religious profile of both places; but first, I 
outline the ethnic and religious composition of Indonesia as a whole.
Indonesia consists of a great many ethnic groups. Overall the population is 
growing, but the growth rates of the various ethnic groups differ significantly. The 
ranking of the top ten largest ethnic groups continuously changes, with the exception 
of the Javanese and Sundanese, who have been the first- and second-largest ethnic 
groups in Indonesia since time immemorial. Together these two make up about 
half of the Indonesian population. Some ethnic groups are not always mentioned 
separately in censuses. In the most recent census of 2010, small ethnic groups were 
lumped together under the category ‘ethnic groups’ of the province to which they 
belonged, such as ‘ethnic groups of Sulawesi’ or ‘ethnic groups of South Sumatera’. 
The ‘ethnic groups of Sulawesi’ included 208 groups as well as Makassarese, 
Buginese, and people from Minahasa or Gorontalo, who made up the greater part of 
the population; those of South Sumatera consisted of people from Lampung, Ogan, 
Komering, Palembang, Semendo, Pasemah, Gumai, Mintang, Musi and Rawas, while 
the more numerous Minangkabau and Batak were mentioned separately (Naim and 
Syaputra, 2011:18). The category of ‘others’ included various ethnic groups, all with a 
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population of less than 5,000,000. These groups comprised Dayak, Sasak, Acehnese, 
Banjar and so on. The changes in categorization make it difficult to follow changes in 
the smaller ethnic groups over time.
Table 1.1 Size of ethnic groups in Indonesia in 2010









Malay  5,365,399 2.26
Ethnic groups of South Sumatera 5,119,581 2.15
Others  52,326,686  22.02
Total 237,641,326 100.00
Source: Na’im and Syaputra (2011: 9).
Besides indigenous ethnic groups, the country also has a few immigrant communities 
of which the Chinese is the largest. In 1930, when the colonial government held 
the first official census, there were 1,233,000 Chinese, slightly over 2% of the total 
population (Koning, 2007: 133). The Chinese, together with other foreign Asian 
groups, were classified as Vreemde Oosterlingen (Foreign Orientals). The legal 
status of ethnic Chinese and other Asian foreigners, such as Arabs and Indians, was 
higher than that of the indigenous population, but lower than that of the Europeans 
(Vandenbosch, 1943: 86; Suryadinata, 1993: 83). Between independence and the 
census of 2000, the Chinese were neglected in statistical records. This had to do 
with the ambiguous position they hold in Indonesian society, and the resentment 
felt towards them. In 2005, about five million of the Chinese in the country held 
Indonesian nationality (Mackie, 2005: 97), while the number who did not was 
2,832,510 (Na’im and Syaputra, 2011: 10). 
With regard to religion, the vast majority of the Indonesian population is 
Muslim. Christians – Protestants and Catholics combined – rank second. Hinduism, 




Regime (1966-1998), only five religions were allowed by the government: Islam, 
Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism. Initially Confucianism was also 
included, but in 1967 it was dropped from the list of recognized religions on the 
basis that it was a regional (Chinese) ethical doctrine rather than a religion. People 
had to register as followers of one of the five official religions. In reality, the variety 
of religions was much broader, but traditional beliefs existing in different part of 
the archipelago were not recognized. After Soeharto stepped down in May 1998, 
all religions unrecognized by the state were allowed again, although radical Islam 
groups attempted to eliminate some of them, such as the Ahmadiyah movement 
and the Shia denomination. 
Table 1.2 shows the religious composition of the Indonesian population in 
1990 and 2010. It makes clear that the percentage of Muslims stayed about the 
same, while that of Protestants increased a little and that of Catholics, Hindus and 
Buddhists declined. The category of ‘others’ in 2010 refers to all religions besides the 
earlier recognized religions, such as Kejawen, Kaharingan and Sunda Wiwitan.
Table 1.2 Population of Indonesia according to religion in 1990 and 2010
Religion
1990 2010
N % N %
Islam 156,318,610 87.21 207,176,162 87.18
Protestantism 10,820,769 6.04 16,528,513 6,96 
Catholicism 6,411,794 3.58 6,907,873 2,91
Hinduism 3,287,309 1.83 4,012,116 1.69
Buddhism  1,840,693 1.03 1,703,254 0.72
Confucianism - - 117,091 0.05
Others  568,608 0.32 1,191,317 0.51
Total 179,247,783 100.00 237,641,326 100.00
Source: Census 1990 (BPS, 1991) and Census 2010 (BPS, 2011).
The religious composition within the research area of greater Yogyakarta does not 
differ greatly from the national level. In Ambon city, however, Christians are in the 
majority. We will give more detailed figures for ethnic and religious diversity in the 
sections on the research locations below, and make clear that ethnic and religious 
identification are important across several areas of society, such as the economy, 
politics and socio-cultural life.  
1.2.4.1. Ambon
The city of Ambon is situated on the island of the same name. In colonial times, 
it was more a town than a city. It was a centre for the spice trade from the end of 
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the 17th century until about 1860, when spices became less lucrative. Ambon city 
was the seat of the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, 
VOC) from 1605 to 1796 and capital of the Residency of Amboina from 1867 to 1924. 
In 1949, after Indonesian independence was recognised by the Dutch, it became the 
capital of the province of the Moluccas which consists of 1,027 islands. In 1999 the 
province was divided into two parts: the North Moluccas with Ternate as capital, 
and the Moluccas, which included the central and southern regions, of which 
Ambon became the capital. The history of Ambon cannot be disentangled from the 
history of the whole Moluccas, an area that possesses rich natural resources and has 
attracted people from near and far for centuries.3 Besides making a living as hunters, 
gatherers and peasants, by the 15th century the population of the Moluccan islands 
were trading spices and pearls with people from Java, China and Malacca. The latter 
were followed by Buginese and Arab traders who alighted in the harbour of Ambon 
a long time before the Europeans (Ptak, 1992: 27-41; Andaya, 1991: 71- 79). 
Ambon town started as a Portuguese fortification in 1576, around which more 
and more people gradually settled. From the beginning, the population around 
the fort consisted of local people, people of related ethno-linguistic groups from 
neighbouring islands and immigrants from elsewhere in the Indonesian archipelago. 
According to a Dutch proto-census in 1673, 81.29% of the people living in the town 
were local Moluccans, while the rest consisted of European soldiers, employees of 
the VOC and migrants from other Indonesian islands. Between 1673 and 1694, the 
population of the town increased from 4,089 to 5,487 (Knaap, 1991:119).
3  The Moluccas is the homeland of several more or less related ethno-linguistic groups, such 
as the Alifuru, Togitil, Arunese, Ternatese, Takabu, Bandanese, Rana, Moa, etc. There are 41 
ethno-linguistic groups living in the Moluccas (Leirissa et al., 1982:1). The term Ambonese 





Figure 1.1 Map of Ambon Island
Source: www.websitesrcg.com
The establishment of Ambon as a centre of the spice trade resulted in more and 
more migrants coming to the town. In 1694, almost half the population were 
migrants: 19.32% were of Malay-Indonesian origin, 14.38% were Europeans and 
8.54% Chinese. The number of Moluccans from the island itself was about 57.76% 
(Knaap, 1995: 234). Due to the flourishing of spice as a lucrative commodity, the 
population grew steadily. In 1860, the population amounted to 9,586 inhabitants, 
among whom 1,793 were migrants: 43.39% Europeans, 16.79% Chinese, 3.83% 
Arabs and 35.97% Malay-Indonesians (Leirissa, 2000: 625). When the first official 
census was carried out in 1930, Ambon, now a city rather than a town, had 17,078 
inhabitants, the Afdeeling (sub-region) of Ambon had 67,597 inhabitants, and the 
Residentie (residency) of Ambon 400,057 (see Table 1.3). 4
4 The subregion of Ambon consisted of the town of Ambon and the islands Buru, Saparua, 
West Ceram, Amahai, Wahai, East Ceram, Banda, Kisar, Babar, Saumlaki, Larat, Kai, Boven 
Digoel and South New Guinea (South of Papua) (Volkstelling 1930, 1931: 31).
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Table 1.3 Population groups in Ambon, 1930 
Groups Total
Natives Europeans Chinese Other Asians
N % N % N % N % N %
Ambon city 13,357 78.11 2,050 12.00 921 5.39 750 4.39 17,078 100.00
Afdeeling 
Ambon 63,314 93.67 2,294 3.39 1,030 1.52 955 1.41 67,593 100.00
Residentie  
Ambon 388,754 97.17 3,803 0.95 4,612 1.15 2,888 .72 400,057 100.00
Source: Volkstelling 1930, 1931: 26-27, 46-47.
The census of 1930 confirms that the population of Ambon city was more 
heterogeneous than that of rural areas of the Afdeeling and residency of Ambon. 
The natives – all Moluccan ethno-linguistic groups – made up 78.11 % of the total 
population of the city. The Europeans also included gelijkgestelden, persons from 
other population groups who had legally obtained equality with Europeans, such 
as privileged Ambonese and Chinese. ‘Other Asians’ consisted of Foreign Orientals 
other than Chinese, such as Arabs and Indians.    
Among the migrants who came to Ambon at the end of the 19th century were 
many Butonese from South-east Sulawesi. Physical reminders of their presence in the 
city still exist today (Chauvel, 1990:2-3). These migrants mainly worked as agricultural 
labourers in spice gardens owned by Ambonese. Buginese and Makassarese, who 
migrated to the city in the early 20th century, worked as fishermen or found work 
on passenger or cargo boats. After independence, and in particular during the 
New Order government, a growing number of migrants, including Javanese, came 
to the island both as spontaneous migrants and as part of transmigration projects 
for landless labourers and unemployed urban citizens. Between 1971 and 1985, the 
percentage of migrants in the city increased from 5.2% to 14% of the total. In 1990, 
they made up 30% of the city’s population (ICG, 2002: 1). The steady population 
growth of Ambon was severely interrupted between 1999 and 2002 when a series 
of violent conflicts took place in the region, during which at least 1,097 were killed 
in the city (Varshney et al., 2010: 43). During this period, a huge number of people 
left (ICG, 2002: 17). In 1998, a year before the troubles started, the city had 314,417 
inhabitants, which decreased to 265,830 in 1999 and 209,303 in 2000. However, ten 
years later, the population had risen to 331, 254.
The recent census of 2010 indicates that the proportion of migrants has 
increased even further, amounting to 112,715 or 34.03% of the total city population. 
In the same year, Moluccans made up 74.95% (1,127,148 persons) of the total 




282,860 came from Sulawesi, 19.86% or 79,340 from Java and 9.35% or 37,362 from 
other islands (see Table 1.4; Na’im and Syaputra, 2011: 36-41). 
To reduce prejudice and hostility following the ethno-religious violence of 1999-
2002, official data about ethnic groups in the city of Ambon ceased to be provided 
by the regional city government. The 2010 provincial data nevertheless give an 
idea of present ethnic diversity, as most migrants live in and around the city. In this 
census, the various ethnic groups in Maluku such as Kei, Ceram, Saparua, Yamdena 
are classified by the single category of Moluccans. The ethnic groups from Sulawesi 
other than the Buginese, Makassarese, Minahasa and Gorontalo are also grouped 
together (Na’im and Syaputra, 2011: 21-54).  
Table 1.4 The ethnic composition of the Province of the Moluccas, 2010 
Ethnicity N %
Moluccans 1,127,148 74.95
Other ethnic groups from Sulawesi 247,266 16.44
Javanese 79,340 5.28









Source: Na’im and Syaputra, 2011:36
Ambon has become a densely populated city over the last ten years (BPS Ambon, 
2012: 5). Table 1.5 shows the population density per district (kecamatan). The 
highest density is in the downtown area, which includes the port and the markets in 
the districts of Sirimau, Nusaniwe and Teluk Ambon Baguala.  
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Table 1.5 Population density per district in the city of Ambon, 2010
District
Population Area Density
(Person/Km2)N % Km2 %
Nusaniwe 89,866 27.13 88.35 0.25 1,017.16
Sirimau 140,064 42.28 86.81 0.24 1,613.45
Teluk Ambon 38.451 11.61 93.68 0.26 410.45
Teluk Ambon 
Baguala
53,472 16.14 40.11 0.11 1,333.13
Leitimur Selatan 9.401 2.84 50.50 0.14 186,16
Total 331.254 100.00 359.45 100.00 921.56
Source: BPS Kota Ambon 2011.
With regard to religion, in 1930 65.9% of the city population was Protestant and 
32.7% was Muslim (Department van Economische Zaken, 1936:139-140). In 1990, 
the Protestants and Muslims made up respectively 53.46% and 41.11% (BPS Ambon, 
1991). In 2010, after the troubles in Ambon, the percentage of Protestants in the 
city was 57.99%, while the number of Muslims accounted for 38.77%. The religious 
composition of the city population differs from that of the provinces. At the provincial 
level, the number of Muslims (50.61%) is higher than that of Christians (48.76%) 
(BPS and Bappeda Maluku, 2011).














The natural growth of the population and the ever-swelling numbers of migrants 
to Ambon, only interrupted by the conflicts between 1999 and 2002, led to fierce 
competition for land, jobs and other scarce resources, and reinforced the already 
existing social segregation along ethnic and religious lines. In the countryside, where 
segregation had taken place much earlier, Christians and Muslims continued to keep 
each other at a distance. In the city, Muslims chose to settle in neighbourhoods with 
fellow Muslims, and Christians in Christian neighbourhoods.
Political situation
Religion has an enormous impact on politics in Ambon and the Moluccas. Since the 
downfall of the authoritarian New Order regime, the city and provincial parliaments 
have become arenas of political contest between Muslims and Christians. This contest 
has become even more vocal, but also more complex, since the advent of political 
reforms that have given rise to new political parties that attract a specifically pro-
Muslim or pro-Christian electorate. As well as the New Order United Development 
Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), the most popular new Islamic parties 
are the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), the Moon and Star 
Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB), the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, PKB) and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), while 
Christians mainly favour the new Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera, 
PDS), the Love the Nation Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa, PDKB), and 
the Catholic Party (Partai Katolik) (al-Makassary and LBH Bakubae, 2004:106). Besides 
the confessional parties, secular parties already in existence also accommodate the 
interests of the religious groups in order to gain the support for their followers. The 
Party of Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar) furthers the interests of 
the local Muslim population to prevent them from voting for Islamic parties, while 
the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, 
PDI-P) sides with the local Christian population, which makes up the greater part 
of the population in Ambon. Although these parties differ in terms of grassroots 
support and have quite different ideologies, coalitions are relatively easily made. For 
example, before the elections for a governor and vice-governor of the Moluccas or 
for a mayor and vice-mayor of Ambon city, co-operating parties nominate a pair of 
candidates who differ in religion (a Christian mayor and a Protestant vice-mayor, or 
the reverse) but who might be acceptable to different ethno-religious groups (Tomsa 
2009: 241-247). Also, parties in parliament who present themselves as pro-Muslim 
or pro-Christian have to work together to defend plans that benefit the voters (or, 
rather, believers), they represent.
Local elites play an important role in politics at both city and provincial level. 
The members of these local elites easily cross the boundaries between business, 
politics and religion. They change membership from one party to another to further 
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their political and economic interests (van Klinken, 2007a: 95). During the conflict 
of 1999-2002, these elites manipulated religious sentiments to mobilize followers 
for their personal objectives (Tanamal and Triyono, 2004: 242-246). In the elections 
for a city mayor and a provincial governor, they acted as political brokers, setting up 
coalitions between religious and secular parties as well as between Christian and 
Muslim parties (Tomsa, 2009: 230). If they fail to obtain public positions themselves, 
they work behind the scenes to orchestrate policy-making in the city and the province 
(Kumorotomo, 2009: 9-13). 
In the 1999 city and provincial elections, six months after the outbreak of 
violence, many members of the local elites won seats in the city and in the provincial 
parliament. In the city of Ambon, PDI-P obtained 54.29%, Golkar 19.45%, PPP 17.14%; 
the rest went to other parties. On the provincial level, Golkar obtained 30.46%, PDI-P 
27.72%, PPP 17.84% and the remaining 23.98% was distributed among 45 parties 
(Suryadinata, 2002: 223). Although the PDI-P is a secular party, it gained many 
Christian votes in this election because many Christian leaders belonged to the party 
elite. Muslims won less than 20% because many Muslim migrants had left the city to 
escape the conflict (ICG, 2002:2)              
In comparison with the national elections of 1999 and 2004, in the 2009 national 
elections PDI-P and the confessional parties lost a large number of voters in Ambon 
city to nationalist and secular parties. People were apparently disappointed with the 
confessional parties’ failure to reduce tensions in line with their expectations. The 
PDI-P vote drastically decreased to 13.88%, despite remaining the party with the 
most votes. The other secular parties such as Golkar, the Democratic Party (Partai 
Demokrat), the People’s Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, Hanura) and 
The Great Indonesian Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerindra) 
together received 29.73% of the votes. The Islamic parties obtained 19.94% and the 
Christian parties 5.49%; the remainder was distributed among 33 other small parties 
(BPS Kota Ambon, 2011: 32). On the provincial level, the result of the general election 
was quite similar. Golkar received roughly 17.13% of the vote, and the Democratic 
Party 16.39%. The Islamic party PKB obtained about 12.82%, slightly more than 
PDI-P, which was supported by Christians (BPS dan Bappeda Maluku, 2011).       
In 2001, when the election for city mayor was held during the conflict, the 
elected mayor was a Christian from PDI-P, and the vice-mayor a Muslim from PPP. 
In the governor election of 2003, PDI-P and its coalition partner PPP were able to 
install their Christian candidate Karel Albert Ralahalu (PDI-P) as governor, and their 
Muslim candidate Muhammad Abdullah Latuconsina (PPP) as vice-governor of 
Maluku. In 2008, the incumbent governor was elected as the result of a coalition 
between secular parties (PDI-P, Democratic Party and PDK) and Muslim parties (PKB 
and PBB). When I conducted fieldwork in 2011, the election of the city mayor of 




mayor a Muslim. This pair of elected candidates was nominated by a broad political 
coalition between the secular parties Golkar and Gerindra, the Muslim parties PPP 
and PBR, and the Christian party PDS.
This co-operation between political parties to present a pair of Christian and 
Muslim candidates in the elections for both (vice-)governor and (vice-)mayor shows 
the importance of religion in regional politics. The coalition represents a political 
deal among the elites to fulfil the demand for acceptable leaders from both religious 
groups. The elites also desire a Christian-Muslim balance across the high ranking 
government positions and among civil servants, and in the budget allocation for 
regional development, such as for education and health services (Pariela, 2007: 
107). The increasing number of votes for secular and national parties in the 2009 
election demonstrates the success of such parties’ proposals to mitigate the tensions 
between Muslims and Christians.   
Economic situation
The violent conflict of 1999-2002 deeply affected the economic situation. During 
this time, most of the public infrastructure was devastated, business activities were 
paralyzed, and many people lost their jobs and income. In 2000, the economic growth 
rate was -7.18% and the level of poverty went up from 13% to 29% (BPS Ambon, 
2001). In 2011, the economic growth rate was 8.7% and the poverty level was about 
8% (BPS Ambon, 2012: 66), but the impact of the conflict was still apparent in the 
division of economic activities between Muslims and Christians.
During the conflict, both Muslims and Christians set up their own markets 
because people felt too insecure to sell and buy wares in places where they were 
outnumbered by members of the religious out-group. Muslims usually shopped in 
Batu Merah Mardika, Pasar Amplaz or Pasar Aman, while Christians went to Pasar 
Batu Meja, Pasar Paso, Pasar Tagalaya or Kuda Mati. There was only one market in 
the city, founded by the local government at the insistence of peace development 
organisations, where both Muslims and Christians did their shopping. Once the 
number of violent incidents had declined, believers of different religions began to 
return to a variety of markets. However, traders of the same faith were now clustered 
together, as they felt more secure working among members of their own religious 
group. 
The conflict also led to a reshuffling of work roles between Christians and 
Muslims. Many Ambonese Christians, who had predominantly worked in salaried 
jobs or administrative positions, had to make a living during and after the conflict 
from petty trades, transportation services or other informal activities that were 
previously carried out by Muslim migrants (Adam, 2008b: 6); this was due to the 
closure of offices and business operations, and because Muslims had left Christian 
areas. Muslims in turn took over various kinds of work in areas where Christians 
CHAPTER 1
20
had moved out. Spatial religious segregation of economic activities continues 
to this day; it has led to a substantial reduction of economic specialization along 
(ethno-) religious lines, which was widespread before the conflict. Now, Muslims and 
Christians compete for jobs in bureaucracy, trade and services, which have become 
the main source of income for about 64% of the city’s population (BPS Kota Ambon, 
2012: 68). While they may work in the same field as before, however, they choose 
their workplace in an area where their religion is dominant (Adam, 2009: 188).  
After 2002, when the security situation of Ambon began to improve, Chinese 
Christians were among the first to return to the city to resume their role as suppliers 
of dairy foods and other commodities. During the conflict, the wholesale sector 
stagnated; only a few of these suppliers ran their businesses, under military custody. 
As soon as the market began to pick up, Butonese Muslims who had left the island 
during the conflict also came back to the city to resume their work as petty traders 
or crop collectors. They now had to compete with Ambonese Christian vendors 
who had taken over part of their informal economic activities in the meantime. 
In bureaucratic positions, Christians were still dominant, although their numbers 
had begun to decrease. Before the conflict, about 90% of civil servants had been 
Christians (Bertrand, 2002:69); in 2006, 84.07% were Protestants, while the rest 
consisted of Muslims and followers of other denominations (Tamagola et al., 2007: 
27). The dominance of Christians in local administration is an issue that easily raises 
tensions between ethno-religious groups. Muslims still feel that discrimination 
operates in the selection of civil servants, while Christians fear that their dominant 
position will be taken over by Muslims (van Klinken, 2007a: 93-94). 
Socio-cultural situation
Before the outbreak of violent conflict in 1999, Muslims and Christians in Ambon 
lived together, despite all kinds of tensions, in relative harmony. Members of both 
communities interacted freely, and many lived side by side in the same quarter (Lee, 
1997: 59-67). Social segregation began to increase in the 1970s, when the government 
legally prohibited interreligious marriages, intensified religious education in schools 
and recruited civil servants on the basis of religious identity (Sidel, 2006: 40). The 
conflict of 1999-2002 increased and reinforced segregation and sharply defined 
territorial boundaries between Muslims and Christians. As stated above, almost all 
residential settlements have now become religiously homogenous. 
Spatial and social divisions between Muslims and Christians also developed in 
the educational sector. Public schools as well as denominational schools became 
religiously homogeneous. Before the conflict, Muslim and Christian pupils attended 
the same public schools; many Muslim and Christian families felt no qualms about 
sending their children to public schools in areas dominated by other denominations. 




schools where the majority of the population or pupils were of a different religion. 
During the conflict, however, they moved to schools in areas where the majority of 
the population practised the same religion. Since most school teachers are Christian, 
schools in Muslim areas experienced a shortage of teachers during those years; 
secondary school teachers were obliged to teach subjects for which they had no 
training. However, after the conflict, many teachers felt safe enough to return to their 
old schools. In 2006, about 30% of the 83.83% of teachers who were Protestants 
were employed in schools of a different denomination (Tamagola et al., 2007: 20).5  
Religious segregation in Ambon is also visible among university students. 
The majority of Muslims study at the State Islamic Institute (Institute Agama Islam 
Negeri, IAIN), or the Islamic University of Darussalam (Unidar). Christian students 
prefer to attend the Indonesian Christian University in Maluku (Universitas Kristen 
Indonesia di Maluku, UKIM) or the Higher Education of State Protestantism (Sekolah 
Tinggi Agama Kristen Protestan Negeri, STAKPN). Only the University of Pattimura 
(Unpatti) and the State Polytechnic School (Poltek) have a relatively high proportion 
of students from both religious groups. 
By the early 1990s, the University of Pattimura, the oldest and biggest university 
in the Moluccas, was already plagued by tensions between Muslim and Protestant 
students, which frequently led to violent incidents. The selection of new students or 
the appointment of the rector or staff members often led to overt conflict between 
Christian and Muslim groups; both demanded a fair ‘religious’ balance between the 
number of staff members and students. In 2011, the student registration building, 
which had been burned down in 2000, was destroyed again following several waves 
of student demonstrations against alleged unfairness in the admission of Muslim 
students. One of our respondents said that violence also took place because 
Christian students resisted the restructuring of student organizations on campus, 
believing it benefitted Muslim organizations. Students of confessional universities, 
for example UKIM or IAIN Ambon, never actively took part in these conflicts, but 
often expressed solidarity with their ethno-religious group in demonstrations or 
rallies outside campus. 
Relations between Muslims and Christians in Ambon at all levels of society 
have remained inharmonious. Even if it is unlikely that eruptions of violence on a 
scale comparable to those of 1999-2002 will recur, conflicts between Muslims and 
Christians are inevitable. Because of large-scale spatial and social segregation, daily 
interaction between the two groups is limited. Suspicion towards each other runs 
5 The effect of the conflict was that 36 school buildings were seriously damaged, and about 
30.56 % of high school students dropped out. The majority were male students who were 
forced to look for income-generating activities to support their families (Tamagola, et al., 
2007: 20-21). By the time of our research in 2011, most of the school buildings had been 
renovated and educational activities had returned to normal. 
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high, and trivial issues can easily trigger violent clashes. During the period of data 
collection, two violent incidents between Christians and Muslims took place. The 
first was triggered by the death of a Muslim ojek driver on 10 September 2011.6 
According to the police, it was a traffic accident, but rumours soon circulated that the 
driver had been stopped, beaten, tortured and killed by Christians. After the funeral 
ceremony, violence erupted leaving three victims dead and dozens wounded. Over 
a hundred homes, mostly of Muslims, were burned to the ground. Another eruption 
of violence took place on 12 December 2011 between Muslims and Christians whose 
villages were separated by a small river some two metres wide. Inhabitants of both 
communities shouted insults and hurled rocks at each other; within minutes, crowds 
on both sides were throwing stones. However, this violent incident was isolated and 
was stopped, thanks to the intervention of government officials and peace activists, 
who in the meantime had already started to work on the prevention of further 
conflict escalation.
The biggest effort made by the government to end the conflict was the peace 
accord made between Muslim and Christian representatives from Ambon in Malino 
on 11-12 February 2002. After this agreement, the number of violent incidents soon 
declined; the city government succeeded in restoring order via law enforcement and 
the improvement of public infrastructure. The government also supported meetings 
and dialogues between Christian, Muslim and adat leaders to foster peace in the 
city.   
In order to reconcile the warring parties, peace activists and non-government 
agencies in Ambon continuously try to bridge the communication gap between 
Muslims and Christians, and to develop mutual understanding of their religious and 
socio-economic concerns. Among the peace organizations are the Peace Provocateurs, 
Moluccan Ambassadors of Peace (MAP), Coffee Badati and the Moluccan Interfaith 
Institute (Lembaga Antar Iman Maluku). The Peace Provocateurs are a group of peace 
activists using social media, such as internet or SMS, to disseminate information 
designed to reduce prejudices between Muslim and Christian groups. MAP is a non-
government organization, consisting of youths, ex-combatants and social workers, 
that trains young Christians and Muslims in kampongs and villages to speak about 
peace and to work together. Coffee Badati is a youth organization in which Muslims 
and Christians co-operate to promote solidarity and harmony by organizing musical 
performances and sporting competitions. The Moluccan Interfaith Institute is an 
organization of both Christian and Muslim religious leaders that attempts to reduce 
religious conflict by dialogue and discussion. Although these organizations have 
different activities and strategies, they share the same goal: to stimulate harmony 





between different groups, reduce tensions and prevent the escalation of violence in 
Ambon city.
The peace efforts of government and activists are favourably received, as the 
majority of people in Ambon are no longer willing to become involved in conflict. 
The violence has brought suffering from the death and injury of relatives, the loss 
of property, displacement and a lack of food supplies. They shoulder the burden of 
traumatic experiences that make their daily lives difficult enough, without the added 
problems brought about by suspicion and distrust of people and groups. Most people 
believe that violence leads to nothing. Only people who wish to take advantage of 
the conflict may provoke violence again. 
On almost all levels of society, people believe that a revival of pela can 
prevent conflict and make sustainable peace in Ambon possible. Pela is a traditional 
institutionalised bond of friendship or brotherhood between two or more Moluccan 
villages (cf. Sterkens and Hadiwitanto, 2009: 66-67). Apart from in a few villages, pela 
did not function well during the conflict, but is now being used again as a symbol of 
unification and restoration of broken relationships between villages in the peace-
building process (Bräuchler, 2009: 879). After the conflict, several villages renewed 
their pela relations to prevent new conflicts; in 2003, for example, the leader of 
the predominantly Muslim village of Tulehu invited their pela partner, the Christian 
village of Hulaliu, to renew their pact to help and protect each other. Inhabitants 
of both villages performed a ritual called ‘kindling pela’ (panas pela). During the 
conflict, Christians from Hulaliu had been afraid to pass Tulehu, because its people 
had attacked the village of Waai of which the majority of the population are Christians. 
By renewing the pela pact with Hulaliu, the people of Tulehu also made peace with 
Christian Waai. In 2006, Batu Merah and Passo also renewed their oath to help and 
protect their pela partners by ‘kindling pela’. Following the ritual, the predominantly 
Christian people of Passo provided material and labour for the renovation of the 
mosque in Batu Merah, which was damaged during the conflict. 
1.2.4.2. Yogyakarta 
The Special Region of Yogyakarta (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta or DIY) is situated in 
the southern part of central Java, between the Indian Ocean in the south and the 
Merapi volcano in the north. It is divided into one municipality and four regencies: 
the city of Yogyakarta and the regencies of Bantul, Gunung Kidul, Kulon Progo and 
Sleman. My research area consists of the city of Yogyakarta and the highly urbanized 
adjacent regencies of Bantul and Sleman. I refer to this area as ‘greater Yogyakarta’.  
Yogyakarta was founded in 1756 as a result of the Gianti Treaty, which divided 
the Mataram kingdom into two principalities: Surakarta (Solo) and Yogyakarta. Both 
principalities were given self-rule, but were overseen by the Dutch. Paku Buwono 
III, a descendent of the king of Mataram, continued to govern Surakarta, while 
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Hamengku Buwono I, his uncle, became the ruler of Yogyakarta. Originally, the areas 
were poorly defined, as the division was based on numbers of cacah, households, 
rather than geographic territories. Each principality numbered 53,100 cacah in their 
central area and around 30.000 cacah in their outlying regions.7 The present Sultan 
of Yogyakarta and Surakarta are direct descendants of these first rulers.
Figure 1.2 Map of the Special Region of Yogyakarta
Source: http://www.pip2bdiy.org/sigperkim/peta.php
In 1833, the number of inhabitants in the court city of Yogyakarta totalled 283,820. 
Between 1890 and 1905 the population grew from 785,473 to 1,100,000 (Haryono, 
7 The central area of Yogyakarta comprised Nagari Ngayogyakarto (the capital), Nagara Agung 
(the main region), and Mancanegara (the outlying region). Nagari Ngayogyakarto consisted 
of the current area of Yogyakarta Special Region and part of the current Central Java province. 
Mancanegara consisted of Surabaya, Kediri, Madiun, Rembang and Semarang. The present 
size is the result of the Constitution of 1945, which defined Yogyakarta as an autonomous 




2009:8). In 1930, the year of the first official census, the city had 1,558,844 
inhabitants: 914,939 natives, 7,158 Europeans and others of the same status, 11,710 
Chinese, and 201 other Foreign Orientals (Volkstelling 1930, 1931a: 2-3).
In the first census after Indonesian independence, in 1961, the inhabitants 
of the Special Region of Yogyakarta totalled 2,233,791. Between 1971 and 1980, 
the population increased steadily from 2,488,544 to 2,750,128, and between 2000 
and 2010 from 3,120,478 to 3,457,491 (BPS-DIY, 2011). Table 1.5 shows that the 
city has a high population density. The highest density is in the municipality or 
city of Yogyakarta, followed by the regency of Sleman and the regency of Bantul 
respectively.  




Population Area Density 
(Person/Km2)N % Km2 %
Yogyakarta 388,627 11.24 32.50 1.02 11,957. 75
Sleman 1,093,110 31.62 574.82 18.04 1,901.67
Bantul 911,503 26.36 506.85 15.91 1,798.37
Kulon Progo 388,869 11.25 586.27 18.40 663.29
Gunung Kidul 675,382 19.53 1,485.36 46.63 454.69
Total 3,457,491 100.00 3,185.80 100.00  1,085.28
Source: BPS-DIY, 2011.
Although Javanese make up the majority of the population, several minority groups 
have lived in Yogyakarta ever since its foundation. In the past, both the indigenous 
population and foreign minorities lived in their own quarters. The original names for 
those quarters still exist, and reflect the ethnic groups who lived there. For instance, 
Kranggan and Ketandan were the Chinese quarters; Kotabaru (New Town) and Loji 
Kecil were Dutch; Kampung Bugisan was originally the quarter for Buginese, who 
mainly worked as soldiers at the royal court; Kampung Menduran was Madurese and 
Sayidan the quarter for Arabs. Although quite a number of Chinese still live in the old 
Chinese quarter and most of its buildings are owned by Chinese, the majority moved 
to new areas after independence.  
Nowadays, a greater variety of ethnicities live in the city than in the past, 
although with the exception of Javanese, most groups are quite small. The census 
of 2010 gives a good picture of the ethnic composition of the population (see Table 
1.6). Of the small ethnic groups, Sundanese, Malay and Chinese are larger in number 
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than Batak, Madurese, Dayak and groups from East Nusa Tenggara. Students from 
beyond greater Yogyakarta are not represented in the table, as they are registered 
as temporary migrants.









East Nusa Tenggara 4,238 0.12
Dayak 3,790 0.11
South Sumatera 3,629 0.11
Others 36,986 1.07
Total 3,450,844 100.00
Source: BPS, 2011: 34
In 2010, 90.27% of the population was Muslim. Muslims have always made up the 
majority of the city’s population; the majority are nominal Muslims (abangan), but 
the number of pious Muslims (santri) has increased dramatically in recent decades. 
At the end of the 19th century, Christianity was introduced, first Protestantism and 
later Catholicism. Besides spreading their faith and building churches, Catholic and 
Protestant missionaries also built hospitals and schools. Over the years, the number 
of Catholics surpassed the number of Protestants. Buddhist and Hindus are also 














Source: BPS DIY, 2011:181
During colonial times, most native migrants came from the Javanese countryside. 
After Yogyakarta had become the capital of the Indonesian Republic (1946-1949), 
more migrants from elsewhere in the archipelago came to the city. Between 2001 
and 2010, about 278,233 people migrated to greater Yogyakarta (Handiyatmo, 
2010: 13). The highest number of migrants is registered in the regency of Sleman 
(48.15%) followed by the regency of Bantul (22.58 %) and the municipality of 
Yogyakarta (20.74%). The higher migration to Sleman and Bantul is the result of the 
housing development policy of Yogyakarta, which has stimulated settlement in these 
regencies instead of in the city since the 1990s. Although most migrants live in Bantul 
and Sleman, a great number of them commute daily to the city to work.
Political situation
In Yogyakarta, the dominant political orientation is secular and nationalist, as the 
parliamentary election results for the special region of Yogyakarta since 1955 make 
clear. In the recent election of 2009, 29 political parties competed for seats: 21 secular 
and nationalist, 6 Muslim and 2 Christian. The secular and nationalist parties, including 
the Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, 
PDI-P), the Functional Groups Party (Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar), the Democratic 
Party (Partai Demokrat), the People’s Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, 
Hanura), and the Great Indonesian Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, 
Gerindra) received 61% of the votes. The Islamic parties, the Prosperous Justice 
Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat 
Nasional, PAN), the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), the 
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Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang), the United Development Party (Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), the National Sun Party (Partai Matahari Bangsa), and 
the Ulema National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama, PKNU) 
won the rest. The two Christian parties, the Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Damai 
Sejahtera, PDS) and the Love the Nation Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Kasih 
Bangsa, PDKB), did not win any seats in the regional parliament, having obtained 
0.8% of the votes, far below the electoral threshold of 15%.
Many Christians voted for secular parties, such as the PDI-P, which won 21% 
of the vote. The Democratic Party, which in the same year won the elections for the 
national parliament with 21% votes, became the second biggest party in the special 
region of Yogyakarta with 14% of the vote. The National Mandate Party (PAN), 
affiliated to Muslim organization Muhammadiyah, won only 12%, despite having its 
headquarters and the greatest number of organization members in the city.8 It is 
clear that the nationalist and secular groups, supported by abangan and Christians, 
dominate politics in Yogyakarta.     
 The process of law reform, which has given rise to national political controversies, 
has also had an influence on the region. For example, Muslim groups on the one 
hand and secular and nationalist groups on the other became polarized both in and 
outside parliament during the preparation of an anti-pornography bill (Rencana 
Undang-Undang Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi, RUU APP). The bill was promoted by 
the Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) in 1999, and was 
discussed by the national parliament in 2006. The debates attracted a great deal of 
attention; it was an emotive issue that effectively divided those for and against the 
bill. In March, April and May 2006 a series of mass demonstrations by both pro and 
contra took place in several big cities, including Yogyakarta. The supporters of the 
bill included, besides MUI, Islamic organizations such as the Indonesian Association 
of Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI), the Islamic 
Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), the Indonesian Mujahedeen Council, 
(Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI), HTI (Hisbut Tahrir Indonesia) and the Social 
Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sosial, PKS ). During their demonstrations, they would 
shout slogans such as, “Against pornography and porn-actions, save the nation’s 
morality!”, “Only under shariah can Indonesia be civilized!”, or “Porn culture is 
the child of secularism!” Opposition to these groups came from artists, activists, 
academics and traditional leaders who joined groups such as Unity in Diversity 
Alliance (Aliansi Bineka Tunggal Ika) and Yogyakarta for Diversity Alliance (Yogyakarta 
untuk Keberagaman). With messages such as “RUU APP is not the solution to moral 
degradation,” “Indonesia is not America, but also not Arabia: reject pornography, 





concern about the content of the anti-pornography bill, with its enforcement of a 
single narrow-minded moral perspective. Although the religious polarization brought 
tensions, it did not lead to violent conflict.
In 2011, a national decentralization reform bill stipulated that all governors 
and vice-governors in Indonesia should be elected, which created great political 
consternation in the Special Region of Yogyakarta (Undang-Undang Keistimewaan 
Yogyakarta); the bill opposed the hereditary position of the sultan and paku alam 
as the region’s leaders, which had been granted to them by the first president of 
Indonesia in 1945 (Poerwokoesoemo, 1984:15). As some Muslim leaders favoured 
direct election, Christians and Kejawen (adherents of an amalgamous Javanese 
religious tradition) suspected that their plan was to replace the sultan with an elected 
Muslim governor, and to create “Yogyakarta Serambi Madinah’’ (Yogyakarta, veranda 
of Medina).9 The tensions declined when the national government eventually decided 
to maintain the hereditary position of sultan and paku alam as governor and vice-
governor of Yogyakarta.10 The fact that the position of these traditional leaders was 
preserved demonstrates the strong influence of secular and nationalist groups on 
the local politics of the region. For them, the sultan is not only a symbol of Javanese 
Islamic syncretism; even though he is a santri himself, but also a leader who stands 
above the religious groups. 
Economic situation
The urban area of greater Yogyakarta has a diverse economy. Its major economic 
sectors encompass trade, services (hotels, restaurants), transportation, small 
industry, street vending, tourism and education. The last two sectors in particular 
heavily influence the informal sector (souvenir industry, boarding houses). The 
unemployment level is relatively low. In August 2011, it stood at about 4.8% of 
the labour population (BPS-DIY, 2012: 93). Nonetheless, a relatively high number 
of people live below the poverty line. The average income per capita in greater 
Yogyakarta is less than IDR 300,000 monthly, while the regional minimum wage is 
IDR 745,694 per month. In the city of Yogyakarta, the poor number about 9.75% of 
the population, and 10.70% and 16.09% in Sleman and Bantul respectively (BPS-DIY, 
2012: 235).  
Although Javanese can be found in almost every economic sector, some ethnic 
groups dominate certain jobs, such as the Madurese who are active as barbers and 
sate-sellers, and Minangkabau who run Padang restaurants or sell souvenirs as 
vendors along Malioboro Street. Chinese dominate the wholesale business and the 
9 The idea of Yogyakarta as veranda of Medina is inspired by the position of Aceh as veranda 
of Mecca.      
10 Declaration of Law No. 13/ 2012, Article 18c.
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trade in gold, building materials, electronic goods and food. The production and sale 
of handicraft products such as batik, silver and leather are the domain of Javanese 
businessmen. Some of them also own guest houses and hotels. Generally speaking, 
Chinese businessmen with or without Indonesian citizenship are economically better 
off than those from other ethnic groups, even though they still suffer discrimination: 
they are, for example, not allowed to live in kampong (quarters) within the walls of 
the kraton. They still have no rights to own land, although they can own houses and 
other buildings in the city (Susanto, 2008: 137-138). Chinese also cannot become civil 
servants or military officers and have to pay higher bribes to officials than others.   
Due to the increasing Islamization which started at the end of the New Order 
and continued during the reformation, the production and distribution of products 
specifically for Muslims become more and more lucrative. Nowadays, Yogyakarta 
has special shops for Muslim dresses, veils and perfume; it has shariah banks, halal 
restaurants, Muslim publishing houses, and businessmen who trade in Islamic real 
estate. The veil has become popular since the New Order allowed students to wear it 
at school and university. Muslim dress (busana Muslim) and fashionable accessories 
with an Islamic label are produced by fashion designers and displayed in stores in 
the local malls. Cheaper varieties are sold in the traditional markets. Muslim dress is 
also the uniform in Islamic schools and offices. Some real estate contractors promote 
housing in complexes with an exclusively Islamic atmosphere (“Mosque nearby”, 
“Muslim neighbours”). Darrusalam, Yogya Terrace and Baitus Sakinah are examples 
of these real estate projects that are aimed exclusively at Muslim buyers. Religious 
labels for consumer products have made the boundaries between Muslims and 
other religious denominations more visible in everyday life. 
Socio-cultural situation
As a student city, Yogyakarta has a large number of students from a wide range 
of ethnic groups and religious backgrounds, who come from all over Indonesia. In 
2011, the number of students at universities in greater Yogyakarta totalled 239,128, 
consisting of 103,627 students at the 10 state universities and 135,501 students at 
about 115 private universities (including institutions of higher education, such as 
academies and polytechnics). About 60% of university students are not registered 
as inhabitants of Yogyakarta because they are temporary residents in the city (BPS 
DIY, 2012: 159).   
Most students from other regions live in boarding houses situated around 
their campus. Most of these boarding houses accept students irrespective of their 
religion, but some accommodate Muslim students only. A small number of students 
from other regions stay in dormitories provided by their regional governments. There 
are about 30 of these dormitories in Yogyakarta, such as Meurapi Duwa for Aceh 




Sumatra students, Wisma Bundo Kanduang for female students of West-Sumatera, 
and Kamasan for West Papua students, to name just a few. The relationship between 
students and permanent residents in a kampong is generally speaking good, although 
now and then conflicts arise between students and local inhabitants or between 
students of different ethnic groups. For instance, a Makassar dormitory was attacked 
by Ambonese students after a street fight on January 15, 2008; the incident was 
triggered by a quarrel between a Makassarese and an Ambonese in a discotheque. 
This led several friends of the Makassarese to beat the Ambonese, who was alone. 
In retaliation and to express their solidarity, other Ambonese attacked the dormitory 
of the Makassarese the next day.11 
Ethnic discrimination clearly exists among the inhabitants of Yogyakarta. Many 
landlords refuse Papua and Batak tenants in their boarding houses because members 
of these ethnic groups are seen as trouble-makers. People complain that they drink 
alcohol or use drugs, or throw parties that disturb the neighbourhood. According 
to the chairman of the Catholic Union of University Students of the Republic of 
Indonesia (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia, PMKRI), a number of 
students from Papua were seriously beaten in the city12 – without any investigation 
by the police.  
Increasingly, religious identity has become a factor in the selection of room 
boarders. A growing number of Muslim house owners accept only Muslim tenants, 
the main reason being their desire to maintain Muslim purity. The presence of non-
halal food and the smell of pork, or habits that are strictly forbidden for Muslims, 
such as exposing certain parts of the body or drinking liquor are seen as threats to 
the Muslim lifestyle. Boarders have to prove their religion by showing their identity 
cards (Kartu Tanda Penduduk). Some boarding houses are even limited to female 
students wearing veils.
1.3. Historical sketch of Ambon and Yogyakarta
1.3.1. History of Ambon
Ethno-religious conflict has occurred in Ambon since pre-colonial times, particularly 
since the introduction of Islam. During colonial times, such conflict erupted as a result 
of political intervention and economic control over the production and distribution 
of spices. The conversion of part of the native population to Christianity also led to 
increasing tensions between Muslims and Christians. Religious segregation started 
with the implementation of colonial policies that favoured the education of Christian 
11 Interview with the chairman of the Indonesian Nationalist Students’ Movement (Gerakan 
Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, GMNI) on 27 October, 2011.
12 Interview with the chairman of the Catholic Union of University Students of the Republic of 
Indonesia (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia,PMKRI) on 8 July 2011.
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inhabitants, and the recruitment of clerks and soldiers from among them. After 
independence, Christian Ambonese felt threatened at the prospect of living in a 
state that was dominated by Muslims. The tensions between Christians and Muslims 
became heightened at the end of the New Order, when Muslim migrants took over 
important positions in government and business from Christians. Between 1999 and 
2002, a bloody conflict erupted between the two main religious groups in Ambon 
and neighbouring islands. 
Political changes
When the Portuguese arrived in the Moluccas in 1512, the islands were under the 
influence of one of four competing sultanates in the area: Ternate, Tidore, Jailolo and 
Bacan.13Ambon, still a relatively isolated island, fell within the sphere of the sultanate 
of Ternate. Politically, Ambon was divided into villages (negeri) with a high degree of 
autonomy, whose inhabitants claimed to descend from the same ancestors. A negeri 
consisted of a varying number of extended families (lumatau) that belonged to the 
same lineage or uku (Leirissa, et al, 1982:1). 
As elsewhere in the Moluccas, there were two types of inter-village alliance: 
ulisiwa and ulilima. Ulisiwa were associations of nine villages, and ulilima associations 
of five. These two types of associations regarded each other as enemies. On Ambon 
island, ulisiwa were situated in Leitimor and the south coast of Hitu, while ulilima 
were only found on the north coast of Hitu (Cooley, 1962: 6-18; Bartels, 1977: 26-27). 
The function of these associations was for the villages to help each other in times of 
disaster, calamity or war. Competition, tension and violent conflict between ulisiwa 
and ulilima were frequent. The population of the ulilima had already embraced Islam 
and was more influenced by the sultanate of Ternate than the inhabitants of ulisiwa, 
who remained ‘heathen’ until the Portuguese engaged them in the spice trade in 
the 1530s. From then on, many ulisiwa villagers converted to Catholicism to obtain 
protection from the Portuguese against their Muslim enemies, who were backed by 
the Sultan of Ternate (van Fraassen, 1983:5).   
The Portuguese built a fortress in Ternate in 1522, and initially bought cloves 
from the local traders for the European market. The traders used Ambon only as 
a source of water and other refreshments on the shipping route between Banda, 
where they bought nutmeg and mace, and the northern Moluccas, where they 
bought cloves. Once the Portuguese had intervened in local politics and converted 
Moluccans to Catholicism, they were expelled from Ternate in 1576 by troops that 
13 The Sultan of Ternate claimed sovereignty in the central part of the Moluccas, the eastern 
part of Sulawesi and the southern part of Mindanao, while Tidore was powerful in south-
east Halmahera, the Raja Ampat islands, the northern coast of Bird Head’s peninsula and the 




included Muslim Javanese and Arab descendants from Makassar. Moluccans who 
had converted to Catholicism also became targets for attack; if caught, they were 
forced to accept Islam to prove their loyalty to the sultan and were killed if they 
refused (Andaya, 1993: 134; Heuken SJ, 2008: 19, 34; Bartels, 2010: 226). 
A much smaller Portuguese settlement on Ambon Island had in fact been built 
earlier, in 1513, on the north coast of Hitu at the mouth of a small river between the 
villages of Hitulama and Mamala. However, a conflict with the Hituese forced them to 
move from the north to the south coast of Hitu in 1524. As Portuguese influence was 
growing in Ambon, in 1558 the Sultan of Ternate appointed a governor for Hitu who 
was stationed with a military unit on the opposite coast in Hoamoal (Ceram), and 
whose main task was to support the Muslims in their fight against the Portuguese. 
After a series of attacks, the Portuguese decided to move again: in 1572 they built 
a new fortification on Leitimor peninsula, which eventually developed into the city 
of Ambon. In 1605, they were forced to leave the island (van Fraassen, 1983:2-13; 
Widjojo, 2007:11-12). In 1599 the Dutch had landed on Ambon and forged an alliance 
with Ternate; the allies had then succeeded in defeating the Portuguese together. 
Between 1605 and 1796, Ambon and the Lease islands were ruled by the Dutch 
East India Company (VOC). Since their arrival in the archipelago, the Dutch tried to 
control the spice trade completely, first by introducing a trade monopoly (1619) and 
later by introducing a production monopoly (1627). From 1610 until the founding of 
Batavia in 1619, Ambon was the headquarters of the VOC in the Indian archipelago. 
During the monopoly system, the economy of Ambon flourished from the spice 
trade. All spices from the Moluccas were collected there before being shipped to 
Europe via Batavia. When the centre moved to Batavia, Ambon became the capital 
of the Afdeeling (sub-region) of the same name.  
In 1656, the Dutch began to resettle the population of Ambon, Lease, Hoamoal, 
East Ceram and Buru to prevent resistance to Dutch rule (Bräuchler, 2010: 68). This 
resettlement policy obliged all inhabitants to move to easily controllable villages along 
the coast and all village heads to come under Dutch supervision (Cooley, 1966: 139; 
Bartels, 1977:27). In these new settings, Muslims started to live in Muslim villages 
(former ulilima) and Christians in Christian villages (former ulisiwa) (Chauvel, 1990: 
4-5). In the course of the resettlement, the population of villages formerly belonging 
to ulisiwa gradually converted from Catholicism to Protestantism. However, there 
was no special support from the VOC for the growth of Protestantism at this stage; 
pastoral activities were initiated by local churches without its support. There were 
no differences between Muslims and Christians with regard to taxes and compulsory 
services levied by the company (van Fraassen, 1983:18-19). 
Short occupations of the islands by the British between 1796-1803 and 1810-
1817 did not change the political system significantly, although they did increase the 
supply of consumer goods and openly supported the missionary and educational 
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activities of the Protestant church. When the Dutch returned to the islands in 1817, a 
rebellion broke out in Saparua, Ceram and Ambon to demand that they improve their 
treatment of the population (Noldus, 1984:177-180). This rebellion led the Dutch 
government to reconsider the monopoly system, in particular the compulsory labour 
service for clove production that was introduced in 1627, and the hongi expeditions 
to combat illegal production and smuggling. In 1864, when the price of the spice 
dropped drastically on the world market, the monopoly system was completely 
abolished and the colonial government decided to put an end to compulsory labour 
services. 
In the first half of the 19th century, many Ambonese tried to raise their 
status from villager to burger (burgher) to free themselves from compulsory clove 
production labour, and to earn a wage or salary instead. This status of burger could 
be obtained via a pass (vrijbrief) from the government. In order to obtain one, 
Ambonese had to prove that they had a paid job in the city. Burgher status could 
also be achieved through education in the Ambonesche Burgerschool (ABS), which 
was founded by the government to recruit civil servants. Most of the Ambonese 
burghers worked as civil servants, carpenters and boatmen, peddlers (penjaja) and 
manual labourers (tenaga serabutan) (Leirissa, 1995: 3-10). From the beginning, 
more Christians than Muslims became burghers, because Muslims were reluctant 
to work for the predominantly Christian colonial government. As a result, Muslims 
held marginal positions until the burgher status disappeared in the second decade 
of the 20th century (Leirissa, 2000:626). It was only during the Japanese occupation 
of World War II and after Indonesian independence that an increasing number of 
Muslims succeeded in getting better, or even prominent, positions in society (van 
Fraassen, 1983: 32- 38; Bartels, 2010: 226).     
When the Dutch left the islands after the recognition of Indonesian independence 
in 1949, the Moluccans who had benefitted from their loyalty to the colonial state 
felt threatened by the new Republic of Indonesia. To stem the tide, members of the 
Moluccan elite, mainly Protestants with just a few Muslims, proclaimed the South 
Moluccan Republic (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS). Those who feared losing their 
former privileged position in the new Republic of Indonesia sympathised with the 
RMS. The violent action of the Indonesian army in 1950 against the RMS led to the 
immediate departure of 4,000 Moluccan soldiers of the Koninklijk Nederlandsch-
Indische Leger (KNIL, Dutch Indies Army) and their relatives to the Netherlands 
(Chauvel, 1990: 396; Bartels, 1977:11-12). 
Religion continued to influence politics in Ambon after independence; political 
parties often used religion as a banner under which to gain supporters. In 1955, 
when the first national election was held, the Indonesian Christian Party (Partai 
Kristen Indonesia, Parkindo) obtained 49.36% of the votes, the Islamic Masyumi 




(van Klinken, 2008:12). In 1971, Parkindo won 35%, Golkar 32%, the Indonesian 
Muslim Party (Partai Muslim Indonesia, Parmusi) 10% and Nahdatul Ulama Party 
(Partai Nahdatul Ulama, PNU) 5%. When the New Order reduced the number of 
political parties to three in 1973, Golkar, which they controlled completely, always 
won a majority.14 In 1977 and 1997, Golkar obtained 62.11% and 74.51% of the vote 
respectively. 
In the new political landscape that followed reformation, the religious groups 
demanded greater powers and representation in local government (Klinken, 2005:101 
and 2007: 158), something that the secular parties were prepared to consider. In the 
general elections of 1999 and 2004, the Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle (Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) obtained the highest number of votes in 
Ambon: 54.29% and 26.67% respectively. Even though it was a secular party with a 
nationalist ideology, PDI-P attracted many Christian voters on the island. In 2009, it 
lost many followers, but still won a majority in the city. As mentioned earlier, a great 
number of voters moved to other secular parties including the Democratic Party, 
Golkar, Hanura and Gerindra. This swing to secular and national parties was the 
result of their proposed accommodation of Christians and Muslims who demanded 
a ‘religious balance’ in government policies and in the recruitment of civil servants 
in the region. 
Far-reaching political change at village level took place in Ambon in the 1980s, 
when a new type of village administration was introduced throughout Indonesia. 
New village government (desa) replaced the traditional negeri and reduced the 
authority of the adat leaders.15 Village administration came under direct control of 
the government, which also appointed the leaders. More often than not, traditional 
adat leaders were passed over for these positions. Due to the increasing migrant 
population, new villages were also founded (Lee, 1997: 68-72). Just like traditional 
villages, they were formed along religious lines, because migrants chose to settle in 
places in which their own religion was dominant. In these new migrant villages adat 
did not, of course, play the role it performed in traditional villages. 
When the New Order government came to an end, the division between 
Christians and Muslims was more sharply defined than ever before. After the 
downfall of the Soeharto regime, the prolonged tensions between Muslims and 
14 In 1973, the New Order government reduced the existing political landscape to three 
parties. The Islamic-oriented political parties merged into the United Development Party 
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), and the nationalist, Protestant and Catholic parties 
fused into the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI). The third, 
new, political party was the Functional Group (Golongan Karya, Golkar) that became the 
electoral vehicle of the military-backed New Order government.




Christians led to an outbreak of violence in Ambon and neighbouring islands such 
as Haruku, Saparua, Buru, Kei and Ternate (Sterkens and Hadiwitanto, 2009: 59-61). 
According to Varshney et al. (2010: 40-43) the conflict killed between 4,000 and 
5,000 people in the Moluccas, 1,097 on Ambon alone. In the city, 12,249 houses 
were damaged and 106 government offices, and 636 stores and kiosks were looted 
and burnt down (Manuputty and Watimanela, 2004: 128); 170,590 inhabitants were 
internally displaced, and public services were paralyzed (Yanuarti, 2003: 40-41). This 
violent conflict increased prejudice, suspicion and distrust between Muslims and 
Christians and widened religious segregation yet further. 
Economic changes
The population of the Moluccas originally made a living as peasants, hunters and 
gatherers (Stark and Latinis, 1996: 52-53). Trade become more important from the 
11th century onwards, when Asian traders became interested in cloves, nutmeg and 
mace for culinary and pharmacological use (Knaap, 1986:66-67). As stated above, 
these traders dominated the spice trade until around 1500, when it was gradually 
taken over by Westerners, first the Portuguese and then the Dutch (van Fraassen, 
1983:1-8). From the beginning, the VOC tried to monopolize the trade in cloves 
in Hitu and Hoamoal, and in nutmeg and mace in Banda, by excluding Javanese, 
Makassarese and Malaccan traders who had exchanged these commodities for rice, 
cloths and other goods. The trade monopoly was enforced by obliging the population 
to sell spices only to the company or to traders operating with VOC’s permission. In 
1609, the company made a monopolizing contract for the purchase of cloves with 
the chiefs of Hitu and Hoamoal, and in 1621 forced the population of Banda to sell 
their nutmegs and mace to VOC exclusively. Peasants, traders and villagers who 
undermined the monopoly were punished.  
Besides a trade monopoly, the company introduced a production monopoly 
in 1627. This only allowed clove cultivation in Ambon and forbade production in 
Hoamoal. The villagers of Ambon were obliged to cultivate according to VOC’s 
directions and to sell for a fixed price to the company. Village leaders were assigned 
to control the system (van Fraassen, 1983:18). By way of compensation, these leaders 
received 4% of clove sales from their villages (Braithwaite and Dunn, 2010: 148). 
The production monopoly benefitted the economic position of Christian Ambonese 
more than that of Muslims, as clove production mainly increased, over time, in areas 
where Christians lived. As Christians were also given more privileged positions in 
both the production and distribution spheres, the social and economic gap between 
Muslims and Christians eventually became larger.  
To prevent people from selling spices beyond the monopoly system, the VOC also 
forced Ambonese villages to hand over rowers for boats used to control smuggling. 




also destroyed (Bartels, 1977: 124). Between 1641 and 1646, the Hituese violently 
resisted the interference of the company, as did the populations of Hoamoal, 
East Ceram and Buru between 1651 and 1656. After the Dutch had succeeded in 
repressing these insurrections, they took complete control of the clove trade and 
production on the islands (Knaap, 1992: 21; Widjojo, 2007:26).         
In 1864, the Dutch put an end to the spice monopoly because the international 
market for spices decreased sharply, and Java had already become a centre for much 
more valuable export commodities such as sugar, tobacco and indigo (Chandler et 
al., 2005:130). The declining value of spice as a commodity caused Ambonese to 
abandon their clove plantations. To survive, many farmers tried to cultivate new 
introduced crops, such as coconut, cacao and tobacco, but they did not succeed 
(Chauvel, 1990: 14). 8,060 Ambonese who had previously worked as village clove 
farmers became manual labourers or administrators in the colonial government 
(Leirissa, 1995: 4). As described in the previous section, they obtained burger status 
once they had found salaried positions. 
Ambonese Christians were favoured over Muslims as employees of the colonial 
government. This was partly because the Dutch trusted Christians more, but also 
because the Christian education was better, thus making Christians better equipped 
work for the government; some had studied in schools established by Protestant 
missionaries. Conversely, Muslims were neither interested in working for the colonial 
government, nor had they studied at Christian schools because of their concerns 
about being converted to Protestantism. Protestants and, to a lesser degree, 
Catholics found privileged roles as, for example, bureaucrats, middlemen, doctors, 
nurses, teachers and soldiers across the whole colony, while Muslims mainly worked 
as petty traders, sailors and fishermen (Bertrand, 2002: 62-63). As only Protestants 
took advantage of the education system to fill bureaucratic and military positions 
in Ambon and elsewhere in the western part of the Dutch Indies, the economical 
division between Protestants and Muslims had intensified by the end of the 19th 
century (Bartels, 1977: 11).  
This economic polarization along religious lines rose to unprecedented heights 
in the first half of the 20th century and during the Old Order regime that followed 
independence. It only started to change during the New Order regime (1966-1998), 
a change that was enhanced by migration from Sulawesi and Java. The number 
of migrants, most of whom were Muslims, increased from the beginning of the 
1970s. Muslims from Buton and Makassar moved spontaneously to Ambon to 
seek employment, while many Javanese, again mainly Muslims, came as members 
of transmigration projects initiated by the government. This influx of Muslim 
migrants gradually took over local trade, transportation and established commercial 
enterprises, thus becoming a threat to, and reducing the economic opportunities 
for Ambonese Christians. As a result, the Ambonese saw Muslim outsiders become 
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wealthier than themselves, and dominate these areas of the economy (Goss, 
2000:19-20).
As a result of the shifting balance between the number of Muslims and Christians 
in Ambon and the interference of the central government in Jakarta, towards the 
end of the New Order Muslims began to obtain more and more of the key jobs in 
the administration, such as that of governor, vice-major, and head of department 
(Bertrand, 2002: 67-71). Although the balance is still in favour of Christians, the 
competition and tensions between Muslims and Christians was without doubt the 
main trigger for violence in the closing years of the Suharto regime (van Klinken, 
2001: 18; Sidel, 2008: 37-38).  
Educational and religious developments 
Islam was introduced to the Moluccas in the middle of the 15th century by Javanese, 
Malay and Arab merchants and wayfarers. It began to spread when the kings of 
Ternate, Tidore, Bacan and Jailolo in the northern part had embraced the new faith 
shortly afterwards (van Fraassen, 1883: 2; Chauvel, 1990: 1-23, Bräuchler, 2010a: 67). 
Before the arrival of Islam, the Ambonese practised an indigenous animistic belief 
system called Nunusaku. According to this belief, the ancestors of the Ambonese 
originally came from a sacred mountain of the same name. After a quarrel among 
them, their descendants were divided into Patasiwa and Patalima. Despite this 
division, they promised to respect one another and maintain harmony and solidarity 
(Bartels, 1977: 313-320). As already stated, Islam mainly developed in ulilima villages 
in Northern Leihitu (Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008:32). During the presence of 
the Portuguese on the island, the population of Leihitu remained predominantly 
Muslim, while Catholicism took root among of the rest of population. In 1605, when 
the Dutch replaced the Portuguese, there were about 16,000 baptized Catholics 
in Ambon and Lease (Chauvel, 1990:18), the majority of whom were gradually 
converted to Protestantism during the VOC period. 
Besides proselytizing the indigenous population, Christian missionaries 
established health services and schools in several locations on the island. By 1618, a 
teacher-training school had already been founded in Ambon. Schoolteachers became 
the main agents for the spread of Protestantism, as they acted as local religious 
leaders at the same time. Between 1633 and 1860, the number of primary schools 
in the Afdeeling Ambon increased from 32 with 1,200 pupils to 54 with 5,190 pupils. 
Schools became the main forum for introducing Protestantism (Chauvel, 1990:25). 
The VOC was replaced by the colonial state at the beginning of the 19th century. 
In 1823, the colonial government started to support educational activities initiated 
by Reformed Protestant missionaries in the Moluccas by paying the salaries of 
village teachers. Between 1817 and 1871, village teachers were made responsible 




Over that period, Muslims were reluctant to send their children to school for fear 
that they would be converted to Christianity. Even when the colonial government 
separated school and church in 1871, they were not willing to send their children 
to schools they associated with the colonial system. Hence, Ambonese Christians 
benefitted much more from the development of education, particularly when the 
colonial government’s demand grew for educated people to serve as teachers, 
nurses, administrators or soldiers across the whole archipelago (Chauvel, 1990: 25-
38; Steenbrink and Tapilatu, 2008: 383-400). The development of the education 
system thus widened the gap between Muslims and Christians and led to a closer 
relationship between Ambonese Christians and the Dutch over the course of the 19th 
century.
In 1821, there were 30,435 Protestants in the Moluccas, a number that had 
increased to 35,877 by 1837 (Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008: 389). In 1842, the 
Protestant Church of the Indies (Indische kerk) was founded, in order to organize 
missionary activities more systematically. It trained native teacher-preachers for the 
confessional schools; their tasks were to lead Sunday services, to lead catechesis and 
pay pastoral visits to native congregations. In 1885, the theological school (School tot 
Opleiding van Inlandse Leraren, STOVIL) was founded to educate native ministers; 
in the 1930s, there were 347 such ministers. Since 1935, the Protestant churches of 
the islands have been united under the synod of the Moluccan Protestant Church 
(Gereja Protestant Maluku, GPM). 
The rise of Protestantism gradually led to a division between Muslims and 
Protestants in the Moluccas. The Protestant church began to use Malay in its religious 
services, which led to a decline in the use of local languages in Protestant villages. 
In Muslim villages, however, the local vernacular remained the principal language. 
Given that Malay had become the lingua franca in the archipelago, it was also used 
interchangeably with Dutch as a language of education in schools. Dutch was taught 
to enable pupils to read the Bible and religious publications that were only available 
in that language. In 1665, all schools in the Moluccas began to use Malay, when the 
Dutch government in Batavia decided to no longer encourage the teaching of Dutch; 
it was not only difficult to develop as a means of communication on the islands, but 
was also too expensive to teach in schools (Groeneboer, 1994: 1-10). 
However, at the beginning of the 20th century, Dutch was adopted once more as 
the language of education, both in three Dutch native primary schools (Hollandsch-
Inlandsche Scholen, HIS) and the secondary school (Middelbaar Uitgebreid Lagere 
Onderwijs, MULO) in Ambon. In Saparua, Dutch was likewise taught at the HIS. In 
1926, the total number of pupils in Dutch language schools totalled 2,846. Most 
pupils who graduated from these schools became colonial government officers. In 
1920, the Dutch government also built schools in six Muslim villages in Ambon, but 
only one survived until 1930 (Chauvel, 1990: 28-32). Muslims were not inclined to 
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study at these modern schools, since they suspected that they would be proselytized. 
However, there were very few traditional Islamic schools (pesantren) on the islands. 
After independence, as well as the Protestant schools, Muslim and public 
schools were widely established in the villages. Public schools were located where 
there was a higher proportion of more Christian pupils, while Muslim schools were 
built in Muslim-dominated areas. Nowadays, most young people go on from primary 
education to secondary school, but only a few attend university. Both Christians 
and Muslims can pursue their studies at a state or private university in the city. The 
oldest state university is the University of Pattimura (Unpatti), which was founded 
by the government in 1962. Although Unpatti is the state university, Christians have 
outnumbered Muslims in terms of lecturers, administrative staff and students ever 
since its foundation. This has nothing to do with discriminatory policies toward 
Muslims, but is a reflection of the fact that Christians have a relatively higher level of 
education, and are thus better qualified for university positions. In the city of Ambon, 
Christian students have options other than Unppati; they can continue their studies 
at the Moluccan Christian University of Indonesia (Universitas Kristen Indonesia 
Maluku, UKIM). This is the extension of the Theological School – Protestant Church 
of the Moluccas (Sekolah Tinggi Theologia – Gereja Protestan Maluku, STT GPM) 
that was founded in 1885 by Dutch missionaries. An institute for higher Muslim 
education was built in 1980 in Ambon. It started as a branch of the State Islamic 
Institute (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN) of Sutan Alauddin in Makassar, and was 
developed into an independent institution as the State Islamic Academy of Ambon 
(Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Ambon) in 1997. It became the State Islamic Institute 
of Ambon in 2007. 
Education in Ambon is affected by the religious tension between Muslims and 
Christians. During the violent conflict of 1999-2002, school and university buildings 
were the target of raids by both conflicting groups. Unpatti and UKIM were burnt 
down by Muslim groups, since both universities were seen as symbols of Christianity. 
Conversely, the Islamic schools were destroyed by Christians. Many students joined 
religious paramilitary groups such as Christ Soldiers (Laskar Kristus) for Christians, 
and Jihadist Soldiers (Laskar Jihad), Islamic Defender Front (Front Pembela Islam, 
FPI), or Muslim Fighters (Mujahidin) (Mulyadi, 2003: 76). The conflict also deeply 
divided schools and other educational centres along religious lines. Even after the 
conflict had ended, pupils and students were still inclined to continue their studies 
in religiously homogenous schools and universities; state universities alone were 




1.3.2. History of Yogyakarta
Political changes
The founding of Yogyakarta and Surakarta by the Gianti Treaty in 1755 was meant 
to end recurrent conflicts between claimants to the throne. However, the authority 
of the sunan was challenged by one of the Surakarta princes, Raden Mas Said. 
After fresh negotiations, he became ruler of a sub-region of Surakarta with 4,000 
cacah (households) and was given the title of Mangkunegoro in 1757. A similar 
development took place in Yogyakarta during the British interregnum (1811-1816). A 
brother of Sultan Hamengku Buwono II, who had supported the British, received his 
own princely domain amounting to 4,000 cacah, and received the title paku alam. 
Both principalities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta were now divided into two regions, 
although for both pairs of areas, the terms Surakarta and Yogyakarta continued to 
be used. The rulers were allowed to demand taxes and labour from the households; 
a high proportion of the rights were given out in apanage to relatives of the sultan 
(sentono dalem) and court officials (abdi dalem) as remuneration for their services 
(Ricklefs, 1974:71-72).16  
Between 1825 and 1830, Yogyakarta became the centre for the Java War which 
was started by a discontented relative of the sultan, Prince Diponegoro, against the 
Dutch. During the war, which spread through the whole of Central and Eastern Java, 
about 200,000 people died, including half the population of Yogyakarta. After the end 
of the war, the Dutch became more involved in the administration of the principalities 
than before and drastically restricted the authority of the sultan. Although they 
continued to govern indirectly, their influence on political and economic affairs 
gradually increased; for example, they allowed the apanage holders in Yogyakarta to 
lease their land rights to private plantations for the cultivation of crops such as indigo 
and tobacco (Soemardjan, 1962: 33; Shiraishi, 1990: 8-18).17 Later, the government 
even permitted private plantations in the principalities to regulate the rights and 
obligations of the population in the apanage lands they were renting (Houben, 
1989:193). Over time, the sultan also lost the right to appoint higher officials without 
the consent of the colonial administration. In fact, each time a new sultan came to 
the throne, he had to give up some of his traditional privileges. This interference by 
the Dutch in political and economic affairs gradually reduced the sultan’s power; by 
16 The apanage system is discussed further in the section on the economy.  
17 In Yogyakarta, the apanage land leased to the Dutch plantations increased from 54,600 hect-
ares in 1870 to 65,000 hectares in 1890. It comprised 46 indigo, 8 sugarcane and 6 tobacco 
plantations. The plantations expanded further after the construction of the railway connect-
ing Yogyakarta with Batavia, Bandung, Semarang, Surakarta and Surabaya and the operation 




the end of the 19th century, his court had been turned into little more than a centre 
for civilization, literature and the performing arts (Ricklefs, 2001:163-166). 
In August 1945, the sultan and paku alam took the side of the Indonesian 
Republic. In 1946, Yogyakarta became the capital of the newly proclaimed Indonesian 
Republic. Shortly after the recognition of independence by the Dutch, it was granted 
the status of Special Region (Daerah Istimewa); the sultan and paku alam were 
appointed as its governor and vice governor. 
Since 1955, a regional parliament has been elected every five years (alongside 
the national elections). In 1955, the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis 
Indonesia, PKI) won 26% of the vote, the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai 
Nasional Indonesia, PNI) 25%, and the Islamic parties Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama 
19% and 15% respectively. During the New Order, when all political parties were 
condensed down to just three, Golkar, the party backed by the government, always 
won by a majority. In 1999, the first election after political reformation, nationalist 
and secular parties won significantly more votes than religious ones. Together 
PDI-P, the Democratic Party and Golkar Party won more than 60% of the vote in 
Yogyakarta. The religious parties attracted fewer votes, even though the National 
Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), which is affiliated to Muhammadiyah, 
has its headquarters in Yogyakarta. It did, however, win proportionally more votes in 
Yogyakarta than elsewhere.
The present Sultan Hamengku Bowono X has played an important role in 
diffusing ethnic and religious tensions in the region. For instance, when ethno-
religious violence in the form of rioting against the Chinese spread to several areas 
of Indonesia in 1997, the sultan persuaded the people to stay calm. At the time, he 
also led large peaceful demonstrations in the front yard of his palace, demanding 
state reformation and the abdication of President Soeharto. The sultan, who entered 
politics as leader of the local Golkar Party, is held in great respect by the majority of 
inhabitants of Yogyakarta.   
Besides political parties, several religious organizations are active in politics; 
sometimes, as in the case of PAN, in co-operation with parties. When a new law 
regarding the national education system was drafted in parliament in 2001, most 
Islamic organizations in Yogyakarta mobilized their supporters to demonstrate 
in favour of it, while Christian minority groups lobbied against it on the basis of a 
particular article. The controversy pertained to article 12, sub 1a of the proposed 
bill, which stated that: “Every student in an educational unit is entitled to receive 
religious education in accordance with his/her belief imparted by an educator who 
has the same religion.” Muslim supporters of the bill saw this as the reflection of 
fair democratic process, and a good way to prevent religious proselytization and 
conversion of their children in Protestant and Catholic schools. Christians, for their 




and Catholic schools. Neither of these reactions dealt with the substantial issues of 
education, but the article lent itself to the reinforcement of prejudice and hostility 
within the public arena. Although there were no physical clashes, this sharp division on 
the basis of religion shaped tensions in society. However, when the bill was legalized 
in 2003, the protesters apparently accepted the outcome, as demonstrations and 
other forms of protest stopped. 
Economic changes
As was common in Javanese kingdoms, the royal court of Yogyakarta depended on 
taxes and labour from the population, levied through an apanage system (lungguh). 
Apanage is an entitlement to returns from the land or other resources in areas 
assigned by the sultan and paku alam to relatives (sentana dalem) and high officials 
(abdi dalem) (Moertono, 1981: 117). The apanage holders demanded taxes in kind 
and labour from the peasant population, both for themselves and for the sultan or 
paku alam. They commonly extracted 2/5 of the rice harvest twice a year, of which 
1/5 was left to the village head as the collector. Of their own share, the apanage 
holders had to pay 2/5 to the sultan (Margana, 2007:97). The size of apanage varied 
according to the administrative rank of the court officials and their closeness to the 
sultan. The number of households living in the apanage area depended on the status 
of the holders. Panewu (thousand) was the term for apanage holders who had the 
right to demand taxes from a thousand households, panatus (hundred) for those 
with a hundred households and paneket (fifty) for those who had fifty (Moertono, 
1981:88-89).
In the course of the 19th century, the apanage system underwent several changes 
due to colonial economic policies. For example, when private plantation systems 
started to lease land from apanage holders, 2/5 of the land was rotated annually 
(geblagan) for plantation crops, 2/5 for rice and other food crops for the peasant 
themselves, while 1/5 of the land was reserved for the village head as remuneration 
for his services. The peasants were forced to provide labour for the cultivation and 
harvesting of the plantation crops; if unable to do so, they had to pay compensation 
in cash (Shiraishi, 1990:13-16). The detoriating situation of the peasants under the 
apanage and the plantation system became of growing concern for the government. 
In 1918, the system was completely replaced by a ‘modern’ system of land-tenure, 
village organization and taxation (White, 2004: 4).
After this reform, the peasants in Yogyakarta received exclusive rights to exploit 
the land, i.e. they were given individual and hereditary rights to use the land, but 
not to own it. All peasants’ rights were registered in the village (Soemardjan, 1962: 
34). This policy not only brought about more economic security for peasant families, 
but also affected the economic development of the principality. Besides subsistence 
crops, peasants started to cultivate commercial crops that were bought up by Chinese 
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traders who travelled the countryside during the harvest season. Some commercial 
crops was sold by the Chinese to European firms in the city before being exporting 
abroad. When peasants were in need of cash they would ask for an advance from 
the Chinese traders (which of course had a negative effect on the prices paid), go to 
money lenders who were mostly Chinese, or take their valuables as collateral to a 
Chinese pawnshop (Kwartanada, 1997: 88-99). 
On the outskirts of the city, the home craft industries – such as handloom cloth 
weaving, or working in silver, batik or leather – also grew as the result of the increased 
buying power of the wider population. In 1930, there were 163,397 artisans, or about 
10.6% of the population, in the region of Yogyakarta (Haryono, 2009a: 7). Most of 
the craft industry was the preserve of the Javanese. Only in the batik industry did 
Javanese entrepreneurs compete with the Chinese, who produced the commodity 
on a large scale;18 but they were highly dependent on Chinese wholesalers, who 
controlled and supplied them with the materials for batik such as cotton cloth, wax 
and dye. This dependency on Chinese traders led to serious tensions between the 
groups on a regular basis. In 1934, the Javanese batik entrepreneurs of Yogyakarta 
founded the Association of Native Batik Entrepreneurs (Persatuan Pengusaha Batik 
Bumi Putera, PPBBP) to fight the monopoly of the Chinese traders (Subagya, 2001: 
40).19
The expansion of private plantations and commercial activities in the early 20th 
century attracted a great number of migrants to the region. The number of Dutch and 
other Europeans increased from 2,097 in 1890 to 7,317 in 1930. They dominated the 
high ranks in government and on plantations. A new wave of migrants from China also 
arrived in Yogyakarta at the end of 19th century, adding to the Chinese community 
that had existed since the founding of the city. In 1890, there were fewer than 3,000 
Chinese in the city but in 1930, this number had increased to 12,640. During the 
colonial period, the Chinese generated their income as traders, entrepreneurs, tax 
collectors, money lenders, and owners of opium houses until the economic crisis of 
the 1930s. Japanese, Indians and Arabs also settled in Yogyakarta city as traders and 
shopkeepers (Purwanto, 2003: 29). 
18 After the invention of the stamp (cap) technique in the 1850s, batik production grew in 
importance, as this made it possible to produce batik for the commercial market on a large 
scale. In 1920, 17 of 225 batik workshops in Yogyakarta were owned by the Chinese (Subagya, 
2001: 4-9 & 39). 
19 In Surakarta, an association of Javanese batik entrepreneurs, Rekso Rumekso, had been 
already been founded in 1909. It was established not only to fight against the monopoly on 
materials, but also to protect its members against criminals stealing and robbing their batik 
factories. Members of this association were often involved in street fighting with members 
of the Chinese association Kong Sing. To attract more members, the name of the association 




In the 1930s, Yogyakarta felt the impact of the worldwide economic depression. 
Not only did prices of agricultural commodities such as sugar cane, tobacco or 
cotton fall to their lowest levels ever, but many craft industries went bankrupt, 
as consumers had no money to purchase their products (White, 2004: 6-11). The 
economic depression worsened during the Japanese occupation (1942-1945), and 
the independence war (1945-1949). In both periods, famine spread throughout the 
region. During the war, many fled for safety to areas outside the region, and most of 
the population lived in poverty.
During the Old Order, economic growth was very limited; most sectors stagnated. 
Between 1958 and 1965, the economy even deteriorated, as economic measures 
taken did not succeed. Efforts to diminish the influence of foreign trade with import 
substitution failed, as did policies to develop an indigenous entrepreneurial class. 
In this period, according to Dahles (2001: 62) “Yogyakarta was lacking economic 
and human capital to restore old and establish new enterprises to provide jobs in 
the region. The few existing private enterprises were mostly family businesses that 
offered no employment to non-family members.” 
During the New Order, economic development gradually increased as a result of 
the successive Repelita Plans (5 in total) which focused on agricultural and industrial 
growth. Thanks to the green revolution, agricultural returns increased drastically, 
as did industrialization at a later stage due to the introduction of new technologies 
and the influx of foreign capital. In Yogyakarta, the local government gave priority 
to the tourism and educational sectors (Dahles, 2001: 64). Local entrepreneurs took 
advantage of the opportunities to start all kinds of small-scale business activities. 
Inhabitants of Yogyakarta now own dormitories, boarding houses, restaurants, food 
stalls, stationery and copy shops. The souvenir craft industry also flourishes in the 
city and its surrounding areas. The city now has an impressive number of star-rated 
hotels, shopping malls, boutiques and supermarkets.
Economic development during the Old and New Order did not occur without 
tensions arising between ethnic groups. During the Old Order, the governments 
discriminated against Chinese entrepreneurs by complicating the issuing of export 
and import licenses, and by forcing them to accept indigenous partners to run their 
businesses. The discriminatory policies continued during the New Order, although 
in Yogyakarta a large number of Chinese profited from the ongoing economic 
development. They played major roles in the production and distribution of dairy 
foods and cigarettes as well as money-lending to small businessmen (Susanto, 2008: 
36).  
With a few exceptions, such as the post-war years and the time of the Asian 
crises in 1997, Yogyakarta has experienced continuous economic growth in the post-
colonial period. Economic development benefitted more or less all ethnic groups, not 
least the Chinese. Paradoxically, this did not lead to more anti-Chinese resentment. 
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Between 1996–1998, when anti-Chinese riots took place in many cities in Java, the 
Chinese in Yogyakarta experienced few problems. They made considerable efforts 
to prevent conflict escalation in the city by giving material and financial support 
to groups hit by the economic and political crisis. After reformation in 1998, the 
Chinese expanded their businesses to include printing, publication, real estate 
and entertainment (karaoke nightclubs, bars) as well as education, in the form of 
computer training and foreign language courses. Some big businesses in Yogyakarta, 
such as Matahari and Ramayana Department Store, Hypermart, Carefour, Hero 
Supermarket, Gramedia, Melia Hotel, Sheraton Hotel, Hyatt Hotel, Novotel, Syantika, 
BCA, Bank Mega, Bank Niaga are owned by tycoons from Jakarta. 
Socio-cultural changes 
In the 19th century, the Dutch colonial government legally classified the population 
into three categories. At the apex of the hierarchy were the Dutch and other 
Europeans, who occupied the most important administrative and economic positions 
in the colony. The second level consisted of Chinese and other Foreign Orientals, who 
dominated the intermediary trade. The natives, mostly peasants and labourers, sat 
at the bottom. Only a few native people worked as administrators or entrepreneurs 
(Kartodirdjo, 1991: 107-127). As an effect of this stratification, relations between 
population groups were characterized by antagonism and prejudice. There were 
occasional outbreaks of violence between the Dutch and the natives, and between 
the natives and the Chinese minorities. More often than not, these conflicts also 
had an ethnic and religious dimension. As aforementioned, the worst and bloodiest 
violence in Yogyakarta took place during the Java War. From the end of the war in 
1830 until the Japanese occupation in 1942 the violence declined, but relations 
among the ethno-religious groups were marred by a high degree by prejudice and 
hatred; for instance, Javanese peasants hated the Dutch plantation managers, who 
saw the peasants as cheap labour and often treated them badly (Shiraishi, 1990: 
17-18). The Javanese perceived the Chinese as opportunistic and untrustworthy. 
The Dutch, in turn, saw the Javanese as backward and lazy and the Chinese as 
parasites (Kwartanada, 1997: 136-137). When the Japanese occupied Yogyakarta, 
most of the Dutch had to leave the city. Tensions now arose between the Japanese 
and the Chinese, because the Chinese were seen as supporters of the Dutch. Some 
Chinese stores became the target of looters and robbers. Relationships between the 
Javanese, who had helped to drive out the Dutch, and the Japanese were initially 
good (Kwartanada, 1997: 200-205). 
After Indonesian independence in 1945, ethno-religious conflict arose between 
fundamentalist Muslims who favoured an Islamic state, and nationalists who 
supported a secular state (Van Bruinessen, 1996: 23-24). A widespread rebellion of 




took place in West and Central Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi between 1948-
1962, but did not erupt in Yogyakarta because the majority of the population in 
the principality were loyal to nationalist figures such as Soekarno-Hatta and Sultan 
Hamengku Buwono IX. Only after the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis 
Indonesia, PKI) was accused of masterminding the abortive coup d’état attempt in 
1965 did ethno-religious conflict take place in the city. A large number of communist 
sympathizers in Yogyakarta were put under military detention without trial. Some 
of them were executed on the outskirts of the city, and others were exiled to Nusa 
Kambangan or Buru (Sumarwan, 2007: 55-197). Muslim and Catholic groups backed 
by the military clashed with the organizations affiliated with the PKI, such as the 
Indonesian Peasant Organization (Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI), People’s Youth 
(Pemuda Rakyat, PR) and the Student Movement of Liberation (Consentrasi Gerakan 
Mahasiswa Indonesia, CGMI) (Harnoko, Fakkih and Darban, 1996: 45-54).
During the New Order, the government suppressed conflicts based on ethnicity, 
religion and race (Suku, Agama dan Ras, SARA). Incitement to such conflicts was 
considered subversive and attracted severe punishment. During the first decades 
of his regime, President Soeharto was also very critical of Muslim politicians who 
were keen to combine religion and politics and were thus a danger to the neutral 
Pancasila state philosophy. In 1990, when Soeharto’s grip on power was slipping, 
he began to accommodate Islamic leaders both in and outside government. For 
example, he sponsored the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim, ICMI) in order to obtain more support. 
Since then, Islamic leaders have become deeply involved in government policies, 
and a great number of Muslims have taken over strategic positions in the military 
and the bureaucracy (Van Bruinessen, 2004: 31-34). In Yogyakarta, Muslims began 
to intensify their religious activities on campus through the Campus Preaching 
Institute (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK), and Muslim student organizations such 
as the Jamaah Shalahuddin)20 at the University of Gadjah Mada, and Jamaah Al 
Mujahidin21 at the State University of Yogyakarta (Turmudi and Sihbudi, 2005: 116-
119). In neighbourhood communities, religious activities have intensified with the 
establishment of the Mosque Youth organization (Remaja Masjid) (Kim, 2007: 90-92). 
These religious organizations run their programmes not only to deepen knowledge 
of Islam among Muslims, but to promote action in religious, societal and political 
arenas. Occasionally, they collect funds for charity, particularly for distributing aid 
to victims of disasters or conflicts. Compared to Christian organizations such as the 
20 Shalahuddin is the name of an Islamic figure from the Crusades. The organization took his 
name in recognition of how he incited Muslim forces at the time (Karim, 2006:37).
21 Al Mujahidin was originally the name of the mosque in the State University of Yogyakarta. 
Mujahidin means holy warrior.
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Youth Commission of Churches (Komisi Pemuda Gereja), or Catholic Youth (Pemuda 
Katolik), Muslim groups are much more active.   
When violent conflict erupted in Ambon and Poso during the reformation, 
Muslim and Christian organizations supported their fellow believers in the conflict 
zone by collecting donations, and recruiting volunteers and fighters. Many Muslims 
from these organizations became jihadists of the Holy War Force (Laskar Jihad) or 
the Indonesian Holy Warriors’ Force (the Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia), paramilitary 
groups with headquarters in Yogyakarta. The Holy War Force was originally founded 
in January 2000 by salafi groups, namely the Forum for Followers of the Sunna and 
the Community of the Prophet (Forum Komunikasi Ahl Sunnah wal-Jama’ah, FKAJ), 
to help Muslims in the Moluccas fight against Christians; recruitment of jihadists 
started after a huge prayer meeting (tabligh akbar) in the Kridosono Stadium in 
Yogyakarta. The Indonesian Holy Warriors’ Force was founded in August 2000 by the 
Indonesian Holy Warriors’ Assembly (Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia). This group was 
an alliance of Muslim paramilitary organizations from Solo, Yogyakarta, Kebumen, 
Purwokerto, Tasikmalaya and Makassar; it aimed to establish the Islamic State of 
Indonesia by rejecting all ideologies that are opposed to Islam, and by conducting 
jihad for the dignity of Islam. Many members of the group had joined the jihad in 
Afghanistan and the Southern Philippines (Hasan, 2005: 3-9). 
The religious tension between Muslims and Christians that started to increase 
in the 1990s raised concern among academics, progressive religious leaders, students 
and NGO activists in Yogyakarta, while the government paid skant attention to it. In 
1991, the Institute for Interfaith Dialogue (Institut Dialog Antariman di Indonesia, 
DIAN/Interfidei) was founded to generate mutual understanding among different 
religious groups and to prevent conflicts. When violence broke out in different 
regions of Indonesia in 1996, DIAN/Interfidei established the Brotherhood in Faith 
Forum (Forum Persaudaraan Umat Beriman, FPUB) in Yogyakarta. The Forum aims 
to share knowledge of religion and to generate tolerance by respecting difference. 
Its members consist of religious leaders such as kyai (Islamic teacher), priests, 
monks and followers from religious communities in Yogyakarta. In the regular 
meetings (which are usually held in a mosque, church, Buddhist vihara or Hindu 
pura in turn), each religious group presents information about their religion and 
their religious activities. Among the student population, a group called Tikar Pandan 
promotes student solidarity across ethnic and religious lines. Their activities are 
mainly designed to unify students by fostering understanding of other religions and 
reducing the prejudice that arises from ignorance. The Tikar Pandan was founded 
by Tim Relawan Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta Volunteer Team) in response to the inter-
religious tension in the city.
Besides this dialogue about religion within various organizations, tensions 




neighbourhood communities. The slametan (also known as kenduri) is a communal 
meal held on important occasions such as births, marriages, circumcisions and death. 
Slametan are a means whereby social solidarity are reinforced, and shared social 
and cultural values significant to the group are emphasized (Geertz, 1973: 110). To 
some extent, slametan also take place during national or local festivities, such as 
the commemoration of Independence Day or the start or finishing of the building 
of a house. The host invites relatives, neighbours and acquaintances to his or her 
house to participate in a meal that has been blessed by an Islamic religious leader 
in the village. Before the meal prayer, this leader generally explains the intentions of 
the host in holding the ritual; he asks all those present to forgive each other, and to 
maintain peace and harmony. Neighbours have to attend unless they do not share 
a sense of solidarity and religious tolerance, which now happens more and more 
regularly. Although not designed specifically to resolve ethno-religious tensions, 
slametan do contribute to the diffusion of conflict in a neighbourhood (Kim, 2007: 
127-131). 
Religious developments
When the principality of Yogyakarta was founded in 1755, the vast majority of 
the region’s population were Muslims. Most were abangan, nominal Muslims, 
who claimed Islam as their religion, but seldom or never prayed five times a day 
(sholat) or read the Koran. Only a small section of the population were santri, pious 
Muslims. Among the pious Muslims, court religious officials (abdi dalem putihan), 
religious teachers, guardians of holy sites and students at Islamic boarding schools 
(pesantren) were most prominent (Ricklefs, 2007: 30-104). At the kraton (palace) 
of the principality there was even an Islamic court that favoured an Islam that was 
different from the folk variant, but also heavily influenced by the Hindu and Buddhist 
traditions (Nakamura, 1993: 4).
In the early 20th century, the spread of Islam in Yogyakarta was furthered by two 
Muslim organizations: Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Muhammadiyah, 
founded in 1912 by a local religious official, K. H. Ahmad Dahlan, attempted to purify 
Islam of pre-Islamic influences (Nakamura, 1993: 45-50). In order to increase religious 
preaching and social services, Muhammadiyah built hospitals, orphanages and 
modern schools (Ricklefs, 2001: 215-216). In Yogyakarta, many of its members come 
from urban quarters such as Kauman, Nitikan, Jogokaryan, and trading villages, such 
as Kotagede. NU, which was founded in 1926 in Jombang, advocated the traditional 
abangan worldview and has a great influence in the countryside. In Yogyakarta, the 
centre of the NU tradition is found in the Islamic boarding schools of Besi, Ploso 
Kuning, Mlangi, and Krapyak. The students of these pesantren are mostly from East 
and Central Java.  
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Christianity started to grow in Yogyakarta in the second half of the 19th century, 
when European missionaries were allowed by the Dutch authorities to proselytize 
among its inhabitants. Before this, the Dutch government had restricted the work 
of missionaries to avoid conflict with the principality’s Islamic rulers. The Protestant 
missionaries’ activities started earlier than those of the Catholics. Among the 
first missionaries was Sadrach Surapranata from Purworejo, whose followers in 
Yogyakarta date back to 1870. In 1891, the sultan of Yogyakarta gave permission to the 
Nederlandsche Gereformeerde Zendings Vereeniging (NGZV), the Dutch Reformed 
Mission Organization, to build a church and to establish the first hospital, along with 
a training school for indigenous evangelists (Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008: 671-
677). Having given permission for Protestant missionaries to work in Yogyakarta, the 
government refused Catholic missionaries to do the same. However, Catholics began 
to spread their faith in Muntilan, where in 1908 Jesuit fathers founded Xaverius 
College. The first indigenous Catholics in Yogyakarta originally came from this college 
(Ricklefs, 2007:114-122).  
In 1920, the restriction on spreading Catholicism in Yogyakarta was lifted 
and in 1922 the first Catholic Church was built. In 1932, the city had four parish 
churches, a hospital, 6 elementary schools and 2 high schools led by various Catholic 
congregations such as Jesuits, Sisters of Carolus Borromeus, Heythuizen and Brothers 
of the Immaculate Conception (Steenbrink, 2007:390-391). In the 1930s, there were 
more Catholics (4,342) than Protestants (3,148) in the city of Yogyakarta (Haryono, 
2009b:7; Sumartana, 1991; 105). Both Protestants and Catholics rose in number after 
the 1965 massacre, when people had to choose one of the five officially recognized 
religions (Subanar, 2001:241-242). In 1974, there were about 21.766 Protestants 
(1.39%) and 59,576 Catholics (3.80%) in greater Yogyakarta (BPS, 1975: 97). In 1980, 
Catholics in greater Yogyakarta totalled 75,087, distributed over 19 parish churches 
(Subanar, 2001:342-344).
 The rapid growth of Christianity in Yogyakarta concerned some Muslim leaders. 
They were particularly suspicious that Christianization took place in Christian schools 
attended by Muslim children, since these schools did not offer Islamic education 
as a subject. In order to counteract this, they established the Islamic Community 
Forum (Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah, FUI) in 1997, the main aim of which was to 
reduce the number of Muslims studying in Christian schools. In 2001, the FUI posted 
anti-apostasy banners on Christian schools in the main streets of Yogyakarta, and 
distributed a list of Christian schools that Muslim parents should avoid sending their 
children to. This activity gained the support for the Council of Indonesian Ulama 
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), which released a decree (fatwa) stating that 
“Muslims are strictly forbidden to study in Christian schools.” (Subkhan, 2007:110-




education law that compelled Christian schools to provide Islamic education for their 
Muslim pupils.       
After reformation, religious organizations on campus began to recruit members 
and run religious activities more actively. Although these organizations have no 
formal ties with the universities, they nevertheless play an important role in 
campus life. Particularly noteworthy are the Islamic Student Association (Himpunan 
Mahasiswa Islam, HMI), the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (Pergerakan 
Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, PMII), the Muhammadiyah Student Association (Ikatan 
Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah, IMM), the United Action of Indonesian Muslim 
Students, (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI), the Catholic Union 
of University Students of the Republic of Indonesia (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Katolik 
Republik Indonesia, PMKRI), the Indonesian Christian Students’ Movement (Gerakan 
Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia, GMKI), and so on. Members of these organizations are 
not only encouraged to pray and to read their particular holy scriptures, but are also 
trained to become future society leaders. Student activists often approach political 
parties to support their programmes; and to some extent, political parties use these 
student organizations as a recruitment ground – many political figures in Indonesia 
are former student activists from religious organizations. 
In Yogyakarta, Islamic fundamentalist groups have found a large following 
among students. Ahllu Sunnah wal Jamaah and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia were 
founded in the city in 2000; Hizbut Tahrir, which was established in Bandung, also 
gained many members in Yogyakarta (Turmudi & Sihbudi, 2005: 121-130). These 
groups have connections with Jama’ah Tabligh, Darul Arqam, Ihwanul Muslimin 
and various salafist groups that were established in Palestine, Pakistan, Malaysia, 
Egypt and various countries of the Middle East (Wahid, 2009: 212). Since the 1980s 
fundamentalist Christian groups, neo-Pentecostal and charismatic in nature, have 
also emerged, although their following is smaller. Essential to these denominations 
is the concept of being “born again”, in which individuals are spiritually reborn and 
leave their “sinful past” behind (Koning, 2011: 31). Among the Pentecostal and 
charismatic churches in Yogyakarta are Aletheia, El Shaddai, Camp David, the Seventh 
Day Adventist Church and the Indonesian Bethel Church (GBI), Jehovah Witnesses 
in Indonesia, Mawar Saron and Bethany. This fundamentalist form of Christianity 
has found adherents among urban, professional and middle-class Chinese (Koning 
& Dahles, 2009:6-16).  
The increasing diversity of ethno-religious groups in Yogyakarta occasionally 
brings about conflict and tension in the city. For instance, in 2007 members of the 
Muslim FUI protested against a healing rally held by Pentecostal and charismatic 
churches. Called “Jogja Festival 2007,” the rally was led by a Canadian pastor, and 
both Christians and Muslims were invited. It was condemned by the FUI, which 
suspected that it would encourage Muslims to apostasize. A few days beforehand, FUI 
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asked the regional government for it to be banned and for the organizers to cancel it, 
threatening trouble if their wishes were ignored. Meanwhile, FUI members took down 
posters in the main streets. When the regional government withdrew permission for 
the event, a clash between Muslim groups and the Christian Pentecostal church was 
averted (Subkhan, 2007:115-118). Many other ethno-religious conflicts have taken 
place in the city, but have never escalated into full-scale violence.
1.4. Research questions
After the above outline of the research setting, we now introduce the main research 
questions of this empirical study. These consist of descriptive and explanatory 
questions. The descriptive questions seek to ascertain the presence of ethno-religious 
identification and support for intergroup violence as the main variables of this 
study, while the explanatory questions explore relations between the independent, 
dependent and intermediary variables. 
1.4.1. Descriptive questions 
This study aims to scrutinize the relationship between ethno-religious identification 
and support for intergroup violence. In order to explain the relationship, we seek 
to investigate whether ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup 
violence are present and observable among Muslims and Christians in Yogyakarta 
and Ambon. Hence, the set of descriptive questions at individual level can be 
formulated as follows:
 To what extent is ethno-religious identification present among Christians and 
Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta? 
 To what extent is support for intergroup violence present among Christians and 
Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta? 
 In what ways is ethno-religious identification among Christians and Muslims 
observable in their daily lives? 
 In what ways is support for intergroup violence among Christians and Muslims 
observable in their daily lives?
1.4.2. Explanatory questions at individual level
One of the theoretical foundations of this study is social identity theory. The main 
proposition of this theory is that in-group identification gives rise to prejudice, 
hostility and discriminatory behaviours towards out-groups (Tajfel, 1970, Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979). Based on this theoretical assumption, we are interested in examining 
the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup 
violence in the Indonesian setting. To do so, we set up the research question 




identification among Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta and support 
for intergroup violence?
Studies of intergroup relations show the important influence of social position 
on the relationship between social identification and exclusionary attitudes. 
In European countries, studies have found that people with a socio-economic 
position similar to that of ethnic minorities compete fiercely for scarce resources. 
Such people hold weak or very weak socio-economic positions and in general are 
poorly educated (Scheepers et al., 2002a; Coenders, et al., 2003). Further evidence 
for individual determinants of ethnic exclusionism show that people of a lower 
educational level, including manual workers and some sectors of the self-employed, 
avoid all social contact with immigrants (Coenders et al., 2007: 233). In this study, 
we include social characteristics such as gender, parents’ religion, parents’ level of 
education, social class or household income, parents’ occupational status and the 
subject’s occupational status. The research question is: (6) To what extent is there a 
relationship between ethno-religious identification among Christians and Muslims 
in Ambon and Yogyakarta and support for intergroup violence, considering other 
individual-level determinants (such as gender, educational attainment, social class 
of individuals and their parents)?
This study also examines determinant variables in the relationship between 
ethno-religious identification and support for violence. Previous studies have found 
evidence that the relationship can be explained by these variables. Scheepers and his 
colleagues (2002a; 2003; 2009) demonstrated that an increasing level of perceived 
threat intensifies exclusionary tendencies. Phinney (1990) and Duckit (2006) affirmed 
the salience of ethnic identity as a determinant variable for ethnic identification. 
Allport (1954) Pettigrew (1998), (Coenders, 2001), Tropp et al. (2006), Brown et al 
(2007), Schneider (2008), Schlueter and Scheepers (2009) and many others have 
shown that variables such as intergroup contact, perceived discrimination, trust, 
nationalistic attitudes all affect the relationship between social identification and 
exclusionary attitudes. Hence, we propose the following research question: (7) To 
what extent can we explain the relationship between ethno-religious identification 
among Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta and support for intergroup 
violence given particular intermediate determinants (such as perceived group 
threat, intergroup contact, perceived discrimination, individual memory of violence 
or nationalistic attitudes)? 
In order to find (some) preliminary answers to these research questions, a 
number of theories from the field of intergroup tensions will be presented in the 
next chapter, from which preliminary hypotheses can be derived indicating relevant 






This chapter presents the theories and hypotheses that form the basis for this study. 
First, we discuss the main theories referred to, which are realistic group conflict 
theory, social identity theory and ethnic competition theory. Next, we review other 
relevant theories in order to derive a set of hypotheses. To apply the theories to this 
study, we subsequently draw a conceptual model. In the last section, we set out 
hypotheses.
2.1. Theories on support for ethno-religious violence
This study builds mainly on a combination of realistic conflict theory, social identity 
theory and ethnic competition theory. Taking realistic conflict theory as our base, we 
look at support for ethno-religious violence as a form of latent conflict arising from 
competition for scarce resources and values that shape status and group differentials. 
Social identity theory helps us to understand ethno-religious identification as the 
formation of social identity in relation to the psychological processes of individuals, 
along with societal factors. Ethnic group conflict theory explains support for ethno-
religious violence as a dimension of exclusionism. This study also adopts several 
theories, complementary to the above, to examine the individual factors that 
explain support for intergroup violence. These theories pertain to include salience 
of identity, intergroup contact, memory of violence, perceived discrimination, 
religiosity, nationalist attitudes, and intergroup (dis-)trust, and will be proposed as 
complementary to our main theories. Overall, these insights will be presented in 
an overarching theoretical model, containing many insights previously developed in 
predominantly Western countries, to be eventually tested in Indonesia.
2.1.1. Realistic conflict theory
The premise of realistic conflict theory is that conflict of interest between social 
groups arises from competition over scarce resources, such as material goods, power, 
status and values. It assumes that intergroup conflicts are rational – that different 
groups have incompatible goals and compete with each other for resources; hostility 
towards an out-group is thus a means of reaching the in-group’s goals. It contrasts 
with non-rational conflict, which involves two or more groups engaging in conflict as 
a result of the need to release tension. Rather than being psychologically driven by 
aggression or frustration, realistic conflict is rational in the sense that the individuals 
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or groups involved have ultimate objectives to achieve, and are competing for scarce 
resources (Coser 1956; Sherif, 1969; Le Vine and Campbell 1972). In addition, Coser 
(1956: 54) points out that conflicts between social groups (such as ethno-religious 
groups) do not merely relate to economic interests, but also deal with struggles over 
values or competing value systems.     
Realistic group conflict theory has been repeatedly examined in the field of 
social psychology and sociology. Sociological studies have validated the theory 
by inquiring into the contextual factors that induce conflict. Coser (1956) points 
out that the function of social conflict is to reinforce the social boundaries of 
groups and to establish group identities. Conflict strengthens social cohesion and 
solidarity within the group, and at the same time excludes members who are not 
part of the in-group. To reinforce social cohesion, group leaders often employ the 
strategy of looking for an enemy within the out-group. Blumer’s study (1958) of the 
racial prejudice of dominant groups in society supports Coser’s concept of group 
characterization. Accordingly, the sense of social or group position that emerges 
from group identification is considered to be the basis for unequal power relations. 
Racial prejudice is viewed as a defensive reaction to a felt challenge to the group 
position. The dominant group tends to claim the scarce resources over subordinate 
groups (cf. Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers, 2009).
Blalock (1967) specifically proposes that objective competition over scarce 
resources may become a cause of intergroup conflict. He classifies two kinds of 
competition: actual and perceived. While actual competition refers to contextual 
aspects of intergroup relations, perceived competition refers to a subjectively 
experienced degree of competition, i.e, perceived ethnic threat. They are interlinked 
by the way in which the perceived competition derives from the individual experience 
of looking at the actual competition. The perceived competition leads to the sense 
of threat, and so becomes the determinant for intergroup reactions. Furthermore, 
actual competition can be located within macro- or meso-level socio-economic 
conditions, such as the availability of scarce resources, the balance of work force, 
level of unemployment, discriminatory policies, population growth affected by 
migration, etc. At the micro level, actual competition can, for instance, be identified 
as competition for scarce resources between individuals from different groups who 
hold similar positions (cf. Gijsberts, Hagendoorn and Scheepers, 2004: 14). 
Perceived competition can be specified in terms of the personal evaluations of 
social conditions made by individual members of the groups, more specifically relating 
to four domains: economy (perceived future job opportunities, and evaluation of 
family living standards), politics (closure through patronage or nepotism), social 
life (access to education) and cultural life (negative perceptions of the dominant 




support conflict and/or collective violence when the competition is interpreted in 
terms of the groups involved (cf. Sterkens et al., 2009). 
2.1.2. Social identity theory
Complementary to realistic group conflict theory is social identity theory, which we 
employ to explicate individuals’ position in group formation, along with its relation 
to social identification. The micro-foundation of social identity theory has been 
validated empirically by social psychologists (Tajfel 1970; 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 
1986; Turner & Reynolds, 2010); it attempts to explain individual attitudes and 
behaviours through the psychological processes underlying the development and 
maintenance of group identity. It encompasses four interwoven concepts, namely: 
social categorization, social identity, social comparison and psychological group 
distinctiveness (cf. Gijsberts, Hagendoorn & Scheepers, 2004: 9). 
Social categorization is the cognitive selection that sets up social boundaries, 
by which people define themselves as belonging to an in-group or out-group, us or 
them. Via social categorization, members of the same group shape social identities on 
the basis of their similarities. Social psychological experiments reveal that competiti-
on between groups creates solidar ity within a specific group, which in turn increases 
hostility between groups (Sherif and Sherif 1969; 1979). A series of experiments in 
‘minimal’ conditions, in which there was no interaction between the participants, 
also supported this theory. As Tajfel (1970) emphasized, the mere perception 
of belonging to a distinct group is sufficient to produce in-group favouritism and 
discrimination against out-groups. Individuals perceived greater homogeneity among 
out-group than in-group members. This process is called the ‘depersonalization’ and 
‘dehumanization’ of out-groups (Tajfel, 1982; cf. Sterkens et al., 2009).  
Moreover, social categorization also defines the individual’s place in society. 
In the social group, membership does not only entitle an individual to the group’s 
identities, but also defines his or her own identity. Social identity is defined as part 
of an individual’s concept of self, which derives from the knowledge of membership 
of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance 
attached to membership (Tajfel, 1981: 255). In this regard, individuals also practise 
self-enhancement by emphasizing norms and stereotypes that favour the in-group. 
Although individuals might belong to several different groups, they prefer to associate 
themselves with the positive characteristics of each group and downplay its negative 
characteristics, for the sake of their self-esteem. Individuals strive for a positive self-
image via their social identification and tend to generalize negative characteristics 
of out-groups, i.e., they practise contra-identification (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, Brewer: 
2001: 17-28). 
As well as social categorization, Hecter and Okamoto (2001) added that the 
mechanism of social identification is affected by interest interdependence. Based 
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on social psychological research, they argue that the categories of in-group and out-
group do not emerge until some kind of mutual dependence creates beliefs that 
members of different categories will act for or against, in their own self-interest. 
Furthermore, they claim that in minimal group experimental settings, individuals 
will favour out-group members when they perceive that they share interests with 
them.22 Accordingly, categorization is not sufficient to produce in-group bias when 
there is no mutual dependence. 
This social identification is constructed on the basis of social comparison. The 
concept of social comparison refers to individual’s assessment of their position 
in relation to members of other groups. Through the social comparison process, 
individuals achieve an understanding of the relative status and value of their own 
group and the status and value they acquire through membership of that group. 
Individuals strive for positive group distinctiveness by maximizing the differences 
between in-groups and out-groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). They perceive in-
groups to be ‘better’ than out-groups as a result of the cognitive process of social 
identification, which enhances their in-group distinctiveness. In this sense, individuals 
selectively define positive characteristics of the entire in-group, and negative ones of 
the out-groups. 
The counterpart process of social identification, which refers to the perception 
and generalization of negative characteristics of the out-group, is labelled ‘social 
contra-identification’. The process of social identification and contra-identification 
brings about ethnocentrism, which underlies individual favouritism towards the 
groups which they (consider themselves to) belong to, and negative perceptions of 
out-groups (Gijsberts, Hagendoorn & Scheepers, 2004: 10).23 
Psychological group distinctiveness is an individual need that underlies in-group 
identification. The need to differentiate is the basis of identity for which individuals 
search as members of the in-group. Differentiation develops its own distinctive 
characteristics that go beyond the comparative characteristics of the out-groups. 
Optimal distinctive theory shows the need for differentiation to be the crucial factor 
for group identification. According to this theory, in-group identification is particularly 
affected by the extent to which satisfaction of assimilation and differentiation needs 
are balanced simultaneously (Brewer, 2001). In terms of group size, this theory 
22 The minimal group experiment is a methodology in social psychology, used to investigate 
the minimal conditions required for discrimination to occur between groups (Tajfel, 1970: 
96-102).
23 Ethnocentrism refers to a perspective in which one’s own group is seen as central, and 
all others are measured in relation to it. It manifests itself in complex attitudes, including 
positive identification with one’s own group, and xenophobia expressed in varying degrees 
towards outside groups. For further discussions of the concept, see Sumner, 1906; Adorno 




reveals that minority groups are well suited to meet differentiation needs, unlike 
majority or large groups (Hornsey & Hogg, 1999). Furthermore, in large groups, 
individuals often identify themselves in fragmented categories as a means of shaping 
their distinctiveness (Badea et al., 2010). 
2.1.3. Ethnic group conflict theory
The combination of realistic group conflict theory and social identity theory is 
formulated in what is called ethnic group conflict theory or ethnic competition theory 
(Scheepers et al., 2002a; Gijsberts, Hagendoorn and Scheepers, 2004; Schneider, 
2007; Coenders et al., 2009). This theory integrates the dispositional notions of 
social identity theory with the situational notions of realistic group conflict theory, 
and unites them in one theoretical framework. It develops realistic group conflict 
theory, which does not account for the psychological processes that are the focus 
of attention in social identity theory. Simultaneously, it reveals contextual factors 
underlying individual attitudes, derived from rational competition within the conflict. 
In this sense, competitive conditions intensify group identification in conjunction with 
factors such as group size, power and status differences, as well as specific histories 
of conflict. Both theoretical approaches are complementary to one another. 
Ethnic group conflict theory attempts to explain various phenomena – individual 
attitudes, and formation of groups in which either individual or group identities are 
drawn along specific boundaries, such as ethnic or religious. It is a multi-level theory 
that can be used to derive hypotheses regarding variations in different social contexts 
as well as at an individual level. The fundamental proposition of the theory is that 
inter-group competition, at an individual as well as a contextual level, reinforces the 
mechanisms of social identifica tion and contra-identification, the eventual outcome 
of which is refer red to as group exclusionism (Scheepers et al., 2002a; Gijsberts, 
Hagendoorn and Scheepers, 2004: 18; Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers, 2009).
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Figure 2. 1. Theoretical model of ethnic group conflict theory
Sources: Adapted from Gijsberts et al., 2004.
In this theory, actual competition is seen to develop perceptions of threat, which 
in turn intensifies the processes of social identification and contra-identification. It is 
assumed that the intergroup conflict that inevitably occurs deals with group claims 
to and possession of scarce resources, and values as well as the distribution of power, 
privileges and other means of livelihood. The challenge to in-group prerogatives by 
out-groups creates a threat to the in-group. The competition between groups induces 
social cohesion, solidarity and feelings of superiority among in-group members, and 
hostile and prejudiced attitudes towards members of out-groups. Perceived threat 
plays a mediating role between individual and contextual level determinants when 
it comes to competitive intergroup conditions and unfavourable out-group attitudes 
(Scheepers, et al., 2002a; Gijsberts, Hagendoorn and Scheepers, 2004)
In terms of its methodology, this theory suggests different levels of analysis. At 
the contextual level, competition refers to observable and measurable macro-social 
conditions. At the individual level, competition may be specified in terms of the 
observable and measurable social conditions of the individual members of groups; 
it also refers to perceived threat, which mediates the effects of social conditions on 
different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. In this sense, the intensity of actual 
competition and/or perceived threat is crucial: it may vary between different social 
categories and between various contexts that affect exclusionist and nationalist 





2.1.4. Salience of identity 
Salience of identity is defined as strong attachment by individuals to group 
identification. It refers to individuals’ awareness of their ethno-religious categorization 
and identity, and the importance that they give to ethno-religious differentiation 
(Duckit, 2006: 154). It has its roots in ethnocentrism, which comprises the existence 
of social groups and the hostility between them. However, salience of identity is 
different from ethnocentrism, in that its in-group attachment is not necessarily 
related to out-group hostility. In other words, salience of identity is a process of 
social identification by which individuals strongly associate with their group. This 
group identification can be multidimensional, given that it can embody a variety of 
attitudes towards the out-group, from hostility to acceptance.
Salience of ethno-religious identity comprises one of four dimensions to ethno-
cultural group identification, as proposed by Phinney (1990). The three others are 
attachment to the ethno-religious group; evaluation of the ethnic-religious group; 
and involvement with the group and its cultural practices, ways and customs (cf. 
Duckit, 2006: 152). The salience of identity measure consists of eight composed 
scales (see appendix 1, Table 2). Therefore, salience might intermediate the relation 
between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. 
2.1.5. Intergroup contact theory
Intergroup contact theory seemingly contradicts ethnic group conflict theory. 
While ethnic group conflict theory assumes that the increasing size of out-groups 
strongly induces perceived ethnic threat, intergroup contact theory proposes that 
such increases strongly induce intergroup contact opportunities, which in turn 
reduce exclusionist attitudes. However, the repeated validation of the intergroup 
contact theory (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006) shows its relevance in explaining ethnic 
exclusionism, such as anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe (Schneider, 2008) and anti-
Muslim attitudes in the Netherlands (Savelkoul et al., 2010). The meta-analytic test 
for intergroup contact theory also finds that it is applicable beyond racial and ethnic 
groups (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). 
Among the studies that have developed intergroup contact theory, Allport’s 
(1954) hypothesis is the most influential, by specifying the situational conditions in 
which intergroup contact tends to decrease prejudice. The fundamental assumption 
of the theory is that contact between groups can effectively reduce negative attitudes 
toward out-groups under ‘optimal’ conditions, i.e. equal group status within the 
situation, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the support for authorities, 
laws or customs. It has gained support from a diverse range of empirical studies, not 
merely laboratory experiments but also field research (Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew 
and Tropp, 2006). 
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Pettigrew (1998) refines Allport’s hypothesis by adding friendship potential as 
an essential factor for positive intergroup contact, in that it leads to less negative 
stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination. He argues that constructive contact 
relates more closely to long-term relationships than to initial acquaintanceship. 
Optimal intergroup contact requires time for cross-group friendships to develop. By 
taking into account recent findings of intergroup contact studies, he thus reveals the 
importance of four interrelated processes: learning about the out-group; changing 
behaviour; forming affective ties; and reappraising the in-group. Furthermore, 
Pettigrew proposes a longitudinal model for intergroup contact with a meso-level 
analysis, placed between the micro-level context of participants’ characteristics and 
the macro-level social setting. It distinguishes between essential and facilitating 
situational factors and emphasizes the dimension of time, with different outcomes 
predicted for different stages of intergroup contact.
The result of a longitudinal study of intergroup contact theory by Brown et 
al. (2007), conducted between two neighbouring schools, also affirms that contact 
with members of an out-group can improve intergroup attitudes, especially if those 
people are viewed as representatives of their group. This study provides evidence 
that quantity of contact with a member of the out-group is predictive of more 
favourable intergroup attitudes. When the contact is with someone perceived to be 
typical of the out-group, the effects are stronger and more beneficial than with an 
‘a typical’ individual. This conclusion serves to further validate previous longitudinal 
researches in the context of interethnic or inter-nation attitudes.24       
In her study of anti-migrant attitudes in Europe, Schneider (2008) shows that 
over time, growing familiarity with immigrants decreases perceptions of ethnic 
threat. The huge number of migrants that exists not only increases competition, but 
also increases opportunity for contact and familiarity with them. When immigration 
has featured strongly in a country’s past, people become accustomed to the presence 
of other nationalities, and can deal more easily with cultural diversity without feeling 
threatened. Schneider’s research implies that an increase in contact opportunities 
leads to a reduction in perception of out-group threat. Similar findings have been 
reported in the Netherlands (Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010).
By taking into account intergroup contact theory, this study examines the 
relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for ethno-religious 
violence on the individual level. As contact theory suggests that ‘constructive’ 
intergroup contact reduces prejudice (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Brown et al., 
2007), it can be expected that contact between ethno-religious groups tends to 
decrease negative attitudes towards out-groups and may decrease support for ethno-
24 Earlier longitudinal studies of contact and attitudes include the work of Hamilton and Bishop 




religious violence. Therefore, and vice versa, this study assumes that individuals who 
have less contact with other ethno-religious groups are more likely to support ethno-
religious violence.
2.1.6. Memory of violence
The experience and memory of past violence affects how people see present social 
relations. The memories of atrocities, attacks and injustices play a vital role in 
motivating individuals to continue the struggle and to somehow resist peacemaking. 
Individual memory constitutes part of collective memory, since individuals have a 
shared memory of the past by virtue of being members of a community. Consequently, 
they may shoulder the community burden of past violence, which hinders their 
social relationship with other groups. Collective memories play an important role in 
creating or recreating conflict, and in reactivating it when people work through their 
past experiences in the present (Cairns and Roe, 2003: 3-5).
Daniel Bar-Tal (2003: 77-93) describes how protracted ethnic conflicts of 
long duration and deadly impact lead to a culture of violence. Such cultures tend 
to have characteristics in common, including particular memories about conflict, 
rivals and enemies, patriotism, and common practices such as rituals, ceremonies 
and memorials. When a culture of violence has arisen, it can play a major role in 
perpetuating the conflict and hindering peacemaking; examples are the cultures of 
Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, or of Arab states and Israel. In this 
study, it is clearly illustrated that the impact of past violence deeply influences 
present social relationships via collective memories.
Other studies of collective memories of past violence delve into the different 
attitudes of both victims and perpetrators towards their traumatic burden. The 
survivors of past violence never forget their bitter experiences; individuals who have 
lost their families or valuable belongings suffer deeper pain as a result of traumatic 
memories than those who have not. Their experiences are often shared within their 
group in an attempt to release the burden of the past, and to seek justice for their 
loss or suffering. Both victims and perpetrators strive to create historical narratives 
within their society by commemorating past events. The experience of atrocities 
persists in collective memory. Individuals who strongly identify themselves with 
their in-group tend to recall their groups’ histories by limiting their social identity. 
They are less likely than low identifiers to recall harm or wrongdoing committed by 
members of their in-group in the past (Sahdra and Ross, 2007: 384-386). Therefore, 
we propose that those who have experienced, or have memories of, past intergroup 




Perceived discrimination refers to individual or group perceptions of being treated 
differently (especially unfairly) by other groups, because of membership of a 
certain group. Discrimination arises from the threat that increasing out-groups may 
become dominant, and gain control of scarce resources. Ethnocentrism and out-
group antagonism between over-privileged and under-privileged groups become 
strongly defined when the unequal division of scarce resources leads to social 
stratification (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Individuals of lower economic status tend to 
support discrimination more, and have more negative attitudes towards out-groups 
(Coenders and Scheepers, 1998). 
Previous studies of the perception of discrimination and ethno-cultural 
variables show results consistent with social identity theory; perceived discrimination 
occurs more where there are negative attitudes towards out-groups. Perceived 
discrimination can be transmitted by a process of socialization – learning about 
injustice and unequal distribution from ancestors can make individuals more aware 
of it. Via ethnic affirmation, which constitutes a positive sense of belonging to an 
ethnic group, it brings about negative attitudes towards out-groups (Romero and 
Roberts, 1998: 652). 
In another study, of the relationship between perceived discrimination and 
integration among the migrants of Moroccan and Turkish descent in Belgium, 
researchers found no clear support for either assimilation theory or ethnic 
competition theory (Vancluysen and Van Craen, 2010).25 This shows the difference, 
in relation to integration, between perceived personal discrimination and perceived 
discrimination towards the ethnic group. Social-cultural integration seems to be 
negatively associated with perceived discrimination towards the group, but not to 
bear relation to personal experiences of discrimination. The findings for structural 
integration are also ambiguous. Perceived discrimination is higher among people 
with high-status occupations. The relationship between integration and perceived 
discrimination is complex and depends on the specific dimensions of integration, 
local context and the characteristics of the ethnic groups being studied. 
Hence, perceived discrimination is proposed as an explanation for the relation 
between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. On 
the basis of earlier studies, it seems that the higher the level of ethno-religious 
identification, the stronger the perception of being discriminated against. This may 
therefore induce support for violence. 
25 Assimilation theory states that the greater extent to which ethnic minorities integrate into 
the country of residence, the less discrimination they perceive. It is contradictive with ethnic 
competition theory, which proposes that the greater the integration of ethnic minorities, the 





According to Stark & Glock (1968: 14), religiosity refers to a personal attachment 
to religion in at least five dimensions: belief, practice, knowledge, experiences and 
consequences. Belief refers to personal faith experience, and practice involves 
the participation in religious rituals. Doctrinal knowledge refers to the whole set 
of representations of reality supported by religious institutions, while experiences 
relates to the personal relationship with what is seen as divine reality in all its forms 
and mediations. Several measurements of religious dimensions have been tested 
cross-culturally, mainly among Christian denominations in different contexts, but 
also occasionally among Muslims (Anthony et al., 2015). In their cross-cultural study 
in eleven European countries, Scheepers et al. (2002b) provide evidence for the 
relationship between different dimensions of religiosity and exclusionary attitudes, 
and more specifically prejudice. In this study, we measure several indicators of 
religious identification: religious self-definition, participation in religious practices 
(praying, attending religious services and reading Holy Scriptures), friends by religion, 
participation in religious ceremonies and membership of religious organizations. But 
alongside this general measurement, we will observe some additional important 
aspects of religiosity that may influence support for violence: religiocentrism, 
attitudes towards religious plurality and religious fundamentalism. 
Religiocentrism refers to the combination of positive attitudes towards the 
religious in-group and negative attitudes towards religious out-groups; it is analagous 
with the concept of ethnocentrism, in which group-belonging refers to ethnicity. 
Religiocentrism is inherent in religions in which adherents favour themselves with 
positive characteristics of the religious in-group, while dissociating themselves from 
the negative attributes of religious out-groups (Sterkens and Anthony, 2008: 63). 
Attitudes towards religious plurality refers to different interpretations of the 
truth claims of people’s own religions against a background of religious plurality. 
We have measured three different attitudes towards religious plurality: monism, 
pluralism and relativism (Anthony et al., 2005; Hadiwitanto & Sterkens 2012). Monism 
can take an inclusivistic or exclusivistic approach. Inclusive monism is an affirmation 
that there is partial truth in other religions, while maintaining that absolute truth 
is the provenance of one’s own religion, while exclusive monism affirms that one’s 
own religion is the only true religion in the world. Pluralism consists of commonality 
pluralism and differential pluralism. Commonality pluralism emphasizes the 
underlying common elements expressed by various religions in various ways. 
Differential pluralism acknowledges real differences between religions, and sees 
their particularities as sources for reciprocal enrichment and growth. Relativism 
is the attitude that different religious traditions are always equally valid, equally 
profound and equally humanitarian.
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The third aspect of religiosity is religious fundamentalism. Earlier studies have 
defined fundamentalism as a meaning system through which adherents interpret the 
world and derive motivation via the sacred text of Holy Scripture. Fundamentalists 
may be militant, especially when “they react to a perceived threat as posed by the 
larger culture to their absolute beliefs – and even then, their resistance may take 
on forms that are non violent” (Hood et al., 2005: 5). This militancy can be seen 
as an exclusionary attitude via which fundamentalists support their in-group when 
intergroup conflicts occur. The current studies define fundamentalism as “an intra-
textual disposition towards the text that a tradition holds as sacred”. Fundamentalism 
views the sacred text to hold an absolute, non-negotiable truth, which stands 
above individuals as a ground of objective reality in their understanding of life and 
experiences (Williamson et al., 2010: 722-723). 
These dimensions of religiosity mediate the relationship between ethno-
religious identification and support for violence. Moreover, we consider the ritualistic 
dimension as an important control: membership of a denomination and frequency 
of church or mosque attendance will therefore be included.
2.1.9. Nationalistic attitudes
Nationalistic attitudes are defined as favourable attitudes toward one’s own country 
and the national in-group. It has two dimensions: chauvinism and patriotism. 
Chauvinism is the view that one’s own country and people are unique and superior, 
thereby implying that other countries compare negatively. Patriotism refers to 
feelings of pride in one’s people and country. While chauvinism relates to a blind, 
uncritical attachment to the national group and country, patriotism stems from a 
more critical assessment of them (Coenders, 2001: 64; Coenders et al., 2004: 29-
32).  
The results of a cross-national study in 22 countries by Coenders et al. (2004) 
show multiple dimensions to nationalistic attitudes. Both chauvinism and patriotism 
correlate differently to individual and contextual characteristics. While chauvinism 
is positively associated with perceptions of ethnic threat, patriotism shows a 
negative correlation. Chauvinism is stronger among individuals who live in inter-
ethnic competitive socio-economic conditions, and national circumstances of rising 
inter-ethnic competition. It tends to exclude ethnic minorities. On the other hand, 
patriotism is stronger when the home country achieves high economic development. 
There are only minor differences in patriotism between individuals holding different 
socio-economic positions.
Todosijevic (2001) conducted another study of nationalist attitudes in Hungary 
and Yugoslavia. The result shows similar trends to those found by Coenders (2001), 
in that nationalistic attitudes were multidimensional. Nonetheless, the number and 




fused into a single ethnocentric nationalism, and seemed strongly related to the 
authoritarianism that was embedded in the country’s traditional values. Nationalistic 
attitudes in Hungary spanned three dimensions: national discrimination, romantic 
nationalism and national closeness. The term national discrimination is interpreted 
as support for discrimination toward out-groups or ethnocentrism, while national 
closeness refers to in-group exclusiveness (Todosijevic, 2001: 10). 
The link between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic identification has also 
become the focus of research by Bollen and Medrano (1998), in relation to Spain’s 
identity. The result of their analysis underscores the view that group identification is 
of lower importance than national attachment. The degree of national attachment is 
related to ethnic origin, economic development, economic specialization and people’s 
cognitive skill. Respondents’ ethnic origin and education have the strongest negative 
influence on national attachment. Economic specialization within a region also has a 
strong negative effect on national attachment. Furthermore, the legitimization of the 
development of regional character, enshrined in the Spanish Constitution of 1978, 
contributes to the contest between regional and Spanish identities in the Basque 
Country, Catalonia and Galicia. 
In the Balkans, religion was tied to nationalism and served to legitimize wars, 
even against different factions within the same religion (Loizides, 2000). Hence, this 
study proposes that nationalistic attitudes explain the relationship between ethno-
religious identification and support for intergroup violence. 
2.1.10. Trust and distrust
Trust refers to the mutual “faithfulness” on which all social relationships ultimately 
depend. It is even more fundamental to the constitution of group solidarity than a 
sense of moral obligation (Parsons, 1970: 142; Tropp et al., 2006: 771; Tam et al., 
2009: 46). From a sociological perspective, trust refers to how people relate one to 
another within a social system, rather than to their psychological states or individual 
traits. Trust has been studied in experimental sociology and political science, but the 
majority of quantitative research has been carried out by psychologists, who tend to 
conceptualize it as a psychological construct within individuals, and only to a lesser 
extent as an inter-subjective or systemic social reality. 
Social psychological studies of trust and acceptance in interaction between 
members of ethnic minority and majority groups find that “group members may have 
different expectations for cross-group interactions, depending on the way in which 
their group membership is introduced in the contact situation” (Tropp, et al., 2006; 
789). More specifically, respondents feel less trust in interactions with out-group 
members who explicitly refer to their group membership. The result is not limited 
to members of ethnic minority groups, which are often confronted with prejudice 
and stigma; it has been found in two different groups of respondents – among Asian, 
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Latino and white participants, and among black and white respondents (Tropp et al., 
2006: 769).  
Another study examining inter-ethnic trust in conflict-affected societies shows 
that respondents who do not express strong ethnic pride, and those with friends from 
a variety of ethnic backgrounds, are more likely to trust members of other national 
groups. Further, respondents who have personal experience of ethnic violence are 
more likely to express trust in members of other ethnic groups. Only respondents 
who doubt that the current situation is improving are less likely to trust members of 
other ethnic groups. This result is consistent with the results of a social psychology 
study that found that trust can be achieved through intergroup contact. This survey 
was conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the North Caucasus region of Russia 
(Ward et al., 2007: 1-4). Furthermore, a survey in Northern Ireland on intergroup 
trust pinpointed the positive impact of increased intergroup contact on behavioural 
tendencies towards out-groups. Direct and extended intergroup contact apparently 
enhances inter-group trust (Tam et al., 2009: 55-58). Hence, we propose that distrust 
may mediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for 
violence.
2.2. Research model
In the scheme of the conceptual model below, we propose a relationship between 
ethno-religious identification and support for ethno-religious violence at individual 
level. Ethno-religious identification is the main independent variable. It shapes group 
distinctions by strengthening in-group solidarity, while at the same time inducing 
hostility towards out-groups. 
Support for ethno-religious violence arises when exclusionary attitudes result 
from the multiple processes of ethno-religious identification. We propose to explain 
the relation between the two phenomena via intermediary variables, including: 
perceived group threat, salience of identity, intergroup contact, individual memory of 
violence, perceived discrimination, religiosity, nationalistic attitudes and intergroup 
(dis)trust. Specifically, Figure 2.2 below draws the set of relations between variables 




Figure 2.2. Research model
Perceived group threat is proposed as an intermediate variable in the 
relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for ethno-religious 
violence. It includes competition that increases ethno-religious identification. At an 
individual level, competition refers to the social conditions of individual members 
of the groups, which can be specified in terms of perceived threat to economic, 
political, social or cultural objectives. Economic objectives may relate to the closing 
down or opening up of a job market for respondents’ own or other ethno-religious 
groups; political objectives, to protect or reduce power structures and group–
related nepotism; social objectives, to preferential access to education, and cultural 
objectives, to fight repudiated behavioural and normative patterns. 
Intergroup contact mediates the relationship between ethno-religious 
identification and support for ethno-religious violence in a different direction as 
compared to perceived group threat and salience of identity. Earlier studies suggest 
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that the intensity of contact among different groups reduces prejudice and increases 
positive attitudes towards out-groups (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; 
Schneider, 2007). In this regard, it is assumed that a high level of contact between 
ethno-religious groups will reduce support for violence between members of these 
groups.  
The memory of past violence is assumed to influence individuals’ support 
for ethno-religious violence. Survivors of past violence may have bad memories 
that affect their current social relationships. The traumatic burden of individuals’ 
memories of loss from past conflicts hinders their encounters with out-groups. 
Conversely, they are more likely to share collective memories with the in-group; 
such memories reinforce solidarity among them (Cairns and Roe, 2003; Sahdra and 
Ross, 2007: 384-394). By taking into account earlier findings, this study attempts to 
search for different individual responses, mediated by their memory of violence, 
that support ethno-religious violence. It is assumed that individuals with traumatic 
memories of past violence tend to support ethno-religious violence.
Perceived discrimination refers to the internalization process of individuals or 
ethno-religious groups in relation to their marginalization and exclusion from social 
domains by dominant groups. Previous studies affirm that perceived discrimination 
is related to fear of economic competition and of a perceived threat posed by the 
out-group population (Semyonov et al., 2002; Gijsberts et al., 2004). As well as 
in economic, political and cultural arenas, religion also plays an important role in 
various forms of discrimination (Fox, 2000). In this study, perceived discrimination is 
viewed as a mediator for the relationship between ethno-religious identification and 
support for violence.
In this research, we also examine the significance of religiosity, nationalism 
and intergroup distrust as intermediary determinants in the relationship between 
ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. Religiosity could 
be a strong determinant for support for ethno-religious violence, because strong 
religiosity might increase ethno-religious identification. This assumption is similar 
to the relevance of intergroup distrust to the relationship between ethno-religious 
identification and support for ethno-religious violence. Ethno-religious identification 
decreases intergroup distrust, which in turn increases support for intergroup violence. 
The influence of nationalistic attitudes as an intermediary variable is similar to that 
of distrust. Ethno-religious identification decreases nationalistic attitudes, which in 
turn increases support for violence.     
Furthermore, social positions can be determinants that affect the relationship 
between ethno-religious identification and support for violence. Social positions 
include categories in society such as gender, church or mosque attendance, parents’ 
education, homogamy and social economic status. These are used as control variables 





This study is going to examine the following hypotheses:
1. The stronger people’s ethno-religious identification, the higher their level 
of support for intergroup violence.
2. The stronger people’s ethno-religious identification, the higher their 
level of support for intergroup violence even after controlling for other 
individual-level determinants (e.g. gender, educational attainment and 
social class of individuals and their parents).
3. The relationship between ethno-religious identification and support 
for intergroup violence can be explained by particular intermediate 
determinants:
a. perceived group threat 
b. salience of identity
c  intergroup contact









DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENTS
This chapter describes data collection procedures, the representation of the research 
sample, measurements of the variables, and the development of a topic list used 
for this study. Quantitative and qualitative approaches are applied to the data 
collection through fieldwork, while the theoretical concepts and historical analysis 
presented in the previous chapters are scrutinized via literature and archival study. 
The survey was carried out in six universities in two different cities in Indonesia. The 
two sites are Yogyakarta and Ambon. The former is a relatively calm and peaceful 
area where conflict does not often manifest itself in collective violence. However, 
Ambon experienced a series of massive violent conflicts that were destructive and 
unpredictable; the ethno-religious dimension to these conflicts is very apparent, 
and the tension between Muslims and Christians manifests itself in residential 
segregation and division in other social domains. Three universities were thus 
selected in each city with the criterion that one (state university) was attended by 
heterogeneous groups, and that the two others were dominated by one (ethno-)
religious group. A qualitative approach was employed when interviewing informants, 
both respondents and non-respondents of the survey. The research instruments 
were developed from inventories of previously tested measurements. The selected 
batteries of measurements were reviewed, tested via a pilot survey, and modified to 
ensure the validity and reliability of the research. 
    
3.1. Data collection procedures
This research uses a range of quantitative and qualitative approaches. A survey 
was conducted to collect data regarding respondents’ attitudes and behaviours in 
relation to ethno-religious conflict. The respondents of the survey were university 
students, chosen because they constitute part of the middle class, yet with various 
socio-cultural backgrounds that represent the diversity of society. Moreover, 
students belong to intellectual groups that will determine the dynamics of society 
in the future. 
A qualitative approach, using a number of techniques, was employed to collect 
data from available sources. Documents and other printed materials, as well as media 
sources, were used to complement the analysis. Besides providing baseline data to 
embed within the research question, secondary data sources enriched the details 
of history and information related to the study focus. The study used topic lists for 
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semi-structured interviews in the qualitative aspects of our empirical research. To 
ensure the validity of the research outcomes, the data is then triangulated using the 
different techniques mentioned above. 
3.2. Representation of samples
The research sample was drawn from the student population in Yogyakarta and 
Ambon. We employed a purposive random sampling technique to ensure a full 
representation of the population. This procedure was used after the selection 
of three comparable universities in both cities; a selection made with a view to 
representing the variety of religious profiles and relative group sizes of Muslims 
and Christians at university level. These universities consisted of state universities, 
Islamic universities and Christian universities. State universities were selected for 
their heterogeneity, which corresponds proportionally to religious diversity in the 
area. Student populations at Islamic and Christian universities, however, tend to be 
homogenous in terms of their respective religions. In Ambon, the three universities 
were the University of Pattimura (Unpatti), Indonesian Christian University in 
Moluccas (Universitas Kristen Indonesia di Maluku, UKIM) and the State Islamic 
Institute Ambon (IAIN Ambon). In Yogyakarta, the selected universities were the 
University of Gadjah Mada (UGM), Duta Wacana Christian University (UKDW) and 
the Islamic State University of Sunan Kalijaga (UIN Sunan Kalijaga). 
The respondents were undergraduate students in their second year or above, 
from the intake of 2010, 2009, 2008, and so on. This criterion was made because 
first-year students (the 2011 intake) who had just started university were less likely 
to have adequate experience of student life or to be involved intensely with the 
campus at the time of the survey; they might not have made enough contacts to 
be integrated in social networks, or to have developed close friends, be able to 
recognize their class- or board-mates well, or to have formed particular groups. In 
each university, we aimed for 250 survey respondents, randomly selected from the 
student lists held by the registrar or directorate of academics and administration. 
Before the actual survey was begun, a pilot project was initiated to examine the 
instruments, to make contact with the authorities of each university, and to ask for 
permission to carry out the research.   
3.2.1. Pilot survey
The pilot was conducted in the same three universities in Yogyakarta and Ambon 
respectively. It aimed to explore the appropriate research procedure, as well as to 
examine and assess the validity of the questionnaire. Sampling was undertaken by 
drawing a random selection of 50 students from each university population. The pilot 
survey was expected to give insights that would enable a more efficient and more 
effective distribution of the questionnaire, and to conduct preliminary research; it 
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also allowed time to garner the necessary permission from each campus and local 
authorities.  
In the three universities in Yogyakarta, student data is kept centrally in the 
administration office. Nonetheless, we initially found the student list of UIN Sunan 
Kalijaga to be inaccurate; because IAIN (Institute Agama Islam Negeri, State Islamic 
Institute) was in the process of becoming UIN (Universitas Islam Negeri, Islamic 
State University), data centralization was still ongoing. So, replacements were made 
because some randomly selected students had already dropped out or graduated. 
Thus, we used data that was more accurate from each faculty rather than the data 
from the central administration office. At UGM, the student list was obtained after 
about a month of bureaucratic procedures. Meanwhile, apart from at UNPATTI, 
where student data had been centralized, the registration list of two other universities 
in Ambon (IAIN and UKIM) was generated at faculty level. The sample for these 
universities was then drawn randomly after combining all faculties into one list.    
Of the three universities in Yogyakarta, it was only at UKDW that the campus 
authority formally supported the research by providing a student list, meeting room 
and invitation for students to fill out the questionnaire. At UIN, the survey was 
assisted by the student union. At UGM, the organization of the survey was helped 
by the Centre for Population and Policy Studies (CPPS), part of the university. Data 
collection in Yogyakarta was first carried out by gathering the respondents in the 
auditorium, and then contacting them in their faculty when the first effort was 
unsuccessful; getting students together to fill out questionnaires was not easy. Fewer 
than 50% of the expected 50 invited were present. In Ambon, the data collection 
technique was to visit the selected respondents directly, and ask them to fill out the 
questionnaire personally.
Respondents varied across the different universities in Yogyakarta in their 
response to the invitation to fill out the questionnaire together. At UKDW, only 23 
respondents participated; to meet the quota of 50, the rest were reached through 
their faculties. Replacements were made due to the absence of some faculty 
students for more than a week. In UIN Sunan Kalijaga, the student union assisted the 
organisation of data gathering, and was very helpful in encouraging respondents to 
attend the data gathering session; 32 respondents were present. At UGM, only 21 
students attended. The absentees were tracked down in their departments, faculties 
or boarding houses to fill in the questionnaire.
The result of the pilot survey was then assessed to examine the validity and 
reliability of the research instruments. The correlations between items/variables were 
scrutinized; if they were very low or extremely high, the items were reformulated or 
simply removed from the survey. To some extent if, according to respondents, the 
wording of questions and translations was unclear, it was either replaced or revised 
with a more straightforward or simpler one. Likewise, some directions as to how 
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to answer questions were improved to prevent misunderstandings about what the 
questions meant. Thus, the pilot helped to create better research measurements.  
3.2.2. Survey
Given what had been learnt from the pilot, the actual survey began with advance 
preparation of updated student lists from the selected universities, invitations to 
respondents from the sample lists and the organization of venues at which the 
respondents would gather to fill out the questionnaire. The overall goal was to collect 
a random sample, from each university, of students in the second or third year of 
their BA, so that generalizations could be made. Institutional permission to obtain 
the latest student lists was again required from the office of academic administration; 
this updated data was needed because many students had graduated, and some had 
dropped out. It is general policy in Indonesian universities for studies to last for a 
maximum of 7 years; students who take longer must leave the campus. At UGM 
and UIN Sunan Kalijaga, the student list was issued by the office soon after student 
registration for the new semester had ended. The data of the survey population in 
Ambon was obtained at faculty level in all three universities, i.e. UKIM, UNPATTI 
and IAIN. Due to the eruption of mass violence in the city where the campus was 
affected, the sampling frame used the data from the 2010 population obtained in 
the pilot. As explained in the previous section, the research sample was drawn from 
higher-level students and did not include the new 2011 academic year intake.  
The sample was taken by random procedure. It began with calculating the 
total population divided by 250 as the sample quota for each university. To ensure 
the randomness of the procedure, the beginning number was selected randomly 
from 1 to 10, and was then multiplied by the interval. While selecting the sample, a 
replacement was also taken from the upper number of the sample selection. Thus, 
500 respondents were obtained, consisting of 250 as the respondent sample and 
250 as the replacement sample. This procedure was applied to the populations of 
all three universities in Yogyakarta. Meanwhile in Ambon, the sample was drawn at 
faculty level, so that the total number of respondents was proportionally equivalent 
to the number of students in each faculty of the respective universities. 
Again, data collection was carried out via two procedures, as practised in the 
pilot. The first was to gather respondents in an auditorium to fill out the questionnaire 
together, and the second was to hunt down the remaining respondents and ask 
them to do it personally. The University of Gadjah Mada was targeted first, because 
the experience of the pilot indicated that it had given the lowest response to the 
survey invitation. As the capacity of the auditorium was only 125, the survey was 
held twice, with the invitation given to two groups. The first session was on 27 
September 2011 and the second on 28 September 2011, the expectation being that 
250 students would attend. Unfortunately, a total of only 52 students came. The 
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remaining respondents (198) were tracked down in their departments and faculties. 
With the permission of the chairman of the departments and the deans, we looked 
for them on campus with the assistance of the student organization. When we found 
one of them, we gave a short introduction to the survey and asked if they would be 
willing to fill out the questionnaire. If they refused, we looked for a replacement. We 
provided a ball point pen as a gift to each respondent. 
At UIN Sunan Kalijaga, a similar procedure, in which the respondents were 
asked to answer the questionnaire together in an auditorium, was also followed. 
Two auditoriums, each with a capacity for 150, were prepared on the same day; 
these were the Faculty of Islamic Philosophy and the Faculty of Islamic Teaching 
and Communication, which are situated close one to one another. However, only 
58 students attended, so we used only one room. We looked for the remaining 
192 respondents in their faculties, departments and boarding houses with the 
help of the student union, which is represented in every faculty; we provided the 
union with a short briefing about the research and information on how to fill out 
the questionnaire. It took about one and half months to reach all these remaining 
respondents. 
The lengthiest process was at UKDW, where the survey did not run as smoothly 
as it had at the pilot stage. The university authorities still supported the actual survey, 
but the number of students who turned up to fill out the questionnaire together was 
very low. The date of the gathering was set by the vice rector for 28 October 2011 
– after the mid-semester when students no longer had a hectic academic schedule. 
Four big classrooms with a capacity of 75 each were prepared in anticipation of 250 
students. However, only 46 students appeared. This may have been because the 
meeting was only announced on the blackboard of the administration office, so 
not all invited students were able to read it. Thus, we looked for the remaining 204 
respondents in their faculties and even their dormitories.
Tracking down the UKDW respondents was no easy task, simply because 
students seldom went to their faculty office other than to meet their lecturers or 
deal with administrative matters. Furthermore, most students at UKDW hesitated 
to participate in student union activities. So, when I attempted to approach them 
through the board of the student executive, the results were still unsatisfactory; the 
student union at UKDW was not really active, and its organizers found it difficult to ask 
students to join extra campus activities. Only some (69 students) were interviewed 
with the assistance of the student union. The remaining 135 were located in their 
dormitories and after class by four trained survey assistants, who were willing to wait 
day after day in the faculties of the survey respondents. In the end, 122 respondents 
were from the replacement list, because the original sample hardly met even until 
the season of the final examination came.   
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Data gathering in Ambon was even harder to manage, because of the incidents 
of mass violence between Christian and Muslim groups that occurred at the time. 
Academic activities on campus were affected; some students may have been 
involved in the riots. Campus activities were halted for several weeks, especially 
at UNPATTI and UKIM, where some of the buildings were burnt down. However, 
respondent gatherings to fill out the questionnaire together took place in some 
faculties including Agriculture, Engineering, Education and Economy; this was made 
possible with the cooperation of the respective faculties. In the other faculties and 
IAIN, as well as UKIM, the data gathering was carried out by the student union or 
research assistants; they distributed the questionnaire to respondents, who were 
personally asked to fill it out.  
The response rate to the survey is presented in the following Table 3.1., which 
indicates the correspondence between the actual and the planned sample. The 
calculation of the response rate was made by dividing the number of responses 
with the number of respondents on the sample list and their replacements. The 
outcome shows a higher response rate in Ambon than in Yogyakarta. In Ambon, it 
is in the range of 55.45% to 78.57%, so more than half of the invited respondents 
participated in the survey. By university, the highest response rate was at UNPATTI 
(65.45%), followed by IAIN (64.43%) and UKIM (59.38%). In Yogyakarta, the highest 
response rate was at UIN Sunan Kalijaga (60.83%). UGM (54.70%) was higher than 
UKDW (50.51%), but still lower than UIN Sunan Kalijaga. Compared to Ambon, the 
response rate of the three universities in Yogyakarta was more varied, and so a 
pattern is more difficult to discern. The lowest was 22.78% by the Faculty of Law at 
UGM, and the highest was 95.00% by the Faculty of Theology at UKDW. 
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Table 3. 1. Sampling frame and response rate at 6 universities in Yogyakarta and 
Ambon
UIN Sunan Kalijaga








rate N (%) 
sample/
list









1,147 10.47 35 33 94.29 13.20
Islamic 
Philosophy
862 7.87 52 42 80.77 16.80
Islamic 
Education
2,250 20.53 59 43 72.88 17.20
Islamic Law 2,057 18.77 67 37 55.22 14.80
Science and 
Technology
2,236 20.41 93 42 45.16 16.80
Social and 
Humanities
938 8.56 28 7 25.00 2.80
Total 10,957 100.00 411 250  60.83 100.00
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University of Gadjah Mada








rate N (%) 
sample/list








2,556 8.85 30 20 66.67 8.00
Cultural Science 2,137 7.40 42 34 80.95 13.60
Philosophy 230 0.80 6 5 83.33 2.00
Geography 954 3.30 12 6 50.00 2.40
Law 1,449 5.02 31 7 22.58 2.80
Psychology 858 2.97 11 8 72.73 3.20
Agriculture 1,731 5.99 39 23 58.97 9.20
Agricultural 
Technology
1,209 4.19 11 5 45.45 2.00
Forestry 1,021 3.54 16 9 56.25 3.60
Biology 824 2.85 14 8 57.14 3.20
Veterinary 
Science 708 2.45 9 4 44.44 1.60




2,842 9.84 34 22 64.71 8.80
Medicine 1,907 6.60 28 13 46.43 5.20
Pharmacy 830 2.87 9 6 66.67 2.40
Dentistry 883 3.06 19 7 36.84 2.80
Engineering 5,783 20.03 107 51 47.66 20.40
Total 28,878 100.00  457 250 54.70 100.00
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Duta Wacana Christian University 








rate N (%) 
sample/list
% of students 
in the sample
Business 629 20.78 103 60 58.25 24.00
Theology 300 9.91 60 57 95.00 22.80
Information 
Technology 
1,396 46.12 224 80 35.71 32.00
Architecture 
and Design
408 13.48 68 28 41.18 11.20
Biotechnology 121 4.00 26 18 69.23 7.20
Medicine 173 5.72 14 7 50.00 2.80
Total 3,027 100.00 495 250 50.51 100.00
State Islamic Institute Ambon








rate N (%) 
sample/list




2,467 62.81 66 32 62.12 59.60
Islamic 
Philosophy
499 12.70 98 61 61.22 16.40
Islamic Law 962 24.49 224 157 66.52 24.00
Total 3,928 100.00 388 250 64.43 100.00
Indonesian Christian University in Moluccas








rate N (%) 
sample/list
% of students 
in the sample
Theology 494 23.20 81 58  56.79 18.40
Engineering 389 18.27 101 76 55.45 22.40
Economics 651 30.58 91 37 61.54 22.40
Social Sciences 312 14.65 70 46 61.43 17.20
Public Health 
and Nursing
283 13.29 78 33 62.82 19.60












rate N (%) 
sample/list
% of students 
in the sample
Agriculture 959 6.75 24 17 70.83 6.80
Engineering 541 3.81 15 10 66.67 4.00
Law 1203 8.47 31 21 67.74 8.40
Economic 1781 12.54 49 32 65.31 12.80
Political and 
Social Science
1490 10.49 37 26 70.27 10.40
Natural 
Science 1273 8.97 28 22 78.57 8.80
Fishery 1,147 8.08 31 20 64.52 8.00
Education 5,804 40.88 167 102 61.08 40.80
Total 14,198 100.00 382 250 65.45 100,00
However, there was a trend at UGM, where the response rate of the Faculty of Social 
Science and Humanities was higher than that of the Faculty of Natural Science and 
Engineering, with the exception of Animal Science. Table 3.1 also shows the high 
response rate of Philosophy (83.33%), followed by Cultural Science, Psychology, and 
Social and Political Science. Indeed, three faculties of social science returned a low 
score. These were the Faculty of Geography, Economics and Business and Law. The 
Faculty of Natural Science tended to be low except for Animal Science, Pharmacy 
and Mathematics, and Natural Science. The Engineering Faculty, which has eight 
departments, was extremely low with participation of only 47.66%. 
This trend was rather similar at UKDW, but considerably different at UIN 
Sunan Kalijaga. In UKDW, the Faculty of Information Technology had the lowest 
percentage response rate to the questionnaire of all the faculties (35.71%), while 
the Faculty of Theology was extremely high (95.00%). At UIN, the Faculty of Dakwah 
(Communication), Ushuluddin (Religious Study) and Tarbiyah (Education) showed a 
higher response percentage than Adab (Literature), Syariah (Islamic laws), Science 
and Technology, or Social Science and Humanities.  
Given the random procedures we used, the relatively high response rates and 
the match between the distribution of students across faculties and in the samples, 
we propose that this database allows us to generalize from this sample to the general 
student populations of these universities.  




This research examines the sets of relationships between dependent, independent 
and intermediary variables presented in the conceptual scheme. The variables 
comprise support for ethno-religious violence as the dependent variable, ethno-
religious identification as the independent variable, individual categories of 
gender, parent’s education, household social status as control variables and some 
intermediate variables i.e. perceived threat, salience of identity, intergroup contact, 
individual memory of violence, perceived discrimination, religiosity, nationalistic 
attitude and intergroup distrust. The measurements were developed and improved 
using relevant variables from previous studies as a benchmark. Reliability as 
indicated by Cronbach’s alpha of inventories became the main consideration for 
testing the measurement. Modifications were made due to the local sensibilities of 
the Indonesian context. Some other measurements that we could not find in earlier 
studies were explored through meticulous discussions of the variables. 
3.3.1 Support for ethno-religious violence
Support for ethno-religious violence encompasses attitudinal and behavioural 
dimensions in which members of ethno-religious groups approve the instrumental 
use of violence in order to achieve their objectives. Support for violence can be viewed 
on two difference planes: the societal domains it inhabits, and the levels of violence 
supported (Tilly, 2003; Sterkens et al., 2009). The societal domain has economic, 
political, social, cultural and religious dimensions. Within these, the religious domain 
cannot be said to relate directly to violent motivation, but it is connected to violence 
in the sense of conflict of values, norms and convictions between religious traditions. 
Besides the societal dimension, support for violence can be assessed at different 
levels including criticism, protest or public debates, demonstrations, corporal harm 
and material harm. Public debates and demonstrations do not necessarily denote 
violence per se, but they are considered to bring about psychological hurt that can 
provoke violence. Corporal harm includes physical injuries and killings, while material 
harm refers to destroying property and the belongings of people from other ethno-
religious groups. 
We used the questionnaire of Hadiwitanto et al. (2007) in order to measure 
support for violence and to investigate religion, social trust and conflict in Ambon. 
Within it, the variable of conflict included support for intergroup violence. Its 40 
questions were equally distributed over five societal domains and four levels of 
violence; the respondents were requested to answer with the five categories of 
Likert’s scale, from “I totally disagree” to “I fully agree”. 
Based on this questionnaire, we assessed the results using factor analysis. We 
set up two religious traditions (Muslim and Christian) as the comparative categories 
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without ignoring the distinctiveness of each religion. The result of the analysis showed 
the different loadings of the scale which were then classified according to the level 
of violence, cross-cutting the domains of political economy, socio-cultural life and 
religion. Overall, the result of the classification was 22 items divided into three levels 
of support for violence, namely: public criticism (6 items), demonstrations (6 items), 
corporal and physical harm in relation to economic, political and social domains (6 
items), and corporal and physical harm in relation to cultural and religious domains 
(4 items). The following items are measurements based on the result of the factor 
analysis. Semantic adjustments to the questions were made to affirm the personal 
attitude of the respondent towards being a member of a group. For instance: “My 
religious community should openly criticize the lack of free access to all levels of 
education,” was changed to, “I would openly criticize my religious group’s lack of free 
access to education.” 
Public debate/ criticism
1. I would openly criticize my religious group’s lack of free access to 
education.
2. I would openly criticize unjust treatment of fellow believers.
3. I would openly criticize the behaviour of other religious groups that does 
not accord with the values of my religion.
4. I would openly criticize abuse of political power that threatens my religious 
group.
5. I would openly complain when there are not enough religion-based 
schools.
6. I would look for political influence through public debate.
Demonstration
1. I would support demonstrations that protest about my religious group’s 
lack of free access to education.
2. I would support demonstrations that demand that other religious groups 
respect the values of my religion.
3. I would support demonstrations that protest against abuse of political 
power that threatens my religious group.
4. I would support demonstrations that demand religion-based schools.
5. I would support demonstrations that protest when my religion is deeply 
insulted.
6. I would support demonstrations that protest about job discrimination 
against my religious group. 





1. I would accept corporal harm to others to enforce free access to all levels 
of education for my religious group.
2. I would accept the damaging of homes and public buildings to enforce 
free access to all levels of education for my religious group.
3. I would accept the damaging of public buildings to enforce religion-based 
schools.
4. I would accept corporal harm to others to fight for religion-based 
schools.
5. I would accept corporal harm to others to enforce the political influence 
of my religious group.
6. I would accept corporal harm to business people to ensure higher income 
for my religious group.
Cultural/Religious
1. I would accept corporal harm to fight for respect for my religious values.
2. I would accept corporal harm to others when my religion is deeply 
insulted.
3. I would accept the damaging of houses and public buildings when my 
religion is deeply insulted.
4. I would accept the damaging of public buildings to enforce respect for my 
religious values.
However, the measurement used in the pilot study was considered to be 
inadequate, because the distribution of the questions was unbalanced across the 
different domains and level of violence; the table 3.2 below shows that there were 
no questions in the economic and religious domains that assessed support for public 
debate, while the political domain had three such questions, thus creating a bias. 
Economic items linked to physical harm were likewise not covered. The unbalanced 
design of the measurement influenced the results, since important factors may have 
been eliminated before data gathering.
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Table 3.2 The composition of items to analyse support for intergroup violence from 
the previous study
Social Economic Political Cultural Religious
Public debate/ 
criticism
2 - 3 1 -
Demonstrations 2 1 1 1 1
Corporal Harm 2 1 1 1 1
Material Harm 2 - 1 1 1
The measurement was modified to give equal weight to each of the domains. As 
the result of the preliminary factor analysis, the social and economic domains were 
combined with cultural and religious domains into one single question. Each domain 
category was then assessed using four dimensions of support for violence: public 
debate, demonstration, corporal and material harm. For example, the items in the 
social-economic domain then included, “I would support public criticism of my 
religious group’s lack of free access to education,” “I would support demonstrations 
that protest against my religious group’s lack of free access to education,” “I would 
support harm to others to enforce free access to education for my religious group.” 
The total set of questions then comprised twenty items, with the distribution of the 
domain composition as in the following table 3.3.
Table 3.3 The balanced composition of items to analyse support for intergroup 
violence
Social-Economic Political Cultural-religious
Public debate/ criticism 2 2 1
Demonstrations 2 2 1
Corporal Harm 2 2 1
Material Harm 2 2 1
To adjust the balance, six items were retained while others were excluded from the 
measurement. In the category of public debate and demonstration, these preserved 
items pertained to free access to education, job discrimination, abuse of political 
power, political influence and disrespect for the values of religious groups. Corporal 
and material harm were allocated four similar items except for the last, regarding 
disrespect for the values of religious groups, which was added to the items related to 
religious insults. As well as changing the structure of how the measurement was set 
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out, we also made semantic changes to several sentences to make the statements 
clear and obvious. First was the additional phrase, “my religious group’s” or “of 
my religious group” in all statements since it theoretically links the individual with 
group identification. The second was a grammatical change – the addition of “would 
support” to ascertain the attitudinal affirmation of respondents. The third was to use 
the word “property/properties” rather than housing and public buildings, because 
public buildings are associated with government buildings while the question was 
meant to include housing, and private, non-government and government buildings. 
There were five answer categories from “totally disagree” (1) to “totally agree” (5), 
with “I am not sure” or “neither disagree nor agree” (3) in the middle. 
We  also  added  two  more  questions  to  the  measurement  to  discover 
respondents’ participation in violent activities. These asked whether the respondents’ 
support for violence is matched by their behaviour, or includes joining protests, 
public criticism or demonstrations undertaken by their respective group. Although 
the study is about latent conflict, the respondents’ involvement in violence is an 
important aspect of how they express support for it. 
When we look at the survey results presented in tables 3.4 – 3.6, they point to 
high support for public criticism and demonstrations, but low support for corporal 
and physical harm. It seems that people are willing to support their groups through 
verbal protest and public demonstrations when they lack access to education, are 
discriminated against in the labour market, are politically abused or when the values 
of their group are disrespected (means > 3.00). But in contrast, they tend to disagree, 
or show low support, when it comes to using physical violence and destroying 
property (means < 3.00). However, there is a high mean (3.21) for Muslims in Ambon 
who support harm to others when their religious group is deeply insulted.
Furthermore, more Muslims support public criticism and demonstrations 
than Christians. The mean for Muslims ranges from 3.14 to 3.77 and the mean for 
Christians ranges from 2.62 to 3.59. In general, the standard deviation of Muslims is 
also lower than Christians, meaning their answers are more homogenous to some 
extent. In terms of location, both Muslims and Christians in Ambon have higher 
mean scores at all levels of support for violence than groups in Yogyakarta.  
Specifically, in table 3.4, Muslims in Ambon tend to show greater support than 
Muslims in Yogyakarta and Christians (both sites) for open criticism of their religious 
group’s lack of free access to education (3.83) and for open criticism or disrespect 
towards their religious group (3.73). 
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Table 3.4 Mean and standard deviation on public criticism
Public criticism
Yogyakarta Ambon Total
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264. I would support 
public criticism 
of abuse of 
political power 














265. I would support 
public criticism 
of actions that 
undermine the 
political influence 














266. I would openly 
criticize people 
who disrespect 














Meanwhile, Muslims in Yogyakarta indicate more support for public criticism of job 
discrimination, of abuse of political power that threatens their religious group and of 
actions that undermine the political influence of their religious group. The standard 
deviation of Muslims in both cities is lower in general than that of Christians, 
which ranges from 0.91 to 1.05, indicating that the Muslims’ answers tend to be 
more homogenous than Christians’. So, Muslims tend to stick to one answer while 
Christians give a variety of answers.
Regarding support for demonstrations as presented in Table 3.5, Muslims in 
Ambon and Yogyakarta indicate higher support than Christians in both cities. The 
mean ranges from 3.53 to 3.58, which shows strong support for demonstrations. 
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The standard deviation also indicates that their responses to the questions tend 
to be more homogeneous (0.98-1.07) than the Christians (1.03-1.16). Even though 
Muslims in Ambon are in the minority, it appears they show the highest support for 
demonstrations in relation to all measures. Their answers for the parameter also tend 
to be homogeneous, especially for “support demonstrations that protest against my 
religious group’s lack of free access to education”, as the standard deviation is only 
1.00. In contrast, the lowest support is indicated by the Christians in Yogyakarta, who 
are considered to be a minority group. Their means ranges from 2.58 to 3.24 and 
their standard deviation from 0.93 to 1.07, signifying less support than Muslims; and 
their answers tend to be more diverse, from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
Table 3.5 Mean and standard deviation on demonstrations
Demonstrations
Yogyakarta Ambon Total
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demonstrations 
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269. I would support 
demonstrations 
that protest 
against abuse of 
political power 














270. I would support 
demonstrations to 
enforce the political 














271. I would support 
demonstrations to 
demand respect for 
















In general, both Muslims and Christians do not show support for damage to property 
and harm to others, as shown in table 3.6 below. The range of mean scores is mostly 
lower than 3.00. Specifically, most of them extremely disagree with supporting 
harm to others merely to enforce the political influence of their religious groups. 
The exception is the highest mean score for Muslims in Ambon, which points to 
3.21 with standard deviation of 1.41 for the statement that “I would support harm 
to persons when my religion is deeply insulted.” They tend to agree about this, but 
their answers are more diverse than those of other groups. The mean for this item 
is also relatively high for Muslims in Yogyakarta (2.28), where the standard deviation 
points to 1.13. This tendency shows how essential the meaning of religion is for 
Muslims, in that they cannot accept their religion being insulted. 
 
DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENTS
91
3
Table 3.6 The mean and standard deviation on physical and corporal harm
Harm to others or property
Yogyakarta Ambon Total
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281. I would support the 
damaging of property 














In contrast with their attitudes, the actual support by respondents for public 
criticism and demonstration is low both in Ambon and Yogyakarta. Only about 10% 
of respondents said that they had expressed public criticism and 9% had participated 
in a demonstration over the past year. Nonetheless, the respondents of Yogyakarta 
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are more frequently involved in public criticism (58.5%) and demonstrations (70.5%) 
than those of Ambon who participate in public criticism (42.4%) and demonstrations 
(57.6%).
3.3.2 Ethno-religious identification
Ethno-religious identification is a cognitive process by which individuals construct 
the image of themselves from their ethno-religious group membership, along with 
the values and emotional significance of that group (Gijsberts et al., 2004: 10). 
Ethno-religious identification stems from social identity theory, which proposes 
that identification with in-group activities is motivated by a desire to positively 
differentiate that group from out-groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Brown, 1995). 
In this sense, ethno-religious identification encompasses both ethnic or religious 
dimensions, and allows individuals to develop a positive image from their in-group 
while dissociating themselves from the out-groups. Ethno-religious identification is 
measured by several indicators, adopted from inventories of a previous study with 
some modifications, and built into the new scale. It encompasses self-definition in 
relation to ethnic/religious groups, language use, friends by ethnicity/religion and 
friend preferences, participation in ethnic/religious ceremonies, religious beliefs and 
practices, and individual affiliation with ethno-religious organizations. 
3.3.2.1. Ethnic self-definition 
Ethnic identification has four distinct dimensions: ethnic self-labelling or self-
categorization, attachment to the ethno-cultural group, evaluation of the ethnic 
group, and involvement with the group and its cultural practices and customs 
(Phinney, 1990). While individuals cannot change its basis in genealogical relations, 
they can deny or choose ethnic group attributes, and can be subjective about their 
membership of a certain ethnic group. Ethnic groups serve as a point of reference 
that give individuals a positive image of their identity. Since the category is inherited 
from blood relations, our measurement asks for parents’ ethnic groups. However, 
the father’s ethnic group can be different from that of the mother’s in inter-ethnic 
marriages; to allow for this, individuals could choose the ethnicity of their mother, 
father or a combination of the two via the question, “To which ethnic group do you 
consider yourself to belong?”
The question is actually similar to that in Tuti’s questionnaire (2007), but 
the answer categories were adjusted according to the specific situation of the 
research areas. Based on the combination of the six big ethnic groups in Yogyakarta 
and Ambon, we provided twelve ethnic groups in the answer, including Javanese, 
Sundanese, Madurese, Minangkabau, Ambonese, Bugis, Makassar, Buton, Toraja, 
Minahasa, Chinese and Batak. In anticipation of other possibilities, the choice of 
“other” was openly provided. 
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As a part of individual self-definition, the parent’s ethnicity was also of interest 
to us. It identified whether respondents were from one or more ethnic lines, and 
if so, we were curious as to how they defined themselves. The measurement we 
used for parent’s ethnic identification was similar to Tuti’s scale, but the answer 
categories were different. The question was, “To which ethnic group do you consider 
your parents to belong?” This was divided into father’s ethnic group and mother’s 
ethnic group, with the answers in precisely the same categories as for individual 
self-definition.
The survey recorded the various ethnic backgrounds of our respondents. In 
Yogyakarta, Javanese is the largest group, followed by Chinese, while Ambonese is the 
dominant group in the city of Ambon. As well as respondents whose ancestors were 
from the ethnic groups of the Ambon and Lease islands, respondents who claimed to 
be Ambonese could be those who were born in Ambon and whose parents had lived 
there for a generation, although they might also belong to various ethnic groups of 
the neighbouring islands such as Seram, Aru, Saparua, Buru, Kei, etc. As shown in 
Table 3.7, the ethnic diversity of Yogyakarta is higher than in Ambon, despite the large 
number of ethnic groups found in the latter. This is due to the fact that Yogyakarta 
has become a student city, to which young people from many regions of Indonesia 
come to study. In Ambon, the ethnic diversity is apparently increased by the number 
of migrants who make a living in the area, as indicated by the percentage of Buton 
(12.4%), Toraja (1.3%), Buginese (0.8%) and Makassar (0.1%). 
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N % N % N %
Javanese 436 58.1 21 2.8 457 30.5
Sundanese 38 5.1 0 0 38 2.5
Madurese 37 4.9 0 0 37 2.5
Minangkabau 16 2.1 1 .1 17 1.1
Ambonese (e.g. Seram, Kei, Ternate, 
etc.)
8 1.1 581 77.5 589 39.3
Buginese 5 .7 6 .8 11 .7
Makasarese 2 .3 1 .1 3 .2
Butonese 2 .3 93 12.4 95 6.3
Toraja 10 1.3 10 1.3 20 1.3
Minahasa 4 .5 1 .1 5 .3
Chinese 47 6.3 2 .3 49 3.3
Batak 37 4.9 0 .0 37 2.5
Others, specify 90 12.0 14 1.9 104 6.9
Missing 18 2.4 20 2.7 38 2.5
Total 750 100.0 750 100.0 1500 100.0
The respondents’ ethnicity is notably similar to that of their parents. Among 77.5% of 
respondents who define themselves as Ambonese, only 2.1% have non-Ambonese 
fathers, while the percentage with mothers who are non-Ambonese is a little higher 
(8.5%). These parents are of Javanese, Butonese, Buginese, Makasarese, Toraja, 
Chinese descent, etc., who married Ambonese-born spouses. So, even with one non-
Ambonese parent, the respondents saw themselves as Ambonese.  
We found the same trend in Yogyakarta. Respondents tend to identify 
themselves as Javanese when they have either a Javanese father or mother; indeed, 
a few respondents do so even when neither parent is Javanese. 3.5% of fathers 
and 5.5% of mothers are from other ethnic groups such as Sundanese, Madurese, 
Minangkabau, Buginese, Bataknese, Butonese and Chinese. This demonstrates that 
there are relatively few interethnic marriages, and that endogamous spouses are 
preferred. 
3.3.2.2. Language use
The corresponding indicator for ethnicity is the use of language in everyday life. 
Individuals might speak different languages or dialects with different people i.e. with 
family, with friends, with neighbours, with government officers or in different social 
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contexts, i.e. at home, at family gatherings, at school, in the neighborhood, etc. 
Language use indicates individuals’ ethnic category in relation to people with whom 
they have a certain degree of intimacy or with those who belong to their ethnic 
group, such as siblings, parents, family members, relatives, etc. In Indonesia, it is very 
common for people to speak different languages, either their local dialect/ethnic 
language or the national language, depending on the situation. Which language is 
used signifies individuals’ attachment to their ethnic group; the more they speak 
local languages with different people across a range of social interactions, the higher 
their degree of attachment to their ethnic group.   
An inventory of previous studies sets out the importance of language use in 
showing individuals’ relation to their social identities. The European Social Survey 
(2008/2009) asked what languages respondents speak most often at home. The other 
study was the Tuti questionnaire (2007), which asked “What is the language that you 
usually speak at home (big family gathering, work place, and social gathering)?” We 
made changes to the situation categories, because our survey was carried out among 
university students rather than the general population: work place was changed 
to university, and social gathering was changed to community of residence. We 
additionally asked what language respondents mainly speak with close friends and 
in dealing with government offices, with the response options being “Indonesian”, 
“ethnic language”, and “other language”.
The survey outcome indicates that ethnic rather than national languages 
are generally spoken at home and at family gatherings. In Yogyakarta, 59.9% of 
respondents claim to speak their ethnic language at home, and 33.9% the national 
language. In Ambon, 46.1% of respondents speak their ethnic language and 42.5% 
speak Bahasa Indonesia at home. The language used at family gatherings is not 
significantly different from the language used at home. However, Bahasa Indonesia, 
as the national language, is more frequently spoken on campus and in government 
administration offices. 
Nonetheless, there is a sharp difference between Muslims’ and Christians’ 
use of language for particular social interactions. Christians, both in Ambon and 
Yogyakarta, tend to talk in Bahasa Indonesia at home, at big family gatherings and 
in the community residence. With close friends, Christians in Yogyakarta are more 
likely to use Bahasa Indonesia than their ethnic languages, as are Muslims in Ambon. 
Tabel 3.8 illustrates the survey results for the language used at home and at family 
gatherings, and with close friends. 
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Table 3.8 The language used at home, at big family gatherings, and with close 
friends
22. What language do 
















Indonesian 23.8 58.4 36.5 55.3 29.3 56.5
Your ethnic language 75.1 40.4 59.8 39.8 68.5 40.1
Other language 1.1 1.2 3.7 4.9 2.2 3.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
23. What language do you 
















Indonesian 36.2 62.4 41.1 57.4 38.3 59.6
Your ethnic language 63.1 36.8 54.1 40.7 59.3 39.0
Other language .7 .8 4.8 1.8 2.4 1.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
25. What language do you 
















Indonesian 45.4 64.0 58.9 55.1 51.4 58.9
Your ethnic language 49.9 33.2 30.4 40.0 41.2 37.1
Other language 4.7 2.8 10.7 4.9 7.4 4.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
3.3.2.3. Friends by ethnicity
Ethnic identification can also be measured by numbers of friends who belong to the 
same ethnic group. This is a good indicator for individuals’ wider relationship to their 
ethnic groups. It is assumed that the more same-ethnicity friends, the stronger the 
identification of individuals with their ethnic group. The measurement was developed 
by estimating respondents’ number of close friends. A measurement from Tutti (2007) 
was adapted, with appropriate adjustments of the question as well as the answer. 
The original question was, “How many Javanese friends/colleagues/neighbours do 
you know well?” This was then changed to, “How many of your close friends are…?” 
The change was made because the triple-barrelled nature of the original (friends/
colleagues/neighbours) could be confusing for respondents. Furthermore, intervals 
were replaced with ordinals, because of respondents’ difficulty in counting the 
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number of people that they could remember. The previous scale comprised: none; 
1 to 10 people; 11 to 25 people; more than 25 people. We modified this with four 
ordinal scales of none, some, relatively many, almost all and all. 
The result shows that the respondents of Ambon tend to be exclusive in 
their friendships, and the respondents in Yogyakarta inclusive. The respondents 
in Yogyakarta state that they have more friends of different ethnic groups than 
the respondents of Ambon. Indeed, there are different ethnic groups from which 
their friends come, but the Yogyakarta sample is more diverse compared to that 
of Ambon. In Yogyakarta, they said they had “some to many” Sundanese (89.2%), 
Bataknese (78.3%), Makassarese (68.4%), Chinese (67.8%) and Madurese (65.3%) 
friends. In Ambon the respondents mentioned Javanese (81.7%), Butonese (67.8%), 
Buginese (61.2%), Makassarese (63.7%) and Toraja (46.3%) as the ethnic identities 
of their friends.  
Muslims and Christians show different preferences in their friends. Muslims 
tend to have more Madurese, Minangkabau and Butonese friends; these ethnic 
groups have traditions that are often strongly interwoven with Islam. Table 3.9 
below indicates the stronger tendency of Muslims to make friends with Madurese, 
Minangkabau and Butonese, while Christians show the opposite tendency. A higher 
percentage of Christians said “few to none” friends from these groups. 
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None 22.0 47.1 65.8 77.3 39.7 62.7
Some 48.6 44.6 30.6 16.0 41.3 29.8
Relatively Many 20.0 6.3 2.0 2.3 12.7 4.2
Almost all 6.9 .4 1.0 2.0 4.5 1.2
All 2.7 1.7 .7 2.3 1.8 2.0
















None 33.5 47.0 74.4 80.3 50.6 64.3
Some 51.1 41.9 21.2 11.0 38.6 25.8
Relatively Many 12.0 9.0 2.7 1.2 8.1 4.9
Almost all 2.4 1.3 .7 3.9 1.7 2.7
All 1.0 .9 1.0 3.5 1.0 2.3
















None 70.5 73.0 .9 41.0 38.4 55.5
Some 23.8 20.0 42.8 46.8 32.6 34.6
Relatively Many 3.7 5.7 33.0 7.2 17.2 6.5
Almost all 1.2 .4 16.4 2.5 8.2 1.6
All .7 .9 6.9 2.5 3.6 1.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Christians tend to make more Torajan, Chinese and Bataknese friends than Muslims. 
This might be because of the large number of Christians within these groups, thus 
making it easier for the Christian respondents to engage in friendships with them. 
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None 63.5 14.5 69.1 14.3 65.9 14.4
Some 29.4 57.0 26.7 69.7 28.3 64.0
Relatively Many 3.9 21.5 2.3 9.5 3.2 14.9
Almost All 2.2 4.5 1.3 3.7 1.8 4.1
All 1.0 2.5 .7 2.7 .8 2.6
















None 37.6 3.7 80.1 37.1 55.6 21.3
Some 43.6 27.8 17.3 48.4 32.5 38.7
Relatively Many 15.9 49.0 1.3 8.7 9.7 27.7
Almost All 1.9 15.1 .3 2.9 1.2 8.7
All 1.0 4.5 1.0 2.9 1.0 3.7
















None 24.0 2.0 77.6 33.0 46.3 18.6
Some 56.8 36.0 19.8 55.8 41.4 46.6
Relatively Many 15.9 51.8 1.3 6.3 9.9 27.4
Almost all 1.6 5.3 .3 1.8 1.1 3.4
All 1.6 4.9 1.0 3.2 1.3 3.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
3.3.2.4. Participation in ethnic ceremonies
Individuals’ participation in ethnic ceremonies reflects their level of integration 
as members of their ethnic group, and also their identification with their group’s 
distinctive characteristics – the traditions and customs that deal with individual life 
cycles or key events, such as birth ceremonies, maturity or coming of age events, 
wedding rituals, dealing with illness, funerals, or moving house. The measurement is 
based on the individual’s knowledge and participation, with or without their family. 
It is linked to their family because ethnic ceremonies usually involve members of 
either the nuclear or extended family. In this question, we also checked their level 
of knowledge about ethnic ceremonies or rituals, since such knowledge could not 
be assumed. The question was therefore, “Are you familiar with these ceremonies 
and do you and/or your family participate in these ethnic ceremonies or rituals?” 
The ceremonies and rituals concerned related to births, weddings, moving house, 
dealing with illness, funerals and others that the respondents could add. The answer 
categories were “no knowledge”, “I do not participate and neither does my family”, 
“I do not participate, but my family does”, and “I participate.”
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The survey results generally found that respondents are familiar with their 
ethnic ceremonies, but they do not actively participate in them except for weddings 
and funerals. This is indicated by the relatively high mean score in both Yogyakarta 
and Ambon, regardless of religion (> 3.00). However, more precisely, Muslims seem 
to have slightly higher participation levels than Christians. The mean for Muslims is 
between 2.44 (illness) and 3.42 (wedding rituals), and for Christians between 2.18 
(illness) and 3.26 (funeral/wake). The variability also indicates that Muslims are more 
consistent than Christians, given that the standard deviation of Muslims ranges from 
.84 to 1.38 and of Christians from .98 to 1.40.  
      
3.3.2.5. Membership of ethnic organizations
An ethnic organization is a formal group that binds members together by virtue of 
ethnic particularities such as shared inherited customs, place of origin or myths 
of ancestors. Formal ethnic organizations or ethnic associations usually exist in 
heterogeneous spaces such as urban areas which have high densities of migrants, 
high ethnic diversity and multiple cultures. Ethnic organizations are assumed to 
play an important role in strengthening ethnic group identification. Membership 
indicates a positive association by individuals with their ethnic group that also 
distinguishes them from ethnic out-groups. Although an ethnic group is a system of 
social organization, it is not always the case that they create formal organizations. 
In this measurement, therefore, an example of an ethnic group organization or 
association was presented to give an idea of what was meant to the respondents. 
Such examples were the South Sulawesi Family Association (Kerukunan Keluarga 
Sulawesi Selatan,KKSS), the Unity of Madurese Family (Ikatan Keluarga Madura, 
IKAMA), the Unity of Banda Eli Society (Ikatan Masyarakat Banda Eli), The Unity of 
Minang Society (Ikatan Masyarakat Minang) etc.
The measurement for this item was formed by two yes and no questions, 
in which respondents could indicate whether they were supporters or members, 
the first being “Are you a member or a supporter of any ethnic organization?” The 
second, follow-up question was designed to discover the intensity of respondent 
participation, and was worded “On average, how often did you participate in the 
activities of your ethnic group organization over the past year?” Answers were 
categorized on an ordinal scale comprised of “never”, “only on special days”, “at 
least once a month”, “once a week”, and “more than once a week”.
The survey found that few respondents were members of ethnic organizations 
both in Ambon (8%) and in Yogyakarta (10%). A large number were not members, 
but some participated in organization activities only on special days (52.5%), at least 
once a month (12.3%), once a week (9.4%), and more than once a week (12.3%). 
This suggests that their attachment to their ethnic groups is founded less on formal 
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organizations, and more on kin or genealogical relationship to people with a similar 
tradition.  
3.3.2.6. Religious self-definition 
Religious self-definition refers to an individual’s subjective feeling, or acknowledgement 
and recognition through verbal statement, that their membership of a religious 
group represents their religious identity. It is an individual choice of religious identity 
in which the characteristics of a religious group are associated with a positive image. 
The question we used is actually a common measurement for demographic variables, 
adapted from the European Social Survey (Round 4, 2008/2009) question, which is, 
“Do you consider yourself to belong to any particular religion or denomination?” 
Given the social context of Indonesia, in which citizens are officially obliged to follow 
one of six religions, we modified this to, “To what religion do you consider yourself 
to belong?” In the earlier question, the respondent could answer “no,” as they might 
be either agnostic or atheist – impossible for Indonesians. Our range of answers 
comprised the five official state religions, i.e. Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, 
Hinduism, and Buddhism. Respondents who followed Confucianism or local beliefs 
could insert their religion under the option “Others”. 




N % N % N %
Islam 480 64.0 373 49.7 853 56.9
Catholicism 59 7.9 19 2.5 78 5.2
Protestantism 196 26.1 355 47.3 551 36.7
Buddhism 6 .8 0 0 6 .4
Hinduism 3 .4 0 0 3 .2
Others 2 .3 0 0 2 .1
Missing 4 .5 3 .4 7 .5
Total 750 100.0 750 100.0 1500 100.0
Furthermore, we were interested to discover whether respondents had changed or 
converted from one religious identity to another. This is simply because identity is 
not fixed, for many reasons, one of which is oppression or discrimination against 
minorities. In Indonesia, the obligation to adhere to one of the state religions was 
declared after the extermination of communist party sympathizers in 1965/1966, 
when the authoritarian regime of the New Order exerted control over civil society. 
Data on previous religious identity and parents’ religion were also important for 
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understanding religious diversity and pluralism in the family; it would be possible 
for the respondents and their parents to have different religions, or even for their 
mother and father to differ. The deciding factor for whether a respondent had 
changed religion was whether they had converted during high school, because the 
period between the ages of 12-17 is considered to be when the respondent could 
make up their own minds in relation to this. 
A large number of respondents’ religion is Islam (56.9%). Unlike in Yogyakarta, 
the religion of respondents in Ambon is almost balanced, with 49.7% Muslims 
and 49.8% Christians (Protestants and Catholics). This simply reflects the student 
population of Unpatti – the state university is more heterogeneous than the other 
two. In Yogyakarta, it appears that not all students at the Christian university are 
Christians; some are in fact Muslims. Even if the Protestant and Catholics are 
combined, they still number fewer than the sample of 250 respondents.  
Interestingly, there are a few respondents whose religion differs from that of 
their parents, with Yogyakarta showing similarities to Ambon. This difference could 
be a result of the inter-religious marriage of parents or religious conversion. The 
cross-tabulation between respondents and their fathers show that 0.6% of Muslim 
respondents have Christian fathers and 1.8% of Christian respondents have Muslim 
fathers. In addition, 0.8% Muslim respondents have Christian mothers and 1.3% 
Christian respondents have Muslim mothers. There are more Christian respondents 
with Muslim parents than Muslim respondents with Christian parents. A small 
number of respondents said that they had a different religion at high school – 1.3% 
in Ambon and 3.9% in Yogyakarta. These converts identified as Catholic (30.8%), 
Protestant (10.3%), and Muslim (7.7%). Such religious conversion was apparently 
slightly higher in Yogyakarta than in Ambon. 
3.3.2.7. Religious practices
Religious practices are not only an indicator for individual religiosity, but also 
religious identification. Religious practices encompass the frequency of church or 
mosque attendance, the reading or reciting of Holy Scripture, and personal prayer. 
There are at least three studies that we used to design the measurement. These 
were the European Social Survey (2008/2009), Religiosity and Personality in a Muslim 
Context (Wilde and Joseph, 1997), and the questionnaire of Hadiwitanto (2007). The 
European Social Survey asked about the frequency of religious service attendance, 
with the answer categories: “every day”, “more than once a week”, “once a week”, 
”at least once a month”, “only on special holy days”, “less often”, “never” and “don’t 
know”. The questions were, “Apart from special occasions such as weddings and 
funerals, roughly how often do you attend religious services?” and “Apart from when 
you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray?” 
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Many studies of religion have a Protestant or Catholic bias in their measurements 
of religious practices, so this research adapted input from the Muslim Attitudes 
towards Religion Scale (MARS) (Wilde and Joseph, 1997), allowing religious practices 
to be measured not only by frequency of church or mosque attendance, but also by 
the extensive dimensions of reading or reciting Holy Scripture and personal prayer. 
Our research developed three items that were similar to those used by Hadiwitanto 
(2007). The first question was, “How often do you read or recite the Holy Scripture 
(Bible or Al Quran)?” The word “recite” was added since reciting, instead of reading, 
is common in the Muslim tradition. The second question was “How often do you 
go to religious services in mosques, churches, or other places of worship?” The 
term “other places of worship” was added to include langgar or mushola and other 
common places of worship in Indonesia, and to provide a choice for other religious 
adherents who formed part of the random sample. The third question was the 
same as the Hadiwitanto question, “How often do you pray?” The measurement for 
religious practices involved a more or less straightforward question based on these 
three dimensions, with answers ranging in seven scales as follows: “never”, “only on 
feast days or special holy days”, “at least once a month”, “once a week”, “more than 
once a week”, “once a day”, and “several times a day”.
The survey results delineate a similar direction for the three religious practice 
indicators; frequency of respondents reading or reciting Holy Scripture, attending 
religious services and praying tend to be high. A large number of respondents (80.3%) 
read Holy Scripture from once a week to several times a day. Table 3.12 points out 
the higher level of activity among Ambon respondents (83.8%) than among those 
in Yogyakarta (77%). In Ambon, those who claim to read the Holy Scripture once a 
day or several times a day constitute 50% of the respondents. In particular, more 
Muslims tend to read Al Quran once a day, while more Christians read their Bible 
more than once a week.
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Table 3.12 Frequency of reading or reciting Holy Scripture


























Never 1.1 3.6 0 1.8 0.6 2.6
Only on feast days or 
special holy days
7.9 11.7 5.6 4.1 6.9 7.3
At least once a 
month 10.9 6.0 5.6 3.5 8.6 4.6
Once a week 10.9 24.6 10.6 14.1 10.7 18.5
More than once a 
week
20.4 23.4 20.1 27.6 20.3 25.9
Once a day 25.5 22.6 24.9 22.9 25.2 22.8
Several times a day 23.4 8.1 33.2 25.9 27.7 18.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 3.13 Frequency of religious service attendance
39.  How often do you 






















Never 1.3 .8 .3 .3 .9 .5
Only on feast days or 
special holy days
21 8.7 40.0 12.3 29.2 10.8
At least once a month 12.7 7.5 6.8 3.3 10.1 5.0
Once a week 16 50.2 12.1 29.5 14.3 38.0
More than once a week 19.4 31.2 9.9 40.2 15.3 36.5
Once a day 7.1 .4 5.4 2.5 6.4 1.6
Several times a day 22.5 1.2 25.6 12 23.8 7.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Likewise, the vast majority of respondents attend religious services at least on 
feast days or special holidays. Among these, 67.7% attend religious services in 
the aggregate range from once a week to several times a day. In addition, more 
respondents in Ambon than in Yogyakarta go to the mosque, church, or other places 
of worship frequently. A greater percentage of Muslims attend religious services on 
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feast days or special holy days and several times a day. Meanwhile, Christians are 
more likely to attend religious services once a week and more than once a week.
The vast majority also pray at least once a day (11. 9%) and even several times 
a day (71.9%). In Yogyakarta, the percentage of respondents, especially Muslims, 
who pray several times a day is higher than in Ambon. Most of the respondents 
actively practise their religion, even in terms of personal worship such as praying. 
Interestingly, only 0.3% of respondents claimed that they never pray, and apparently 
more Christians than Muslims never pray.
Table 3. 14  Frequency of praying






















Never 0 1.2 .6 0 .2 .5
Only on feast days or 
special holy days
1.5 1.6 3.7 .5 2.5 1.0
At least once a month .7 2.0 1.4 1.6 1.0 1.8
Once a week 2.0 2.8 1.7 1.6 1.8 2.1
More than once a week 5.4 6.7 11.0 8.2 7.9 7.6
Once a day 7.2 16.9 13.0 15.0 9.7 15.8
Several times a day 83.3 68.9 68.7 73.0 76.9 71.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
3.3.2.8. Friends by religion
The number of same-religion close friends indicates individuals’ identification with 
their religious group, and how much they distinguish themselves from other groups. 
It is assumed that a close friend is one with whom individuals have an intimate 
relationship and can build trust. The more close friends they have from within their 
religious group, the stronger their religious identification. Our measurement stemmed 
from the Hadiwitanto questionnaire (2007) with a paraphrasing modification; the 
original question was, “How many of your best friends consider themselves to be 
members of the same religion as you?”, which we modified to, “How many of your 
close friends are (Muslims, Protestants or Catholic)?”, splitting the categories of 
religion across three questions. We changed the term “best friend” to “close friend” 
to give a clearer idea of the distance within the relationship. However, the answer 
options remained the same with five categories from “none”, “some”, “relatively 
many”, “almost all” to “all”. 
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In general, intergroup relationships are apparently inclusive. A large number 
of respondents do not limit their friendships. Both in Ambon and Yogyakarta, fewer 
than 25% of respondents claimed to have no close friends from other religious 
groups. The Christian respondents with close Muslim friends tend to answer some 
(45.5%) and relatively many (40.8%), a tendency that seems higher for Christians in 
Yogyakarta than in Ambon. For the Muslim respondents, those with close friends 
who are all Muslims is higher in Ambon (61.5%) than in Yogyakarta (22.3%) as shown 
in Table 3.15 below. 
Table 3.15 Muslims as close friends
274.   How many of your 
close friends are 
Muslims?
Respondents



















None .6 2.4 .5 5.5 .6 4.1
Some 1.3 31.6 1.6 56.1 1.4 45.5
Relatively many 12.6 49.8 14.2 33.9 13.3 40.8
Almost all 63.2 14.6 22.1 1.5 45.4 7.2
All 22.3 1.6 61.5 3.0 39.3 2.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
The percentage of Muslims who have some Catholic close friends (51.1%) and some 
Protestant (49.3%) close friends also appears high, but the number with no close 
Christian friends is also relatively high. Specifically, Muslims in Ambon had fewer 
close Christian friends, either Catholic or Protestant, than in Yogyakarta. This implies 
a tendency towards exclusiveness among Muslims in Ambon and inclusiveness 
among Christians in Yogyakarta. In Ambon, this presumably reflects the religious 
segregation that hinders social interaction between Muslims and Christians. 
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Table 3.16 Catholics as close friends
275.    How many of your 






















None 16.1 .4 51.6 4.3 31 2.6
Some 61.6 28.1 36.6 57.8 51.1 44.8
Relatively many 20.5 58.5 9.9 28.6 16 41.7
Almost all 1.6 10.3 1.3 4 1.5 6.7
All .2 2.8 .6 5.2 .4 4.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 3.17 Protestants as close friends
276.   How many of your 
close friends are 
Protestants?
Respondents



















None 17.0 0 42.1 .6 27.7 .3
Some 60.5 7.5 34.3 1.5 49.3 4.1
Relatively many 19.3 46.2 19.6 17.8 19.4 30.0
Almost all 3.0 35.2 2.8 41.5 2.9 38.8
All .2 11.0 1.2 38.6 .7 26.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
3.3.2.9. Participation in religious ceremonies
Individuals’ identification with their religious group can also be measured via their 
participation in religious ceremonies, which are often celebrated in accordance with 
the religious calendar or to mark important events in an individual’s life. Participation 
in religious rituals strengthens religious identification because ceremonies or rituals 
increase social cohesion and distinguish group members from non-members. The 
term “participation” is defined as taking part in the ceremony, such as helping out 
with the preparations or being involved in the ceremony itself.  
The measurement for participation was adapted from Tuti’s questionnaire on 
ethnic attitudes in Indonesia (2007). The original question was, “Could you indicate 
the traditional ceremonies of your own ethnic group and whether you have knowledge 
of them, you know about the traditions but do not perform them, or whether your 
family still carries them out and you participate?” We changed this to, “Could you 
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indicate whether or not you and/or your family participate in religious ceremonies/
rituals?” The religious rituals were divided into Muslim and Christian ceremonies. 
The Muslim ceremonies were circumcision, marriage, funerals, Ramadhan, Idul Fitri, 
Idul Adha, Isra Mi’raj, Maulud, and selamatan. For Christians, the ceremonies were 
baptism, marriage, Christmas, Easter, funerals and fasting. The answers options 
were, “I do not participate and neither does my family”, “I do not participate but my 
family does”, “I do participate, but for non-religious reasons” and “I do participate, 
for religious reasons.”
The survey revealed that most respondents participate in almost all religious 
ceremonies as shown by the high mean score (> 3.00), except the mean Christians’ 
fasting Christians (2.81). For Muslim respondents, the highest mean is for 
participation in Idul Fitri (3.89) and slightly lower for Idul Adha (3.88). Conversely, 
Muslims in Ambon participated less in wedding ceremonies (3.23), while for Muslims 
in Yogyakarta, lowest participation is in circumcision (3.18). For the Christian 
respondents, Christmas is apparently viewed as the most important ceremony so 
they participate for religious reasons (3.80). However, Christians, as indicated above, 
might not participate in fasting, or if they do, they fast for non-religious reasons. The 
variability of Christians is wider for fasting (SD: 1.31) and of Muslims for circumcision 
(SD: .98) 
3.3.2.10. Membership of religious organizations
Membership of a religious organization is assumed to be a good indicator for 
individual religious identification, simply because religious group membership gives 
individuals an identity that is distinct from other groups. The measurement was 
adapted from Hadiwitanto’s questionnaire (2007); the original asked respondents to 
identify any student organization to which they belonged, as well as the frequency of 
involvement in mosque or church activities. Our first question was, “Please indicate 
if you belong to one of the organizations below.” The answer choices were several 
student organizations: the Islamic Student Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa 
Islam, HMI), The Islamic Student Movement of Indonesia (Pergerakan Mahasiswa 
Islam Indonesia, PMII), the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Movement (Kesatuan 
Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI,), the Indonesian Christian Student 
Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia, GMKI), The Union of Catholic 
University Students of the Republic of Indonesia (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik 
Republik Indonesia, PMKRI), others (namely…), and “I am not a member of any of 
these organizations”. The second question was, “How often are you involved as a 
volunteer with a mosque or church?” The answer options were “never”, “on feast 
days or special days”, “now and then”, “monthly or several times a month”, “weekly 
or several times a week”, and “every day”.
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We then modified both the question and answer categories further. For the first 
question we asked, “Are you a member or a supporter of any religious organization?”, 
in the expectation that the respondent would give a specific answer. We then added 
a distinction between two types of religious organization – community-based and 
school-based, because the respondents are university students who might be 
members of both, or perhaps only one of them. The second question was, “On 
average, how often did you participate in the activities of your religious organization 
over the past year?” The range of answers were “never”, “only on special days”, “at 
least once a month”, “once a week”, and “more than once a week”.
More than half of the respondents are not members of a religious organization 
(55.3%). 27.2 % are members of an organization and 12.5% claim to be supporters 
only. Ambon (34.9%) has a higher rate of membership than Yogyakarta (19.5%). This 
trend is similar for supporters; Ambon has 14.3% and Yogyakarta 10.8%. Although 
only a small number of respondents are members of a religious organization, the 
trend is higher than for membership of ethnic organizations; it seems that this is the 
case in both Ambon and Yogyakarta.
Most respondents (74.0%) who are members of an organization are connected 
to a campus-based organization. Fewer are members of community-based 
organizations (45.3%). Some are, in fact, passive members, since they said they had 
not participated in any activities over the past year (9.7%) or only on special days 
(37.9%). Some, about 46.5%, attended organizational activities once a week or even 
more than once a week. In terms of preferential membership of and participation 
in campus-based organizations, there is not much difference between Ambon and 
Yogyakarta.      
3.3.2.11. Political orientation
Ethno-religious identification might also be indicated by an individual’s choice 
of political party. The political reformation in Indonesia after the downfall of 
authoritarianism led to an increase in political parties, all with their roots in the 
three parties that had been previously recognized by the New Order government. 
In total, 43 parties passed the electoral threshold requirements in the latest general 
election of 2009. Among these, there exist religious parties that claim to represent 
Muslim communities, all offering a different angle, be it nationalist, liberal, moderate 
or fundamentalist. Such religious parties are the Justice and Welfare Party (Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), the Nation Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, 
PKB), the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), the Development 
Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), the Moon Star Party (Partai 
Bulan Bintang, PBB) and the Peace Welfare Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera, PDS), etc. 
It is assumed that choosing a party constitutes an aspect of individuals’ religious 
CHAPTER 3
110
identification; respondents who vote for a particular religious party are likely to have 
a strong religious identification.
For this measurement, the respondents were asked three questions. The first 
was, “Did you vote in the last national election?” with the answer choices “yes” 
or “no”. The next question was, “If no, why did you not vote?” Four categories of 
answers were listed, from “I was not yet eligible to vote”, “I am eligible to vote, but 
was not able to register”, “I am eligible to vote, but did not want to participate in the 
election”, to “Other reasons, specify.......” From this followed, “If yes, which political 
party did you vote for in the last election?” and “If you were not able to vote, which 
political party would you have voted for?” The answer options for the second and 
third questions included the political parties of Indonesia.
The survey discovered that more than half of respondents voted in the national 
election in 2009. Reasons for not voting were that they were not yet eligible (36.2%), 
were not able to register (18.6%) and were uninterested in participating in the 
election (17.2%). The favourite parties were PKB (2.2%), PAN (2.1%), Gerindra (1.7%) 
and Hanura (1.2%). Other parties receiving less than one per cent included PDS, 
PBB, PKPI, Patriot, etc. This indicates that the respondents prefer nationalist and 
secular parties to religious parties; the top three choices are all secular. The religious 
parties that obtained more than 9.9% per cent of respondents’ votes were PKS, PKB 
and PAN. These seem to have higher support in Ambon (10.6%) than in Yogyakarta 
(9.4%). 
3.3.3. Social position 
Social position refers to social categories of individuals that might influence their 
attitudes to supporting violence by their ethno-religious group. It constitutes a 
number of control variables in which all indicators potentially affect such support. 
These include gender, age, place of birth, parents’ educational level, parents’ 
occupational status, parents’ field of occupation, parents’ income, migration, and 
where they live. 
3.3.3.1 Gender, age, place of birth and university courses
Gender is a social indicator based on sexual difference between male and female. 
Earlier studies reveal different attitudes and behaviours on the part of men and 
women regarding ethno-religious conflict and support for violence. For instance: the 
study of religiocentrism in Tamil Nadu by Sterkens and Anthony (2008; c.f Anthony, 
Hermans & Sterkens, 2015: 157-159) found higher levels of religiocentrism among 
male students than their female colleagues. Another study related to communal 
conflict pinpointed the different roles played by men and women during and after 
violent conflict. The men were engaged on the front line as military, militia or as 
political decision-makers, while women mostly supported them by preparing food, 
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taking care of casualties or looking after the camps. When the violent conflict 
came to an end, women played a greater role in their family’s survival as refugees 
by making a living and taking care of their children within the uncomfortable and 
insecure conditions of the camps (Putranti and Subagya, 2005). 
Age difference might affect individuals’ identification with ethno-religious 
groups as well as their support for ethno-religious violence. We were interested 
to discover whether there was a difference in attitude between younger and 
older students in relation to this. Besides their age, the survey respondents were 
questioned about their place of birth, where they currently live and where they grew 
up, to examine whether there are different attitudes between natives and migrants; 
between individuals who live in the city and those who live outside it; and between 
individuals who grew up in the city and those who grew up in other areas such as 
towns or the countryside, all in relation to their ethno-religious identification and 
support for violence.
As control variables, the university attended and course of study were 
also included in the questionnaire, to assess differences in attitude according to 
these factors. Do students at a state university identify with their ethno-religious 
groups more negatively than those attending Islamic state universities or Christian 
universities? Do they have similar attitudes towards support for violence? Do students 
of the natural sciences or engineering support violence more strongly than students 
from the social science department? The aggregate answer for such questions acts 
as a control for the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support 
for violence.
In terms of gender balance, 52.1% of the respondents were male and 46.3% 
female, with a slight difference between Ambon and Yogyakarta. In Ambon, the 
percentage of male respondents was 49.1%, and female 48.8%. In Yogyakarta, 
55.2% were male and 43.9% female. The gender composition of respondents in 
Ambon was apparently not very different from that of the total population of the 
city; the male population of Ambon is 49.50% and female is 49.84%. However, the 
gender composition of Yogyakarta is reversed when compared to the gender of 
the respondents – the city’s male population (49.75%) is smaller than the female 
(50.24%) (BPS, 2011).
 The respondents’ age ranged from 18 to 33 years old in Yogyakarta. In Ambon, 
the range was a little wider, with some respondents as old as 42 when the survey 
was carried out. A large number of respondents in both cities were seemingly 
migrants. Even though most now live in the city where they are studying, they grew 
up in different places (237 regencies of 35 provinces). The respondents of Yogyakarta 
were more diverse than those in Ambon; of 43.1% living in the Special Region of 
Yogyakarta, only 19.3% were born there and 20.5% grew up in the city. The rest were 
from the other 35 provinces of Indonesia i.e. Central Java (23.5%), East Java (14.9%), 
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West Java (7.9), East Nusa Tenggara (2.3%), South Sumatera (2.0%), North Sumatera 
(2.0%) etc. This trend was similar among the Ambon respondents, although their 
place of birth and where they grew up showed less diversity. 79.2% of respondents 
lived and studied in the city of Ambon while the rest commuted from neighbouring 
regencies, but all within one province of Maluku. The vast majority of respondents 
(86.5%) were born and grew up in the province, while the rest came from South East 
Sulawesi (1.5%), North Maluku (1.3%) and other provinces. In addition, almost half 
the respondents, both in Yogyakarta and Ambon, have lived in their current place of 
residence for more than three years (47.7%). The rest varied from two to three years 
(15.6%), one to two years (25.4%) to less than a year (9.3%).           
As has been delineated in the preceding section on the sampling procedure, 
the survey respondents were students in their second year or above when they were 
drawn randomly from the sampling frame at the selected universities. This resulted 
in the following distribution: second year (6%), third year (30.6%), fourth year 
(29.8%), fifth year (15.3%) and above fifth year (9.9%). In Yogyakarta, the fourth year 
provided the largest number of respondents (295) and in Ambon it was the third 
year (228). The exact respondent composition according to their course of study and 
university is shown above in Table 3. 1.  
3.3.3.2. Parental education, occupational status and household income
The social position of the respondents could be identified from their family 
backgrounds, in terms of, for example, the highest educational attainment of 
parents, their parents’ occupational status and fields, and family income. From these 
measurements, the socio-economic positions of the respondents could be classified 
as low, middle or upper class. The inventory of the measurements was derived from 
the European Social Survey (2008/2009) with some modifications to both questions 
and answers. For the highest level of parents’ education, the answer options were 
“Primary school”, “Junior high school”, “Senior high school”, “Diploma”, “Bachelor 
(S1)”, “Master (S2)”, and “PhD (S3).” These were adjusted for the range of educational 
levels in Indonesia.
For the occupational status of parents, father and mother were addressed 
separately. The original question of the European Social Survey (2008/2009) was, 
“Was your father/mother an employee, self-employed, or not working?” with answer 
categories of employee, self-employed, not working, and father/mother dead/absent 
when the respondent was 14. We changed this to, “What is the occupational status of 
your father/mother?” The answers were adopted from the Indonesian occupational 
status categories used in the 2010 Indonesian population census, and followed a 
scale from “self-employed”, “employee helped by paid workers”, “employee helped 
by unpaid workers”, “workers”, “free workers in agriculture”, “free workers in non-
agriculture sector”, to “unpaid workers”.
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Likewise, parents’ occupation was an important measure of the respondents’ 
social characteristics. The measurement was adapted from the European Social 
Survey (2008/2009) and the 2010 Indonesian population census. Again, the parents 
were listed separately, and occupations ranged from government officials or officials 
of specialist organisations, corporate executives, managers, managing proprietors 
and supervisors; professionals; technicians and associate professionals; to farmers, 
forestry workers and fishermen, etc. The question for parental occupation was 
initially, “What field does your father (mother) work in?” After the pilot survey, this 
was changed to, “What is your father’s (mother’s) occupation?”
Another indicator was household income. This was estimated from the earnings 
of all persons living under the same roof including parents, siblings and other 
members of the household. Household income suggests individuals’ socio-economic 
class. In this measurement, the scale started with “lower than IDR 500,000” for the 
lowest economic class, which is below the poverty line. The second category was 
an adjustment by an interval scale of IDR 1,000,000, on the basis of the average 
provincial minimum wage both in Maluku and Yogyakarta in 2010. The regional 
minimum wage is decided according to the Regulation of Ministry of Empowerment, 
PER-01/MEN/1999, and includes the calculation of basic salaries and fixed allowances. 
In Yogyakarta, the minimum wage is IDR 750,480, and IDR 1,400,990 in Maluku. 
The average for the two provinces is IDR 1,075,000; we rounded this down to IDR 
1,000,000 to provide the interval scale for our measurement. Individuals’ differing 
socio-economic class may affect their identification with ethno-religious groups and 
their attitudes to supporting violence.
Respondents’ parents in Yogyakarta tended to have attained a higher level of 
education than those in Ambon. Some 7.5% of respondents’ fathers had acquired 
a master degree and 25.3% a bachelor degree. The educational attainment of 
respondents’ mothers in Yogyakarta was lower than that of their spouses, but the 
percentage who reached higher education is still greater (38.8%) than for mothers 
in Ambon, where a high percentage of parents did not study beyond senior high 
school. There, 70.3% of fathers graduated from primary school to senior high school, 
while the percentage for mothers was similar (75.5%).
In terms of occupational status, most parents were workers, labourers, officers 
or were self-employed. In Ambon, more respondents’ fathers were self-employed 
than in Yogyakarta (38.3% vs 27.7%). Conversely, respondents’ fathers in Yogyakarta 
with an occupational status of worker, labourer or officer were more numerous than 
in Ambon (41.5% vs 25.6%). For respondents’ mothers, the trend is similar both in 
Ambon and Yogyakarta; the aggregate result was 38.1% self-employed and 22.8% 
workers, labourers and officers. However, the percentage of self-employed was 
slightly higher in Ambon (45.5%) than in Yogyakarta (30.7%). It is notable that 11.5% 
of respondents’ mothers in Yogyakarta are unpaid workers, or work for family.
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Table 3.18 Parent’s occupation 
Occupation
Father Mother
Yogyakarta Ambon Yogyakarta Ambon
N % N % N % N %




managing proprietors and 
supervisors
30 4.0 9 1.2 7 .9 4 0.5
Professionals 45 6.0 9 1.2 29 3.9 4 0.5
Technicians and 
associated professionals
14 1.9 8 1.1 3 .4 0 0.0
Clerks 219 29.2 172 23.1 181 24.1 120 16.0
Service workers and shop 
and market sales workers
50 6.7 20 2.7 49 6.5 7 0.9
Farmers, forestry workers 
and fishermen
110 14.7 284 37.9 88 11.7 242 32.3
Trades and related 
Workers
107 14.3 46 6.1 159 21.2 108 14.4
Plant and machine 
operators and assemblers
14 1.9 14 1.9 1 .1 1 0.1
Labourers and unskilled 
Workers
32 4.3 20 2.7 21 2.8 5 0.7
Special occupations 56 7.5 48 6.4 130 17.3 103 13.7
Dead/absent 47 6.3 62 8.3 37 4.9 64 8.5
Missing 28 3.7 57 7.6 45 6.0 92 12.3
Total 750 100.0 750 100.0 750 100.0 750 100.0
Respondents’ parents’ occupations also varied across all fields, with differing trends 
in Yogyakarta and Ambon and also between father and mother. In Yogyakarta, 
most parents are clerks, while in Ambon most are farmers, forestry workers and 
fishermen. The percentage of clerks in Ambon is relatively high, but comes second 
to agricultural work. In Yogyakarta, the percentage of mothers whose work relates 
to trade is also considerably high (21.2%), after clerks. Trade and its related work is 
also an important sector for women in Ambon. The details for parents’ occupation 
are shown in table 3.18.        
Half the respondents are considered to come from a middle-class household, 
with a monthly income from IDR 1,000,000 to IDR 5,999,999. 12.9% belong to the 
upper class, with a household income of more than IDR 6,000,000, but at the same 
time 31.8% come from the lower income class. In Ambon, 29.5% of respondents’ 
households even live below the poverty line, with a monthly income of less than IDR 
500,000. Indeed, the majority of respondents in Ambon could be classified from low 
DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENTS
115
3
(46.7%) to middle class (40.7%). Meanwhile, the respondents in Yogyakarta come 
from middle (59.7%) to upper class (20.5%) households, as illustrated in Table 3.19.




N % N % N %
Lower than IDR 500.000, 47 6.3 221 29.5 268 17.9
IDR 500.000 - IDR 999,999, 79 10.5 129 17.2 208 13.9
IDR 1,000,000, - IDR 1.999.999, 113 15.1 119 15.9 232 15.5
IDR 2,000,000, - IDR 2.999.999, 115 15.3 86 11.5 201 13.4
IDR 3.000.000, - IDR 3.999.999, 98 13.1 60 8.0 158 10.5
IDR 4.000.000, - IDR 4.999.999, 56 7.5 22 2.9 78 5.2
IDR 5.000.000, - IDR 5.999.999, 65 8.7 18 2.4 83 5.5
IDR 6.000.000, and over 154 20.5 40 5.3 194 12.9
Missing 23 3.1 55 7.3 78 5.2
Total 750 100.0 750 100.0 1500 100.0
3.3.4. Intermediate determinants 
The intermediate variables in this study cover perceived group threat, salience 
of identity, actual intergroup contact, individual memory of violence, perceived 
discrimination, religiosity, nationalistic attitudes and intergroup distrust. All these 
variables relate to ethno-religious identification and support for violence in different 
ways; they are affected by ethno-religious identification and in turn determine 
variations in support for violence. They also mediate the relationship of ethno-
religious identification to support for violence. The measurements for each of them 
were set up from a review of previous relevant studies. 
3.3.4.1. Perceived group threat
This concept refers to an in-group’s feeling of insecurity due to increasing competition 
with out-groups. It is an individual response to perceived and actual competition. 
The subjectively perceived group threat arises when the presence of other groups 
is assumed to pose risks to the socio-conditions of individuals and their groups 
in terms of, for example, job prospects, housing availability, financial assistance, 
privileged positions in government offices, or preferential treatment by authorities, 
etc. (Scheepers et al. 2002a; Gijsberts et al., 2004, Schneider, 2008; Savelkoul et al. 
2010). In our measurement, perceived group threat was addressed in relation to 




To construct a measurement for perceived group threat, we began with the one 
used by Scheepers et al. (2002a) to predict exclusionist reactions to ethnic minorities. 
The reliability of this measure is a quite high, ranging from 0.61 in Portugal to 0.83 
in France. From this measure, four statements were adopted for their relevance 
to perceived group threat in relation to issues of way of life, security, preferential 
treatment and the job market. These were, “The religious practices of people from 
these minority groups threaten our way of life;” “The presence of people from these 
minority groups is a cause of insecurity;” “People from these minority groups are 
given preferential treatment by the authorities” and “The presence of people from 
the minority group increases unemployment in (country).” We then adjusted them 
for our focus on ethno-religious groups and to reflect the characteristics of university 
students. 
To do this, we changed the term minority groups to “other religious groups”, 
so that the statement, for example, “The religious practices of people from these 
minority groups threaten our way of life” then became “The religious practices of 
people from other religious groups threaten our own way of life.” We also extended 
the measurement in the statement about insecurity by identifying the two specific 
sites where the respondents perceive a threat from individuals related to the out-
groups, paraphrasing it thus: “I am worried that security in my neighbourhood will 
decline due to the presence of other religious groups.” Furthermore, we added two 
new statements to make the measurement relevant to university students, especially 
in terms of economic competition at the micro-individual level. These were based on 
the fourth item of Scheepers et al. (2002a) about the effect of migrants on increasing 
unemployment; we modified the term “unemployment” to “job prospects”, which 
is more suitable for students, and added a statement about business opportunities 
to obtain a measure of perceived group threat in the important sector of economic 
activity. The new statements were, “I am worried that job prospects for members of 
my group will decline due to the presence of other religious groups,” and “Members 
of other religious groups are in control of business opportunities.”
The other items were partly constructed from the measurement of Savelkoul 
et al. (2010) on perceived threat dimension. The reliability is relatively high, as 
indicated by the score of Cronbach alpha = 0.80. The original statements were about 
perceived threat in relation to the housing market and culture: “Minorities get their 
turn before Dutch people in the housing market” and “Minorities are a threat to our 
own culture” (Savelkoul et al., 2010: 16). To make this measurement more relevant 
to university students, we changed housing market competition to boarding-house 
competition so that it became, “The chances of finding room in a boarding house 
will decline due to the presence of other groups.” The statement about culture was 
split into two to cover cultural groups and religious groups: “I am afraid that customs 
of my group will be lost due to the presence of other religious groups,” and “The 
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migration of people of different religious groups to my community is a threat to my 
own religious group.” 
Our measurement also contained three other items related to subjectively 
perceived competition – study grant opportunities, political threat of the dominant in 
government positions, and increasing violence due to the presence of other religious 
groups. These were, “I am worried that study grant opportunities will decline due 
to the presence of other religious groups,” “The day will come when members of 
other religious groups will occupy crucial positions in government,” and “I am afraid 
of increasing violence in my neighbourhood due to the presence of other religious 
groups.” In total, the measurement set for perceived group threat numbered 12 
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The general trend of the survey result indicates a moderate attitude towards 
perceived threat. The highest mean score is for Muslim respondents in Ambon who 
are “afraid that customs of their group will be lost due to the presence of other 
religious groups” (3.09). Even though the means are not extremely low or high, 
the pattern is still apparent. The respondents of Ambon feel more threatened than 
those in Yogyakarta. Specifically, Muslims in Ambon tend to perceive threat more 
than Christians in Ambon and Muslims in Yogyakarta. Furthermore, Muslims in 
Yogyakarta perceive more threat than Christians in the same city. The highest score 
for perceived threat among Christians in Ambon, as well as Muslims and Christians 
in Yogyakarta, relates to the occupation of crucial positions in the government by 
other religious groups. 
3.3.4.2. Salience of identity
Salience of identity refers to an individual’s acknowledgement, conscious and 
intentional, of identifying as a member of a certain group and the importance 
attached to this membership and its consequences. Since this study delves into 
aspects of ethnic and religious identities, the measurement was developed via two 
indicators, namely salience of ethnic identity and salience of religious identity. The 
measurement stems from a combination of “the salience of ethno-cultural identity 
scale” (Duckit, 2006:161) and “salience of religion” (Eisinga et al., 1991:320). 
Duckit’s salience of ethno-cultural identity is measured by eight items with fairly 
high reliability for white Africans (0.70), Indians (0.60), and white English (0.77), but 
slightly lower for Africans (0.44). Two items were adapted from this measurement, 
namely: “My ethnic/cultural identity is very important to me” and “Most of the time, 
I don’t see myself as a ‘real’ member of my ethnic/cultural group.” Three other items 
were modified from the measurement of “salience of religion”, which originally had 
five questions. The alpha of the measurement is 0.87.   
The four items were then revised to make them clear and parsimonious. For 
instance, Duckit’s statement (2006), “Most of the time, I don’t see myself as a ‘real’ 
member of my ethnic/cultural group’’ was modified to “I see myself as a ‘real’ 
member of my ethnic group.” The term “cultural” was omitted to avoid a double 
barrel. We also made some linguistic revisions to the items adopted from Eisinga 
et al. (1991). One item was added to measure the influence of religion and ethnic 
identities on social relations, namely, “My religious belief/ ethnic identity has a great 
deal of influence on how I relate to others.” All in all, we devised five items that were 
similar for both ethnic and religious identities. The scale of the measurement used a 
similar scoring system to that of Eisinga et al. (1991), a five-point index ranging from 
totally disagree to totally agree.  
The result of the survey shows that salience of ethnic identity is relatively 
high in both Muslims and Christians (> 3.32), as shown in Table 3.20. However, the 
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ethnic identity of respondents in Ambon is more salient than that of respondents in 
Yogyakarta. In all measurements, both Muslim and Christian respondents in Ambon 
score higher than respondents in Yogyakarta; and the ethnic identity of Muslims in 
Ambon is more salient than that of Christians. 
Table 3.20 Salience of ethnic identity
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In general, religious identity has even more salience than ethnic identity; the pattern 
looks similar, but the score is higher. In all measurements, the mean is close to 4.00 
and even higher, except for Christians in Yogyakarta who see themselves as committed 
members of their religious group (3.80) and claim that their religious belief has a 
great deal of influence on how they relate to others (3.92). Compared to Yogyakarta, 
the religious identity of respondents in Ambon is more salient. Nonetheless, the 
religious identity of Muslims in both cities is more salient than that of Christians and 
religious identity is most salient to Muslims in Ambon. 
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Table 3. 21 The salience of religious identity
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3.3.4.3 Actual intergroup contact
The main concept of intergroup contact refers to the intensity of social interaction 
between members of different ethno-religious groups (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 
1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Brown et al. 2007; Schneider, 2008). It involves the 
quantity and quality of both individual and group contact in terms of their effect on 
negative attitudes towards out-groups. While quantity of contact refers to what can 
be measured in terms of, for example, frequency of face-to-face meetings, quality of 
contact emphasizes the depth or intimacy of interaction. In our measurement, we 
determined levels of intimacy, from far to close, in terms of neighbours, classmates, 
board mates, close friends and relatives. 
There are several inventories that are seen as the benchmark for constructing 
this measurement. The quantity of contact scale was developed by Tabory (1993), 
which measured the frequency of respondents’ social encounters with religious 
and non-religious youth. The answer categories were “often”, “occasionally” and 
“infrequently, if at all”, with a high score for reliability as indicated by Cronbach 
alpha 0.95. A comparable measure was devised by Wagner et al., (2006), whose 
questions were, “How often do you have personal contact with foreigners in your 
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neighborhood?” and “How often do you have personal contact with foreigners in 
your work place?” The answer categories ranged from “never” to “often”. From 
these measurements, we constructed a new scale of contact quantity by replacing 
“the religious and non-religious youth” of Tabory (1993), and foreigners of Wagner 
et al. (2006), with Christians if the question was asked of Muslim respondents, and 
with Muslims if the question was asked of Protestants or Catholics. We also specified 
categories of religious out-groups, from far to close, e.g., neighbours, classmates, 
board-mates/house-mates, close friends and relatives. To limit the time-frame of 
the contact, we added the qualifier of “in the past year”. So, the question became, 
“In the past year, how often did you have contact with Christians/Muslims as 
neighbours, classmates, board-mates, close friends and relatives?” Each question 
had similar answer categories, from “never”, “almost once a week”, “once a week”, 
“more than once a week”, “once a day”, to “several times a day”. The column “not 
applicable“ was provided for respondents who might not know anyone relevant to 
the question.  
The work of Nix (1993) assessing social distance and factors that affect its 
magnitude at Southern University in the United States of America was adapted to 
measure quality of contact. This study evaluated contact from extremely positive to 
extremely negative with six scales, via the question, “How would you rate your cross-
cultural experience at (insert your university)?” In our measurement, we modified 
this to, “How would you rate your contact with them?” – “them” referring to the 
aforementioned categories of neighbours, classmates, board-mates/house-mates, 
close friends and relatives. The answer categories were “very negative”, “negative”, 
“neither negative nor positive”, “positive”, “very positive”, and “not applicable”.  
A further measurement was constructed from Brown et al. (2007) on quality 
of relationships, the reliability of which is shown by Cronbach alpha 0.66. In this 
inventory, quality of contact is measured by asking about closeness, equality and 
cooperativeness, with seven scales of answer categories ranging from “once a 
year” to “daily”. We changed the grammatical structure of the measure by using 
the question form instead of a positive statement, to establish social distance from 
neighbours, classmates, board-mates/house-mates, close friends and relatives. The 
three items of closeness, equality and cooperativeness remained as in the original 
version. 
The resulting measurements were, “How close are you to your neighbours, close 
friends, class-mates, board-mates, and relatives from other religious groups?”, “How 
equal would you say you are to your neighbours, close friends, class-mates, board-
mates, and relatives from other religious groups?”, “How much do you cooperate 
with your neighbours, close friends, class-mates, board-mates, and relatives from 
other religious groups?” The answer categories were changed respectively to five 
categories: very close, close, neither close nor not close, not close, nor not close at 
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all. The column of “not applicable” was provided for respondents who might not be 
able to choose an answer.
The survey found that the average quantity of contact between Muslim 
respondents, both in Ambon and Yogyakarta, with Christians is less than with their 
board-mates or housemates (1.42). In Ambon, where the residential segregation of 
Muslims and Christians is so apparent, it might be less prevalent for respondents 
staying together with people of different religions, either in the same house or 
boarding house. Certainly, contact with Christians neighbours must be very rare, or 
almost never, since they are unlikely to live in their neighbourhood. In Yogyakarta, 
the quantity of contact with Christian house-mates or neighbours is more frequent. 
Muslims in Yogyakarta are even in contact with Christians as their close friend more 
than once a week (3.07).
In contrast with Muslims, Christians in Ambon have contact with their Muslim 
house-mates or board-mates at least once a week (2.00) and with close Muslim 
friends more than once a week (3.07). The higher quantity of contact might be an 
indication that there are more Muslims living in Christian neighbourhoods than the 
reverse. In Yogyakarta, Christians have almost no barrier to their contact with Muslim 
friends or neighbours, as the average mean is high (> 3.51). However, Muslims seem 
to have less contact with Christians, overall, than Christians with Muslims. 
A similar pattern appears when survey respondents were asked to rate their 
contact with Christians as neighbours, classmates, house-mates/boarding-mates, 
close friends and relatives. All respondents have positive contact (> 3.00), especially 
Christians, who claim it is very positive (>3.99). Even though positive, the quality 
of contact with Muslims in Ambon is the poorest compared to other groups. The 
lowest mean is for the quality of contact with house/boarding-mates (3.36) and the 
highest is for neighbours (3.55). This trend is consistent with Christians in Ambon, 
where there is less contact with house/boarding-mates of different religions due to 
social segregation. Furthermore, Christians in Ambon seem similar to Muslims in 
Yogyakarta. Nonetheless, if the rate is made within the comparison of their relation, 
the Muslims in Yogyakarta value Christians less as neighbours and house/boarding-
mates (3.87). The variability of all answers tends to be less pronounced, but Muslims 
are slightly more heterogeneous than Christians. The standard deviation for Muslims 
is .78 - .90 and for Christians it is .67 - .75.  
When respondents were asked about their closeness and equality in 
relationships with people of other religious groups with the same parameters, the 
outcome is consistent with the pattern above, though the mean of closeness differs 
slightly from that of equality. The pattern also recurs in terms of how different 
religious groups in Ambon and Yogyakarta cooperate with one another; the lowest 
cooperation is of Muslims in Ambon with Christian house/boarding-mates (2.78) 
and neighbours (2.99). Christians also seem to cooperate less with the Muslims in 
CHAPTER 3
124
Ambon as neighbours (3.49); the level is similar to that of Muslims’ cooperation with 
Christians in Yogyakarta. Meanwhile, Christians in Yogyakarta cooperate openly with 
Muslims, especially their close friends, relatives, neighbours, class mates, but less 
with house/boarding-mates. The variability of answers follows the same pattern in 
terms of closeness, equality and cooperativeness, in that Christians vary less than 
Muslims. The standard deviation of Christians for assessing cooperativeness is .65 - 
.81 and of Muslims is 1.08 – 1.25   
3.3.4.4. Experience and individual memory of violence 
Violent conflict brings about individual traumatic experiences and resides in the 
collective memory of the community. Even if individuals have not experienced it, 
memories of past violence persist in the groups or communities affected. It can 
be transmitted from generation to generation or from group to other groups. The 
memory of past violence influences individual identification with ethno-religious 
groups; it increases the tendency to create positive associations for the in-group and 
to dehumanize out-groups (Sahdra and Ross, 2007; Fierke, 2008). 
The measurement for individual memory of violence was constructed via 
two inventories – Sahdra and Ross (2007) and Hayes and McAllister (2001). In their 
experimental design, the first inventory asked the participants three main questions. 
The first asked them to rate the extent to which they had thought about communal 
violence over the past five years. The scale offered five choices, ranging from 
“never” to “very frequently”. The second asked them to rate the extent to which 
they thought that members of the victim group should forget about the event and 
move on. The response scale was in nine categories from “agree not at all” to “agree 
very much”. In the third, the participants were asked to indicate the degree to which 
they experienced various emotions while reading about the incidents of violence; 
they were asked to respond to fourteen negative emotions and four positive ones, 
on a scale of 1-10 ranging from “not at all” to “very much”. 
Hayes and McAllister (2001) cited some questions from an Irish social mobility 
survey of 1973; a social attitudes survey of 1978; a social identity survey of 1995 
and a Northern referendum and election survey of 1995. The relevant questions 
were as follows for 1973: “Have you been present when a riot or confrontation took 
place?”, “Have your family and/or friends suffered any kind of injury due to the 
troubles?” and “Have your family and/or friends been killed due to the troubles?” 
For 1978: “Have you ever witnessed an act of terrorism, for example a shooting, an 
explosion, a hijacking, or rioting?” For 1995 and 1998: “Were you a victim of any 
violent incidents?”, “Were any of your family or close friends killed or injured due to 
the violence?” and “Do you know anyone (not family or relatives) who was killed/ 
injured due to the violence?” 
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Overall, our instrument for individual memory of violence comprised twenty-
four questions, consisting of twelve items as the leading questions with a scale of 
“yes” and “no” answers. The first item was developed from the measurement of 
Sahdra and Ross (2007), and asked whether the respondents remember incidents 
of violence from the past ten years. If yes, they were then asked to estimate the 
number of incidents. The second item inquired as to whether memory of ethno-
religious violence had been transmitted within the respondent’s family; if the answer 
was yes, we asked how often it was talked about, with answers on a four-point scale 
of ”never”, “rarely”, “sometimes” and “often”. 
The remaining items were based on several questions from the second inventory. 
The third asked whether the respondent had witnessed ethno-religious violence 
over recent years. If yes, they were asked how many times they had witnessed it. 
The fourth through eighth items asked whether the respondents and their family, 
relatives, close friends, and/or neighbours had been injured during communal 
violence over the past ten years, and if yes, how many of them had suffered physical 
injury. The last item asked whether any members of the respondent’s family, 
relatives, close friends or neighbours had been killed during the communal violence. 
If yes, they were asked how many people around them had died.    
The vast majority of respondents (79%) in Ambon remembered ethno-religious 
violence from the past ten years, even though the peace accord was implemented a 
decade ago. Most of them can recall it happening more than once; 22.7% remember 
two incidents and 20.0% remember three. Moreover, 10.8% remember more than ten 
instances of ethno-religious violence in their immediate environment. In Yogyakarta, 
where there has been little mass violence since 1965, 19.7% of the respondents said 
that they remembered acts of ethno-religious violence; it could be that these were 
students from other regions. More than half of them remember violence occurring 
more than once (65.5%).  
About half the respondents talk about ethno-religious violence in their family. 
In Ambon, the percentage is 76.3%, while in Yogyakarta it is 39.9%. More than half 
the respondents in Ambon and Yogyakarta answered “sometimes” and “often”. In 
Ambon, 61.6% of the respondents had witnessed violence. Among them, 57.8% had 
witnessed one to three episodes and 27.1% had experienced it more than three 
times. In Yogyakarta, 28.9% respondents had witnessed violence over the past ten 
years; considerably fewer than in Ambon.  
A large number of respondents had also suffered physical injury as a result 
of ethno-religious violence. In Ambon, 46.6% of respondents said they had done 
so more than once. Some also claim that members of their immediate family had 
been injured; 62.6% said that this had happened to more than two family members. 
Moreover, 25.1% of respondents said that members of their immediate families had 
lost their lives; almost half had lost more than two. In Yogyakarta, the number of 
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respondents to have suffered injury is fewer than in Ambon; the number whose 
immediate family members had been injured or had died was similarly low.    
Besides immediate family, 35.2% of respondents in Ambon also say that relatives 
had been injured and even killed in the violence of recent years (22.9%); 40.7% had 
lost one of their relatives. The percentage of relatives injured is similar to that for 
close friends (22.7%), but slightly different to that for neighbours (32.1%). However, 
the percentage of close friends who had been killed is smaller than the percentage of 
neighbours who had been victims of ethno-religious violence. Several respondents 
in Yogyakarta also said that they have relatives, close friends and neighbours who 
had been injured or lost their lives, but the percentage is much lower than for the 
respondents in Ambon.
3.3.4.5. Perceived discrimination
Discrimination in general refers to the feeling of being excluded because of race, 
nationality, religion, ethnic group, language, age, gender or disability. Perceived 
discrimination is a subjective perception of exclusionary treatment on the part of the 
minority by the dominant groups, as a result of competition over scarce resources in 
economic, political, cultural and religious domains (Coenders and Scheepers, 1998; 
Verkuyten and Yildiz, 2006; Fox, 2000a). In order to construct the measurement for 
perceived discrimination, this study uses the indicators applied by Fox (2000a) and 
the questions of the European Social Survey 2008/2009. 
The leading questions for perceived discrimination asked respondents to 
make a general assessment as to whether or not they belong to the group being 
discriminated against. First is a polar question, followed by an open-ended one. These 
questions are modified from the European Social Survey 2008/2009, which asked, 
“Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated 
against in this country?’ and “On what grounds is your group discriminated against?” 
The answer categories were colour or race, nationality, religion, language, ethnic 
group, age, gender, sexuality and disability. The next question was, “Do you consider 
yourself to be a member of a group that is discriminated against in this city?” and 
“If yes, on what ground is your group discriminated against?” The answer categories 
were basically similar, with the choices condensed to religion, language, ethnic 
group, gender and other. 
The measurement for perceived discrimination was also specified according 
to the fields of economics, politics, culture and religion, in which ethno-religious 
groups compete for limited resources. The question for economic discrimination 
was modified from Fox (2000a), “To what extent is there official restriction on 
minorities’ economic activities?” to “Would you agree or disagree that your own 
ethno-religious group experiences the following economic limitations?” We also 
modified the set of following phrases, since Fox‘s questions are difficult to apply and 
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somewhat confusing. The new phrases described economic discrimination indicators 
including “Limitation on access to credit”, “Limitations on access to government 
subsidy”, “Limitations on participation in the local market”, “Limitations on access 
to the housing market” and “Limitations on access to the job market”. The answer 
categories, across the economic, political, cultural and religious domains, were 
listed from “totally disagree” to “totally agree”. However, limitations on access to 
credit was omitted after the pilot survey, because of its low correlation with other 
indicators for economic discrimination.
The indicators for political discrimination were defined in terms of limitations 
on freedom of expression, on freedom to choose a place of residence, on the right 
to form political organizations, on the exercise of the right to vote, on recruitment 
to the police corps, on recruitment of civil servants and on attaining higher positions 
in government offices. The set of the measurement was mostly derived from Fox 
(2000a) with some modifications to make it more reliable, plausible and simple. The 
first modification was to replace the word “restriction” with “limitation” because 
some aspects of discrimination may not be enshrined officially, but occur due to the 
challenge from other groups. Of the eight items, we initially used only seven, since 
the right to judicial proceedings is not applicable to the Indonesian legal system; after 
the pilot study, only four were retained, namely: freedom of expression, freedom 
to choose a place of residence, recruitment of civil servants and attaining higher 
positions in government offices. The general question for political discrimination 
was, “Would you agree or disagree that your own ethno-religious group experiences 
the following limitations in politics?” The following limitations refer to the four 
dimensions above. 
Cultural discrimination was measured by four aspects of limitations on cultural 
practices: on celebration of group ceremonies, of dress, behaviour and marriage. 
This was simpler and more relevant to the local context of this study than the original 
indicators of Fox (2000a), which comprise seven aspects of restriction, namely 
restriction of observance of group religion; restriction of speaking and publishing 
in the group’s language/dialect; restriction of instruction in the group’s language; 
restriction of celebration of group’s holidays, ceremonies and cultural events; 
restriction of dress, appearance and behaviour; restriction of marriage and family 
life; restriction of organizations that promote the group’s cultural interests. 
Perceived discrimination can be experienced by the minority religious group 
in relation to the dominant majority. The measurement for the religious dimension 
was constructed with the following question: “Would you agree or disagree that 
your own ethno-religious group experiences the following limitations on religion?” 
The indicator was partly modified from Fox (2000a) on religious discrimination, since 
some of the latter’s dimensions were inappropriate for the societal context of our 
research sites. For instance, ordination or access to clergy were not applicable to 
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Muslim respondents. Moreover, the Fox measurement could be confusing given 
the double and triple nature of its question. Our measurement consisted of seven 
questions encompassing limitations on public observance of religious services, public 
observance of religious holy days, public observance of religious festivals, building 
places of worship, forced observance of religious laws of other groups, running of 
religious schools, and the observance of religious laws on marriage and divorce. In 
the interests of efficiency, and based on results of the pilot survey, limitations on 
religious services and religious holidays were then omitted. The answer categories 
were the same as for other dimensions of discrimination: from “totally disagree” to 
“totally agree”. 
A large number of respondents said that they do not belong to groups that are 
discriminated against. In particular, the respondents in Yogyakarta tend to affirm this 
(89.3%), while some in Ambon claim that their group is still discriminated against 
(24.5%). Of respondents who feel they are discriminated against, both in Ambon and 
Yogyakarta, a large percentage (66.3%), especially in Ambon (73.4%), see religion 
as the root of discrimination against their group, followed by ethnicity (14.9%). In 
general, discrimination is at a low to moderate level (means < 3.00).  
In the economic sector, Muslims in Ambon feel that limitations on access to 
the housing market (2.32) are the main form of discrimination, while Muslims in 
Yogyakarta feel it to be limitations on access to the job market (2.97). Christians 
in Ambon (2.31) and Yogyakarta (2.39) both indicated limitations on access to 
government subsidies. The variability indicates less disparity between Muslims than 
Christians in general, as showed by the standard deviation of Muslims in the range 
of .84 to .87, while Christians range from .96-1.03. In the political sector, Christians 
in Ambon indicate limitations on freedom of expression (2.27) while Christians in 
Yogyakarta (2.57) and Muslims in both cities (2.23 and 2.16) assert that limitations on 
attaining higher positions in government offices are the main area of discrimination. 
The variability seems be largely similar to that for the economy, but slightly wider; 
the range of standard deviation for Muslims is .90-.94 and for Christians is .98-1.12. 
All respondents in Ambon and Muslims in Yogyakarta feel that there is cultural 
discrimination in relation to limitations on dress (> 2.59). Meanwhile, Christians 
pinpoint limitations on behaviour as the discriminative focus of the majority group 
(2.61). Dress is still the subject of debate in Indonesia in relation to the implementation 
of an anti-pornography law. Christians perceive that there are limitations on wearing 
clothes that reveal aurat (sensual parts of the body), which Muslims are forbidden 
to show. Conversely, Muslims who wear veils and long dresses are often accused of 
following Arabic traditions, rather than being proud of local or national identities. 
Parallel to the issue of dress is behaviour; Muslims are viewed as more conservative 
than Christians. The range of standard deviation tends to be greater for Muslims 
(.87-1.12) than Christians (.93 – 1.14)
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Furthermore, respondents tend to agree that there is religious discrimination. 
Respondents in Yogyakarta feel that there are limitations on building places of worship 
(2.56). This is true for minority groups, due to the implementation of Joint Regulation 
of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs No. 9 2006/8 
2006. This regulation seems to have a powerful impact, because the requirement for 
agreement by both the local community and the government constrain minorities’ 
ability to build such places (Wijsen and Singgih, 2002:87-90). This is the item for 
which respondent responses show the highest disparity in standard deviation, a 
score of 1.24. All respondents in Ambon and Muslims in Yogyakarta tend to agree 
that discrimination is high in terms of limitations on observance of religious laws 
regarding marriage and divorce. The variability indicates that Muslims in Yogyakarta 
are more homogenous than other groups; the standard deviation is .99, while 
for Muslims in Ambon it is 1.10. Christians in Ambon are similar to Christians in 
Yogyakarta with a standard deviation of 1.09.  
3.3.4.6. Religiosity
As discussed in the previous chapter, religiosity is a religion-based sentiment of 
exclusiveness in which individuals believe their religion to be the axis of everything, 
and that all others should be assessed with reference to it. It encompasses 
religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality and religious fundamentalism. 
The measurements for these are described in more detail below. 
 
3.3.4.6.1. Religiocentrism
At least two measurements for religiocentrism are available. The first was constructed 
by Ray and Doratis (1971) to measure religiocentrism and conservatism in Catholic 
and Protestant groups in Australia. The second was developed by Sterkens and 
Anthony (2008) in their study of religiocentrism among Muslims, Christians and 
Hindus in India. Although the former measurement has higher reliability with a 
Cronbach alpha score of .88 (Sterkens and Anthony has an alpha between .55 and 
.70), we used the latter as the basis our measurement, simply because its questions 
are more elaborative and more systematic and because it has already been tested in 
a cross-religious comparative study.
The instrument of Sterkens and Anthony (2008) consisted of three sets of 
questions to be asked of the three different religious groups, i.e. Christians, Muslims 
and Hindus. The respondents were asked to respond to a list of positive statements 
about their in-group and negative statements about the religious out-groups. So 
Christian respondents assessed their positive attitudes toward Christianity and their 
negative attitudes toward Islam and Hinduism; Muslims their positive attitudes 




The statements for each religious group consisted of fourteen items: four 
positive statements about the religious in-group and two sets of five items associating 
religious out-group members with negative characteristics. For our measurement, 
we selected three of the positive in-group items and three of the negative out-group 
ones. The positive statements were: “Christians (Muslims) show the most faith in 
God;” “Thanks to their religion, most Christians (Muslims) are good people;” and 
“Christians (Muslims) are best able to talk meaningfully about God.” The negative 
statements were: “Muslims (Christians) talk about doing good deeds, but they do 
not practise them,” “When it comes to religion, Muslims (Christians) are intolerant,” 
and “Muslims (Christians) are often the cause of religious conflict.” 
While our measurement remained similar to this, we paraphrased the 
statements to an extent. For instance, in the statement “Muslims (Christians) 
talk about doing good deeds, but they do not practise them,” we used the word 
”without” for its strong sense of irony, so that it read, “Christians (Muslims) only 
talk about doing good deeds without practising them.” We also refined the sentence 
about tolerance by adding “less”, so that it read, “When it comes to religion, Muslims 
(Christians) are less tolerant.” The answer categories were on a five-point Likert scale 
from “totally disagree’’ (1) to ”totally agree” (5). Muslim respondents were asked to 
react only to the positive statements about Muslims and the negative statements 
about Christians, and vice versa.  
Table 3.23 below shows the positive attitudes towards the in-group, and 
Table 3.24 the negative attitudes towards the out-group. The tables show, on 
average, stronger levels of religiocentrism among Muslims than Christians; they 
value their religious in-group highly, and show higher levels of negative out-group 
attitudes, particularly in terms of the view that Christians only talk about doing 
good deeds without practising them (2.77) and that Christians are less tolerant 
(2.84). Nonetheless, Muslims view Christians as the cause of conflict less (2.72) 
than Christians consider Muslims to be so (2.78). The variability of responses to the 
positive statements is greater (.89-1.23), while negative attitudes towards the out-
group is more homogenous among Muslims (.99-1.09) than among Christians (.93-
1.18). 
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Specifically, Muslims in Ambon have stronger religiocentric attitudes than Muslims 
in Yogyakarta. Not only do they value their own religious group highly (4.42); they 
also view Christians as less tolerant (3.12) and to be the cause of conflict (3.02). 
In this section, the variability of responses to the positive statements tends to be 
homogenous, as indicated by the standard deviation of .84, while their negative 
attitudes tend to vary more (SD: .99- 1.15). The Muslims in Yogyakarta are probably 
more tolerant because they are less prejudiced towards Christians. The mean 
for assessing Christians as less tolerant is relatively low (2.64), and so are their 
assumptions that Christians are the cause of religious conflict (2.49). Despite this 
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tolerance, Muslims in Yogyakarta tend to value their religious group highly, as 
indicated by the mean value for “Muslims show the most faith in God” (4.19) and 
for “Muslims are best able to talk meaningfully about God” (3.79). Their responses 
to the negative statements, as indicated by the standard deviation, tend to be less 
varied (.91- .99) than to the positive statements (.88 - 1.10).
Compared to Christians in Yogyakarta, Christians in Ambon are more 
religiocentric; all the means for positive attitudes towards their in-group are higher. 
Only in the view that Muslims are less tolerant do Christians in Ambon have slightly 
lower mean score (2.78). In Yogyakarta, Christians are apparently more tolerant and 
somewhat more critical of their own religious group than Christians in Ambon, as 
indicated by their tendency to moderately disagree with the claims that Christians 
are good people (2.74) and that Christians are best able to talk meaningfully about 
God (2.75). Moreover, they tend to disagree that Muslims only talk about good 
deeds without practising them (2.41), that Muslims are less tolerant (2.79) and that 
Muslims are often the cause of religious conflict (2.73). The variability of answers is 
also less heterogeneous, as shown by the standard deviation, which is from .79 to 
1.09.
3.3.4.6.2. Attitudes towards religious plurality
Attitudes towards religious plurality involve individuals’ interpretation of other 
religions from the perspective of what is claimed to be true by their own religious 
tradition. These attitudes encompass three different models: monism, pluralism 
and relativism. Each model has four dimensions, namely: normative, experiential, 
transformative and relational. The normative dimension refers to a religion’s truth 
claims; the experiential dimension deals with the human being’s experience of 
God; the transformative dimension concerns self-realization or liberation, and the 
relational dimension can be viewed as the relationship of one religion to others 
(Anthony et al., 2005).       
Our measurement for attitudes toward religious plurality stems from the 
research of Anthony et al. (2005), but with a number of modifications. The monism 
models used four similar items with small revisions to make the statements clearer. 
First, we changed, “The truth about God, human beings and the universe is found 
only in my religion” to “The truth about God is found only in my religion,” deleting 
“human beings” and “the universe” to avoid the triple barrel. The second item, 
“Other religions do not offer a true experience of God,” was reformulated to “Other 
religions do not provide as deep an experience of God as my religion.” The third 
item, “Only through my religion can people can attain true liberation,” was changed 
to “Compared with other religions, my religion offers the surest way to liberation.” 
The fourth item remained the same: “Compared with my religion, other religions 
contain only partial truths.” 
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The pluralism model had similar dimensions and consisted of four items. The 
first and second items from Anthony et al. (2005) were replaced by new statements 
because of their low points founded in the research. These two were, “Differences 
between religions are an opportunity for discovering the truths ignored by my own 
religion,” and “Differences in God-experience made possible by various religions 
challenge the idea that God is one”. We replaced them with, “Differences between 
religions provide more knowledge of God,” and “Differences between religions are 
a source of spiritual development.” We also modified the third item, given that the 
pilot survey revealed that respondents had difficulty understanding it. The original 
was, “Differences between religions are part of God’s plan to save the world,” which 
we changed to “In religious traditions, different aspects of God are revealed.” The 
fourth item was revised by deleting the words “and growth” at the end, which 
we considered to create a double barrel for the measurement. Thus it became, 
“Differences between religions are a basis for mutual enrichment.” Each item had 
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The four items for the relativism model were modified from the earlier measurement 
of Anthony et al. (2005). The first, “Different religions reveal different aspects of the 
same ultimate truth,” was changed by replacing “different” with “all”, to become 
“All religions reveal different aspects of the same ultimate truth.” We modified the 
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second item by replacing the passive with an active sentence, and by again replacing 
the word “different” with “all”. So, “Different aspects of the same divine reality are 
experienced in different religions” then became “In all religions, you can experience 
aspects of the same divine reality.” The third item, “Every religion contributes in a 
unique way to the ultimate liberation of human beings,” we kept exactly the same. 
However, we changed the fourth item totally, from a relational dimension to a 
normative one: “The similarities among religions are a basis for building up a universal 
religion” was replaced with “All religions provide an equally profound experience of 
God.” After the pilot survey, all items were changed to a formulation that could be 
understood easily by respondents, and so became, “All religions are equally valid ways 
to ultimate truth,” “All religions are equally valid paths to liberation,” “Everything 
that is said about God in other religions has the same value,” and “At the deepest 
level, all religions are the same.” Both in Ambon and Yogyakarta, Muslims agree with 
monism more strongly than Christians. Muslims in Ambon reveal the strongest belief 
that their religion is the only source of truth. The mean for “The truth about God is 
found only in my religion” is 4.09. The lowest is 3.54, for “Compared with my religion, 
other religions contain only partial truths.” This tendency is similar for Muslims in 
Yogyakarta, with a lower mean. For “the truth about God”, the mean of Muslims in 
Yogyakarta is 3.85, and for “partial truth”, it is 3.24. The tendency of Christians to 
believe in the truth of their religion is different; certainly, like Muslims, they believe 
that their religion offers the surest way to liberation, but some of them seem to 
have a different understanding of what this means, given that their mean value is 
3.73 in Ambon and 3.15. The mean for Christians in Ambon is even lower than that 
for Muslims in Yogyakarta. The lowest mean is for “Other religions do not provide 
as deep a God-experience as my religion,” which is 2.64 for Christians in Ambon and 
2.27 for Christians in Yogyakarta. The variability between Muslims and Christians is 
similar, with a spread of .93-1.14, except for Christians in Yogyakarta who are more 
homogenous in relation to “Other religions do not provide as deep a God-experience 
as my religion” (SD .82).
For pluralism, the highest mean of the aggregate measurement appears 
in Christians in Yogyakarta. The highest mean (4.11) is for “Differences between 
religions are a basis for mutual enrichment,’’ while the lowest is 3.45 for “In religious 
traditions, different aspects of God are revealed.” Christians in Ambon follow a 
similar pattern to Christians in Yogyakarta. Furthermore, Muslims in Yogyakarta 
view pluralism in much the same way as Muslims in Ambon. The measurement for 
‘Differences between religions are a basis for mutual enrichment” has the highest 
mean for Muslims in Yogyakarta (3.62) and the lowest mean for Muslims in Ambon 
(347). The lowest mean for Muslims in Yogyakarta is 3.41 for “Differences between 
religions are a source of spiritual development.” The variability tends to be wider 
among Muslims (SD .95 – 1.03) while Christians are more consistent (SD .87-.97).
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Concerning relativism, Christians have a higher mean than Muslims, as Table 3.27 
shows. Christians in Ambon have the highest mean, which is 4.14 for “All religions 
are equally valid ways to ultimate truth,” slightly more than for Yogyakarta (3.93). For 
Christians in Yogyakarta, “Everything that is said about God in other religions has the 
same value” has a mean of 3.66; the lowest mean is 3.77 for Christians in Ambon. 
The lowest mean is for Muslims in Ambon, for “Everything that is said about God in 
other religions has the same value” and “At the deepest level, all religions are the 
same,” which are both 2.76. Muslims in Yogyakarta are slightly more moderate than 
those in Ambon, but still less so than Christians. The mean is in the range of 3.06 
for “Everything that is said about God in other religions has the same value” to 3.28 
for “All religions are equally valid paths to liberation.” Overall variability tends to be 
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3.3.4.6.3. Religious fundamentalism versus hermeneutic interpretation
Religious fundamentalism has been a focus of attention since the early 20th century. 
Several definitions and measurements have been used to examine this form of 
religious dogmatism. From among the scholarly developments of the methodological 
framework, we chose an intra-textual fundamentalism scale (Williamson et al., 
2010: 738). This scale consists of: (1) “Everything in sacred writing is absolutely true 
without question”; (2) “Sacred writing should never be doubted, even when scientific 
or historical evidence outright disagrees with it”; (3) “Sacred writing is not really the 
words of God, but the words of man” (which should be reverse-coded); (4) “The 
truths of sacred writing will never become outdated, but will always apply equally 
well to all generations”, and (5) “My sacred writing is the only one that is true above 
all holy books or sacred texts of other religions”. These five statements were taken 
from the previously tested measurement without any changes. We also added, “I 
think that the sacred writings should be taken literally as they were written,” taken 
from the literal affirmation measurement of Duriez et al. (2005).
Alongside fundamentalism, we measured its opposite – a hermeneutic 
interpretation of sacred writings – through two items, taken from the measurement 
of symbolic affirmation by Duriez et al. (2005: 854). These two items were: “The 
Bible holds a deeper truth which can only be revealed by personal reflection” and 
“The meanings of sacred texts are open to change and interpretation”. There were 
the same five answer categories for all eight items, ranging from “totally disagree” 
to “totally agree”.
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The survey found that Muslims in Ambon tend to be the most fundamentalist 
in their approach to religion. This is indicated by the highest mean value in the 
aggregate measurement (> 0.40). For the item, “Sacred writing is not really the 
words of God, but the words of man,” Muslims agree the least (1.40). Muslims in 
Yogyakarta seem to be more fundamentalist than Christians in the city, but they are 
less fundamentalist than Christians in Ambon. Moreover, Christians in Yogyakarta 
show some disagreement with items that others agree with, such as “My sacred 
writing is the only one that is true above all holy books,” and “Sacred writing should 
be taken literally as written,” as shown by the mean of 2.75. In addition, Christians 
show more interest than Muslims in hermeneutic interpretations of sacred writing, 
given that they tend to strongly agree with the statement “The meanings of sacred 
writing are open to change and interpretation’’ and ”Sacred writing holds a deeper 
truth which can only be revealed by personal reflection.” Their variability is also less 




Table 3.28 Intra-textual fundamentalism (q62-67) and hermeneutic interpretation 
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Nationalistic attitude is defined as a favourable attitude towards one’s own country 
and the national in-group. It contains two dimensions: patriotism (romantic 
nationalism), and chauvinism (ethnocentric nationalism). Patriotism refers to the 
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degree of attachment to one’s country and the national in-groups, while chauvinism 
is the view that these are unique and superior. Patriotism refers to the expression 
of love and pride; the latter inclines to be rather blind and uncritical of country 
and national in-group (Coenders, 2001; Todosijevic, 2001). Nationalist attitude is 
in contrast to regiocentrism, which focuses on the interests of a particular region 
and/or ethnic groups within a region. The increase in regiocentrism is a recent 
phenomenon in post-authoritarian Indonesia, along with decentralization policies 
and the democratization process (Aspinal and Fealey, 2003).    
The measurement for nationalist attitudes was made by combining the 
measurement of Coenders (2001) on patriotism/chauvinism, and of Todosijevic 
(2001) on romantic nationalism/ethnocentric nationalism. The term “romantic 
nationalism” of Todosijevic actually equates to patriotism in Coenders and 
“ethnocentric nationalism” to chauvinism. The reliabilitiy of Todosijevic is shown by 
Cronbach alpha of .60 to .75. The patriotism measurements cited from Coenders 
were, “How proud are you of your country in terms of its achievements in history?” 
and “How proud are you of your country in terms of its achievements in equal 
treatment of all groups in society?” Other questions regarding patriotism were 
taken from Todosijevic, including, “One should respect the nation and its traditions,” 
“One should always put national interest above the personal,” and “Renewing of our 
national ideals is our most important task.” 
To measure chauvinism, most of our statements were taken from Coenders. 
These were, “I would rather be a citizen of (country) than of any other country in 
the world,” “My country is better than most other countries,” “I should support my 
country even if my country is wrong,” and “There is something about (country) that 
makes me feel shame.” Only one was taken from Todosijevic, namely, “One’s most 
important characteristics come from nationality.”
We made some minor changes; in the fourth item, the term “personal” in “One 
should always put national interests above the personal” was replaced with “ethno-
religious interest”, so that it became, “One should always put national interests above 
ethno-religious interests.” In the fifth item, the term “our most important task” was 
replaced with “our most national task”, to become, “Renewing our national ideals is 
our most national task.” Furthermore, we used “Indonesia” instead “country” in the 
rest of the chauvinism items.   
In order to measure regiocentrism, we constructed four statements by 
modifying the dimension of nation to region, using two items for patriotism and two 
for chauvinistic attitude. These were, “I should support my region even if my region is 
wrong,” “I should always put regional interest above ethno-religious group interest,” 
“I would rather be a resident of (my region) than of other regions in Indonesia,” 
and “I should respect my province and its tradition.” Based on the pilot experience, 
region was changed to district to make the meaning clear. There were five answer 
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categories for most items, but a different scale for the two items on patriotism; 
the range for these two was from “not proud at all” to “very proud”, while for the 
remaining twelve, the scale was from “totally disagree” to “totally agree”.
Muslims apparently have a greater spirit of patriotism than Christians, though 
the overall mean is high (>3.29). Christians in Ambon score even higher than Muslims, 
and Christians in Yogyakarta are particularly proud of their country (4.20), but less so 
in terms of its equal treatment of all groups in society. Christians in Yogyakarta have 
the lowest mean value for patriotism. In relation to dedication to their country, all 
respondents tend to strongly respect their nation and tradition. Nonetheless, not all 
really commit to putting the national interest above that of ethno-religious groups, 
although they tend to strongly agree with it (>3.74). The variability is apparently 
greater among Christians than Muslims, the range of standard deviation among 
Muslims being .70-.97 while it is.60-.96 for Christians.
Likewise, the aggregate measurement shows that Muslims tend to be have a 
more chauvinistic attitude to their country than Christians. Christians demonstrate 
their lower mean in their responses to “My country is better than most other 
countries” (2.89). They are also less likely than Muslims to support their country if 
their country is wrong. The Christians in Yogyakarta have the highest value of all in 
strongly agreeing that “There is something about Indonesia today that makes me 
feel shame.” In this measure, Christians tend to vary more than Muslims, with the 
standard deviation being from .97-1.18 for Christians and .90-1.15 for Muslims.
While Muslims tend to have higher mean values than Christians for nationalistic 
attitudes, the score is reversed for regiocentrism. Christians score higher in the 
aggregate measurement, which means they are more regiocentric than Muslims. 
Moreover, Christians in Yogyakarta tend to agree (2.64) more than others with the 
statement, “I should support my district even if my district is wrong.” The standard 
deviation is similar for Muslims and Christians (.75-1.19).
 
3.3.4.8. Intergroup distrust
Trust is a psychological mechanism whereby individuals believe and rely on others. 
People tend to trust their in-group, but not their out-group. Trust permeates 
all spheres of everyday life and enables individuals to interact with others and 
institutions. It is often presumed that trust fades during times of conflict. Hence, 
trust can be constructed and institutionalized, which can greatly reduce prejudice 
and the chances of explosive violence (Ward, et al., 2007). The measurement for 
trust was taken from the survey questionnaire on “Living in Germany: Survey 2003 
on the social situation of households,” with several modifications appropriate to this 
research and the local situation of Indonesia. 
The original questionnaire had three questions. There were three aspects to 
the first question; respondents were asked to express their opinion about these 
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statements: “On the whole one can trust people,” “Nowadays one can’t rely on 
anyone,” and “If one is dealing with strangers, it is better to be careful before trusting 
them.” These were measured with four scales ranging from “totally agree” to “totally 
disagree”. We developed all three statements by changing “people”, and “anyone” 
and “strangers” with “Muslims” and “Christians” interchangeably. So, the three 
dimensions became six, with three each for Muslims and Christians. We also added 
“neither disagree nor agree” to the answer scale. 
The two other questions were also multiplied by exchanging “people” for 
Muslims and Christians. Here, the respondent was asked to choose one of two 
statements by matching it with the main clause. For instance: “Do you believe that 
most Muslims....” was followed by the choice of “...would exploit you if they had 
the opportunity,” and “...would attempt to be fair towards you.” The next question 
followed a similar pattern and asked the respondent whether Muslims or Christians 
are helpful, or only act in their own interest. All in all, there were ten questions on 
trust.
The general tendency was for respondents to trust their in-groups and to be 
less trusting towards the out-groups. Both Muslims and Christians tend to strongly 
agree about the positive characteristics of their groups, and strongly disagree about 
its possible negative characteristics. The mean value for Muslims is 3.87 for the 
statement, “On the whole, one can trust Muslims.” Conversely, their mean value 
is 3.19 for the statement, “On the whole, one can trust Christians.” Christians show 
the same tendency when asked the parallel questions. However, the gap in trust 
between Muslims and Christians in Yogyakarta is smaller than it is between Muslims 
and Christians in Ambon. It seems that Muslims have less trust than Christians in 
Ambon, as the mean value (2.86) is lower than that for Christians’ view of Muslims 
(2.95). The mean for Muslims who feel they cannot to rely on Christians is also lower 
(2.67) than for Christians in relation to Muslims (3.14), and so on. The variability of 
both Muslims and Christians tends to be wider when they assess their out-groups, 
but more consistent for the in-groups.
3.4. Topic list
Besides a questionnaire for the survey, data was also collected with a topic list for 
conducting interviews with informants. The main objective of the interviews was to 
explore and to generate data that might not be captured through the questionnaire, 
and that would give context to the local situation. It was also intended to elaborate 
variables and indicators used in the questionnaire. Hence, the topic list consisted of 
a series of themes and variables that were itemized in a set of keywords, and as such, 
gave direction to the interviews.
CHAPTER 3
142
3.4.1. Selection of interviewees
We selected 18 informants for the interviews to complement our data from the 
quantitative survey. The general criteria for their selection were (1) knowledge 
or familiarity with the theme of the study in general, or the topics of the list in 
particular; (2) willingness to communicate and to share information regarding the 
issues being studied. They were selected from survey and non-survey respondents; 
we chose survey respondents in accordance with “low”, “middle” and “high” support 
for ethno-religious violence, based on their responses to the “support for violence” 
scale on the questionnaire. Prospective informants were invited at each university; 
their addresses were obtained from the final page of the questionnaire, where they 
could fill in their contact details if they were willing to be interviewed personally. 
All in all, the informants from the survey respondents included nine students 
from Yogyakarta and nine from Ambon. The informants from Yogyakarta were derived 
from the three universities selected for the survey. Their ethno-religious groups were 
varied, and included Christians and Muslims from Javanese, Sundanese, Dayak and 
Melayu backgrounds, as well from other places such as Gorontalo and Sumba. Some 
of the informants from Ambon had different ethno-religious backgrounds from those 
in Yogyakarta; other than Ambon itself, they came from various places such as Java, 
Minangkabau, Manado, Buton, Seram, Kei, Ternate, Bugis and Makassar. 
All in all there were 20 non-survey informants. These key informants consisted 
of leaders and activists of various organizations inside and outside campus, and 
were chosen on the basis of the group leaders and their knowledge regarding ethno-
religious identification and intergroup violence. In Yogyakarta, the organizations 
included the Indonesian Christian Student Movement (GMKI, Gerakan Mahasiswa 
Kristen Indonesia), Indonesian Catholic Student Association (PMKRI, Persatuan 
Mahasiswa Katolik Indonesia), the Indonesian Islamic Student Association (PMII, 
Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia), the Executive Board of Students – UGM, 
Student Senate of UIN Sunan Kalijaga, Student Union of UKDW; the leaders included 
those of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhamadiyah, and a director of Interfaith Dialogue 
Dian Interfidei, and Sekretariat Bersama untuk Keistimewaan Yogyakarta (the 
Secretariat for the Special Region of Yogyakarta). In Ambon, the informants included 
were from the Board of Student Representatives of UKIM, GMKI, PMKRI, the Synod 
of the Protestant Church of the Moluccas (GPM), ethnic leaders in the village of Soya, 
Wai and Wakal, the Islamic Student Association (PII) and Komite Nasional Pemuda 
Indonesia (National Comittee of Indonesian Youth, KNPI).
3.4.2. Development of topic list
The topic list was primarily developed from the variables used in the survey and from 
macro-contextual factors that might affect the relation between dependent and 
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independent variables. To develop the list, we began by elaborating ethno-religious 
identification and support for intergroup violence as the main independent and 
dependent variables. Ethno-religious identification was divided into two categories: 
ethnic identification and religious identification. Then, several categories for 
intermediary variables were constructed, including perceived group threat, perceived 
discrimination, intergroup distrust, memory and experience of violence, religiosity 
and nationalism, as well as regionalist orientation. Contextual factors relevant to this 
study were added, such as the history of conflict and violence in the research areas, 
the role of mass media and the importance of migration and education. In particular, 
student organizations were studied, as the survey respondents were students who 
might build socio-political affiliation with ethno-religious groups for the sake of their 
prospective careers. 
The topic categories were then used to structure the interview questions, and 
covered subject matter that might have influenced informants’ experiences, world 
views or personal opinions. The layout of the topic guide opened possibilities for 
informants to articulate, elaborate and clarify points for which there was not enough 
space on the questionnaire. At same time, it prevented incoherent or pointless 
conversations during the interview process. 
The guide was then translated into Bahasa Indonesian. As we had done for the 
questionnaire, we also tested it in the field during the pilot study by interviewing two 
respondents of the preliminary survey, and two outside informants who had not been 
included in it. The aim of this was to explore the guide’s capacity to generate data 
and to discover any problems that might arise during the interviews. The experiences 
of the pilot study taught us to give priority to the main variables of the research, i.e. 
ethno-religious identification and support for violence, simply because after about 
two hours of interviewing, the informants began to tire and lose concentration. We 
therefore gave priority to list topics that informants knew more about and were 
keen to discuss. The flow of the interviews followed the situation and the context of 
what the informants shared; they were designed to be comfortable and convenient 
conversations that also provided enough time for the informants to think and answer 
questions. In other words, the researcher kept the topic list in mind while keeping 
the interview on track. 
 
3.4.3. Actual topic guide
The actual topic guide was similar to the one used in the pilot study. The only 
changes were to the interview strategy and techniques, to make it more efficient and 
effective. The interviews with non-survey respondents had been set up earlier, while 
the survey had been going on, and were conducted soon after data cleaning the 
questionnaire. To make them more effective, the topic list was sent to informants 
prior to the appointment so that they could learn and prepare. If the informant had 
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limited time or if the interview was interrupted, it could be rescheduled up to three 
times or more as long as the informant agreed to it.   
After filling in the questionnaire and showing willingness to be interviewed, 
the informants were selected and appointments for an interview were arranged. A 
list of available respondents with their postal or email addresses or phone numbers 
was prepared. For reasons of privacy, this list was kept confidential and was only 
used for research purposes. Not all the respondents who had given their addresses 
and contact information were keen to be interviewed; some of them cancelled the 
appointment, with or without giving reasons.
The topic guide
1. Ethno-religious identity
 Ethnic and religious identity:  
 socialization (family, clan, community, school)
 characteristics and stereotypes: ethnic/religious in-group (positive, 
negative)
 ethnic organizations (membership, activities, contribution, importance)
 ethnic ceremonies (attendance, contribution, importance)
 characteristics and stereotypes: ethnic/religious out-group (positive, 
negative)
 importance of identity (family, clan, community, school; politics, 
economy)
2. Intergroup contact 
 family, clan, friends, classmates, neighbours of out-groups (intensity, 
closeness, cooperation, equality, maintenance, changes, problems)
3. Perceived discrimination
 social, economic, political, cultural, religious (which groups, when, where, 
how, why)
4. Perceived group threat
 presence and size of out-group (in neighbourhood, university, region) 
 migration and immigration
 nature and impact of out-group threats (economic, political, social, 
cultural/religious) 
5. Intergroup (dis)trust
 experiences and circumstances (where, whom, when, how; family, clan, 
university, neighbourhood, government)
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 reasons, motivations, effects (personal, group)
 strengthening intergroup trust (possibilities and expectations) 
6. Memory and experience of inter-group violence
 experiences (personal and in-group members) 
 bio-physical effects (self, family, university, neighbourhood/community) 
 effects on attitudes and views vis-à-vis government, armed groups, 
religious groups
 religious effects (attitudes and beliefs) 
7 Support for intergroup protest and violence 
 opinion and participation (public debate, demonstration, material harm, 
physical harm)
 issues (economic, political, social, cultural/religious)
 goals, reasons, justification, efficacy, results
8. Intergroup (dis)satisfaction
 experiences and circumstances (where, whom, when, how, why; family, 
clan, university, neighbourhood, government)
 reasons, motivation, effects (personal, group)
 strengthening levels of satisfaction (possibilities and expectations)
9. Nationalist and regionalist orientation
 affinity to, and opinions about region, nation, regional and national 
government
 national and regional interests versus ethno-religious group interests
 multiple identities (national, regional, ethnic, religious)
10. Social dominance orientation
 perceptions of dominance and equality
 fairness, justification 
 causes and effects 
 changes over time
11. History of conflict and violence
 ethnic and religious groups/organizations/movements (history, members, 
leadership, networks, funding)
 tensions in intergroup relations 




12. Student organizations (ethnic and religious)
 profile of organizations (members, recruitment, funding, alumni)
 goals and activities (educational, political)
 ethnic and religious affiliations (political parties and religious 
organizations)
13. Mass media
 portrayal of Muslims and Christians (stereotypes, prejudices, 
discrimination; how, why)
 reporting ethno-religious conflict and violence (facts and interpretation)
 policies and practices (media organizations, government)
 media groups and ethno-religious affiliations
14. Migration 
 presence and size of out-groups (neighbourhood, university, region, 
migration and history)
 nature and impact of out-group threats (economic, political, social, 
cultural/religious) 
 adaptation and integration (university, community)
15. Education
 religious and public education (advantages and disadvantages)
 opinion on curriculum (religious vs public; quality)
 influences on religious and ethnic identities
The place of interview could be anywhere, depending on where the informant 
felt comfortable talking. Some liked a public space such as a campus, mosque, coffee 
shop or restaurant. Others preferred somewhere more private, such as a boarding 
house or family house. All interviews went smoothly, with only a little variation from 
the topic list. Relevant questions that might differ from the list were continuously 
asked to generate more data, so conversations could jump from one topic to 
another without necessarily following the numbering on the list. However, the 
interview would return to any omitted questions once the interviewee had finished 
explaining the earlier topic; most topics were covered. Questions were sometimes 
repeated to make sure that the given answer was correct. The interview was then 
transcribed verbatim. Eventually, 18 were translated into English after being edited 
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This chapter presents the results of univariate and bivariate analyses. It begins with an 
attempt to find factor scales for the observed variables. We use factor analysis to test 
the validity and reliability of the dimensions of support for intergroup violence (4.1). 
Then, independent t-tests and analyses of variance are used to discover whether there 
are group differences and significant correlations between the variables examined. 
These analyses specifically look into the relationships between the dependent 
variable(s) and independent variables (4.2) as well as their relationships to control 
and intermediary variables (4.3 & 4.4). Prior to the description of the results, we 
briefly discuss the general procedures for scale construction. The qualitative data 
are presented after the presentation of these quantitative results to triangulate the 
study findings. We also elaborate the results of the factor analyses for support for 
violence and ethno-religious identification. The selection criteria for the qualitative 
data are based on the expressions and explanations of the respondents about the 
relevant topics. 
 
General procedures for factor analysis and the analysis of 
variance
Factor analysis is employed to identify the important dimensions of the observed 
variables in this study. It also streamlines the data by reducing its complexities to a 
more parsimonious model, the goal being to find a smaller number of theoretical 
variables. It is assumed that some underlying factors that are smaller in number 
than the number of observed variables are responsible for the co-variation among 
the observed items (Kim and Mueller, 1978). We chose confirmatory factor analysis 
rather than exploratory factor analysis to reduce the number of variables and identify 
the pattern between them. The method applies the principal axis factoring extraction 
with Oblimin rotation. The computation process relies on SPSS 19 software. 
As the factor analysis was intended to find a substantial construction to 
enable comparison between Muslims and Christians, we tested it three times on 
the observed variables. First we ran it on national-level data, ignoring differences 
between religious traditions. Next, we ran it on the Muslim and Christian groups 
separately. Other religious groups (Buddhist, Hindu and some smaller religious 
denominations) were excluded from the analysis. When the factors had been defined 
from these tests, the final test was run again on the national level to get an identical 
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solution for the respective religious traditions. The distinctive characteristics of the 
groups were filtered out, since we were looking only for the commensurable factor 
for Muslims and Christians (Anthony et al., 2007: 111-112). The process resulted 
in a comparable model solution for the two religious groups. In the process, the 
outcomes of communality, Eigenvalue, structure of the pattern matrix and item-
correlations became the focus for the data interpretation.  
Commonality refers to the proportion of common variance present in a variable. 
It measures the variance of an observed variable accounted for by common factors. 
It is equivalent to the sum of the squared factor loadings. For the commonality (h2), 
the score must be higher than .20, as a rule of thumb, as it indicates the lowest 
point of the shared variance in the tested variable. In the process, the score of 
Eigenvalue also comes into consideration. Eigenvalue is the mathematical property 
of a matrix used in relation to decomposition of a covariance matrix. It accounts for 
the variances explained by a given dimension and is a criterion for determining the 
number of factors to extract. In this sense, the Eigenvalue must be greater than or 
equal to 1, because it represents a substantial amount of variation, i.e., larger than 
the variance of a standardized variable (Field, 2009: 637-642). 
The scale construction is also determined by the factor loadings in the pattern 
matrix. The factor loading indicates the correlation coefficient between the item and 
the factor. It must be relatively high, which is, as a rule of thumb, greater than .30. 
Factor loadings in more than one dimension or cross-loadings are avoided. If the 
item loads in two dimensions, the higher value must be selected for the respective 
dimension. Likewise, the positive direction is chosen if the item loads in two 
dimensions that appear both positive and negative. Furthermore, the correlation 
between factors is highlighted so that a reasonable number of them can be selected. 
If the correlation is high (>.50), the factors can be combined together. Next, there 
is a check as to whether the items in one factor show a conceptually meaningful 
dimension; this dimension can then be labelled substantially.    
The reliability of the factor is also tested by measuring Cronbach’s alpha (α). 
This score refers to internal consistency, i.e., how closely a set of items are related as 
a group. The inter-item correlation determines the value of α. If the average inter-
item correlation in the set is high, Cronbach’s α will be high as well. So, the higher 
the score of the Cronbach’s α, the more reliable the scale. Generally speaking, a 
score of less than .40 is not reliable; .41 -.60 is quite reliable (moderate); and a score 
greater than .61 is reliable (Nunnally, 1978; Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman, 1991). 
In our process, Cronbach’s α was tested in the groups of Muslims and Christians as 
well as at national level. The descriptive statistics of the scale results are presented 
to discover the mean and its standard deviation. 
Analysis of variance is run to test whether there are any differences between 
groups for particular variables. It specifically looks into significant correlations 
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between the dependent and independent variables as well as the dependent and 
control variables and the intermediate determinants. All dimensions are examined 
to reveal group differences and tendencies. This test assumes that the scores in 
each group are normally distributed and the variances in all groups are equal (Te 
Grotenhuis and Van der Weegen, 2009: 77); we take into account the score of F, the 
significance level, and the correlation among the tested variables. The significance 
level should be less than .05 (Field, 2009: 660). 
Furthermore, the linearity (or deviance from it) between the tested variables 
is observed. This tells us if there is a linear or non-linear relationship between them. 
If the relation is linearly significant, Pearson’s correlations are applied. The statistic 
of eta is used when the relation is deviant from linearity. In this test, the mean 
values of the dependent variables and of the independent, control and intermediate 
determinant variables are calculated and possibly recoded, simply to get more 
normal distribution and to avoid low frequencies. 
4.1. Support for intergroup violence
Support for intergroup violence, the key dependent variable, consists of four 
dimensions: support for harm to persons, harm to property, public criticism and 
demonstrations. The questionnaire contained twenty items, with five for each 
dimension (q218-q237). 
The factor analysis was run in three steps to generate a cross-religious 
comparative measurement of support for violence towards Muslims and Christians. 
In the first step, the analysis combined Muslim and Christian respondents; in the 
second step, they were analyzed separately. In the final step we combined the two 
again. The twenty items were loaded in three factors corresponding to support for 
public criticism, demonstrations and harm. Among the twenty items, eight were 
loaded clearly in the first factor and seven were loaded clearly in the second. One 
item (q227) was loaded both in the first and second factors while four items (q345, 
q235, q236, q237) were loaded both in the second and third. Q227 was removed 
because the score was higher than .30 and loaded in two factors. However, q345, 
q235, q236, q237 were retained for the next analysis because they were all positive 
in the second factor but negative in the third (<. 30). In the next run, two factor 
solutions consisting of harm to persons and property and public criticism and 
demonstrations were found. 
In the second step, q224 was eliminated because of double loadings in the 
Muslim sub-sample. Then the scale was readjusted by removing q234, q235, q236, 
q237 because these items loaded in two factors; q234 and q235 loaded both in 
the second and third factor and q236 and q237 in the first and third. After deleting 
these items and running the program again, q220 was also excluded because of the 
double loadings. Overall, q220, q224, q227, q234, q235, q236, q237 were removed 
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in the new scale. In the last step, this scale was then tested again using Muslims and 
Christians combined; the result remained consistent in two dimensions, as shown in 
Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Support for harm and demonstration: scales
Muslims & Christians
h2
Factor loading pattern matrix
Harm Demon-strations
233. I would support harm to persons to enforce free 
access to education for my religious group .73 .85
229. I would support harm to persons to enforce the 
political influence of my religious group .71 .84
232. I would support the damaging of property to enforce 
free access to education for my religious group .67 .82
228. I would support the damaging of property to enforce 
the political influence of my religious group .65 .80
221. I would support harm to persons to obtain more jobs 
for my religious group .51 .71
225. I would support harm to persons to fight abuse of 
political power against my religious group .46 .67
223. I would support demonstrations that protest against 
abuse of political power that threatens my religious 
group .51 .71
222. I would support public criticism of abuse of political 
power that threatens my religious group .47 .69
231. I would support demonstrations that protest against 
my religious group’s lack of free access to education .48 .68
226. I would support public criticism of actions that 
undermine the political influence of my religious 
group .41 .64
230. I would support public criticism of my religious group’s 
lack of free access to education .41 .64
219. I would support demonstrations that protest against 
job discrimination of my religious group .40 .63
218. I would support public criticism of job discrimination 
of my religious group .33 .56
Initial Eigenvalues 4.12 3.53
% of variance explained 28.81 22.85
The reliability of Muslims for harm is .88 and for demonstrations is .81, while the 
reliability of Christians for harm is .93 and for demonstrations is .85.
The result does not match our expectation that support for intergroup violence 
has four dimensions; instead, the dimension of harm to persons and property merge 
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into one, as do public criticism and demonstrations. The range of factor loadings 
for support for harm to people and properties both for Muslims and Christians is 
between .85 and .67. The highest loading is for the item, “I would support harm to 
persons to enforce free access to education for my religious group,” and the lowest 
is for, “I would support harm to persons to fight abuse of political power against my 
religious group.” Meanwhile, the range of factor loadings in the dimension of public 
criticism and demonstrations is between .71 and .56. The highest loading is for the 
item, “I would support demonstrations to protest against abuse of political power 
that threatens my religious group,” and the lowest is for, “I would support public 
criticism of job discrimination of my religious group.”
We labeled the first factor: “support for harm to persons and property’ 
(hereafter called harm) and the second factor: “support for public criticism and 
demonstrations” (hereafter called demonstrations). They indicate two levels of 
violence: harm points to a high level, while demonstration points to a low level that 
is actually acceptable in democracies. The correlation between the first and second 
dimension is .01, indicating that they are completely non-related or independent.  
The Eigenvalue is 4.12 for harm and 3.53 for demonstrations. The variance of 
the first factor is 28.81% and of the second 22.85%. The reliability of both factors is 
very high (>.80) both for Muslims and Christians, but even more so among Christian 
respondents (.93 for the first dimension and .85 for the second) than among Muslims 
(.88 and .81 respectively).  
The means for the items for each scale were then calculated. The mean for 
support for harm was 1.94 and the standard deviation was .73. The mean for support 
for demonstrations was 3.51 with a standard deviation of .73. This indicates that 
the respondents disagree with supporting harm to persons and property, but tend 
to agree with supporting public criticism and demonstrations. When a comparison 
is made between Muslims and Christians regarding support for harm, it shows 
that Muslims have a slightly lower mean (N= 839, M=1.71, SD=.69) than Christians 
(N=602, M=1.75, SD=.75). However, the tendency is different in relation to support 
for demonstrations; Muslims (N = 844, M= 3.26, SD .78) have a higher score than 
Christians (N=602, M=3.03 SD = .84). The difference between Muslims and Christians 
in support for both harm and demonstration is significant (p =.00). In order to get 
a clearer picture, we calculated the percentage of Muslim and Christian support for 
violence in each category. 
Table 4.2 shows that Muslim disagreement with support for harm (90.00%) 
is slightly higher than that of Christians (87.80%). In relation to support for 
demonstrations, the percentage indicates that the reverse is true; Muslims are 
inclined to agree more than Christians, with the percentage of Muslims at 36.70% 
and of Christians 26.60%.  
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Table 4.2 Support for harm and demonstrations: distribution of scores
Harm Demonstrations
Muslims Christians Muslims Christians
N % N % N % N %
Totally disagree 340 40.50 244 40.50 10 1.20 19 3.20
Disagree 415 49.50 285 47.30 110 13.00 126 20.90
Neither disagree nor 
agree
73 8.70 56 9.30 414 49.10 297 49.30
Agree 9 1.10 15 2.50 272 32.20 139 23.10
Totally agree 2 .20 2 .30 38 4.50 21 3.50
Total 839 100.0 602 100.0 844 100.0 602 100.0
What forms can “support for harm” and “support for demonstrations” take? 
Illustrations can be found in the testimonies of our interviewees; the qualitative 
data show that Ambonese respondents, in particular, show high levels of support for 
harm. Even though large-scale violence has decreased since the outbreaks of 1999-
2003, there are still significant tensions between Christians and Muslims. Small-
scale incidents still take place regularly to the present day. People who participate 
in harmful activities or demonstrations sometimes relate this to their experiences 
of violence in the past. Karim, an Ambonese respondent, explained why he gets 
involved. “I felt drawn to it. Summoned, and I was motivated to fight back,” he told 
us, in response to the question as to why he was self-avowedly involved in a riot on 
Jalan Baru in 2011. He related his willingness to participate in violent rallies with 
a traumatic experience during his war-time childhood, in which he saw mutilated 
heads. He said: “It’s like an instinct that drives me to fight without anybody else 
encouraging me. Nobody tells me to do it. I’ve been driven to violence since my 
childhood. My childhood was filled with that horrible game with those heads. I just 
want to have another chance at that game.”
Other respondents agreed with supporting harm as long as it can be seen 
as self-defense. Alhady, a student in the Faculty of Law, argued: “Well, for people 
who study law, attack and self-defense are different. Attacking is proactive. It’s 
different from passive action. If you’re attacked, it’s all right to defend yourself.” In 
Ambon, where the tension between ethno-religious groups runs high, people are 
inclined to support their in-groups even if they are not explicitly violent. Iskandar, 
a student at the University of Pattimura, expressed his opinion: “I prefer dialogue, 
but, if the situation got critical, I would do something […] You know, in Unpatti, all 
demonstrations always involve something physical, like burning down properties.”  
However, a large number of respondents are explicitly opposed to harm to 
persons and property. They argue that violence is not a good solution, even when 
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carried out in the name of religious solidarity. Habieb, a student activist at State 
Islamic University, commented that the way the Muslim jihad had manifested itself 
physically in Ambon over recent years was inappropriate: “They could have done 
something different instead of using violence. In my opinion, there were only a few 
who went to jihad [...]. I believe there are other ways to solve problems.” Likewise, 
Achmad was critical of religious groups that take justice into their own hands, such 
as the Front Pembela Islam (The Islamic Defenders Front): “In my opinion, they’ve 
gone too far. I’m also a Muslim, but I believe in government. The FPI doesn’t have 
the authority to act like that. It’s true that we need to remind the government about 
certain religious issues, but only the police have the authority to do things like that 
[…] It wasn’t the raid that I disagreed with, but the violence that was sometimes part 
of it. Personally, I like the fact that there are people who care about my religion, but 
I don’t like what they do because they don’t have the right.”
Some informants affirmed that acts of violence were unacceptable under any 
circumstances; the damaging of property only results in loss of valuable goods or 
public infrastructure. With regard to the use of violence in retaliation to other groups, 
Heribertus responded: “No, I don’t approve of violence at all. Destruction can cause a 
lot of loss. Even if people humiliate my religion, I’d rather have a dialogue to find out 
what’s at the root of the problem. Having discussions to find the best solution is the 
best way. I’d prefer not to solve problems with violence.” Disagreement with support 
for harm was also expressed by Maemunah; she suggested using other channels to 
protest about unequal treatment or humiliation of her religious group. She said: “I 
prefer openness. If we don’t agree, we can express our opinion. But, then, what we 
see is different. People destroy things around them. I know that it’s freedom, but it’s 
not right, it’s going too far. If you have a different opinion, voice your criticism, but in 
the right way. Don’t cause any destruction. Well, for whatever reason, I don’t agree 
with anarchy.”
Compared to support for harm, which a large number of respondents disagreed 
with, there was considerable support for public criticism and demonstration. As 
discussed above, public criticism and demonstrations are acceptable in a democratic 
society. Several respondents felt that the government plays an important role in 
the mediation of conflicts between ethno-religious groups, and in offering solutions 
to social problems. They considered public criticism and demonstrations to be 
acceptable, and even wanted better strategies for drawing the attention of the 
government or other involved parties to their specific problems.  
Passolo said that demonstrations are a way to articulate the opinions of a group 
of people when dialogue fails, and believes that the government pays attention 
to them. Karrepesina said something similar during his interview, and added that 
protest or demonstrations are related to freedom of expression. The government 
has the legal authority to take action in order to solve problems, while members of 
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civil society can press it to do so through public criticism or demonstrations. Literally, 
he said: “Via demonstrations, we express our opinion. It’s our fundamental right. 
Take Ahmadiyah for an example. We can protest against their existence, but we can’t 
destroy things that belong to them. Banning this religion is the state’s decision. The 
state is the legitimate leader. So I don’t approve of destructive acts against them. In 
other words, as long as we do it orally, in forms of symbols, we can agree with action, 
but not with destruction.”26
In some cases, the demonstrations in Ambon were seen to as a means to put 
political pressure on the government and local authorities for injustices towards 
religious in-groups. For instance, Passolo claimed that the aim of a demonstration in 
Pattimura University (Ambon) was to get attention from the local authority. He says: 
“We put them under pressure, for example by staging a protest in favour of Muslims, 
demanding a balance of students from both religions in the University of Pattimura, 
in accordance to the Malino agreement.27 This principle determines that if there 
are two Christians, there must be two Muslims as well. Unpatti was burned down 
because of these political pressures […] We just noticed that new Christian students 
outnumber new Muslim ones. What’s that all about? We staged the demo to show 
we weren’t happy. Isn’t it fair to say there’s something dirty going on there? […] We 
questioned it – why are more Christians than Muslims admitted? There are fewer 
Muslim students. Why does that happen? Why did we put pressure on the rector? 
Because I believe that it has something to do with the rector.” 
Maria, a female Christian student in Yogyakarta, said that she accepts criticism, 
demonstration and protest, but finds physical destruction unacceptable. She 
revealed: “In certain situations we need to do that [protest or demonstrate], for 
example for the right to build churches. We know it’s hard to get permission to build 
one. My father is an architect. He understands the problem well. We need to openly 
protest about this, so that people understand the real situation. But, violent protest 
26 Ahmadiyah is a denomination of Islam founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in British India at 
the end of 19th centuries. The denomination also developed in Indonesia with the grow-
ing adherents in some regions. In 2008, the Indonesian government officially banned the 
denomination following the protests and demonstrations from a large number of Islamic 
organizations. The Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) supported this de-
cision, after it already declared a fatwa against Ahmadiyah teaching in 2005. The decision 
resulted in asking the Ahmadiyah adherents to convert to other Islam denominations. In 
the mean time, intimidation, attacks and loiters against Ahmadiyah take place in Lombok, 
Tasikmalaya, Tulungagung.   
27 Malino agreement is the peace accord between Muslim and Christian representatives from 
Moluccas to end the conflict on 12 February 2002. As part of the agreement, both groups 
agree to work together to create peace. Many people think that the peace making could be 
achived by power sharing and balance number between Muslims and Christians to occupy 
positions in the government offices and public administration.
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like, sorry, what the FPI (The Islamic Defenders Front) does, I don’t agree with that 
at all. In my opinion some communities damage their reputation by claiming their 
bad deeds are on behalf of religion. So, it’s not about bad religion, but about bad 
acts carried out by a small number of people who claim they’re acting on behalf of 
their religion. I wish there was regulation to control this kind of thing.” Concerning 
discrimination towards her religious group, she asserted her right to protest or 
demonstrate to highlight those problems. “We have to fight in order to survive, and 
we have to unite to fight against discrimination. If we are silent about many things, 
people won’t understand that discrimination occurs,” she declared. 
Our respondents also mentioned several reasons as to why they would 
participate or actually did participate in public criticism and demonstrations. These 
were to do with religious solidarity, political pressure and religious obligation. Alhady, 
a respondent of Yogyakarta, said that solidarity with his fellow Muslim believers 
was the main reason for his participation in a demonstration to show solidarity 
with Palestine. Besides speaking about the hypocrisy of Israel, he also helped to 
collect donations for the event. He told us: “Of course we don’t support them by 
killing Israelites that we meet, but we give other support, like supplies. We’re not 
on the battlefield. On a battlefield you can kill the enemy if you have to, but, here, 
we are not on a battlefield, so we only do it verbally. We’ve also raised funds, and 
sent medical volunteers. We’ve tried to stay within these limits. We raised a lot of 
funds last time, so we’re planning to do it again.” When we asked whether he was 
involved in any activities in relation to religious problems in Indonesia, he did not 
give a clear response, but said there was no pressing reason for violence against 
Muslims in Indonesia. In addition, he explained that solidarity with fellow Muslims is 
considered to be a religious obligation. He asserted: “Muslims are one body. As one 
body, if some of the other parts are in pain, we cannot laugh at them. We must show 
our concern. It doesn’t mean we have to feel the pain, but we have to stand up for 
them so that they don’t suffer too much.”
Compared to Muslim respondents who boldly expressed their anger about 
injustice against their own religious group, Christian respondents tended to stay 
quiet although they did of course disagree with discrimination or unequal treatment. 
This could be to do with the minority status of Christians in the country. Heribertus 
revealed this opinion: “I can’t accept the discrimination. It’s not right because we are 
one nation. But, with our limited capabilities, we can only say that it’s not right.”
Overall, our interviews confirmed the findings of the quantitative data: that 
people are willing to support protest and demonstrations, but that only a few support 
harm. There was also a striking difference between interviewees from Ambon and 
those from Yogyakarta. Some Ambonese respondents showed support for violence, 
especially those who had suffered violent experiences in the past; they supported 
harm and damage to property as long as it could be considered self-defense. In line 
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with the quantitative data, the Muslim interviewees also gave the impression that 
they are more supportive of demonstrations than Christian respondents. They were, 
in specific circumstances, also relatively less negative about harm.      
4. 2. Ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup 
violence
Ethno-religious identification is measured by a set of variable combinations between 
ethnic and religious identification. Ethnic identification consists of self-definition on 
the basis of ethnic group, ethnic languages, friends by ethnicity, participation in 
ethnic ceremonies and membership of ethnic organizations. Religious identification 
is measured by self-definition on the basis of religion, participation in religious 
ceremonies and practices, friends by religion and membership of religious 
organizations. Ethno-religious self-definition is measured by the intersection between 
ethnic and religious identities.  
4.2.1. Construction of measurements
4.2.1.1. Ethnic and religious self-definition 
Self-definition of ethnicity refers to individuals’ identification with a certain ethnic 
group. In this study, we identify twelve ethnic groups based on the populations of 
Ambon and Yogyakarta. These are Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Minangkabau, 
Ambonese, Buginese, Makasarese, Buton, Toraja, Minahasa, Chinese, and Batak. The 
category of “others” includes ethnic groups not on the list such as Timorese, Papua, 
Betawi, Malay, Dayak, etc. Self-definition of religion refers to individuals’ identification 
with their religion or denomination. While there are five official religions in Indonesia 
i.e. Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism, this study examines 
the relationship between Muslims and Christians, so the analyses exclude Hinduism 
and Buddhism but account for both Protestantism and Catholicism as aspects of 
Christianity. The composition of ethnic and religious identity in the sample appears 
in the table below. 
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N % N % N %
Javanese 348 41.8 104 17.0 452 31.3
Sundanese 36 4.3 2 .3 38 2.6
Madurese 36 4.3 0 0 36 2.5
Minangkabau 17 2.0 0 0 17 1.2
Ambonese 241 29.0 346 56.5 587 40.7
Buginese 10 1.2 0 0 10 .7
Makasarese 2 .2 1 .2 3 .2
Buton 95 11.4 0 0 95 6.6
Toraja 0 0 20 3.3 20 1.4
Minahasa 0 0 5 .8 5 .3
Chinese 1 .1 43 7.0 44 3.0
Batak 2 .2 35 5.7 37 2.6
Others 44 5.3 56 9.2 100 6.9
Total 832 100.0 612 100.0 1,444 100.0
Cross-tabulation between ethnic and religious self-definition was done by counting 
the number of Muslims and Christians for each ethnic group. The biggest Muslim 
group was Javanese and the biggest Christian group is Ambonese. There was neither 
a Muslim Toraja or Minahasa, nor a Christian Madurese, Minangkabau or Buton 
in the sample. The combination of ethnic and religious identities is called “ethno-
religious self-definition” and will be used in the further regression analysis.    
Our respondents in Ambon and Yogyakarta defined their ethno-religious identity 
in different ways. In Yogyakarta, they defined their ethnicity with direct reference to 
the ethnic groups of their parents. For instance, Anto, from Yogyakarta, introduced his 
ethnicity as follows: “I am Javanese. My parents are originally Javanese.” Or Habibie 
said: “I am Sundanese because my parents are a hundred per cent Sundanese.”
The ethnic identity of respondents is inherited from their parents. It does not 
change if they have not lived in their place of ethnic origin for a long time, or cannot 
speak their ethnic language. Achmad was one of the respondents whose parents 
moved from Java to Sumatera more than thirty years ago. He was born in Sumatera 
but still identifies himself as Javanese. When asked about his identity, he replied: 
“Well, I see myself as Javanese. Sumatera is identical with Malay, but I was born and 
brought up in an environment in which Javanese are the majority. Then, I went to 
school, starting in kindergarten, then elementary school, junior, and then senior high 
school. My teachers and my friends were Javanese. Although I live in a Malay area, 
my community is still Javanese.”
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In some cases, if parents had different ethnicities, the respondent’s self-
definition referred to either the father’s or mother’s ethnicity, depending on the 
intensity of socialization in the family. For instance, Maria had a Batak mother and 
a Javanese father. She identified herself as Javanese rather than Batak because she 
was born and grew up in Java. Her claim was similar to Alhady’s, who defined himself 
as Kutai despite having a Javanese father, because he was born and socialized in his 
mother’s family. He confirmed: “I’m a native of Borneo, Kutai Kartanegara. I was born 
in a rural, remote area. My father is from East Java; my mother is from Kutai. I’ve 
interacted more intensively with Kutai people ever since I was small. So my identity 
is more Kutai than Javanese.”
With regard to religious identity, our respondents in Yogyakarta tended to 
identify with one of the five official state religions. In Ambon, they referred more to 
the ethno-religious identity of their residential area. Given this concern with place, 
we expected them to recognize both their ethnicity and their religion. For instance, 
a respondent introduced himself: “My name is Passolo from Sepa,” meaning that his 
ethnic group is Sepa and so he should be considered Muslim. Another respondent 
told us, ‘My name is Soselissa. […] My village is called Kampung Silla,” thus indicating 
that he is an Ambonese Christian without actually mentioning his religion. To some 
extent, family name corresponds to ethno-religious identity; for example, Karepesina 
is a family name from Kabau. Marabessy, Tuasamu, Tuanany, and Salampessy are 
names from Haruku Island (Lease). People with these family names are likely to be 
Muslim.
 4.2.1.2. Ethnic languages
The common use of ethnic language in various situations is an important measure of 
ethnic identification. The assumption is that the more the respondents speak their 
ethnic language, the stronger their ethnic identification. For the measurement, we 
set out six situations in which the ethnic language is often used: at home, with the 
family, with friends, within the community residence, and at university. The reliability 
of the scale was .70 for Muslims and .81 for Christians, while for the combination of 
both it was .75. 
4.2.1.3. Friends by ethnicity
Friends by ethnicity is the number of ethnic in-group rather than ethnic out-group 
friends. It is assumed that the more same-ethnicity friends, the more the respondents 
support violence. The reliability is relatively high as indicated by Cronbach’s alpha for 
Christians (.81), Muslims (.77) and both groups (.88).
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4.2.1.4. Ethnic ceremonies 
Participation in ethnic ceremonies is a good indicator for ethnic identification. 
It is assumed that the more respondents participate in ethnic ceremonies, the 
stronger their identification with their ethnic groups. Ethnic ceremonies refers to 
birth rituals, wedding rituals, rituals for moving house, rituals around illness, and 
funeral ceremonies. The option of “other” ceremonies was deleted, because the 
respondents did not specify what those other ceremonies might be. Cronbach’s 
alpha for the scale was .76 for Muslims and .81 for Christians. 
4.2.1.5. Membership of and participation in ethnic organizations   
Ethnic identification is also measured by membership of ethnic organizations. We 
asked whether the respondents were members of such an organization, with three 
options: “no”, “yes, as a supporter only” and “yes, as a member”. The second and 
third options were then combined for the respondents might not differ as members 
or supporters. After this, we asked about respondents’ participation in the activities 
of the organization. The answer categories were from (1), never, to (5), more than 
once a week.
4.2.1.6. Religious practices and religious ceremonies 
The religious practice questions asked about individuals’ habits with regard to 
reading or reciting Holy Scripture, praying and going to religious services. For 
religious ceremonies, the questions were about individuals’ participation in the 
ceremonies of their respective religion. Muslim and Christian groups were asked 
separate questions due to the differences in their ceremonies; for Muslims, they 
included circumcision, weddings, funerals, fasting, Idul Fitri, and Idul Adha. Two of 
the questions for Muslims, regarding Maulud and Isra Miraj, were discarded because 
they are not celebrated in several local traditions. For Christians, the ceremonies 
included baptism, weddings, Christmas, Easter, funerals and fasting. The factor 
analysis was used to determine the substantial dimensions of the measurement. 
The factor analysis was done for Muslims and Christians separately due to the 
difference in religious ceremonies. In the analysis for Christians, fasting was deleted 
because of low commonalities (<.20) and baptism was excluded because it loaded 
highly in two factors (>.30). Two dimensions appeared in the pattern matrix, which 
were religious ceremonies and services. However, in the analysis for Muslims, 
three dimensions were found and could not be reduced to two as had been done 
for Christians; reducing to two would have meant excluding religious practices. 
Three dimensions to adjust measures between Muslims and Christians were used – 
collective rituals, rites of passage and religious practices, as presented in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 Collective rituals, rites of passage, and religious practices: scales 
Muslims Christians
 h2
Factor loading pattern matrix
h2
















































.49 .61 .66 -.75
57. How often do you 
read or recite the 
Holy Scripture (Al 
Quran,  Bible, Vedas 
or Tripitaka)?
.51 .72 .62 .80
38. How often do you 
pray?
.17 .41 .26 .50
39. How often do you 
go to religious 
services in mosques, 
churches, temple 
or other places of 
worship?
.20 .41 .27 .51
Initial Eigenvalues 3.63 1.57 1.23 2.90 .74 1.74
% of variance explained 38.03 11.88 8.43 39.16 6.47 17.08
Reliability .96 .78 .48 .98 .79 .61
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The inter-dimensional correlation was less than .50, so there was no compelling 
reason to combine these factors. Cronbach’s alpha for collective rituals was very high 
for Muslims (.96) and Christians (.98). Rites of passage were also high for Muslims 
(.78) and Christians (.79), but for religious practices Christians scored moderately 
(.60) and the Muslims’ score was low (.48).
4.2.1.7. Friends by religion
Religious identification can also be measured by respondents’ number of friends of 
the same or different religion. It is assumed that the more religious in-group friends, 
and the fewer out-group friends, the stronger the individuals’ religious identification. 
The reliability of the battery was low both for Muslims and Christians, as indicated 
by the score of .08 for Muslims and .46 for Christians. When tested in both groups 
together, the reliability increased to .52. To obtain a more normal distribution, the 
answers “none” and “some” were combined in one score. 
4.2.1.8. Membership of and participation in religious organizations
Membership of a religious organization affects the respondents’ identification with 
their religious group. In this measure, members and supporters were brought together 
into a single category, so we asked respondents only whether they were members 
or not. This was followed with questions about participation in the organizations’ 
activities. The answer categories ran from (1), never, to (5), more than once a week.
 4.2.2. Scores and intergroup differences
For several variables within ethno-religious identification, there were significant 
differences between Muslims and Christians. Ethnic language, ethnic ceremonies 
and membership of ethnic organization all showed significant differences in the 
mean scores between Muslims and Christians. Muslims had higher mean scores 
than Christians, as shown in table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5 Ethnic identification: scores and intergroup differences
Ethnic 
identification




M S D N M S D N Min Max
Ethnic 
languages
2.59 2.08 727 2.00 2.28 545 0.00 6.00 .59 4.73** 1108.83
Ethnic 
ceremonies 2.59 .90 738 2.32 .98 500 1.00 4.00 .27 4.85* 1009.13
Same-ethnicity 
friends 
3.66 .84 776 3.87 .91 519 1.00 5.00 -.21 -4.18 1293
Membership 
of org.
.13 .63 822 .12 .58 564 0.00 1.00 .05 1.36* 1262.83
Participation 
in org.
2.46 1.14 153 2.64 1.17 90 1.00 5.00 -.19 -1.22 241
** Significance at .01 level * Significance at .05 level
Muslims speak their ethnic language (M= 2.59, SD= 2.08) in more situations than 
Christians (M= 2.00, SD= 2.28). The t-test points to 4.73 and p=.00. Muslims (M= 
2.59, SD=.90) also attend ethnic ceremonies more frequently than Christians (M= 
2.32, SD= .98). In addition, more Muslims (M= .13, SD=.63) are members of an ethnic 
organization than Christians (M=.12, SD=.58). The difference is significant (p=.01). 
On the other hand, Christians (M= 3.87, SD= .91) tend to have more same-ethnicity 
friends than Muslims (M=3.66, SD= .84), but the difference is not significant. Likewise 
for participation in ethnic organizations, there is no significant difference between 
Christians (M= 2.64, SD=1.17) and Muslims (2.46, SD = 1.14).  
Our qualitative data suggests that many respondents consider ethnic 
identification to be an important element of their personal identity. Their ethnic 
language is the mother tongue that they still use on many occasions. While the 
quantitative survey makes it clear that Muslims speak their ethnic language more 
than Christians, this could not be confirmed via the interviews in Yogyakarta; and, the 
Chinese, who are mostly Christians, do not speak their ethnic (Chinese) language any 
more. In Ambon, the respondents affirmed that Muslims use their ethnic language 
more than Christians in daily life. Karrepesina observed: “It’s only in Muslim areas 
that people still preserve the ethnic language, although it’s mostly used in traditional 
ceremonies.” In fact, this claim confirms a previous study which found that the 
declining use of local language in Christian communities is due to the use of Malay-
Ambon in Protestant churches (Chauvel, 1990: 4-14).
A number of respondents revealed that ethnic ceremonies related to important 
life events such as births, weddings and deaths are still practised in their families. 
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Several Javanese claimed that participations in these rites of passage preserve 
cultural traditions. They testify that ethnic ceremonies are often blended with 
religious rituals, such as a mass, at Catholic funerals; while traditional prayers are 
said at Muslim weddings or funerals. They also mentioned mitoni, or the celebration 
of the seventh month of pregnancy. Nonetheless, Muslim interviewees who are 
members of Muhammadiah and Protestant interviewees no longer participate in 
ethnic ceremonies. Maemunah, who belongs to Muhammadiah, said: “I feel uneasy 
about the contradiction between ethnic ceremonies and Islam. On the one hand, 
they’re our culture, but on the other hand, they’re not acceptable in my religious 
tradition. That’s because I’m not a Javanese who follows Kejawen28. I only practise 
traditions that don’t conflict with the teachings of my religion. So, for example, when 
the royal palace of Yogyakarta held a ritual in which people try to get the water 
used in the ceremony because they think that it will bring them good luck, I didn’t 
participate.”
In terms of friendship by ethnicity, it is not possible to confirm the quantitative 
data to show that Muslims have fewer same-ethnicity friends than Christians. Muslim 
respondents revealed that such friends make them feel accepted. The interviewees 
who live far from their families also commented that it was easier for them to make 
friends with students from the same ethnic group. Many interviewees confirmed 
that they are members of an ethnic organization; several Buginese students belong 
to the South Sulawesi Family Association (Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi Selatan, 
KKSS); Ambalau students join the Ambalau Students and Youth Forum (Forum 
Pemuda dan Pelajar Ambalau, Forppemaba); Keiese have Communication Forum 
of Evav’s Student (Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa Evav, Fokusmapa), etc. The aim of 
these ethnic organizations is mainly to unify people or students from certain ethnic 
groups or areas.    
As well as ethnicity, we measured religious identification. Significant differences 
in the mean scores of Muslims and Christians also appeared in some variables, 
except for membership and participation in religious organizations. These included 
respondents’ participation in collective rituals, religious practices, rites of passages 
and friends of the same religion. 
28 Kejawen is a Javanese religious tradition. It develops from syncretising aspects of 
animistic, Hinduism Buddhism, and Islam.
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Table 4.6 Religious identification: scores and intergroup difference
Religious 
identification




M SD N M S D N Min Max
Collective rituals 3.87 .50 825 3.79 .51 587 1.00 4.00 .08 3.04** 1,247.67
Religious practices 5.14 1.56 391 5.00 1.39 270 1.00 7.00 .14 1.21** 618.07
Rites of passages 3.19 .86 823 3.42 .75 558 1.00 4.00 -.23 -5.26** 1,291.23
In-group friends 4.21 .77 842 3.88 .86 595 1.00 5.00 .33 7.58** 1,185.46
Out-group friends 2.05 .79 760 2.58 .78 583 1.00 5.00 -.53 -12.18** 1,261.44
Membership of  
org.
1.71 .88 828 1.69 .89 580 1.00 3.00 .02 .40 1,406
Participation in 
org.
2.93 1.37 346 3.23 1.42 230 1.00 5.00 -.30 -2.55 574
** Significance at .01 level  
Significant differences between Muslims and Christians appear in Table 4.6. The 
participation of Muslims (M=3.87 SD=.50) is slightly higher than Christians (M=3.79, 
SD=.51) in collective rituals. Their participation is mostly for religious reasons, as 
shown by the proximity of the score to the maximum value. T-test is significant 
at 3.04. Muslims (M=5.14, SD= 1.56) also pray or attend religious services more 
often than Christians (M=5.00, SD=1.39). On average, they practise their religion 
from between more than once a week to once a day, but participate less in rites 
of passage than Christians. Christians’ participation in rites of passages is more for 
religious reasons (M=3.42, SD= .72), while for Muslims it is for non-religious reasons 
(M= 3.19, SD= .86). Muslims have more friends of the same religion (M=4.21, SD= 
77) than Christians (M=3.88, Sd.86), but the number of friends of different religions 
is inverted for Christians, who have more out-group friends (M=2.58, SD=.78) than 
Muslims (M=2.05, SD=.79). Furthermore, there is a slight difference in the mean 
scores of Muslims and Christians in their membership of religious organizations and 
participations in their activities, but this is not significant.  
Both Muslims and Christians participate in collective rituals because they 
perceive them to be a religious obligation. Muslims celebrate Idul Fitri to mark the 
end of the fasting month (Ramadhan) and Idul Adha to commemorate the willingness 
of the prophet Ibrahim to sacrifice his only son in submission to God’s command. 
Christians celebrate Christmas to celebrate the birth of Jesus Christ and Easter to 
commemorate his resurrection on the third day after his crucifixion. Both Muslims 
and Christians affirm that these rituals often find expression in their ethnic and local 
traditions. During Idul Fitri, Javanese Muslims usually visit their parents, relatives 
and neighbors to ask for forgiveness. When they visit parents or older relatives, they 
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kiss their knees as a sign of respect (sungkem). Idul Adha is celebrated in Haruku, 
Lease islands, with panas pela (the renewal of an agreement and bond between 
villages) e.g. Pelauw, Kailolo, Rohomony, Ori, etc. 
Our respondents’ view is that it is important to participate in collective rituals. 
Both Muslims and Christians feel obliged to attend, even though some do not go 
to the regular communal worship such as Friday prayers or Sunday mass. Achmad, 
a Muslim respondent, revealed that he never misses these events. He said: “From 
elementary school right up to senior high, I was always involved in collective rituals. 
Here (in Yogyakarta) I join in with them too. I always go to tahlilan (communal 
prayers). There’s a schedule. If I don’t go, I feel guilty.” 
Most respondents actively practice their religion every day. Most Muslims pray 
at the mosque five times a day, although a few only go to Friday prayers. Some of 
those who pray five times a day also read Al Qur’an every day. Maemunah says: “My 
family usually prays together (sholat berjamaah) in the evening when everyone is 
already at home. We usually attend the other four prayer times separately, in the 
mosque closest to wherever we are at the time. Personally, I read Qur’an in the late 
evening or after the morning prayer.” Some of the Christian respondents also read 
the Bible every day at morning prayer. A few of them, like Maria, a Catholic, attend 
daily mass in the afternoon after coming back from campus.
In terms of friendship by religion, both Muslims and Christians have relatively 
more friends of their own religious group. Having in-group friends makes them feel 
more secure. Fauzi said that he is more comfortable when he is with his religious 
friends: “When we meet fellow Muslims, we feel accepted. Whenever I meet new 
people, if I find out they’re Muslims, I feel close to them straight away, even though 
we’ve never met before. As a student of UGM, I got to know students from UNPAD 
and ITB. Because they’re Muslims, we immediately felt like old friends, even though 
I’d only met them once.” 
Some Muslim respondents limit their interactions with Christians and other 
religious groups to avoid food contamination from pork, dog meat or amphibians, 
which they are strictly forbidden to eat. Achmad affirmed: “My concern is about 
eating pork. Christian and Kong Hu Cu people eat it, right? If we’re invited to their 
homes and food is served, we don’t eat it. Even if they serve fried chicken, we can’t 
taste it. We think that the chicken is cooked in the same pan as the pork. Other than 
food, we don’t have any problems.”
On the other hand, a Christian respondent told of her difficulty in becoming 
friends with Muslims, even though she tries not to discriminate. She said: “It’s 
mostly because of their religious principles. In my opinion, going out with a friend of 
the opposite sex is normal, but, one day, I went to an event with my friend – a boy. 
We were holding hands. This turned out to be a problem. On another occasion, my 
friend and I went to deliver an invitation, but when we arrived we weren’t allowed 
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in. He said: ‘Stop!’ Then when we left, he cleaned the floor. That made me feel pretty 
uncomfortable because I saw him do it! I hadn’t even left; I was still in the yard. What 
did I do wrong? I was really shocked. Afterwards I went to see another neighbour 
living close by, still feeling shocked. The neighbour told me that they were an 
exclusive family, who restrict their relations with other people for religious reasons.”
Membership of religious organizations is also a dimension of religious 
identification. Some of our respondents claimed that their membership of such 
organizations makes them more devout and helps them to develop their religious 
network. Abdullah described his experience: “In the beginning I joined the Islamic 
Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI). I didn’t even know The 
Action Group of Indonesia Muslim Students (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim 
Indonesia, KAMMI). I saw HMI as a big Islamic student organization. I was taken to 
join KAMMI by a senior. I felt more at ease with KAMMI, because some members of 
HMI have really bad morals – they get involved in romantic relationships, smoking, 
drinking alcohol etc. KAMMI and the Social Welfare Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 
PKS) are the same, and my friends at the mosque are predominantly KAMMI members. 
They teach us the basic tenets of Islam, such as Islamic pillars, faith pillars, sholat, 
and how to behave when we meet other people. We’re different from the Party of 
Liberation in Indonesia (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, HTI) who want to prioritize changing 
the state system. We’re told to make changes gradually, little by little, according to 
Islamic doctrine. As I understand it, we make political changes very gradually because 
Indonesia practises democracy. We enter parliament and government agencies, even 
though the final goal remains to have a khilafah.29 It’s not the same as HTI. HTI hates 
the democratic system without taking part in it and helping to change it. We work 
within the system, and hope to win the general election and transform the system 
into an Islamic one, which would obviously be much better.”
Unlike the training given by KAMMI, which aims to create militant political 
leaders, most Christian organizations aim to enhance religious spirituality and develop 
social skills. For instance, a Christian respondent in Ambon, Samuel, described his 
activities at AM GPM (Angkatan Muda-Gereja Protestan Maluku, Youth Movement 
of the Moluccan Protestant Church), which aim mainly for spiritual growth and 
the empowerment of young people. He explained: “We learn to understand and 
experience the Bible there. At church, there are little kids, teenagers, adolescents, 
and young men. Middle kids at AM GMP range from the fifth year of elementary 
school up to age thirteen. The little kids at AM GMP are from kindergarten up to 
the first or second year of elementary school. It’s the little kids who go to the Tunas, 
29 Khilafah (caliphate) is an Islamic state led by a supreme religious as well as political leader 
known as a successor to Islamic prophet Muhammad.
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and the middle kids and adolescents who come to the Sekolah Minggu.30 AM GPM 
activities focus on deepening understanding of the Bible, and also on learning 
technical organizational skills. The young people have already learned how to chair 
a meeting, debate in a forum, and other skills […] Every Thursday we have youth 
worship.”
In general, our qualitative data support the findings of the quantitative data. 
More specifically, it becomes clear that religious identification is stronger than ethnic 
identification both in Ambon and Yogyakarta. The interview data reveal that religious 
identification is now relatively important, especially with regard to participation 
in religious practices. Most respondents also affirm that their participation in 
traditional ceremonies and religious rituals is mainly for religious reasons. Compared 
to Christians, Muslim respondents have more friends from the same religion, and are 
also more engaged in religious political organizations. Meanwhile, Christians have 
more friends of different religions, even though their interaction with out-group 
friends is limited. A few are involved in religious organizations that are less politically 
active than some of the Muslim equivalents. 
4.2.3. Analysis of ethno-religious identification 
Several variables for ethno-religious identification show a significant relationship to 
support for intergroup violence. In this ANOVA test, the results indicate that religious 
identification has a stronger link to support for harm to persons and property, as well 
as to support for public criticism and demonstration, than ethnic identification. The 
relationship is also different for Muslims and Christians. For Muslims, the significant 
relation appears in several variables such as membership of ethnic organizations, 
participation in collective rituals and friends by religion. Meanwhile, the significant 
relation for Christians is present only in the use of ethnic language. The overall result 
of the test is presented in appendix 2, Table 1 - Table 14.
The relationship between ethnic language use and support for harm is 
significant. Only Christians express a low level of support (M = 1.75; N = 602; p = .01; 
r = -.14). The relation is also linear in a negative direction. It suggests that Christians 
who speak their ethnic language in more than one situation are less inclined to 
support harm to persons and properties. On the other hand, the results do not find 
any significant relationship between ethnic language use and support for public 
criticism and demonstrations (see appendix 2, Table 2)
30 Tunas is the name of pre-school and kindergarten in Maranatha Church in Ambon. Sekolah 
Minggu is the religious teaching session for the Christian children, that is hold every Sunday. 
The children are usually gathered in a specific place while their parents participate in the 
weekly religious service in the Church.
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In terms of participation in ethnic ceremonies, Muslims who are more active 
show more support for demonstrations (M= 3.25, N=734). The relation is significant 
and linear (r=.07, p=.05) as presented in appendix 2, Table 4. 
Muslims who are members of ethnic organizations tend to disagree with 
support for harm (M=1.70, N=811). The relation is significant with an eta of .08. 
There is no difference in support for harm between Christians who are and who are 
not members.
This trend is slightly different from that for participation in activities of ethnic 
organizations. Both Muslims (M=3.31, N= 152) and Christians (M=3.17, N=89) who 
participate only on special days show relatively more support for demonstrations. 
The relation is significant both for Muslims and Christians, but the relation deviates 
from linearity for Christians (eta=.30, p=.05). For Muslims, r is .24. This indicates that 
higher participation in ethnic organization activities is related to more support for 
demonstrations.   
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** Significance at .01 level * Significance at .05 level
Correlation: Pearson’s r for ordinal variables (R), eta for nominal variables (E)
For various indicators of religious identification, Muslims also show more significant 
relations. For Christians significant relations are only apparent for self-definition 
of religion and support for demonstrations. Participation in collective rituals has a 
significant relationship to support for harm (r = -.07, p = .05). The result shows a 
negative relationship – that is, those who participate more often in collective rituals 
are less likely to support harm to persons and property. On the other hand, the 
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relationship between participation in collective rituals and support for public criticism 
and demonstrations was also found to be significant, linear and in a positive direction 
(r=.10, p= .00). It indicates that the higher the participation in collective rituals, the 
greater the support for public criticism and demonstrations. As for participation in 
religious practices, the results of the analysis do not find any significant relationship 
to either support for harm or support for demonstrations. This is true for both 
Christians and Muslims. Furthermore, the relationship between their participation 
in rites of passage and support for harm is not significant, but the relationship to 
support for demonstrations is significant only among Muslims. The relationship is 
linear (r=.11, p= .00), that is, the more frequent their participation in rites of passage, 
the more likely they are to support public criticism and demonstrations. The details 
of the variance analysis results are presented in appendix 2, Table 7 - Table 10. 
A significant relationship is also found between in-group friends and support 
for harm among Muslims. The relationship is deviant from linearity with eta = .17, p= 
.00. On the other hand, the relationship between in-group friends and support for 
public criticism and demonstrations is significant, but linear (r =. 10, p=.04). So, the 
more same-religion friends that Muslims have, the more they support violence. For 
Christians, there is no significant relationship (see appendix 2, Table 11). 
The trend for religious in-group friends is the same as for religious out-group 
friends. The relationship to support for harm is significant and deviant from linearity 
(eta=.10, p=.04). Muslims who have none or some Christian friends show more 
support for harm to persons than those who have relatively more Christian friends. 
However, Muslims whose friends are mostly Christian also show more support for 
harm to persons and property. The relationship to support for demonstrations is 
significant and linear (r= -.10, p=.00). Furthermore, Muslims who have more Christian 
friends show less support for demonstrations. Among Christians, the results are non-
significant, as presented in appendix 2, Table 12.
Membership of religious organizations has no significant relationship to support 
for harm. Only among Muslims does such membership have a significant relationship 
to support for demonstrations (eta = 07, p=.05); Muslims who are members of 
religious organizations are more likely to support demonstrations. Among Muslims, 
the relationship between participation in religious organization activities and support 
for demonstrations is also significant (eta=.15, p=.05). If Muslims participate more 
than once a week in such activities, they support demonstrations significantly more 
(see appendix 2, Table 13 and Table 14).  
4.3. Social position and support for violence
Social position constitutes demographic and social variables that might influence 
individual attitudes to support for violence. They consist of gender, parents’ 
religion, parents’ education, parents’ occupational status, parents’ job, and monthly 
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household income. Parents’ religion is reconstructed into two scales to make the 
analysis more relevant to the homogenous or heterogamous nature of religion in 
the family. The values of social position variables (except for gender) are recoded to 
avoid low frequencies and to create a normal distribution.
4.3.1. Construction of the measurement
We constructed the measurement for social position from several indicators that 
we assumed to affect the relationship between ethno-religious identification and 
support for violence. Besides gender and homogamy of parents, the extent to which 
social economic status of the respondents’ household affects attitudes was also 
estimated. This was measured by parents’ education, occupation and household 
income.
4.3.1.1 Gender
Gender refers to men and women.
4.3.1.2. Homogamy
Parents’ religion encompasses the religion of the respondents’ father and mother. If 
the religion of at least one of the parents was different from that of the respondent, 
we considered it to be a heterogenous family (‘heterogamy’). If the religion of both 
parents was the same, we defined the family background as religiously homogenous 
(‘homogamy’). We assumed that homogamy affects respondents’ support for 
violence, so we recoded the answers regarding fathers’ and mothers’ religion into 
the new scale for homogamy. The first step was to combine father and mother 
whose religion was Islam, or whose religion was Christian. Then, the next step was 
to calculate the number of respondents whose religion was similar to that of both of 
their parents. By computing for homogamy, the result shows that 1,453 respondents 
(96.87%) came from homogamous households. Specifically, Table 3.8 presents the 
composition of respondents’ homogamy and heterogamy; 98.83% of Muslim and 
96.18% of Christian households were homogamous. 
Table 4.8. Homogamy and heterogamy of respondents’ families
Religion in family
Muslims Christians
N % N %
Homogamy 843 98.83 605 96.18
Heterogamy 10 1.17 24 3.82
Total 853 100.00 629 100.00
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4.3.1.3. Parents’ educational attainment
The parents’ educational level was presupposed to have influenced the respondents’ 
attitude to support for violence. Fathers’ education and mothers’ education was 
computed into a single measure for parents’ education. The level of education 
consisted of low, middle and high. Low level corresponded to no formal education 
or only elementary school, the middle included junior and senior high school, and 
higher education encompassed university and polytechnic school. 
4.3.1.4. Parents’ occupational status and parents’ occupation
The parents’ occupational status followed the job status categories used in the 
national census by Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS, Statistics Indonesia); it was recoded 
into four categories. The new categories consisted of self-employed, labourer/officer, 
informal worker and unpaid worker. The measurement also combined fathers’ 
occupational status and mothers’ occupational status into parents’ occupational 
status. For the parents’ occupation we used the original categories from the BPS 
national statistics. The scale was nominal.  
4.3.1.5. Household income
Household income is an indicator of social class and status. The respondents’ 
attitude to support for violence might be influenced by the social status of the 
family. The question for household income was set up in eight interval categories 
from lower than IDR 500,000,- to higher than IDR 6,000,000,-. We recoded this into 
three categories consisting of low, middle and high levels of income. The low level 
corresponded to earnings of less than IDR 999,999,-; the middle from IDR 1,000, 
000,- to 4,999,999,- and the high, more than IDR 5,000,000,-.
4.3.2. Intergroup differences and analysis of variance
There were significant differences between Muslims and Christians across all 
control variables except for parents’ education. There were more female Muslims 
respondents (M=1.50, SD=.50) than female Christians (M=1.44, SD=.50), which is a 
significant difference if we look at the t-test score (2.26; p=.00)
The religious composition of respondents’ families was slightly different for 
Muslim and Christian respondents. More Muslims had homogamous families (M=.99, 
SD=.11) than Christians (M=.96, SD=.19). The t-test score was 3.11 (p=.00). The 
parents’ highest educational attainment was lower for Muslims (M=1.98, SD=.73) 
than for Christians (M=2.25, SD=.66). However, the difference between Muslims and 
Christians was not significant.   
Parents’ occupational status differed significantly between Muslims and 
Christians. Muslims had lower occupational status (M=1.68, SD= .85) than Christians 
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(M=1.75, SD=.79). The t-test score was -1.64 (p=.00). The household income of 
Muslims (M=1.80, SD= .72) was also lower than that of Christians (M=1.94, SD=.71). 
The difference between the two religious groups is significant (t-test=-.363, p=.00). 
Nonetheless, the parental occupational status of Muslim respondents (M=6.23, 
SD=1.69) was higher than that of Christians (M=5.97, SD=1.99). Parents’ occupation 
is arranged hierarchically from (1), absent/dead, to (6), manager. The difference 
between Muslims and Christians is significant (t-test=2.23, p=.00).
Table 4.9 Social characteristics: scores and inter-group difference 
Social 
positions





M SD N M S D N Min Max
Gender 1.50 .50 838 1.44 .50 621 1.00 2.00 .06 2.26** 1,341.39
Homogamy .99 .11 853 .96 .19 629 1.00 2.00 .03 3.11** 917.64
Parents’ 
education




1.68 .85 682 1.75 .79 444 1.00 4.00 -.08 -1.64** 999.21
Parents’ 
occupation
6.23 1.69 624 5.97 1.99 438 1.00 11.00 .26 2.23** 839.17
Household 
income 1.80 .72 823 1.94 .71 583 1.00 3.00 -.14 -3.63** 1,265.23
** Significance at .01 level
We found the relationship between social position and support for violence to be 
barely significant. The results of ANOVA show that only household income has a 
significant relationship to support for harm. On the other hand, gender and parents’ 
education have a significant relationship to support for demonstrations, but for 
Christians only.  
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Support for harm Support for Public Criticism and Demonstrations
Muslims Christians Muslims Christians
M N R/E M N R/E M N R/E M N R/E













Income 1.71 813 -.09* 1.74 575 -.15**
Significance at .01 level * Significance at .05 level
Among Christians, support for criticism and demonstrations (M 3.03, N=594) is 
related to gender, with men showing significantly more support than women. (eta 
=.12, p=.00). There is also a significant relationship between parents’ education 
and support for demonstrations (M=3.02, N=404), a linear relationship with r =.10. 
The higher the educational attainment of parents, the greater the support for 
demonstrations (see appendix 2, Table 17). 
The relationship between household income and support for harm to persons 
and property is significant for both Muslims and Christians. Muslims (M=1.71, N=813) 
showed lower levels of support for violence than Christians (M=1.74, N=575). The 
relationship between household income and support for violence showed the same 
tendency for both Muslims and Christians, although it was somewhat deviant from 
linearity among Muslims. Overall, the relationship indicates that respondents from 
higher income households show less support for harm to persons and property. The 
correlation of Christians (r = -.15, p=.00) is stronger than that of Muslims (eta=.09, 
p=.03. The detail of the analysis is presented in appendix 2, Table 20. 
4. 4. Support for violence and intermediary variables
There were nine intermediary variables in the study: perceived group threat, 
salience of identity, intergroup contact, individual memory of violence, perceived 
discrimination, religiosity, nationalistic attitudes and intergroup distrust. But before 
we present their relationship to the dependent variables, we will briefly discuss the 
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factor analysis to obtain scales for the respective intermediate variables. This section 
therefore describes the scale construction of the intermediate variables, followed by 
the intergroup differences between Muslims and Christians based on the analysis of 
variance.
4.4.1. Construction of the measurements
We subjected some intermediate variables to factor analysis for data reduction 
to construct latent variables. These variables were perceived group threat, 
salience of identity, quality of contact, perceived discrimination, religiocentrism, 
attitudes towards religious plurality, intra-textual fundamentalism versus symbolic 
interpretation, nationalism and regiocentrism. Some other variables were computed 
for their descriptive features, such as quantity of contact, individual memory of 
violence and intergroup distrust. The results of the factor analyses are presented in 
appendix 1.
4.4.1.1. Perceived group threat
Perceived group threat originally contained eleven items. Two were then removed 
– q157, “The day will come when members of other religious groups will occupy 
crucial positions in government,” and q162, “I am afraid of increasing violence in my 
neighbourhood due to the presence of other religious groups.” Question 157 was 
deleted for its low communality (h2 = .24) and q162 was deleted for double loadings 
in two factors when tested in the Muslim group. Appendix 1, Table 1 shows that two 
factors were combined into a single solution because in the pattern matrix, they 
had a strong correlation (.56). The reliability of the scale for Muslims is .91 and for 
Christians is .92.   
4.4.1.2. Salience of identity
Salience of identity was originally constructed in two dimensions: ethnic and 
religious; each had six questions. The two dimensions had been validated by the 
factor analysis (see appendix 1, Table 2). However, two questions were excluded 
because they loaded highly in two factors (>.30). These were q40, “My religious 
identity is very important to me,” and q41, “I see myself as a committed member of 
my religious group.” Since the correlation was lower than .60, the factor was retained 
in two dimensions. For Muslims, ethnic salience explained 34.01% of variance and 
religious salience explained 20.63%. So, ethnic and religious salience for Muslims 
explained 54.64% of variance. It was not greatly different among Christians, in that 
ethnic salience explained 36.33% of variance and religious salience 15.82%, giving a 
total variance of 52.15%. The reliability of ethnic salience for Muslims was .81 and .82 
for Christians; for religious salience, it was .84 for Muslims and .77 for Christians.
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4.4.1.3. Actual intergroup contact
Quantity of contact
Actual intergroup contact was conceptually constructed in two dimensions: quantity 
of contact and quality of contact. Quantity of contact measured the frequency 
of contact with relatives, close friends, neighbours, classmates, and board or 
housemates. The scale was set from never, at least once a month, once a week, more 
than once a week, once a day, several times a day, and not applicable. The answer 
“not applicable” was counted as missing value. We did not carry out a factor analysis 
because the measure had been constructed in one dimension. Cronbach’s alpha for 
Muslims was .89 and .84 for Christians.  
Quality of contact
Quality of contact was originally set up in four dimensions, consisting of evaluation, 
closeness, equality and cooperativeness. Each dimension had five items, with 
five answer categories from very negative to very positive. The factor analysis 
suggested three factors for Muslims and Christians together (“national”). The items 
on closeness and cooperation were merged into one dimension. However, the 
correlation between all three dimensions was very high (>.60), suggesting that a 
single dimension was adequate. For Muslims, the correlation between closeness and 
cooperation and evaluation was .68; between closeness, cooperation and equality 
-.80; and between evaluation and equality -.64. The test for Christians resulted in 
four factors, but it was then constructed in three because the correlation between 
closeness and cooperation was so high (>.60). The correlation for Christians between 
closeness, cooperation and evaluation was -.55; between closeness, cooperation and 
equality -.56; and between evaluation and equality .38. In order to find a comparable 
solution for Muslims and Christians, we decided to use a single measurement. The 
reliability of the scale was .97 for Muslims and .95 for Christians. The result of the 
factor analysis is presented in appendix 1, Table 3. 
4.4.1.4. Individual memory of violence
Memory of violence was constructed with twelve items, categorized into three 
dimensions: memory of violence, direct experience of violence, and indirect 
experience of violence. Memory of violence included individuals’ memory of a place 
where violence had taken place, socialization and witnessing of violent incidents. 
Direct violence encompassed the physical injury of family or relatives, while indirect 
experience accounted for friends and neighbours who had been victims of conflict. 
All items were composed with open-ended questions, so had to be recoded to make 
the scale computation. The reliability of the measure for Muslims and Christians was 
not greatly different. Cronbach’s alpha of individual memory for Muslims was .71 
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and for Christians was .65. Cronbach’s alpha of direct experience of violence was 
.81 for Muslims and .79 for Christians, while for indirect experience it was .75 for 
Muslims and .76 for Christians. We use the three scales for the data analysis. The 
general description of the variable is presented in appendix 1, Table 4. 
4.4.1.5. Perceived discrimination
The scale for perceived discrimination contained seventeen items, but four were 
removed for double loadings when it was tested via factor analysis. Three items were 
deleted when the measurement was examined among Muslims: q195, “Limitations 
on public observance of religious festivals,” q198, “Limitations on building places of 
worship,” and q204, “Limitations on the observance of religious laws on marriage 
and divorce.” Question 197, “Limitations on marriage,” was deleted for Christians. 
The result showed two factors, but since the correlation was high (>.63), it was made 
into a single scale (see appendix 1, Table 5). Cronbach’s alpha for Muslims was .91 
and for Christians was .95. 
4.4.1.6. Religiosity
Our measurements of religiosity included tests for religiocentrism, attitudes towards 
religious plurality and intra-textual fundamentalism versus symbolic interpretation. 
We tested these variables with factor analysis to verify the conceptual variables.
Religiocentrism
Religiocentrism was constructed in two dimensions containing six items for both 
Muslims and Christians. The factor analysis resulted in two dimensions: negative 
out-group attitudes and positive in-group attitudes (see appendix 1, Table 6). For 
Muslims, the initial Eigenvalue for the first factor was 2.80 and 1.16 for the second. 
The first factor explained 39.55% of the total variance and the second factor was 
added to explain 11.71% of variance. For Christians, the first Eigenvalue was 2.95 and 
the second was 1.16. The first factor explained 42.20% of variance and the second 
explained 12.56%. The reliability was .80 for Muslims’ negative out-group attitudes 
and .62 for positive in-group attitudes. The reliability for Christians was .78 for 
negative out-group attitudes and .74 for positive in-group attitudes. The correlation 
between the first and second factor was .48 for Muslims and .50 for Christians, so 
the factor solution was retained in two dimensions. 
Attitudes towards religious plurality
Attitudes towards religious plurality were originally examined via three dimensions: 
monism, pluralism and relativism. Each dimension had four items. In the factor 
analysis, one item was deleted for low commonality (h2 =.18): “In religious traditions, 
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different aspects of God are revealed.” Overall, the factor analysis resulted in two 
dimensions: monism and pluralism (see appendix 1, Table 7). The items on relativism 
were merged with pluralism. The initial Eigenvalues were 3.94 for pluralism and 
2.09 for monism among Muslim respondents, and 26.02 and 18.58 respectively 
among Christian respondents. The pluralism scale explained 31.15 % of variance, 
and monism explained a further 13.65% of variance for Muslims. Among Christians, 
pluralism explained 26.02% of variance and monism added 18.58%. Cronbach’s 
alpha for pluralism was .83 and .80 for Muslims and Christians, and for monism .74 
and .81 for Muslims and Christians respectively. The correlation between the two 
dimensions was <.50. 
Religious fundamentalism
The intra-textual fundamentalism measurement originally consisted of five items, 
while hermeneutic interpretation of texts had three. Two items were then removed 
in the analysis to make identical dimensions for both religious groups: q64, “Sacred 
writing is not really the word of God, but the word of man,” and q67, “I think that 
sacred writings should be taken literally, as they were written,” were removed, the 
former because of the negative value when it was run for Christians, and the latter for 
its low communality (h2<.20) when it was run for Muslims. The result of the analysis 
shows two dimensions as presented in appendix 1, Table 8. We retained intra-textual 
fundamentalism for the first dimension, and hermeneutic interpretation for the 
second. The Eigenvalue for Muslims was 2.41 for the first factor and 1.20 for the 
second, while the Eigenvalue for Christians was 2.61 for the first factor and 1.27 for 
the second. The first factor for Muslims explained 32.17% of variance and the second 
factor added 7.02%. The first factor for Christians explained 36.97% of variance and 
the second added a further 10.61%. For Muslims, Cronbach’s alpha was .77 for the 
first factor and .33 for the second, while for Christians it was .78 for the first factor 
and .40 for the second. 
4.4.1.7. Nationalistic attitudes
Nationalism and regiocentrism
There were fourteen items in total for the measurements of nationalism and 
regiocentrism. During factor analyses, q146, q148, q149 were removed for low 
communalities (h2<.20) and q143 and q147 were discarded for double loadings in two 
factors. Q145 was also deleted, as it had been placed in an inappropriate dimension. 
The factor analysis resulted in two dimensions: nationalism and regiocentrism, with 
a correlation between the factors of lower than .20 (see appendix 1, Table 9). The 
Cronbach’s alpha for nationalism was .66 and regiocentrism .62. 




The measurement for national pride was made on the basis of q136, “How proud 
are you of your country in terms of its achievement in history?” and q137, “How 
proud are you of your country in terms of its achievement of equal treatment of all 
groups in society?” These were separated from nationalistic attitudes above because 
the questions had different answer categories: from (1) not proud at all to (5) very 
proud. The reliability was .56 for Muslims and .58 for Christians.
4.4.1.8. Intergroup distrust
Intergroup distrust comprised ten items. It originally consisted of four items for trust 
(q208, q209, q210, q211) and six for distrust (q212, q213, q214, q215, q216, q217). 
Muslims were asked to what extent they trust or distrust Christians, and Christians 
were asked the opposite. The items on trust were recoded by reversing the answer 
categories, so that the scale ran in the same direction as distrust. So, the higher 
the score, the higher the distrust of the religious out-groups. The reliability of the 
measure was .71 for Muslims and .69 for Christians (see appendix 1, Table 10).
4.4.2. Scores and intergroup differences
Next, intergroup differences based on independent t-test samples were calculated. 
Only significant differences are reported in table 4.11 below. In our set of 
intermediate determinants, several showed significant differences between Muslim 
and Christian respondents. We found highly significant intergroup difference (p< 
.01) for perceived group threat, quantity of contact, memory of violence, direct 
and indirect experience of violence and regiocentrism. We found significant (p<.05) 
intergroup differences for quality of contact, religiocentrism (positive in-group), and 
intra-textual fundamentalism.    
Muslims (M=2.16, SD=.70) perceive more group threat than Christians (M=2.05, 
SD=.66). The differences are significant (t-test=2.93, p<.01). Likewise, they also 
have stronger positive in-group attitudes (M=3.39, SD=.96) and more inter-textual 
fundamentalist attitudes (M=4.10, SD=.97) than Christians (M=3.42, SD=1.07). 
Christians have more actual intergroup contact in terms of both quantity and quality 
than Muslims. For quantity of contact, the mean score for Christians (M=3.51, 
SD=1.82) is higher than for Muslims (2.30, SD=1.65). The quality of contact is also 
higher among Christians (M=2.39, SD=.57) than among Muslims (M=1.96, SD=.65). 
This indicates that Christians have more frequent contact with Muslims and are more 
positive in their response than vice versa.  
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Table 4.11 Intermediate variables: scores and intergroup differences 
Intermediate 
determinants




M S D N M S D N
Perceived group threat 2.16 .70 820 2.05 .66 593 .11 2.93** 1,316
Salience of ethnic identity 2.20 .78 732 2.19 .80 530 .01 .18 1,260
Salience of religious 
identity
3.12 .94 646 3.11 .95 489 .01 .22 1,133
Quantity of contact 2.30 1.65 575 3.51 1.82 417 -1.21 -10.78** 841.07
Quality of contact 1.96 .65 372 2.39 .57 288 -.43 -9.12* 647.78
Individual memory of 
violence
1.38 1.18 836 1.78 1.12 595 -.40 -6.43** 1,318.77
Direct experience of 
violence
.57 1.04 830 .76 1.12 604 -.18 -3.15** 1,240.40
Indirect experience 
violence
.42 .85 834 .66 1.01 618 -.23 -4.65** 1.186.99
Perceived discrimination 1.86 .62 833 1.99 .71 590 -.13 -3.65 1,421
Religiocentrism in-group 3.39 .96 652 2.99 1.00 526 .39 6.75* 1,104.92
Religiocentrism out-
group
2.47 .87 791 2.36 .85 580 .10 2.15 1,369
Religious pluralism 2.74 .82 748 3.29 .77 422 -.55 -11.12 1,168
Religious monism 3.16 .88 659 2.45 .87 577 .70 14.09 1,234
Intra-textual 
fundamentalism
4.10 .97 551 3.42 1.07 467 .68 10.55* 948.49
Hermeneutic 
interpretation
3.31 .95 743 3.72 .91 526 -.41 -7.66 1,267
National pride 3.75 .95 701 3.46 .98 536 .29 5.29 1,235
Nationalistic attitudes 2.70 .81 569 2.62 .77 465 .08 1.65 1,032
Regiocentrism 2.25 .86 827 2.38 .93 609 -.14 -2.89** 1,251.72
Intergroup distrust 1.51 .63 842 1.50 .60 600 .01 .37 1,440
** Significance at .01 level; *Significance at .05 level
For memory of violence, Christians have slightly higher mean scores (M=1.78, 
SD=1.12) than Muslims (M=1.38, SD=1.18). They have also experienced more direct 
and indirect violence than Muslims. In terms of regiocentrism, Christians (M=2.38, 
SD=.93) also score higher than Muslims (M=2.25, SD=.86). 
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4.4.3. Analysis of variance 
The ANOVA results show that some intermediate variables are significantly related to 
support for violence. These are perceived group threat, religiocentrism (negative out-
group), monism, perceived discrimination and distrust. Others are related to support 
for violence only for Muslims or Christians, either support for harm to persons and 
property, or support for demonstrations. The overall result for the variance analysis 
of these variables is presented in appendix 2.   
The relationship between perceived group threat and support for harm is 
significant for both Muslims and Christians (<.05). It is also linear for Muslims (r = .23) 
and Christians (r = .30). In relation to support for demonstrations, the relationship is 
also significant and linear both for Muslims (r. 19) and Christians (r = 10). It indicates 
that the more the respondents perceive threat to their religious in-group, the more 
they support violence. The analysis of variance is presented in appendix 2, Table 21.
The relationship between salience of ethnic identity and support for harm 
show that the correlation is significant and linear for Muslims only: Pearson r is .11. 
So, the higher the salience of ethnic identity for Muslims, the more they support 
harm. It can also be affirmed that salience of ethnic identity is related to support for 
demonstrations. The relationship is significant and linear for both Muslims (r=.16) 
and Christians (r=.18). So, the higher the salience of ethnic identity, the greater the 
support for demonstrations.  
The relationship between salience of religious identity and support for 
demonstrations is only significant among Muslims: the relationship is linear (r = .09) 
which means that higher salience of religious identity among Muslims is related to 
more support for demonstrations. The analysis of variance is shown in appendix 2, 
Table 23.
The relationship between quantity of contact and support for harm is only 
significant for Christians, and is deviant from linearity (eta = .19). But there is a clear 
positive linear relationship between quality of contact and support for harm (r=.18) 
among Christians; more contact with Muslims is related to more support for harm. 
The relationship between quantity of contact with support for demonstrations is 
only significant for Muslims. It is linear, but in a negative direction (r= -.10), so more 
contact with Christians is related to less support for demonstrations (see appendix 




Table 4.12 Variance analysis of intermediate determinant variables 
Variables
Harm Demonstrations
Muslims Christians Muslims Christians














contact 1.72 409 .19* 3.21 571 -.10*
Quality of 






















1.70 781 .19** 1.76 560 .12* 3.26 786 .13** 3.06 560 .14*












1.76 519 .04* 3.07 519 .14*
Nationalism 1.76 563 .14* 1.78 456 .15* 3.24 566 .20**
Regiocen-
trism 1.70 816 .34** 1.76 591 .26**
Intergroup 
distrust
1.84 223 .15** 1.81 182 .13* 3.25 224 .10** 3.03 593 .11**
** :  p < .01, * :  p <  .05
Individual memory of violence only relates significantly to support for demonstrations 
among Christians. The relationship is linear and positive (r = .11). This indicates 
that Christians, who have greater memory of violence, are more supportive of 
demonstrations. The analysis of variance is presented in appendix 2, Table 26.
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Perceived discrimination has a significant relationship to support for intergroup 
violence both for Muslims and Christians. In terms of support for harm to persons 
and property, the relationship is linear for Muslims (r= .32) and for Christians (r= .25); 
the more they perceive discrimination against their group, the more they support 
harm to persons and property. The relationship between perceived discrimination 
and support for demonstrations is also significant for both religious groups. The 
relationship is deviant from linearity for Muslims (eta= .10) and linear for Christians 
(r = -.09). So the direction for Muslims is different from that for Christians; the more 
that Muslims perceive discrimination, the higher their support for demonstrations, 
but the more that Christians perceive discrimination, the lower their support for 
demonstrations. The analysis of variance is in appendix 2, Table 29.
In relation to religiocentrism, Christians with relatively more positive in-group 
attitudes show more support for violence. The correlation is significant and linear 
for harm to persons and property (r=.20), but deviant from linearity for support for 
demonstrations (eta=.15, p=.02). For Muslims, the correlation is significant only in 
terms of support for demonstrations (r=.14). Positive in-group attitudes are related 
to more support for demonstrations among Muslims. 
The relationship between negative out-group attitudes and support for violence 
shows significant correlations for both Muslims and Christians. In terms of support 
for harm to persons and property, r is .19 for Muslims and .12 for Christians. A slight 
difference occurs in the relationship to support for demonstrations. The correlation 
is linear for Muslims (r=.13), but deviant from linearity for Christians (eta=.14). This 
overall relationship indicates that the stronger the negative out-group attitudes, 
the greater the support for violence. The analysis of variance on religiocentrism is 
presented in appendix 2, Table 30 and Table 31.
For monism, the relationship to support for violence is similar to that for 
negative out-group attitudes. Both for Muslims and Christians, it is significantly 
positive and linear. For support for harm to persons and property, r is.14 for Muslims 
and .17 for Christians. For support for public criticism and demonstrations, r is .24 
for Muslims and .11 for Christians. The correlation indicates that monism is related 
to more support for violence, both among Muslims and Christians (see appendix 2, 
Table 32).
The relationship between intra-textual fundamentalism and support for 
violence is significant for Muslims while for Christians it is significant only in terms of 
support for demonstrations. For support for harm to persons and properties, r is .17 
for Muslims and .14 for Christians. This indicates that intra-textual fundamentalism 
is related to greater support for harm to persons and property. For Muslims, intra-




The relationship between hermeneutic interpretation and support for violence 
shows a significant correlation among Muslims, but only for the lower level of 
violence, i.e., support for demonstrations (eta=.21). The analysis of variance for 
fundamentalism is presented in appendix 2, Table 35.  
The relationship between national pride and support for violence is only 
significant for Christians. For support for harm, the relationship is significant and 
linear (r = .04); for support for demonstrations, the relationship is deviant from 
linearity (eta=.14). In general, the prouder that Christians are of their country, the 
greater their support for violence. 
The relationship between nationalism and support for violence is also significant, 
except in terms of Christians’ support for demonstrations. For both Muslims and 
Christians, the relationship to support for harm is deviant from linearity. Eta scores 
.14 for Muslims and .15 for Christians. On the other hand, the relationship between 
nationalism and support for demonstrations is significant and linear only for Muslims 
(r=.20). Muslims who are more nationalistic are more supportive of demonstrations 
(see appendix 2, Table 37).  
Regiocentrism shows a relatively strong correlation to support for harm; both 
Muslims and Christians who are more regiocentric show more support for harm. The 
relationship is also linear for Muslims (r=.34) and Christians (r=.26).  
The relationship between out-group distrust and support for harm is also 
significant. The analysis of variance is presented in appendix 2, Table 39. For Muslims, 
it is linear (r=.15) and deviant from linearity for Christians (eta=.13). On the other 
hand, the relationship between out-group distrust with support for demonstrations 
is significant and linear both for Muslims (r=. 10) and Christians (r=.11). So, the more 
they distrust the out-group, the greater their support for harm.  
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have tested the validity and reliability of the measurements of 
our main variables through factor analysis. The dependent variable results in two 
dimensions: support for harm to persons and property, and support for public criticism 
and demonstrations. Some variables have been reduced to more parsimonious 
factors, such as participation in religious ceremonies and practices, attitudes towards 
religious plurality, perceived threat, intergroup contact, memory of violence, 
perceived discrimination and nationalism. The result of the factor analyses for some 
other variables confirmed that our hypothetical constructions were valid for factors 
including participation in ethnic ceremonies, salience of identity, religiocentrism, 
religious fundamentalism versus hermeneutic interpretation of texts, and distrust. 
Both Muslims and Christians show the same general patterns in their attitudes 
to support for violence. They tend to disagree with supporting harm to people and 
properties, but agree with supporting demonstrations. Compared to Christians, 
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Muslims have stronger ethno-religious identification that in turn relates to the 
two dimensions of support for violence. In general, there are stronger and more 
significant correlations of the tested variables among Muslims than among our 
Christian respondents.  
Furthermore, the analysis of variance between both dimensions of support 
for violence as the dependent variables, with the set of independent control and 
intermediary variables, shows that some relations are significant, but others are 
not. In these analyses, the relationships of the two dimensions of the dependent 
variables are examined via comparison between Muslims and Christians.
In terms of ethno-religious identification, we find that Christians’ participation 
in ethnic organization activities and self-definition of religion are positively related 
to support for demonstrations, whereas the use of ethnic languages is negatively 
related to support for harm to persons and property. Among Muslims, it is seen 
that support for harm can be found mainly among those who are members of 
ethnic organizations, and who have more friends (both belonging to the religious in-
group and the religious out-group), but to a lesser degree among respondents who 
participate more frequently in collective rituals. It is also seen that support for public 
criticism and demonstrations can be found among Muslims who participate in ethnic 
ceremonies, ethnic organization activities, collective rituals, rites of passage, as well 
as those who have more Muslim friends, members of religious organizations and 
those who participate more frequently in the activities of religious organizations. 
However, Muslim respondents who have fewer Christian friends show greater 
support for criticism and demonstrations.   
Regarding social positions, a significant negative relation is found among 
Muslims and Christians between support for harm and household income. It 
indicates that the respondents who tend to support harm are from the lower social 
economic strata, i.e. from families with relatively low household income. Support 
for public criticism and demonstrations has a significant relationship to gender and 
parents’ education only among Christians. Men support demonstrations more than 
women. Further, the higher the level of education of Christian respondents’ parents, 
the more they support demonstrations.
For the intermediary variables, among Christians it is found that perceived 
group threat, quantity of contact, quality of contact, perceived discrimination, 
religiocentrism (both postive in-group attitudes and negative outgroup attitudes), 
monism, intra-textual fundamentalism, national pride, nationalism and regiocentrism 
are positively related to support for harm to persons and property. Likewise, we find 
that salience of ethnic identity, perceived group threat, religiocentrism (in-groups and 
out-groups), memory of violence, national pride and distrust are positively related to 
support for public criticism and demonstrations, whereas perceived discrimination is 
negatively related to support for demonstrations.
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Among Muslims, we find that support for harm to persons and properties can 
be identified mainly among those for whom ethnic identity is salient, who perceive 
relatively more group threat, and have higher scores for religiocentrism (out-
groups), and who demonstrate monism, intra-textual fundamentalism, nationalism, 
regiocetrism and intergroup distrust. By the same token, we also find that support for 
public criticism and demonstrations can be found among Muslims whose ethnic and 
religious identities are salient, who perceive more group threat, who have relatively 
higher scores for religiocentrism (in-group and out-group), and who demonstrate 
monism, fundamentalism, symbolic interpretation, nationalism and intergroup 
distrust, but to a lesser degree among respondents who have good quality of contact 





RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION 
ANALYSES
This chapter presents the results of the multivariate regression analyses. These 
analyses are used to examine the relationship between ethno-religious identification 
(and some other predictors) and individuals’ support for intergroup violence. In order 
to make theoretical sense of the results of the study, we first review several theories 
and hypotheses. We then delineate methods and strategies of regression analyses 
to develop four empirical models. We go on to reveal the findings of the analyses, 
present some of the interviews of the respondents, and triangulate between the 
quantitative and qualitative results. Finally, we discuss these results in the context of 
the wider theoretical background. 
5.1. Theoretical models and hypotheses
There are several theories from which hypotheses can be derived for this study. 
The main theory used is ethnic competition theory, which has been developed 
from social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory. It integrates ‘the 
dispositional notions from social identity theory with the situational notions from 
realistic group conflict theory into one theoretical framework’ (Coenders et al., 
2004: 16). Social identity theory emphasizes that social identities are fundamentally 
important to individuals’ needs. In order to develop in-group identities, individuals 
associate themselves with positive in-group characteristics; they dehumanize the 
out-group and dissociate themselves from it. In their study, Tajfel and Turner (1986) 
point out that this positive identification can become intense even if there is little 
or no competition. Based on this theory, we assume that in-group favouritism 
increases out-group prejudice, which can in turn affect an individual’s support for 
intergroup violence. On the other hand, realistic group conflict theory holds that 
conflict arises out of competition between individuals or groups for scarce resources 
(Coser, 1956). This competition creates incompatible goals for different groups 
and brings about prejudice as well as antagonism between them. The competition 
induces perceived threat, which results in exclusionary attitudes towards out-groups 
while strengthening in-group solidarity (Coenders et al., 2004: 16-20). In this study, 
we examine whether stronger ethno-religious identification increases the level of 
support for intergroup violence. 
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Ethno-religious identification refers to an individual’s construction of their 
identity on the basis of their ethno-religious group, along with the values and 
emotional significance of that group (Gijsberts et. al., 2004: 10). In order to measure 
ethno-religious identification, we construct a set of variables based on inventories 
from previous studies. We begin with those of Phinney (1992) and Phinney and Ong 
(2007) on ethnic identification; however, given that religious identities have become 
an important factor in Indonesia over the last decade (Hefner, 2000: 11; Bertrand, 
2010: 94), we also go on to consider religious identification as a measure. Basing 
their theory on Phinney’s (1992) previous study of the concept of multi-group ethnic 
identity and how it can be measured, Phinney and Ong (2007) point out that any 
measure of ethnic identification should include, among other factors, individuals’ 
own definition of ethnic groups, together with their commitment and attachment to 
their group, an exploration of their ethnic tradition and heritage (i.e. their cultural 
practices and attendance of ethnic ceremonies), their behavioural involvement (i.e. 
their use of ethnic language and association with members of their in-group), and 
their beliefs and values. These dimensions were included because ethnic identity is 
a multi-dimensional construct and because an individual’s identity can change over 
time in different contexts (Phinney, 2007: 279).  
The Multi-group Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM) model developed by Phinney 
(1992) and Phinney and Ong (2007) is used as the foundation for measuring ethno-
religious identification. Although it was originally devised in relation to ethnicity, 
several dimensions of MEIM are applicable to religious identification. For instance, 
exploration of ethnic traditions can be extended to participation in collective rituals, 
rites of passage and religious practices. Likewise, friendships among people of the 
same religion and membership of religious organizations can be inferred from the 
measure’s behavioural dimension. 
Another measurement derived from previous studies concerns the ritualistic 
aspect of religion (Allport and Ross, 1967; Scheepers et al., 2002b). These studies 
investigated increasing levels of prejudice and exclusionary attitudes among 
religious groups. Therefore, we constructed ethno-religious identification by taking 
several factors into account, including self-definition of ethnicity and religion, ethnic 
language use, the tendency to seek friends from the same ethnic and religious 
community, participation in ethnic ceremonies, collective rituals, religious practices 
and rites of passage, as well as membership of ethnic and religious organizations and 
participation in their activities.
An individual’s self-definition of ethnicity and religion refers to the combination 
of their own self-categorization of ethnic and religious identities. Hypothesis 1 
asserts: ethno-religious groups differ in their support for intergroup violence. 
Hypothesis 2 advances that the stronger the level of ethno-religious 
identification, the greater the support for intergroup violence. We propose that 
RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSES
189
5
ethnic language be used as an aspect of ethno-religious identification and hence 
as a predictor variable. It measures the extent to which respondents use their 
ethnic language, the assumption being that such use reflects a connection with the 
ethnic group, which in turn could increase support for intergroup violence. In earlier 
measures of ethnic identification, the use of ethnic language is pinpointed as part of 
the behavioural dimension, and is considered to be a key aspect of ethnic identity 
(Phinney and Ong, 2007: 272). Hence, Hypothesis 2a states that: the more people 
use their ethnic language, the more they support intergroup violence. 
Furthermore, we examine the respondents’ participation in ethnic ceremonies, 
their number of same-ethnicity friends, and membership of ethnic organizations 
as indicators of ethnic identification. Participation in ethnic ceremonies or other 
cultural activities is considered to be an individual exploration of ethnicity, whereby 
people can strengthen their attachment to their ethnic identity. The number of 
same-ethnicity friends and membership of ethnic organizations can be categorized 
as part of the behavioural dimension, since these variables are considered to be the 
expression of ethnic identity (Phinney and Ong, 2007: 272-273). We set out to test 
the following hypotheses regarding these dimensions:
2b. The higher the frequency of participation in ethnic ceremonies, the greater 
the support for intergroup violence.
2c.  The higher the number of respondents’ ethnic in-group friends, the greater 
their support for intergroup violence.
2d.  Members of ethnic organizations support intergroup violence more than 
non-members.
2e.  The higher the level of participation in the activities of ethnic organizations, 
the greater the support for intergroup violence.
By the same token, we also measure the respondents’ religious identification 
via their participation in religious practices, collective rituals and rites of passage, as 
well as their number of friends of the same religion, their membership of religious 
organizations and their involvement in the activities of those organizations. We 
anticipate that support for violence will be greater among those who participate 
more in religious practices, collective rituals and rites of passage. The hypotheses 
are as follows:
2f. The higher the level of activity in religious practices, the greater the 
support for intergroup violence.
2g. The higher the level of participation in collective rituals, the greater the 
support for intergroup violence.
2h. The higher the level of participation in rites of passage, the greater the 
support for intergroup violence.
2i.  The more religious in-group friends held by respondents, the greater their 
support for intergroup violence.
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2j.  The more religious out-group friends held by respondents, the weaker 
their support for intergroup violence. 
2k.  Membership of religious organizations induces more support for intergroup 
violence than non-membership. 
2l.  The higher the level of participation in organized religious activities, the 
greater the support for intergroup violence. 
Studies of intergroup relations also show the considerable influence of social 
position. Ethnic competition theory suggests that competition over scarce resources 
varies between people of different social positions. Individuals who are vulnerable 
both in society and in the labour market perceive more intergroup competition, 
and hence hold stronger negative attitudes towards subordinate and out-group 
populations. Competition is greatest among people with a socio-economic position 
similar to that of ethnic minorities – those who hold weak or very weak socio-
economic positions and generally have a low level of education (Scheepers et al., 
2002a). Moreover, Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers (2003b), in their analysis of the 
determinants of immigrant exclusionism, found that people with lower educational 
levels and lower income levels, elderly people or those who depend on social security 
have more negative, exclusionist attitudes. Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers (2007: 
233) provide further evidence that people of lower educational levels, including 
manual workers and some sectors of the self-employed, avoid all social contacts 
with immigrants. Some earlier studies of ethno-religious conflict have also revealed a 
difference between men and women’s support for violence (Moser and Clark, 2001; 
Putranti and Subagya, 2005). Although these studies demonstrate the influence of 
an individual’s characteristics, this study proposes that ethno-religious identification 
takes precedence over social position. Specifically, religious identification has a 
strong influence on the daily lives of Indonesian people, as is already clear from 
the Indonesian government’s requirement that citizens identify their religion; they 
cannot claim to have no religion at all. Based on our proposition about the effect 
of social position on the relationship between ethno-religious identification and 
support for violence, we test Hypothesis (3) which holds that the stronger the level 
of ethno-religious identification, the greater the support for intergroup violence, 
even after controlling for other individual-level determinants.
The indicators for social position refer to gender (3a), educational attainment 
of parents (3b), homogamy (3c), parental occupations (3d), occupational status 
of parents (3e) and household income (3f). The educational attainment of parents 
is measured by the highest level of education achieved by the father and the 
mother, from pre-school at the lowest level to post-graduate study at the highest. 
Homogamy measures whether family members have the same religious background. 
The occupational status of parents is categorized according to the classification 
criteria used by Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS). Likewise, parents’ 
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occupation adopts a similar classification. Family household income is ranked as low, 
middle or high. In chapter 4, these categorizations are described in more detail.
This study also examines a set of intermediary variables affecting the relationship 
between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. 
Hypothesis 4 states that: the relationship between ethno-religious identification 
and support for intergroup violence can be explained by particular intermediate 
determinants. We consider several theories from which to derive hypotheses for the 
intermediary variables.
Perceived  group  threats  are  expected  to  have  a  strong  influence  on 
the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup 
violence. Ethnic competition theory suggests that perceived threat acts as a 
mediating determinant between, on the one hand, individual and contextual-level 
determinants referring to competitive intergroup conditions, and, on the other hand, 
unfavourable out-group attitudes. Perceived group threat intensifies the processes 
of social identification and social contra-identification (Scheepers et al., 2002a; 
Coenders et al., 2004). The perception of ethnic threat might intermediate the 
relation between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. 
Therefore, the higher the level of ethno-religious identification, the stronger the 
perception of out-group threat, which may induce support for intergroup violence.
The salience of identity concerns the importance of a single identity for 
individuals, since individuals often associate as members of a group. The difference 
in degree of social identification affects an individual’s attitudes towards their in-
group and the other out-groups (Phinney, 1990: Duckit, 2006). In this study, we 
differentiate between ethnic and religious aspects when considering the salience of 
identity. Ethno-religious salience might intermediate the relation between ethno-
religious identification and support for intergroup violence. We expect that the higher 
the level of ethno-religious identification, the stronger the salience of identity, which 
may induce support for intergroup violence.
The most fundamental proposition of intergroup contact theory is that contact 
between groups can effectively reduce negative attitudes toward out-groups (Allport, 
1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Brown et al., 2007). Based on this theory, it can be expected 
that contact between ethno-religious groups reduces negative attitudes toward 
out-groups and in turn decreases support for ethno-religious violence. In this study, 
contact is measured in two different ways: in terms of its quantity and its quality (see 
Chapter 4). It proposes that the greater their level of ethno-religious identification, 
the less contact individuals have with out-groups, and that this may therefore induce 
support for intergroup violence.  
Memories of past violence influence individuals’ attitudes concerning present 
social relations (Cairns and Roe, 2003; Sahdra and Ross, 2007). Conflict can arise or 
be recreated when people deal with the present based on their past experiences. 
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Individuals who have lost their families or valuable belongings as a result of past 
violence suffer more intense pain from their traumatic memories than those who 
have not (Cairns and Roe, 2003: 3-5). This variable is measured in three dimensions: 
memories of violence, direct experience and indirect experience of violence. 
Memories of violence can include frequent talk of violence, direct experiences 
refers to violence in which family members and relatives were victims, and indirect 
violence is that experienced by friends and neighbours who were killed or injured 
as a result of intergroup violence. We anticipate that the greater the level of ethno-
religious identification, the stronger the memories of past violence, which may 
induce support for intergroup violence. 
Perceived discrimination is the perception by individuals or groups of being 
treated unfairly because of their membership of those groups. Previous studies 
of such perceptions have shown that those who perceive discrimination are more 
likely to have negative attitudes towards out-groups (Romero and Roberts, 1998; 
Vancluysen and Van Craen, 2010). Hence, perceived discrimination is expected 
to explain the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support 
for intergroup violence. We propose that the greater the level of ethno-religious 
identification, the stronger the perception of being discriminated against, and that 
this may induce support for intergroup violence. 
Religiosity expresses an individual’s attachment to their religion. It has several 
dimensions, linked to prejudice, by which religious adherents favour the truth claims 
and convictions of their in-group while dissociating themselves from the negative 
attributes of religious out-groups (Scheepers et al., 2002b; Sterkens and Anthony, 
2008: 63). In this study, religiosity is considered to refer to three core dimensions, 
namely, religiocentrism, attitudes towards religious plurality and fundamentalism. 
Religiocentrism refers to positive perceptions of the in-group religion and negative 
perceptions of the out-groups. As a result, we expect that the greater the level of 
ethno-religious identification, the stronger the religiocentrism, and that this may 
therefore induce support for intergroup violence.
Attitudes towards religious plurality measure individuals’ attitudes towards 
other religious traditions, i.e. inclusive and exclusive perceptions of other religious 
groups versus openness towards plurality (Anthony et al., 2005). In this study, we use 
two dimensions based on the result of the factor analysis (see chapter 4): monism 
and pluralism. We expect that the greater the ethno-religious identification, the 
more likely individuals are to embrace monism. It is expected that with higher levels 
of monism, there will be more support for violence; but that conversely, the more 
that individuals support pluralism, the less they support violence.
Religious fundamentalism is characterized by dogmatism. The measure of 
fundamentalism is adapted from the intra-textual fundamentalism scale of Williamson 
et al. (2010: 738) and contrasted with a hermeneutic interpretation scale (Duriez et 
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al., 2005: 854). The results of our factor analysis identified two dimensions to this: 
intra-textual fundamentalism and hermeneutic interpretation. We expect that the 
greater the ethno-religious identification, the stronger the level of fundamentalism, 
which in turn may induce support for intergroup violence.
Nationalist attitudes are favourable attitudes toward people’s own nation or 
country and the national in-group. It comprises two dimensions: chauvinism and 
patriotism. While chauvinism relates to blind, uncritical attachment, patriotism stems 
from a more critical assessment of the national group and country (Coenders, 2001; 
Coenders et al., 2004; Todosijevic, 2001). Nationalist attitudes are measured by two 
scales consisting of nationalism and national pride. We anticipate that the greater 
the level of ethno-religious identification, the weaker nationalistic sentiments will 
be, and that this may therefore induce support for intergroup violence.
In this study, we measure regiocentrism in addition to nationalist attitudes, 
adapting the nationalism scale to assess regionalist perspectives. We expect that the 
greater the level of ethno-religious identification, the stronger regiocentrism will be, 
and that this may therefore induce support for intergroup violence. 
Trust is mutual faithfulness and is what binds all social relationships together. 
In the institution of trust, individuals learn to rely on others. Trust is present in all 
spheres of everyday life and is what enables individuals to interact with others and 
institutions (Parsons, 1970: 142; Tropp et al., 2006: 771; Tam et al., 2009: 46). People 
tend to trust their in-groups, but not their out-groups. It is often presumed that 
trust fades during times of conflict. In this study, we specifically measure out-group 
distrust. We propose that the greater the level of ethno-religious identification, the 
more distrust there will be of out-groups and that this may therefore induce support 
for intergroup violence.  
Based on the theoretical rationales outlined above, we frame the following 
hypotheses as intermediate determinants of the relationship between ethno-
religious identification and support for intergroup violence.
4a.  The more an in-group perceives ethnic threat, the more it supports 
intergroup violence.
4b.  The higher the salience of ethno-religious identities, the greater the 
support for intergroup violence. 
4c.  The less contact with other ethno-religious groups, the greater the support 
for intergroup violence.
4d.  The more individual memories of violence, the greater the support for 
intergroup violence.
4e.  The greater the perceived discrimination, the greater the support for 
intergroup violence.




4g. The more religiocentrism (negative out-groups), the greater the support 
for intergroup violence.
4h.  The more openness towards plurality (i.e. pluralism), the less support for 
intergroup violence.
4i.  The stronger the fundamentalist views held, the greater the support for 
intergroup violence.
4j.  The weaker the nationalism held, the greater the support for intergroup 
violence.
4k.  The weaker the pride in country, the greater the support for intergroup 
violence.
4l.  The more regiocentrism, the greater the support for intergroup violence.  
4m.  The more distrust in out-groups, the greater the support for intergroup 
violence.
5.2. Methods of analyses 
Multivariate regression analysis is applied to test theoretical models that explain 
the relationships between observed variables. It predicts the value of dependent 
variables from predictor variables (Field, 2009:198: te Grotenhuis and Van der 
Weegen, 2009:109). In this study, we are curious to discover the predictors of 
support for violence, as determined by ethno-religious identification, social position 
and a set of intermediary variables.
Prior to the analysis, we computed self-definition of ethnicity and religion into 
one variable, namely ethno-religious self-definition. We identified 28 ethno-linguistic 
groups in addition to the 12 major groups that are the focus of our study. In this 
computation, we determined that each ethno-religious group must have at least 30 
respondents to be included in the analyses. Groups with fewer than 30 respondents 
were separated into ‘Muslim rest’ and ‘Christian rest’ respectively. We differentiated 
‘Muslim rest’ and ‘Christian rest’ from ‘other Muslims’ and ‘other Christians’ 
because the former categories contained the religious minorities who belong to the 
12 ethno-linguistic groups of our study; they might be individual migrants in the 
research areas. The latter categories consisted of ethnic groups that were excluded 
from this study because they were too small in number, including among others 
the Dayak, Papua, Banjar and Timorese. In total, other Muslims or other Christians 
comprised 104 respondents. The category of Muslim rest consists of Minangkabau, 
Buginese, Chinese, Bataknese and Makassarese, while the category of Christian 
rest consists of Sundanese, Toraja, Minahasa and Makassarese Christians. Based on 
the computation, we found 13 ethno-religious categories as presented in Table 5.1. 
In this analysis, we decided that we would choose as the reference category the 
ethno-religious group with the largest number of respondents, which was Javanese 
Muslims.
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Javanese Muslims 1.69 3.25 348 24.10
Ambonese Muslims 1.69 3.28 241 16.69
Butonese Muslims 1.78 3.26 95 6.58
Other Muslims 1.69 3.33 44 3.05
Sundanese Muslims 1.57 3.17 36 2.49
Madurese Muslims 1.89 3.25 36 2.49
Muslim rest 1.73 3.23 32 2.22
Ambonese Christians 1.80 3.04 346 23.96
Javanese Christians 1.56 2.93 104 7.20
Other Christians 1.70 3.02 56 3.88
Chinese Christians 1.77 3.02 43 2.98
Batak Christians 1.74 3.23 35 2.42
Christian rest 1.68 3.04 28 1.94
Total 1.72 3.16 1,444 100.00
Note: 1=totally disagree; 2= disagree; 3=neither disagree nor agree; 4=agree; 5=totally agree
The Muslim ethnic groups consist of Javanese, Ambonese, Butonese, Sundanese and 
Madurese in addition to a combination of several ethnic minorities. Javanese and 
Ambonese Muslims make up 40.79 % of the respondents. Javanese and Ambonese 
also make up the majority among the Christian ethnic groups in addition to the 
Chinese and the Batak. However, the Javanese are the largest Muslim ethnic group 
while the Ambonese are the largest Christian ethnic group. 
We measure support for intergroup violence based on the social domains and 
the level of violence as the result of the factor analysis, as elaborated in chapter 
4. The level of violence refers to the level of the intensity of people’s support for 
violence: support for harm of others (corporal and material) and support for public 
criticism and demonstration. F-statistics show no significant difference between 
Muslims and Christians with regard to support for harm (p=.33). On the other 
hand, there is a significant difference between Muslims and Christians with regard 
to support for public criticism and demonstrations (p=.00). Several Muslim and 
Christian ethnic groups score higher than average with regard to support for harm 
(1.72). These Muslim ethnic groups include Butonese, Madurese, Minangkabau, 
Buginese, Chinese, Batak and Makassarese, while the Christian ethnic groups include 
Ambonese, Chinese and Batak. All Muslim ethnic groups are more willing to support 
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demonstrations and public criticism, while Christian groups are generally less willing, 
with the exception of Batak Christians who show somewhat more support.  
As we carried out the analysis of variance in the preceding chapter, we can 
recognize whether the significant relationships between support for violence as a 
dependent variable, with ethno-religious identification as an independent variable 
and intermediate determinants was either linear or deviant from linearity. Linear 
relationships between variables is the crucial assumption of linear regression analysis. 
When the relationship was linear, we retained the variable as a metric determinant. 
However, if the relation was deviant from linearity, we set up the variable with a set 
of dummies. The nominal and ordinal scales of the variables were also constructed 
with dummies. In addition, all intermediate variables were treated as metric.
As collinearity diagnostics, we conducted a correlation test among the predictor 
variables and computed the variance inflation factor (VIF) which detects strong 
linear relationships between one predictor and another. Multi-collinearity can cause 
problems when drawing inferences about the relative contribution of each predictor 
variable. As a rule of thumb, the correlation must be lower than .80. If we rely on 
the VIF, the value must be below 10 or the tolerance scores below .01 (Field, 2009: 
223-224). The result of the correlation test is that multi-collinearity does not occur 
because the highest correlation is .49, that is between religious in-group friends and 
the amount or the quantity of contact. Moreover, the VIFs showed that there was no 
value higher than 10 on the tested variables.  
We set up four models for the regression analyses. The first model is the 
regression test of the combination between ethno-religious self-definition and 
support for intergroup violence (harm of others and demonstrations). The second 
model is the test between support for intergroup violence and ethno-religious 
definition, where we added a set of ethno-religious identification variables. The 
third model tests support for intergroup violence with ethno-religious identification 
variables that are controlled by social position variables. The fourth model tests 
support for intergroup violence with ethno-religious identification, along with a 
set of social position variables as well as intermediate determinants. Overall, the 
regression model equations can be schematically formulated as follows: 
Model 1: Y = B0 + B1 ERD + e. 
Model 2: Y= B0 + (B1ERD + B2EI +B3RI) + e. 
Model 3: Y = B0 + (B1ER + B2EI +B3RI) + (B4SP1 + B4SP2) + e.
Model 4: Y = B0 + (B1ER + B2EI +B3RI) + (B4SP1 + B4SP2) + (β5IM1+ β5IM2 + β5IM3) + e.
Y= Support for intergroup violence ERD= Ethno-religious self-definition
EI= Ethnic identification  RI= Religious identification
SP= Social Positions   IM=Intermediate determinant variables
e=error
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The method of regression analysis is “enter” (and not “stepwise”) because 
the analysis is used to examine the theoretical framework rather than to explore 
relationships among variables. The “enter” method enters all variables at the same 
time, although in a step-wise fashion. This makes no assumptions about the relative 
importance of each predictor variable (Field, 2009: 212). 
Following the backward procedure, we entered each set of variables in a 
sequence. If adding the variable contributed significantly to the model, then it was 
retained, but all other variables were then retested to see if they still contributed to 
the model. If they no longer contributed significantly, model trimming or removal was 
applied. These procedures produce a parsimonious model with the smallest possible 
set of predictor variables included in the test (Agresti and Finlay, 2008: 632). 
The process of model trimming was repeated, excluding one at a time any 
insignificant variable from the model with the largest p value or the smallest t value. 
The F-Test was used to test the set of dummy variables. For the metric variables, 
the t-value was the critical statistic, whether the variable was retained or removed 
from the model. If the F-test of any of the insignificant dummy variables yielded 
a higher F-value, thus making it significant, we changed the reference category 
from one extreme category to the other (e.g. from never to always). After changing 
the reference category, we replaced the dummy variables for another round of 
regression analyses. All significant variables in Model 2 were carried into Model 3, 
and similar procedures were conducted from Model 3 to Model 4. In this process 
of model trimming, we used the significance level of .05 and one tailed test, except 
for the dummy variables which used the two-tailed test (te Grotenhuis and Van der 
Weegen, 2009:114-115).
Therefore, we started the regression analysis in Model 1 by examining support 
for violence with ethno-religious self-definition. Model 2 tested the relationship 
between support for violence and ethno-religious identification. Model trimming 
was begun based on the results of Model 2. These results were included in the 
analysis of Model 3, which examined support for violence only using the significant 
relations of the previous model and social position as control variables. The model 
trimming was begun once again using the control variables, and after that on the 
remaining ethnic and religious identification which turned to non-significance due 
to the inclusion of the social position variables. These results were used as the basis 
for further analyses in Model 4. In the analysis of Model 4, we set up the significant 
relations in Model 3 plus intermediary variables as predictors. The model trimming 
was conducted once again, but only on the intermediate variables, until it ended up 




The analysis of regression is made on two dependent variables consisting of support 
for harm to persons and properties (higher level of violence) and support for public 
criticism and demonstrations (lower level of violence). This section describes the 
process whereby analyses discovered determinant variables of support for violence 
based on the theoretical models proposed in this study. We will describe the findings 
of our regression analyses in more detail. However, the trimming procedures that we 
applied to these models eventually produced more parsimonious regression models 
that we will describe further in Section 5.4. The complete results of the analysis are 
displayed in Appendix 3. 
5.3.1. Support for harm to persons and properties
The result of the first analysis on support for harm to persons and properties is in 
Appendix 3, Table 1 shows the adjusted R2= 
.
01, whereas R2= .11. The intercept is 
1.69 which holds for Javanese Muslims. Sundanese Muslims, Javanese Christians and 
Christian rest show less support than the Javanese Muslims, but the differences from 
the reference category are not significant. Significant differences appear among 
Madurese Muslims (B
1
= .20, p< .05) and Ambonese Christians (B
1
=.12, p< .05).   
The second round of analyses began with the entering of ethno-religious 
self-definition and ethnic identification. The analysis explained 2% of the support 
for harm variance. The significant relations appeared with reference to friends by 
ethnicity and to membership of an ethnic organization. The second step included 
other variables related to religious identification as the predictor variables. The 
analysis showed the adjusted R2 to be 1.10%. The significant relation appeared to be 
membership of a religious organization. 
Model 2 shows different results from the previous step of the analysis once 
all the variables of ethno-religious identification had been included. The results of 
this analysis indicate that the adjusted R2 is 2%. The remaining significant predictor 
was that of religious in-group friends. The Javanese Christians (B1=-.15, p=.03) 
showed less support for harm than Javanese Muslims. Likewise, it held for Madurese 
Muslims (B1=22, p=.04) and Ambonese Christians (B1=11, p=.02), who showed more 
support for harm than Javanese Muslims and were also affected by the number of 
their religious in-group friends. We excluded several determinants from the analysis 
due to non-significance. The trimming of this model began with out-group friends 
(p=.24), followed by rites of passage (p =.29) and membership of ethnic organizations 
(p=.98). Then, we continued trimming collective rituals (p= .93), religious practices 
(p=.66), ethnic language (p=.88), member of religious organizations (p=. 38), same-
ethnicity friends (p=.42) and ethnic ceremonies (p=.62).    
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Model 3 included religious in-group friends and social positions as the predictor 
variables. The initial results showed the adjusted R2 was 8%. Significant relations 
appeared with regard to the occupational status of parents, parental occupation and 
household income. The variables were trimmed down in order to exclude the non-
significant determinants. Parental education was the first variable to be excluded (p 
=. 93). Next was homogamy (p=.89). Following the trimming procedure, we should 
have excluded household income as well. The F-test showed that the change of 
R2 was .01 and p =.04. The relation became significant by changing the reference 
category from the highest level to lowest level of income. Therefore, we retained 
the variable and continued trimming with gender (p=.44). Eventually, the results of 
the analyses showed that the occupational status of parents, parental occupations 
and household income were the remaining significant intermediary determinants 
between ethno-religious identification and support for harm.
The further analysis of Model 4 incorporated the results of Model 3 and a set 
of intermediate variables. The final equation found that the adjusted R2 increased 
to 20%. Ethno-religious self-definition and religious in-group friends became non-
significant. The results indicate that support for harm was affected by ethno-
religious identification while taking into account parental occupations, perceived 
group threat, religiocentrism (positive towards in-group), pluralism and nationalistic 
attitudes. This is the result of declining values when these intermediate variables 
were included in the analysis. In this analysis, we discarded intermediate variables 
by considering the lowest t-value. The first deletion was religious salience (t=.02, 
p=.98) followed by intra-textual fundamentalism (t=.-.03, p=.97), ethnic salience 
(t=-.10, p=92), quantity of contact (t=-.06, p=.96), perceived discrimination (t=.06, 
p=.95), out-group distrust (t=.09, p=.93), memory of violence (t=.-28, p=.78), indirect 
experience of violence (t=.-51, p=.65), direct experience of violence (t=.43, p=.67), 
monism (t=.35, p=.73), regiocentrism (t=.52, p=.62), quality of contact (t=.61, 
p=.54), hermeneutic interpretation (t=.40, p=.69), religiocentrism, i.e., negative 
stances towards out-groups (t=.1.16, p=.25) and national pride (t=.1.07, p=.29). Four 
intermediate variables remained as the strong predictors, namely perceived group 
threat (p=.00), religiocentrism, i.e., positive stances towards the in-group (p=.01), 
pluralism (p=.01) and nationalistic attitude (p=.00).
5.3.2. Support for demonstrations 
The analysis of Model 1 regarding individual’s support for demonstrations showed 
that the intercept was 3.25 (p=.00). The adjusted R2 was 2%. The analysis indicated 
that Muslim groups, with the exception of Sundanese Muslims and the Muslim 
rest, support public criticism and demonstrations more than Javanese Muslims. On 
the other hand, the Christian groups were less supportive of demonstrations than 
Javanese Muslims.  
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The regression analysis for Model 2 underwent three stages as presented in 
appendix 3, Table 2. The first stage was Model 2a. The adjusted R2 was 4%. Among 
the ethno-religious identification predictors, only the use of the ethnic language on 
five to six occasions (as compared to the reference category ‘never’) was significant. 
It indicated a strong relation between the use of ethnic language and support for 
demonstrations; people who used their ethnic language on five to six occasions were 
more supportive of demonstrations than respondents who never did so. The results of 
the second stage Model 2b showed that R2 was 7%. All ethno-religious groups in this 
test were less supportive of violence than Javanese Muslims as the reference category. 
The final Model 2c showed that, except for Sundanese Muslims and the Muslim rest, 
the Muslim ethno-religious groups were more supportive of demonstrations than 
Javanese Muslims. Except for Batak Christians, all Christian ethno-religious groups 
were less supportive of demonstrations than Javanese Muslims. Regarding the 
ethno-religious identification variables, the significant correlations were found to be 
rituals (p=.00) and membership of religious organizations (p=.02). 
Based on the results of the previous model, Model 3 introduced social positions 
as control variables. The result showed that the adjusted R2 was 7%. Collective 
rituals remained significant (p=.00) – the more individuals participate in collective 
rituals, the more supportive they are of public criticism and demonstrations. Across 
the various social positions, women were less supportive than men. Respondents 
whose parents were unpaid workers were more supportive of public criticism 
and demonstrations (p=.01). Those whose parents were managers (p=.02), clerks 
(p=.02), traders (p=.04), machine operators (p=.04), and special labourers (p= .01) 
were less supportive of violence than those whose parents were farmers. Moreover, 
respondents with a medium level of household income were more supportive of 
harm than those whose household income was low.
The results of Model 4 came with an adjusted R2 of 12%. All ethno-religious 
groups, except for Madurese Muslims, were less supportive of public criticism and 
demonstrations than Javanese Muslims. A significant correlation was found only 
among the Ambonese Christians (p=.01). Collective rituals were significant (p=.00). 
Parental occupation and household income were also significant. Respondents 
whose parents were professionals (p=.03), clerks (p=.01) and special workers (p=.02) 
were less supportive of public criticism and demonstrations than respondents whose 
parents were farmers. Respondents with medium-level household income (p=. 04) 
were more supportive of public criticism and demonstrations than those with low-
level income. Moreover, we found that the salience of ethnic identity (p=.00) and 
hermeneutic interpretation (p=.00) became strong intermediate determinants. The 
results indicate that support for public criticism and demonstrations were affected 
by participation in collective rituals, while taking parental occupation, the salience of 
ethnic identity and hermeneutic interpretation into account.
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5.3.3. Discussion and interpretation of the results
The regression of both aspects of support for intergroup violence showed different, 
but often related tendencies. On the one hand, support for harm to persons and 
properties was affected by the possession of religious in-group friends, while taking 
into account parental occupation and perceived group threat, religiocentrism 
(positive towards in-groups), pluralism and nationalist attitudes. On the other hand, 
support for public criticism and demonstrations was affected by the respondents’ 
participation in collective rituals, while taking into account parental occupation, 
salience of ethnic identity and hermeneutic interpretation.
The ethno-religious groups showed on average little support for harming 
others. There was no specific ethno-religious group that showed significantly 
more or less support for harm than Javanese Muslims as the reference category, 
when it was controlled by the occupational status of parents, parents’ occupation, 
perceived group threat, religiocentrism (positive towards in-group), pluralism and 
nationalism.
The respondents whose parents worked as managers, professionals, technicians, 
clerks, traders or labourers showed less support for harm than respondents whose 
parents were farmers. Respondents who perceived an increasing threat from other 
ethno-religious groups tended to increase their support for harm. Similarly, those 
with a stronger attachment to their positive in-groups were more likely to support 
harm. Surprisingly, the respondents who showed more affinity with pluralism also 
showed more support for harm. This shows that support for violence is not merely 
induced by religious dogmatism, as we previously assumed. The study also revealed 
that nationalism reduced support for harm. 
Support for public criticism and demonstrations appeared to be more 
acceptable among respondents than support for harm to persons and properties. 
In terms of ethno-religious groups, the Muslim ethno-religious groups showed more 
support for public criticism and demonstration than Javanese Muslims, while all 
Christian ethnic groups showed less support than Javanese Muslims. Support for 
demonstrations was connected to participation in collective rituals; the more the 
respondents participated in such rituals, the more they supported public criticism 
and demonstrations. Respondents whose parents were professionals, clerks or 
special workers were less supportive of public criticism and demonstrations than 
those whose parents were farmers. Moreover, support was also connected to the 
salience of ethnic identity and to favouring hermeneutic interpretation; respondents 
who gave ethnic identity a greater degree of salience, and those with a more 




5.4. Summary of findings
The study reveals several important points. Some findings met our expectations and 
offered support for the theories from which we derived our hypotheses; however, 
others did not. We present the trimmed-down, and hence crucial, parsimonious 
findings of the study below.      
5.4.1. Support for harm to persons and for damaging property
The final outcome of the multivariate regression analyses results in a model containing 
significant predictors of the relationship between ethno-religious identification and 
support for harm. 
In Model 1, the Madurese Muslims and Ambonese Christians show more 
support for harm to persons and properties than Javanese Muslims. Except for 
Sundanese Muslims and Javanese Christians, other groups also show more support, 
but the differences among these groups as compared to the reference group are not 
significant. 
The relation between ethno-religious groups and support for harm changes 
slightly when other ethno-religious identification variables are added to the analysis. 
It shows the influence of religious in-group friends. Those with relatively more in-
group friends show less support for harm than those without such friends. It rejects 
Hypothesis 2i: The more religious in-group friends held by respondents, the greater 
their support for intergroup violence.  
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Table 5.2 Summary of regression analysis findings on support for harm 
No Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
1
Constant 1.69** 2.07** 2.09** 1.66**
Ethno-religious self – definition (Javanese 
Muslim = ref.)
Sundanese Muslim -.12 -.09 -.07 .18
Madurese Muslim .20* .22* .08 -.04
Ambonese Muslim .00 .03 -.02 -.04
Buton Muslim .09 .12 .13 .09
Muslim Rest .04 .06 .11 .13
Javanese Christian -.13 -.15* -.07 .10
Ambonese Christian .12* .11* .13 .03
Chinese Christian .08 .06* .07 .23
Batak Christian .06 .02 -.03 .05
Christian Rest -.01 -.02 -.06 -.01
2
Religious in-group friends (none to some = 
ref.)
Relatively many -.36** -.32* -.10
Almost all -.41** -.32* -.17
All -.44** -.36* -.17
3
Parents’ occupational status (self-employed = 
ref.)
Officer -.13 -.17
Informal worker -.18* -.17*
Unpaid worker -.27 -.19





Service worker -.10 -.22




Absent/ deceased -.40 -.57




Perceived group threat .17**
Religiocentrism positive towards in-group .15*
Pluralism .17*
Nationalism -.22**
R2 .11 .15 .24 .45
Adjusted R2 .01 .02 .06 .20
*p < .05  ** p < .01
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The differences between ethno-religious groups decrease to non-significance when 
we include social position variables as predictor variables. Madurese Muslims and 
Ambonese Christians show stronger support for harm, but not to a significant extent. 
The occupational status of parents and household income influence the relationship 
between ethno-religious identification and support for harm. In particular, 
respondents whose parents are labourers show less support for harm than those 
whose parents are farmers. Respondents whose parents are managers, professionals, 
traders or labourers show less support for harm than respondents whose parents are 
farmers. We can also identify that those with higher household income show more 
support for harm than respondents with lower income. These variables are the only 
positional determinants that reach significance. Therefore, support for violence can 
only partially be explained by parental occupation and household income. Overall, 
including these social position variables reduces the differences between ethno-
religious groups in all cases to non-significance. This finding implies that we have to 
accept Hypothesis 3. We must conclude that ethno-religious identification overrides 
individual determinant factors.
The inclusion of intermediate determinants in the analysis in Model 4 affects 
the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for harm to 
persons and properties. After including these intermediate determinants, ethno-
religious groups no longer show any significant difference in their support for 
harm; this also goes for having religious in-group friends. This actually implies that 
prior differences between ethno-religious groups are to some extent explained by 
these intermediate determinants. On the other hand, the significant differences 
regarding the occupational status of parents and parental occupation persist. We 
find that support for harm to persons and properties is influenced by the perceived 
group threat, religiocentrism (i.e., positive attitudes towards in-group), pluralism 
and nationalistic attitudes. The findings corroborate Hypotheses 4a, 4f and 4j, 
but contradict Hypothesis 4h. The more that people subscribe to perceived group 
threat and religiocentrism, the more likely they are to support harm to persons 
and properties. Agreement with pluralism also induces support for harm, while we 
expected this relationship to be negative. Seemingly, pluralism also serves as an 
indicator for ethno-religious identification. Moreover, the support is stronger when 
nationalism decreases. In other words, the weaker the respondents’ support for 
nationalism, the greater their support for harm to people and properties. 
This demonstrates that support for harm will increase when perceived group 
threat and religiocentrism (positive stances towards the in-group) are stronger. This 
support might not be linked only to fundamentalist views, as we might expect, but 
to pluralist views as well. Moreover, it is also plausible in an Indonesian context that 
support for harm also relates to less nationalistic attitudes. It proves that the rampant 
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ethno-religious conflict of the last decade is closely connected to the erosion of 
nationalism due to globalization and the process of decentralization.  
5.4.2. Support for demonstrations  
Differences in support for public criticism and demonstrations are slightly larger 
among the various ethno-religious groups. Muslim ethno-religious groups show 
more support for public criticism and demonstrations than Javanese Muslims, except 
for the Sundanese Muslims and other Muslims. However, these differences are non-
significant. Almost all Christian groups show less support for public criticism and 
demonstrations than Javanese Muslims. This finding is true at least for Javanese, 
Ambonese, Chinese and other Christians, as indicated by the significance of the 
relation. Batak Christians do not differ from the reference category. Table 5.3 shows 
the summary of the regression analysis and the details are presented in appendix 3, 
Table 2.  
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Table 5.3 Summary of the regression analyses findings regarding support for public 
criticism and demonstrations
No Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
1
Constant 3.25** 2.58** 2.64** 2.03**
Ethno-religious self -definition 
(Javanese Muslim = ref.)
Sundanese Muslim -.08 -.07 -.11 -.17
Madurese Muslim .00 .10 .02 .05
Ambonese Muslim .04 .04 .03 -.08
Buton Muslim .01 .02 .03 -.04
Muslim Rest -.02 -.06 .02 -.07
Javanese Christian -.31** -.28** -.27* -.16
Ambonese Christian -.20** -.18* -.16* -.26*
Chinese Christian -.22* -.19 -.29* -.27
Batak Christian -.02 .02 -.03 -.15
Christian Rest -.21* -.18* -.13 -.05
2
Ritual .10** .14** .11*




Women (men = ref.) -.17** -.10
Parent occupational status (self-
employed = ref.)
Officer .03 .08
Informal worker -.11 -.14
Unpaid worker .53* .45*










Absent/ deceased -.25 -.43






R2 .15 .18 .26 .34
Adjusted R2 .02 .03 .07 .12
*p < .05;  ** p < .01
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When the other dimensions of ethno-religious identification are included in the 
analysis, the tendency changes only slightly, in that Chinese Christians are no longer 
significantly different from the reference category. However, all other differences 
remain. Collective rituals show up as the strong predictor for support for public 
criticism and demonstrations. It confirms Hypothesis 2g: that the more actively 
people participate in collective rituals, the more they support demonstrations. In 
addition, membership of religious organizations is shown to result in more support 
than non-membership (Hypothesis 2k).
The inclusion of social positions in the analysis makes the difference between 
the reference category and other Christians insignificant. However, the inclusion of 
social positions results in a significant difference between Chinese Christians and the 
reference category. Collective rituals remain significant, but membership of religious 
organizations is no longer so. Hence, controlling for social position variables does 
not reduce differences between ethno-religious groups, which provides evidence for 
Hypothesis 3. Women show less support for public criticism than men. Respondents 
whose parents are unpaid workers show more support than those whose parents 
are self-employed. More specifically, respondents whose parents work as managers, 
clerks, traders, machine operators or special workers show less support for public 
criticism than farmers. Support for demonstrations is also higher among respondents 
with medium-level household income.
In this analysis, respondents’ participation in collective rituals continued to 
strengthen their support for demonstrations. It provides evidence for Hypothesis 2g. 
The more often people participate in collective rituals, the more they support public 
criticism and demonstrations. Hypothesis 3d is also corroborated. Support is weaker 
among respondents whose parents work as professionals, clerks, machine operators 
or special workers compared with farmers. Moreover, we find only two strong 
intermediate determinants in the analyses, which are salience of ethnic identity and 
support for hermeneutic interpretation. Thus, Hypothesis 4b and 4i are supported. 
The more that respondents accept the salience of ethno-religious identities, and the 
more they adopt a hermeneutic interpretation of religiosity, the more they support 
demonstrations. 
5.4.3. Modification and improvement: the evaluation of hypotheses
There are differences between the ethno-religious groups regarding support for 
harm to persons and properties. However, the inclusion of several variables in the 
analysis overrides these. In particular, although Madurese Muslims and Ambonese 
Christians initially showed more support for harm than Javanese Muslims, this 
became non-significant when the intermediary determinant variables were added 
to the analysis. On the other hand, except for Sundanese Muslims, all Muslim ethno-
religious groups show more support for public criticism and demonstrations, but 
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these differences are non-significant. All Christian ethno-religious groups show less 
support for public criticism and demonstrations.  
We found that the number of religious in-group friends possessed by 
respondents influences their support for harm to persons and properties. This 
finding rejects Hypothesis 2i, which states that the more religious in-group friends 
held by respondents, the more they will support harm. The finding is different in 
relation to support for public criticism and demonstrations. Participation in collective 
rituals and membership of religious organizations affect the respondents’ support 
for demonstrations. The study shows that the more active individuals’ participation 
in collective rituals, the more likely they are to support violence. Similarly, this is also 
the case for respondents who are members of religious organizations.   
The inclusion of social positions as control variables makes no significant 
difference among ethno-religious groups in relation to support for harm. The social 
positions that do influence this are the occupational status of parents, parental 
occupations and household income. Therefore, the third hypothesis is only partly 
supported; specifically, hypotheses 3d, 3e and 3f.
Regarding support for public criticism and demonstrations, we found that the 
Christian ethno-religious groups, especially the Javanese, Ambonese and Chinese, 
show less support for demonstrations. However, their attitudes are affected by their 
participation in collective rituals, which indicates a positive association. Hence, this 
is evidence for Hypothesis 2g. Social positions are only significant with regard to the 
occupational status of the parents and the parents’ occupations (Hypothesis 3d and 
3e). 
Perceived group threats, religiocentrism (i.e. positive stances towards the in-
group), pluralism and nationalism are intermediate determinant variables that can 
explain the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for 
harming people and property. Even though there are minor differences among the 
ethno-religious groups in their support for harm, the relationships are no longer 
significant once these intermediate determinants are included. We found that the 
more respondents perceived threats from out-groups, the more they agreed with 
positive in-group attitudes and the more pluralist they were, then the more they 
tended to support harm. Moreover, the less nationalist the respondents were, the 
more they supported harm.
Regarding the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support 
for public criticism and demonstrations, the significant intermediate determinants 
were salience of ethnic identity and hermeneutic interpretation. This finding provides 
evidence for Hypothesis 4b – that the more salient ethnic identities are for the 
respondents, the more support they give to demonstrations. With regard to religiosity, 
a hermeneutic interpretation of sacred texts also mediates the relationship between 
ethno-religious identification and support for demonstrations. It corroborates 
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Hypothesis 4i in which the more hermeneutic their interpretation of religiosity, the 
greater respondents’ support for public criticism and demonstrations.
5.4.4. Perceived group threat, religiosity and nationalism
Our qualitative data support the findings of the survey. In this section, we will 
describe the respondents’ opinions about the threats they perceived, along with 
their views about religiosity and nationalism.
Perceived group threat
Our respondents perceive the presence of religious out-groups and migrants as a 
threat to their in-group. They consider the presence of migrants of the religious out-
group as contributing to competition in both schools and the job market. For the 
Christian minority, the increase in Muslim migrants makes them anxious if they are 
dominant both in Ambon and Yogyakarta.
Maria expressed her anxiety about the presence of migrants in Yogyakarta. 
When I asked whether she is concerned about the increase in Muslims in the 
city, she replied: “As you see, for example, the number of non-Muslims accepted 
in public universities is now restricted, in public high schools, too. Sometimes, the 
non-Muslims are even not allowed to apply. I’m worried. We are excluded, and the 
situation is getting worse.” 
Ironically, Muslims who are among the majority also feel threatened by the 
presence of Christians. Their concern is Christianization. Fauzi said: “Well, I see it 
this way. Every religion has a mission to proselytize. When it comes to the election 
of local leaders, religious groups compete with each other.” Another respondent, 
Achmad, added that the problem for Muslims has more to do with how to keep their 
religion pure. He remarked, “I think it’s down to conservatism, especially among the 
fundamentalist groups. Muslims are in the majority, but to them, the presence of a 
church affects the purity of Islam. They think that those people are kafir (infidels).” 
The fact that Maria’s dogs were killed by a neighbour is not only an example 
of direct violence, but also shows that the whole (Christian) religious community 
is under threat. Some Muslims consider dogs dirty animals (najis) that must be 
avoided. Maria told me how upset she was. She said: “What I don’t understand is 
that, according to the neighbours, the people who killed my dogs were from the 
neighbouring kampong. But how could they know that there’s a non-Muslim family 
living in this kampong? What’s more, my dogs weren’t noisy. They were always kept 
inside the house. Small dogs are usually noisy, but my dogs were the golden or husky 
types.” 
In Ambon, Christians are historically dominant in the field of education. At the 
first and biggest university of the city, the State University of Pattimura [Unpatti], a 
large number of lecturers and students have been Christians ever since its foundation 
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in 1962. The greater proportion of Christians has raised suspicion among Muslims that 
Christianization goes on at the university, and leads some Muslim parents to forbid 
their daughters from studying there. Karim revealed, “In my village, my parents are 
a bit concerned about that. But according to our friends, they can’t harm us because 
we’re boys. We don’t allow [Muslim] girls to study there. It’s not allowed. That’s 
our culture. That’s what our parents drum into us. Boys are considered better able, 
physically and mentally, to deal with it. That’s why we [Muslim boys] are allowed 
[by their parents] to go there [Unpatti]. That’s how we see it, from a religious and 
cultural point of view. All the same, I go to Unpatti because in Maluku society, we’re 
proud of this university for its high quality. But there are still some issues that I’m 
worried about.”
Salience of ethnic identity
The salience of ethnic identity refers to the strong attachment of individuals to their 
ethnic group. It measures individuals’ awareness of their ethno-religious affiliations 
and identity, and the importance of their ethno-religious differences to them 
personally (Duckit, 2006: 154). The results of the survey show that the salience of 
ethnic identity is relatively high among both Muslims and Christians and that ethnic 
identity is more salient among the respondents of Ambon than Yogyakarta. The 
multivariate analysis also identified ethnic salience as an intermediate determinant 
in the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for 
demonstrations.  
For some of our respondents, the salience of ethnic identity was closely 
associated with their cultural adaptation to their social environment. For instance, 
Maria’s father was Javanese and her mother was Batak. She defines herself as 
Javanese, and claims that her Javanese identity is more important to her than her 
religious identity as a Catholic. She argues: “I was born and brought up in Java. 
[…] What I mean is that, according to the concept of ‘empan papan’ (adapting 
to the environment), we have to see ancestral tradition as central to our lives.” 
Another informant, Fauzi, comments that his ethnic identity makes it easier for 
him to interact with others in new social environments. As a student from East 
Java studying in Yogyakarta, he finds that people are more friendly when he speaks 
his ethnic language, which he uses as an expression of his ethnic identity. He says: 
“For example, if I want to shop in Malioboro, it’s an advantage to be able to speak 
Javanese fluently (buyers who speak Javanese usually get lower prices). The seller 
will also be more friendly towards us.” Another respondent, Maemunah, is a student 
from Sumatera whose parents are Javanese. She reveals she feels more comfortable 
making friends of the same ethnic group: “In friendships, I tend to choose and feel 
more comfortable with the Javanese. Perhaps it’s just because of the similarities in 
our values. Different values make me feel uncomfortable.” 
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Ethnic salience is very strong in Ambon because of its rigid social and spatial 
segregation of Muslims and Christians. When people interact across religious 
boundaries, they often refer to ethnic identity. Iskandar explains the important 
role of ethnic identity in unifying people since their community was torn apart by 
religious conflict. He affirms: “Ethnic identity is important. It is very important for 
pela gandong. Whenever we celebrate the anniversary of Ambon city, or Pattimura 
Day, these are annual rituals of togetherness. But it goes beyond Maluku, too. Back 
home, we have Aroha. Aroha is a traditional ceremony held by four villages. To me, 
the most important thing is togetherness. Many people who have left the villages 
come home to celebrate it, including non-Muslims and those who have lived in the 
Netherlands.”
The experience of Eric, a respondent from Kei, is also relevant here. Eric points 
out that the solidarity of his ethnic group overrides religious identification. Eric is a 
Catholic, yet he told us he was often helped by Keinese Muslim friends. He said: “If 
we have economic or academic problems, a lecturer of the same ethnicity would 
certainly help us, even if he had a different religion. For example, the third deputy-
rector UNPATTI is a Muslim Keinese. If I had problems, he would definitely help 
me. Whatever problem I have, he would help out [...]”. Another respondent, Karim 
Passalo from Sepa, also expressed his pride in being Sepanese. He was proud that, 
whether Muslim or Christian, Sepanese have always been able to work together and 
that the two groups have never fought each other in violent conflict. He said, “I’m 
proud of being Sepanese because we are a people who are willing to cooperate 
and work for the common interest. For example, we’d meet each other and join in 
common activities even though we were still in conflict [shortly after the war]. We 
could work together for common interests such as the renovation of the mosque, 
building a drainage system, etc.” 
The significance of ethnic salience in intermediating the relationship between 
ethno-religious identification and support for demonstrations might be because 
ethnicity is still important for its networking capacities, and as a means to mobilize 
people. Ethnicity is often manipulated by the elite to gain support for their 
interests. 
Religiosity
The multivariate analysis pinpointed a significant relation between support for violence 
and religiosity. Religiocentrism and pluralism are intermediary determinants for the 
support for harm, while hermeneutic interpretation is the intermediary determinant 
for the support for demonstrations. Because of the significant contribution of these 
variables to support for violence, we looked at the respondents’ responses, opinions 
and understanding about religiosity, based on our interviews.
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Religiocentrism (positive stances towards the in-group)
The quantitative data indicated that positive in-group attitudes were significantly 
related to support for violence. Such attitudes result in a view of the religious norms 
and values of the in-group as superior to those of religious out-groups (Sterkens and 
Anthony, 2008). This contributes to intolerance between religious groups; it can lead 
to out-group antagonism and hostility towards religious out-groups. 
An example of positive in-group attitude is best illustrated in our interview with 
Habib, a Muslim respondent in Yogyakarta. Based on his understanding of Islam, he 
believes it is important that his life should reflect Islamic values. Given his perspective, 
it is not surprising that all his friends are Muslim. In his opinion, his religious group is 
better than others because it follows a set of religious rules. He says: “For example, 
relations between men and women cannot get too intimate. In short, the Hadith 
offers guidance […]. I could see how polite they are in the way they speak and dress. 
I sometimes feel uneasy when someone dresses improperly, especially women [...] 
Well, I rarely meet men wearing anything improper, especially where I live, but I hate 
women to dress improperly.”  
He prefers to live in a religiously homogenous rather than a heterogeneous 
area. He argues: “In a homogeneous environment, I feel there are more people who 
share the same ideas. We, Muslims, cannot always involve other religious groups 
in every activity. There are restrictions. For example, they can’t join in with our 
discussions about Islam, or with activities at the mosque. When I ask them to talk 
about the Koran, they refuse because they believe in something different.” Habib’s 
view of leadership emphasizes that a leader must be from his own religious group, 
because the leader influences decision-making and policies in society. He says: 
“Leaders’ policies must be based on Islamic sharia law. We also know that MUI 
[Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Council of Indonesian Ulama] has voiced their opinion 
about this, but non-Muslims don’t respect it. Islamic teachings must be practised in 
every aspect of life.”
Christian respondents also described positive in-group attitudes. Beatrice, one 
of our respondents in Ambon, pointed out: “First of all, Christian solidarity is very 
strong. We have to share even the smallest things with others, just as in the proverb 
sagu salempang patah dua (a tiny sago divided by two). Hiti-hiti hala-hala ale rasa 
beta rasa (what you feel, I feel). Second, we Christians must respect each other and 
avoid causing trouble [...] Third, we have to show mercy to each other, through pela 
gandong. Although we may have different religions, we should help others because 
they are family.”   




Pluralism is an attitude of openness towards different religions (Anthony et al., 2015). 
Some of our respondents revealed that the pluralist attitudes embedded in their 
religion helped them to deal with religious diversity. For instance, Maria claimed 
that the inclusive perspective of her religion, which embraces a universal concept of 
humanity, makes it possible for her to communicate with people from other religions. 
She says:”I just feel that the teachings of Catholicism are relevant. What I mean is 
that I’m not that religious. I don’t completely understand Catholicism. It is just the 
concept of humanity. That’s the value I want to share with other people, including 
respecting people with different religious identities because not everyone is called to 
be a Catholic. I think this religious education is important for me.” Respect for other 
religious traditions in Maria’s family was displayed when her grandmother passed 
away; her family and neighbours held both Muslim and Christian funeral rituals. Since 
Maria’s family was the only Catholic family in the neighbourhood, they conducted 
the Catholic funeral ceremony first, followed by the Muslim ceremony (tahlilan) 
with their neighbours. The Muslim ceremony was held to give her neighbours an 
opportunity to pray for her grandmother in their own way. She recalls: “At that time, 
a mass was held before the funeral. Our neighbors were reluctant to come. So we 
decided to hold a tahlilan. We also held a tahlilan to commemorate the 1,000th day 
after my grandmother’s death. We only provided the place […] At the beginning 
of the gathering, we mentioned that the prayer was meant for my grandmother. 
Then a Muslim leader proceeded with the rituals.” Syamsuddin, one of our Muslim 
respondents, also revealed that his religion taught him to respect other religions. 
He notes: “I hold a tolerant position. My lecturer Mr. Syafin said that all religions are 
mostly the same on the level of humanity. Islam embraces all, so Christians are also 
included in this Islamic principle. Second, there are many verses in Al Quran that 
show respect for differences and respect all religious values, and belief in former 
prophets including those described in the Christian Holy Scriptures. But I don’t know 
whether the current Bible is the same as the Bible in the past.” Although his testimony 
could be qualified as theologically inclusivistic, his openness towards other religious 
traditions is clear enough. Romdlon expresses his respect for plurality by referring 
to his contact with his neighbours, saying that he prefers to live in a heterogeneous 
environment. He argues: “I think we can learn more from our surroundings. We’re 
not restricted to just one area; we can learn about other people’s culture or religion. 
They give us a broader experience. If one day we go to somewhere unfamiliar, we’ll 
find it easier to mingle.”
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Hermeneutic interpretation of religious texts   
A hermeneutic interpretation of sacred texts is the interpretive process through which 
the truth of a text is derived not only from the sacred text itself, but in consultation 
with other authoritative texts (e.g. science, history, scholarly criticism) or traditions 
that offer insights into its meaning, and against the historical background in which 
the text was written. It stands in contrast to intra-textual fundamentalism, which 
takes a literal view of the religious text (Williamson et al., 2010: 273). The survey 
found that Muslims are more fundamentalist than Christians in their understanding 
of their sacred scriptures. In the multivariate analysis, results showed that the more 
respondents agree with a hermeneutic interpretation of their religious texts, the 
more they tend to support demonstrations. These interviews support the findings of 
the quantitative analysis. 
We can look at respondent Agustina’s experience as an example. She is Catholic 
and studies natural sciences at the state university in Yogyakarta. She claims that she 
is a religious person, as testified by her involvement in Church activities and religious 
practices. In her opinion, the Holy Scripture must be understood according to the 
historical and social context. She says:” The Bible is man-made too. It is impossible 
for God to have written it by himself. Perhaps a lot of people think differently to me. 
But we can’t take the meaning of the Bible literally because this age isn’t like the 
time of writing. If we understand it as it was written, it would be weird and odd.”       
Heribertus, a Christian theology student, has a similar understanding of sacred 
texts. He explains that we need to interpret the Bible by searching for its meaning, 
because the context in which it was written is different from ours. Regarding the 
importance of the Bible for his faith, he explains that “The Bible is very important. It 
cannot be understood literally. The context of the story is the past, which is different 
from the present. To me, the Bible is a testimony of faith. We have to learn from the 
testimony by ourselves.”
Nationalistic attitudes 
Nationalistic attitudes are favourable attitudes towards one’s own country. 
Nationalism has two dimensions: patriotism (romantic nationalism) and chauvinism 
(ethnocentric nationalism). Patriotism refers to feelings of pride in one’s country. 
Chauvinism is the view that the home country is unique and superior, and it 
therefore disparages other countries in comparison (Coenders, 2001: 64; Coenders 
et al., 2004: 29-32). The results of the survey indicated that Muslims showed more 
patriotism. All respondents strongly agreed that it is important to respect their 
nation, but not all were committed to putting national interests above their ethno-
religious groups. Moreover, the multivariate analyses uncovered the determinant of 
nationalist attitudes in the relationship between ethno-religious identification and 
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support for harm. The greater the degree of people’s nationalism, the less likely they 
were to support harm to people and property.   
Our qualitative data also reveal that our respondents appear to demonstrate 
strong patriotism, although some are critical of the present government. Maria, 
who often goes abroad for singing festivals, expressed her feelings by saying: “It 
doesn’t matter how bad my country is, I’m proud to be an Indonesian. When I went 
to Malaysia and China, I was proud to reveal my identity. Like it or not, it’s our home. 
I sometimes feel annoyed when an Indonesian abroad says bad things about his own 
country. So, it doesn’t matter how damaged our country is, it’s our own business, 
and it’s our responsibility to fix it. Anyway, I’m still proud of my country.”
Another respondent, Iskandar, comments: “I am proud to be a citizen of the 
country although there are still problems of development to solve. It’s a result of 
being a country that has so many islands. It’s not just a central government problem. 
Local problems also have an impact on development.” Alhady shared Iskandar’s 
sentiments. He said: “Well, there is a good system in this country, but in practice it 
has its difficulties. It’s been more than 60 years since independence, but it’s still far 
from what was expected, in terms of political elites, society, political education, social 
education. I still see many things that need improving. For example, the business of 
Ahmadiyah. I am against Ahmadiyah, but I can’t accept being physically attacked.31  
The government still can’t handle this, or many other conflicts. This shows that the 
government is not yet successful in handling issues of people’s welfare.”
Some of the Muslim respondents added that they have to be nationalists, 
because nationalism is considered a religious obligation. Alhandy said: “According to 
Islam, loving our country is important. Fixing what’s wrong is an important agenda. 
In my opinion, religion and the country are linked together. If religion is strong, the 
country will also be strong and vice versa. I think every religion has this concept.” 
When he was asked further about how he would balance his values between national 
interest and his religion, he replied: “Honestly, I would want to prioritize national 
interests, but I think I’d have to prioritize my religious group because from there 
we can develop ourselves and our environment.” A similar opinion was expressed 
by Habibie who put religious interests above nationalism. Habibie explained: “My 
religion teaches about both worldly and heavenly matters. There are rules for both. 
So, my physical and spiritual needs are fulfilled. The country only fulfills my physical 
31 Ahmadiyah is an Islamic religious movement founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in British 
India at the end of the 19th century. In Indonesia, the Council of Indonesian Ulama banned 
the movement in 1980, declaring it to be heretical and contrary to the teachings of Islam. 
As Ahmadiyah continues to gain support in some regions, in 2008 conservative Muslims put 
pressure on the government to forbid their religious activities. With violence and 




needs, which are temporary. We all begin from willingness and end at satisfaction.” He 
was therefore implicitly emphasizing the importance of religion over nationalism.
The findings of our interviews support the quantitative analysis. We found 
among both Muslims and Christians a strong perceived threat. Religiocentrism (and 
more specifically positive in-group attitudes), attitudes towards religious plurality, 
and modes of interpreting sacred texts also seem to play a – positive or negative 
– role in support for ethno-religious violence. Next, ethnic salience and nationalist 
attitudes influence the level of support for ethno-religious violence, either positively 
or negatively. The qualitative data therefore provide additional evidence for, and 
elaboration of, the survey findings.   
5.5. Discussion of the findings in a wider theoretical context
This study contributes to the theoretical discussions regarding ethno-religious 
identification and support for violence. The main theories suggest that in-group 
favouritism can lead to exclusionary reactions. Empirical studies find support for the 
proposition that in-group favouritism is enhanced by social identification and social 
contra-identification (Scheepers et al., 2002a; Gijsberts, et al., 2004; Coenders et 
al., 2009: Savelkoul et al., 2010). In this study, we assume that support for violence 
constitutes the expression of an exclusionary reaction. Support for violence is 
measured at a higher level (support for harm of people and property) and at a 
lower level (supporting public criticism and demonstrations). In the anticipation of 
distinguishing factors to explain support for violence, this study also examines other 
theories to account for different levels of support among ethno-religious groups. 
These theories refer to, among others, perceived group threat, intergroup contact, 
religiosity and nationalistic attitudes which are relevant to the phenomenon of 
people’s support for violence.
The study finds evidence that support for violence varies from one ethno-
religious group to another. Most ethno-religious groups, except for Sundanese 
Muslims and Javanese Christians, are more likely to support harm to people and 
property than Javanese Muslims, although not all differences are actually significant. 
The most support is given by the Madurese Muslims and the Ambonese Christians. 
This pattern is different in relation to lower levels of violence, of which Muslim 
ethno-religious groups are more supportive while Christian ethno-religious groups 
are less supportive than the Javanese Muslims.
In this study, we uncovered important findings regarding the relationship 
between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. We 
found that people who have more friends within their religious in-group are less 
likely to support harm than those who have few or no friends within their religious 
in-group. This finding is consistent with the social identity theory that proposed that 
individual members of groups always attempt to place the group in a positive light. 
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Those who have stronger identification with the in-group, such as individuals with 
more friends of the same religion, will maintain its superiority. They will protect their 
group from the negative image that would result from harming others or damaging 
property. Therefore, it is plausible that those with more in-group friends of the same 
religion are less supportive of harm because harming persons and properties have 
negative connotations that would damage the in-group status. 
Regarding support for public criticism and demonstrations, we found that 
people who participate in collective rituals are more likely to support public criticism 
and demonstrations than people who never do so. Similarly, people who are 
members of religious organizations are more likely to support public criticism and 
demonstrations than people who are not; they see demonstrations as acceptable in 
democratic society. These findings confirm the second hypothesis: that the stronger 
people’s sense of social identification (participation in collective rituals and being a 
member of religious organizations), the more likely they are to support intergroup 
violence. 
The findings strengthen our theoretical foundation, which is that people always 
attempt to construct a positive social identity within their in-groups and at the 
same time disassociate themselves from out-groups. This supports social identity 
theory, which holds that individuals are motivated to search for positive group 
distinctiveness by defining group membership together with in-group favouritism 
(having more in-group friends of the same religion) and emotional attachment to the 
group (participation in collective rituals) (Tajfel, 1981: Tajfel and Turner, 1986). 
The process of ethno-religious identification even overwhelms individual 
social position. We found that Hypothesis 3 was confirmed, since ethno-religious 
identification continues to have significantly strong effects on support for violence, 
i.e. public criticism and demonstrations, even after controlling for individual social 
positions. The number of religious in-group friends continues to have a significant 
relationship to support for harm; also, whether a person participates in collective 
rituals still has a significant relationship to their support for demonstrations. Among 
the specific characteristics, only parents’ occupation and household income appear 
to be significant. Respondents whose parents are farmers are more inclined to 
support violence than those whose parents work as managers, professionals, 
technicians, clerks, traders or labourers. However, people who support violence do 
not necessarily come from families with a lower income level.
Our findings indicate that supporters of violence come from the more marginal 
groups in society. In Indonesia, farmers or agricultural workers belong to those groups, 
since most work on relatively small tracts of agricultural land. The average farmer 
in Indonesia owns only .25 ha. In Java, more than half of all farmers are landless. 
The marginalization of farmers has also increased because of modernization and the 
implementation of the green revolution during the Indonesian New Order, which 
CHAPTER 5
218
makes agricultural activities dependent on the market and capital. Even though the 
income of farmers is relatively high, their insecurity is also great due to fluctuations in 
crop prices. Farmers are more sensitive to the presence of the other groups because 
of competition for limited resources. Our findings support realistic conflict theory, 
which posits that conflict arises from increasing competition for scarce resources, and 
also confirms ethnic group conflict theory, which states that intergroup competition, 
both actual and perceived, results in exclusionary reactions.  
The multivariate test for the fourth general set of hypotheses finds four 
determinants that significantly intermediate the relationship between ethno-religious 
identification and support for harm of people and property. These intermediate 
determinants include perceived group threat, religiocentrism (positive stances 
towards the in-group), pluralism and nationalism. On the relationship between 
ethno-religious identification and support for public criticism and demonstrations, 
we find two significant intermediate determinants: the salience of ethnic identity 
and the acceptance of a hermeneutic interpretation of religious texts. In regard to 
support for harm to people and properties, the findings corroborate Hypothesis 4a, 
4f and 4j while modifying Hypothesis 4h in the opposite direction. The proposition 
of ethnic group conflict theory is accepted, since an increase in perceived threats 
brings about support for exclusionary reactions (Bobo, 1988; Scheepers et al., 2002a; 
Gijsberts et al., 2004; Coenders et al., 2009). The findings also provide evidence that 
religiocentrism – the combination of positive in-group attitudes and negative out-
group attitudes – induces more support for violence (Sterkens and Anthony, 2008: 
51); they likewise support the proposition about nationalistic attitudes. Consistent 
with earlier theory (Coenders, 2001; Todosijevic, 2001), this study suggests that a 
decline in nationalism increases support for violence. This provides evidence for 
the theoretical discussion about violent conflict in Indonesia, since the erosion of 
nationalism has contributed to ethno-religious violence. The decline in nationalism 
relates to the democratic transition in Indonesia in which various groups have been 
allowed to play a role in the new political landscape, but struggle only for their own 
ethno-religious groups (Aspinal and Fealey, 2003: 6-9; Van Klinken, 2006: 138-143).  
However, out results lead us to revise our assumption that more agreement 
with pluralism is related to less support for violence. We found evidence that the 
opposite is true. Individuals who accept pluralism are also more likely to support 
violence. In other words, people who hold a pluralistic religious view can also become 
supporters of violence. Seemingly, pluralism is also an indicator for involvement with 
the religious in-group; or people’s non-religious reasons for supporting violence are 
greater than their religious reasons.  
At the lower level of support for violence, ethnic salience and hermeneutic 
interpretation are the determinant variables. The greater the salience of ethnic 
identity for individuals, the more likely they are to support violence. In terms of how 
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the respondents’ support for violence is spread and organised, ethnicity is the core 
factor; this probably reflects the migrant element among respondents, as migrants 
form their support groups based on their ethnicity or place of origin. The acceptance 
of a basically hermeneutic approach to religiosity has an influence on support for 
violence. This is consistent with previous findings, which showed that religion can 
be used instrumentally to drive people to support violence (Sidel, 2006; Steward, 







Ethno-religious violence has been the subject of scholarly discussion in Indonesia 
ever since the outbreak of violence in the 1990s. An enormous amount of literature 
on ethno-religious conflicts in the country has emerged as a result of research 
from a wide range of theoretical frameworks and the application of a variety of 
methods. This study adds new insights to this body of knowledge by focusing on 
the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup 
violence. Support for violence is assumed to be one dimension of latent conflict that 
arises as an unintended consequence of dysfunctional systems of social cohesion. 
As a latent conflict, support for violence emerges as one of the consequences of 
ethno-religious identification. A review of previous literature shows that individuals’ 
identification with their ethno-religious group induces exclusionary attitudes and 
antagonism towards out-groups (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Phinney and 
Ong, 2007). Ethno-religious identification creates major rifts between different 
ethno-religious groups (Sterkens et al., 2009). In this study, we measure support for 
violence by asking to what extent respondents would support violence to realize the 
economic, political or socio-cultural interests of the religious in-group. Support for 
violence may also vary in level of intensity. We distinguish between a low level, i.e., 
support for public criticism and demonstrations against out-groups, and a high level, 
i.e., harm to people and property for the purpose of realizing in-group aims.   
This study fills a gap in the literature on ethno-religious identification and 
support for violence at the individual level. As stated above, the growing literature 
on conflict studies in Indonesia has emphasized political and economic issues within 
these conflicts, but has paid less attention to individuals’ perceptions, attitudes and 
behaviour. Most previous studies have looked for commonalities in detailed case 
studies of specific outbreaks of violence between religious groups. As a result, they 
have not generated sufficiently theoretical insights into the partial and differential 
role of ethno-religious identification within these conflicts (Varshney, 2010:2). This 
study is complementary to these previous studies in seeking to explain individuals’ 
attitudes to support for intergroup violence. It employs a cross-cultural comparative 
research design involving Muslim and Christian respondents from different ethnic 
groups in two research areas. One of these areas, Ambon, experiences frequent 
eruptions of inter-group violence, while the other, Yogyakarta, is relatively peaceful. 
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In Ambon, the division between Muslims and Christians clearly defines their 
living space and their social activity. Both groups have established boundaries, and 
seldom interact across the demarcation of religious belonging. Their ethno-religious 
identification is so strong that tensions between Muslims and Christians have led to 
intergroup violence. In contrast, the relationship between ethno-religious groups in 
Yogyakarta is relatively peaceful; while disputes have occurred occasionally, they have 
not led to massive intergroup violence. In the early stages of political reformation, 
when Ambon experienced protracted violence between religious groups, Yogyakarta 
was able to prevent its escalation. 
This research uses a mixture of quantitative and qualitative approaches. It 
provides a large dataset stemming from a survey that included respondents who 
were followed up with qualitative interviews. The research sample was randomly 
drawn from the student population of six universities. At each research site, we 
choose one Christian university, one Muslim university and one state university. 
Overall, 1,500 respondents, equally distributed over these universities, became the 
research sample. The key informants for the interviews were selected from both 
respondents and non-respondents of the survey; for the respondents, the interviews 
were conducted after they had agreed to follow up their statements. They were 
asked to expand on their reasons and give additional explanations concerning the 
research topics.     
The survey was prepared by searching for previous valid and reliable measuring 
instruments to use as a benchmark, which we then improved. We revised the 
measurements for the Indonesian context before translating them into Bahasa 
Indonesian. Important points that were underexposed in the quantitative survey 
were elaborated via the development of a topic list for the interviews. This was used 
to further illustrate relevant topics, and to look for additional means of explaining 
support for violence. The results of both surveys and interviews were triangulated 
in the analysis.
In this study, we examine theories of ethno-religious identification and 
exclusionary attitudes that have been tested and partially validated in Western 
societies. We were curious to discover whether these theories are applicable in 
Indonesia, whether they would receive further confirmation or would be rejected. 
The main example is ethnic group conflict theory, which has been repeatedly tested 
by various academic researchers in many countries. Its main proposition is that 
intergroup competition, at an individual as well as at a contextual level, reinforces 
the mechanisms of social identifica tion and contra-identification, the eventual 
outcome of which is refer red to as ethnic exclusionism (Scheepers et al., 2002a; 
Gijsberts et al., 2004; Schneider, 2007; Coenders et al., 2009: Savelkoul et al., 
2010). The other theories that we test are intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; 




1990: Duckit, 2006), memory of violence (Cairns and Roe, 2003; Sahdra and Ross, 
2007), perceived discrimination (Romero and Roberts, 1998; Vancluysen and Van 
Craen, 2010), religiocentrism (Sterkens and Anthony, 2008), nationalistic attitudes 
(Coenders, 2001; Coenders et al., 2004; Todosijevic, 2001) and intergroup distrust 
(Parsons, 1970: 142; Tropp et al., 2006: 771; Tam et al., 2009). 
This chapter presents a summary of the research findings and conclusions 
based on the empirical answers to our crucial questions. It also sketches the progress 
and innovations made in the research process that will contribute to future studies 
on ethno-religious conflict and violence.  
6.2 Crucial questions
The substantial questions of the research include both descriptive and explanatory 
aspects. The descriptive questions ask about the presence of ethno-religious 
identification and support for intergroup violence among Muslims and Christians in 
Ambon and Yogyakarta; also about the ways in which ethno-religious identification 
and support for intergroup violence among Muslims and Christians is observable in 
the two cities. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are employed to answer 
these questions.
The explanatory questions address three issues. The first examines the 
relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup 
violence. The second assesses the influence of social characteristics such as gender, 
parents’ occupation or household income on this relationship, and the third tests 
whether the relationships are affected by intermediate determinants such as 
perceived group threat, salience of identity, intergroup contact, memory of past 
violence, perceived discrimination, religiosity, nationalistic attitudes and distrust. 
The set of explanatory questions can be formulated as follows:
1. To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-religious 
identification among Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta 
and support for intergroup violence?
2. To  what  extent  is  there  a  relationship  between  ethno-religious 
identification among Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta 
and support for intergroup violence considering other individual-level 
determinants?
3. To what extent can we explain the relationship between ethno-religious 
identification among Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Yogyakarta 





The analyses of the large data set – 1,500 respondents and 18 more in-depth interviews 
--provide evidence for ethno-religious identification among Muslims and Christians 
in Ambon and Yogyakarta. Respondents came from a range of ethnic groups. A large 
number of Muslims were Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Ambonese or Butonese, 
while the Christians were predominantly Ambonese, Javanese, Bataknese or Chinese. 
Smaller ethnic groups were also represented in our sample, such as Minangkabau, 
Minahasa, Toraja, Timorese, Buginese, Makassarese and Papua. In general, religious 
identification was found to be stronger than ethnic identification among both Muslim 
and Christian ethnic groups, as elaborated below. 
We assessed ethno-religious identification with a set of measurements. These 
included ethnic language use, participation in ethnic ceremonies, having in-group 
and out-group ethnic friends, membership of ethnic organizations, participation 
in collective religious rituals, rites of passage, religious practices, having in-group 
religious friends and membership of religious organizations. 
All the ethno-religious groups consider ethnic identification to be an important 
element of their identities, but Muslims show stronger ethnic identification than 
Christians. They speak their ethnic language more frequently and attend ethnic 
ceremonies more often. More Muslims are also members of ethnic organizations. 
Regarding religious identification, Muslims participate in collective rituals more 
often than Christians. They also pray and attend religious services more frequently. 
Only in terms of rites of passage is Muslim participation lower; those who do attend 
the ceremonies do so mainly for non-religious reasons, such as solidarity with 
neighbours, or to respect the invitation of their relatives. Muslims also have more 
religious in-group friends and less religious out-group friends. 
Our qualitative data support the findings of the quantitative analyses. Ethnic 
identification among Muslims is stronger than among Christians. In Ambon, Muslims 
speak their ethnic language more often than Christians; this is particularly the 
case in traditional ceremonies in Muslim villages. Christians use the Indonesian 
language more frequently than their ethnic tongue. The qualitative data also show 
that religious identification is stronger than ethnic identification in both Ambon and 
Yogyakarta. The interviews reveal that personal religious expression and religious 
practices have become increasingly important over the last decade. Most of the 
interviewees confirmed that they participate in traditional ceremonies and religious 
rituals and gave religious reasons for doing so. Only in rites of passage do religious 
rituals blend with ethnic rituals; more specifically, in marriage and funerary rituals. 
Here participation also stems from non-religious reasons. Compared to Christians, 
Muslims are more involved in religious organizations or religiously affiliated political 
organizations. A few of the Christians also claim to engage in religious organizations, 




data confirm that religious identification is stronger and more important than ethnic 
identification, and that overall, Muslims show stronger religious identification than 
Christians. 
The second research question, on support for intergroup violence, is also 
answered via both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The measurement of support 
for violence underwent rigorous factor analyses. We found that such support has two 
dimensions: support for public criticism and demonstrations, and support for harm 
to persons and property. In general, respondents tend to support public criticism 
and demonstrations but reject support for harm to persons and property. When the 
comparison is made between Muslims and Christians, Muslims are more supportive 
of demonstrations and relatively less supportive of harm to persons and property 
than Christians. Our interviews elaborate the findings of the quantitative analyses: 
that Muslims support harm less, but support demonstrations more than Christians. 
In Ambon, all informants, Muslims as well as Christians expressed support for harm, 
especially those who had strong memories and past experiences of violence. Most 
of them also agreed with supporting harm to persons and property as an act of self-
defence. The data triangulation affirms that both Muslims and Christians support 
public criticism and demonstrations more than harm to persons and property. 
The first explanatory question, on the relationship between self-definition 
of ethno-religious groups and support for harm, shows that most ethno-religious 
groups, the exceptions being Sundanese Muslims and Javanese Christians, are 
more likely to support harm than Javanese Muslims. Most support is given by the 
Madurese Muslims and the Ambonese Christians. On support for demonstrations, 
Muslim ethno-religious groups are more supportive while the Christian ethno-
religious groups are less supportive than the Javanese Muslims. 
The second explanatory question is answered by testing the relationship 
between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. We 
found that respondents’ support for harm is influenced by their number of friends 
of the same religion. Those who have many friends of the same religion show less 
support for harm. On support for demonstrations, we found that participation in 
collective rituals and membership of religious organization are strong determinants. 
The more actively people participate in collective rituals, the more they support 
demonstrations. In addition, those who are members of religious organizations also 
show more support for demonstrations than non-members.
Individual determinants, such as education and profession of parents, or 
gender of respondents, do not significantly affect the relationship between ethno-
religious identification and support for violence; the results are similar for support 
for harm and support for demonstrations. Respondents whose parents are farmers 
show more support than respondents whose parents work as managers, clerks, 
traders, machine operators or manual labourers. Respondents from relatively higher 
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income levels show more support than those with lower income levels. In general, 
the findings demonstrate that support for violence can only partially be explained by 
individual socio-economic status; ethno-religious identification persists as a strong 
determinant after taking these individual characteristics into account.
The third research question was answered by testing the influence of 
intermediary variables on the relationship between ethno-religious identification and 
support for violence. These variables were derived from diverse theoretical insights, 
and comprised perceived group threat, salience of identity, intergroup contact, 
memory of violence, perceived discrimination, religiosity (including attitudes towards 
religious plurality, religiocentrism and fundamentalism), nationalistic attitudes 
and distrust. Concerning support for harm, we found that perceived group threat, 
religiocentrism (i.e. positive in-group attitudes), pluralism and nationalistic attitudes 
influence the relationship. The more that people perceive group threat and the more 
they have positive in-group attitudes, the more likely they are to support harm to 
persons and property, which supports our hypotheses in this respect. Contrary to our 
expectations, people with a pluralistic religious view show more support for harm. 
Support for harm is also stronger when nationalism is relatively low. Concerning 
support for demonstrations, the relevant intermediate determinants were salience 
of ethnic identity and acceptance of hermeneutic interpretations: the more the 
respondents accept the salience of ethnic identity and the more they agree that 
Holy Scriptures need hermeneutic interpretation (contrary to fundamentalism), the 
more they support demonstrations.
Overall, the findings support the main theories and add explanations for 
other theories that we examined in this study. The study provides evidence for 
social identity theory, which holds that individuals always attempt to construct a 
positive social identity for their in-groups, and to disassociate themselves from out-
groups (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). We find stronger identification with 
religion than with ethnicity. When we compare the groups, Muslims show greater 
ethno-religious identification than Christians. These findings provide confirmation 
of previous studies in Indonesia that show the growth of religious identification, 
especially among Muslims since the 1990s (van Bruinessen, 2003; Sidel, 2006; 
Hefner, 2011).
The findings on perceived group threat validate ethnic group conflict theory, in 
which perceived threat is the strongest determinant for prejudicial and exclusionary 
attitudes towards out-groups (Scheepers et al., 2002a; Gijsberts et al., 2004; 
Coenders et al., 2007; Savelkoul et al., 2011). It suggests that this theory, which is 
able to explain exclusionary phenomena in Western countries, is also applicable to 
Indonesian society. Nonetheless, this study has not tested the contextual level that is 
part of the theory and which includes the influence of actual competition, migration 




We also present evidence for the proposition regarding religiocentrism by 
Sterkens and Anthony (2008), in which a positive evaluation of the religious in-group 
is related to in-group identification and induces derogatory attitudes towards out-
groups. However, in relation to religious attitudes towards plurality, our findings 
contradict earlier studies. While these studies have shown that pluralism reduces 
prejudice and hostility towards out-groups (Anthony et al., 2005; cf. Anthony et al. 
2015), our study finds evidence that people who have a pluralistic religious view 
do support violence. Seemingly, pluralism can be as much an indicator for religious 
identification as monism.
These findings are consistent with propositions concerning nationalistic 
attitudes (Coenders, 2001; Todosijevic, 2001), which suggest that increased ethno-
religious identification reduces nationalism (i.e. commitment to the national 
Indonesian state, and therefore opposition to appeals for regional autonomy). 
Lower levels of nationalism in turn lead to greater support for violence, which in 
our research contexts is mostly related to the struggle for emancipation by specific 
ethno-religious groups. The findings therefore support the theoretical proposition 
that the degradation of nationalism contributes to the outbreak of ethno-religious 
violence. Bertrand (2004), for instance, observed that the democratic transition in 
Indonesia gave rise to a more influential role for various ethno-religious groups in the 
new political landscape, but their tendency was to struggle only for more regional 
autonomy and to downplay national interests. 
At the lower level of support for intergroup violence, i.e. support for protests 
and demonstrations, we found ethnic salience and hermeneutic interpretation to 
be relevant intermediate determinant variables. Our study validates earlier studies 
that show a significance correlation between ethno-religious identification and 
ethnic salience: the greater the salience of ethnic identity, the higher the likelihood 
of support for violence. Moreover, the acceptance of hermeneutic interpretations 
at the root of religiosity also increases support for violence. This finding contradicts 
an earlier study, which suggests that only fundamentalist interpretations of religious 
texts induce support for violence (Williamson et al., 2010).  
 
6.4 Innovation and progress
This study makes an innovative contribution to the theoretical and methodological 
development of research on ethno-religious conflict in Indonesia. We will discuss 
this contribution in terms of the research questions, the measurements and the data 
analysis.
First, we set out to answer descriptive questions about ethno-religious 
identification and support for intergroup violence, and explanatory questions on 
the relationship between these variables with individual characteristics as well as 
intermediate determinants. These questions have not been explored in previous 
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studies on conflict in Indonesia; most have paid more attention to the wider context 
of economic and political developments, e.g. the three influential studies of Bertrand 
(2004), Sidel (2006) and Van Klinken (2007). While their studies certainly contribute 
to the overall understanding of the causes and effects of violence in Indonesia, they 
do not provide adequate explanations as to why individual people support violence, 
neither do they test theories about intergroup violence in relation to other theories. 
This study seeks to complement previous studies by explaining the relationship 
between ethno-religious identification and support for intergroup violence. We 
tested hypotheses regarding the influence of individual determinants and different 
measures for religious identification, support for intergroup violence as well as 
intermediary variables.
 This study is not alone in seeking to explain support for violence in Indonesia via 
the analysis of individuals, but it is the only one to use mixed methods: quantitative 
methods with a large number of respondents, and qualitative methods with semi-
structured interviews with a selection of these respondents. One of the previous 
investigations of the individual angle was conducted by Adam (2010b) who examined 
how ordinary people became involved in the Ambon conflict. Via case studies 
carried out in the villages of Hila, Kaitetu and Waai, he described the involvement 
of people in the conflict as the result of long-standing competition along religious 
lines over land and jobs. The competition between Ambonese and immigrants, and 
between Muslims and Christians made up the context in which violence erupted. His 
findings, however, are limited to the areas in which he made his observations. Being 
based in specific contexts, his study lacks standardised measurements for intergroup 
comparisons. Unlike previous studies, our work integrates qualitative or quantitative 
approaches in the research design, methods and analyses. The quantitative 
approach provides general findings, which are elaborated in more detail with the 
help of interviews. We did not find contradictory results between quantitative and 
qualitative data. Triangulation of the quantitative and qualitative data gives the 
findings greater validity and reliability.
Second, we developed measurements that were guided by theories related 
to Western countries. As mentioned earlier, these were primarily social identity 
theory, realistic conflict theory and ethnic group conflict theory; we made additional 
use of theories related to salience of identity, intergroup contact, memory of 
violence, perceived discrimination, attitudes towards plurality, religiocentrism, 
fundamentalism, nationalistic attitudes and distrust. On this basis, we made 
inventories of measurements that have been repeatedly tested in Western (and 
in some cases also Asian) countries. Reliability as indicated by Cronbach’s alpha 
is the main consideration for the inclusion of specific measurements. We then 
assessed the standardised measurements and adjusted them for their application 




in previous studies were explored through meticulous discussions of the variables. 
For instance, the measure for ethno-religious identification was adapted from the 
ethnic identification measure from Phinney (1992) and Phinney and Ong (2007). We 
added religious identification to the measure by taking into account the ritualistic 
dimension of religion (Allport and Ross, 1967; Scheepers et al., 2002b). In order to 
make the measures for ethno-religious identification applicable to Indonesia, we 
referred to the Tuti (2007) questionnaire when making our revisions. 
We also made improvements to our measurement of support for violence. 
Since we could not find appropriate measurements from Western societies, we used 
the measurement of Hadiwitanto et al. (2007) as a starting point. His questionnaire 
is relevant as he investigated religion, social trust and conflict in Ambon, but his 
measurement of support for violence was inadequately developed since the levels 
of violence he distinguished were unequally distributed over different societal 
domains (political, economic, socio-cultural and religious). This imbalance would 
affect the results, possibly eliminating important factors before data gathering. We 
therefore modified the measurements so that they were distributed evenly over the 
economic, political, cultural and religious domains. Each domain was then assessed 
in terms of four dimensions of support for violence: support for public debates, for 
demonstrations, for corporal and for material harm.  
For individual characteristics and intermediate variables, we applied the same 
strategy of adapting measurements from earlier studies. In order to assess the 
measurement and test the validity of the questionnaire, a pilot survey was conducted 
in our six selected universities, three in Ambon and three in Yogyakarta. The result of 
this survey was then evaluated by checking the correlations; if any were very low or 
extremely high, the items were reformulated or simply removed from the survey. If, 
according to respondents, the wording of questions and translations was unclear, we 
made them more straightforward and simple to prevent misunderstandings.
Third, we used rigorous data-reduction methods to analyse the data. We began 
by observing the central tendency of the data and its dispersion. This was important 
for discovering its general pattern and variability. Next, we ran factor analyses to 
identify the important dimensions of the observed variables and to test the validity 
and reliability of the scale dimensions. In order to find a comparable model solution 
for both Muslims and Christian, we ran three sets of factor analyses on the observed 
variables, filtering them past Muslims, Christians and the combination of the two 
religious groups. In the process, the outcomes of communality, Eigenvalue, structure 
of the pattern matrix and item-correlation were the focus for data interpretation. 
In relation to support for intergroup violence, we found two dimensions: a 
high level of support, i.e., support for harm to persons and property, and a low level 
of support, i.e., support for public criticism and demonstrations. For independent 
variables, factor analyses were run for religious practices and religious ceremonies. 
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Muslims and Christians were given similar measurement items, even though the two 
religious groups differ in their ceremonies. For Muslims, the ceremonies included 
circumcision, weddings, funerals, fasting, Idul Fitri and Idul Adha. For Christians, 
the questions about ceremonies included baptism, weddings, Christmas, Easter, 
funerals and fasting. The result was three dimensions to use as comparable model 
solutions for both Muslims and Christians: collective rituals, rites of passage and 
religious practices. For intermediary determinants, we found that perceived group 
threat was concentrated in two dimensions: politics and economy on the one hand 
and socio-cultural factors on the other. Salience of identity also had two dimensions: 
ethnicity and religion. Intergroup contact was measured by quantity and quality of 
contact. Quantity was clearly constructed in a single dimension. We also decided to 
use a single dimension for quality of contact, since the factor analysis determined 
two dimensions with a high correlation: closeness and cooperation, evaluation 
and equality. Other intermediary determinants such as perceived discrimination, 
religiocentrism, attitudes towards religious plurality, religious fundamentalism and 
nationalistic attitudes had two dimensions respectively (see appendix 1 Table 5 - 
Table 9).
To analyze the differences between Muslims and Christians, and the variation 
between ethno-religious groups, we compared their means and made t-tests. 
An analysis of variance was also made by testing all dimensions to reveal their 
correlation and tendencies. For this, we took into account of the statistic of F, the 
significance level, and the correlation among the tested variables. The analysis 
of variance specifically looked into the (linear versus non-linear) nature of the 
relationships between the dependent variable(s) and independent variables as well 
as relationships with control and intermediary variables. 
Finally, we conducted multivariate regression analyses. This study 
demonstrates the relevance of certain theories in Indonesia. We provide evidence 
that ethnic competition theory can explain the relationship between ethno-religious 
identification and support for intergroup violence in Indonesia. The level of ethno-
religious identification actually overwhelms the individual determinants, which 
has not been shown in Western countries. We find evidence that the perception 
of out-group threat, positive attitudes towards religious in-groups and nationalistic 
attitudes intermediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification and 
support for violence. Hence, the stronger the ethno-religious identification, the 
stronger the perceptions of out-group threat that induce support for harm. The 
stronger the level of ethno-religious identification, the higher the positive in-group 
attitudes that induce support for harm. Another interesting result is the negative 
influence of nationalism on support for violence, consistent with previous studies in 
Western contexts (Coienders, 2001; Todosijevic, 2001; Coenders et al., 2004). This 




Indonesia; nationalism continues to decrease due to the struggle for local autonomy. 
Local conflicts such as those in Ambon are largely to do with the pursuit of greater 
local autonomy, as opposed to national interests. The devolution of power as a result 
of local autonomy has opened up competition over economic resources, and elite 
contestation of political power for their own interests. In order to maintain their 
power while adjusting to decentralization, the elites have often mobilized their 
followers through ethnic ties or religious networks to attain their objectives (Aspinal 
and Fealey, 2003: 6-9; Van Klinken, 2006: 138-143).  
However, the study revises a previous theory on pluralism. In earlier studies, 
pluralism is described as the individual’s positive appreciation of religious plurality, 
either in the acceptance of underlying common elements of different religious 
traditions, or by stressing the value and richness of differences between religious 
traditions (Anthony et al., 2005; 2015). Therefore, pluralism is expected to have a 
negative association with support for harm. Our result points towards a positive 
relation, i.e., the more that individuals agree with pluralism, the more they support 
harm. This implies support for harm among respondents with an explicit personal 
(religious) interpretation of religious plurality. This support has no connection with 
the positive attitudes towards religious plurality. It could arise from other factors–i.e. 
that respondents have their own, personal agenda in relation to support for violence. 
The support for violence has nothing to do with their pluralistic view.
In the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for 
demonstrations, salience of ethnic identity and hermeneutic interpretation are 
intermediate determinants. Ethnic salience is the awareness of individuals of their 
ethnic categorization and identity and the importance of this ethnic identification 
to them (Phinney, 1990; Duckit, 2006: 154). As we predicted, this study provides 
evidence that ethnic salience mediates the relationship between ethno-religious 
identification and support for demonstrations. It highlights the ongoing importance 
of ethnicity in Indonesia. In addition, relatively more agreement with hermeneutic 
interpretations of sacred texts induces support for demonstrations. It means that 
support for demonstrations is also given by people who have a critical, but committed, 
attitude towards their own religious texts.  
    
6.5. New research issues
Based on the study findings, we propose new research topics as follows:
The repetition of the study with the extension of research sites and 
samples, with multilevel analyses that consider the typical characteristics 
of these sites.
This study has provided explanations for latent conflict in Indonesia by showing 
that support for intergroup violence is a dimension of exclusionism. Although we 
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adopted ethnic group conflict theory as the basis for a number of our hypotheses, 
the contextual level, which is the integral part of the theory, has not yet been tested. 
An analysis of this in future studies will make the corroboration of the theories more 
reliable. We are still curious to discover the extent to which contextual factors (e.g. 
actual competition, relative group size and migration) influence the relationship 
between ethno-religious identification and support for violence in Indonesia; we 
could take into account actual competition over scarce resources, such as in the 
labour market, and power differences within historical and contemporary conditions. 
Relative group size is also relevant to an understanding of group relations, along with 
power and status differences between groups that potentially influence individual 
attitudes to group identification. The individual-level analysis would be more 
meaningful and comprehensive if it were connected to contextual-level analysis. 
We also recommend repeating this study with the same design, and expanding the 
research sites to other areas. Repetition would provide longitudinal data, while the 
expansion to different research sites would give a variety of findings comparable to 
those of this study, and thereby corroborate the theories.
To give a complete picture of latent conflict in Indonesia, further studies should 
also include other areas where intergroup tensions run high, particularly areas where 
ethno-religious violence have ever taken place. For instance, in Sambas, Balikpapan, 
Sampit and Palangkaraya in Kalimantan, ethno-religious violence has had a strong 
ethnic dimension that involved Malay, Dayak and Madurese. In Jakarta, Surakarta 
and Medan, Chinese groups are repeatedly the target of looting and harassment. 
Aceh, Timika and Wamena in Papua experience protracted insurgencies against the 
national government of Indonesia. Besides these, the research should include areas 
of relatively peaceful coexistence such as Surabaya, Bali, Malang, Semarang, Padang, 
and Makassar. In order to extend the reach of the research, the sample should be 
drawn randomly from various groups in society and should not be limited to the 
student population.
Ethno-religious identity and religious intolerance
We have found evidence that religious identification is stronger than ethnic 
identification. Our study has shown that people are more likely to participate in 
religious rituals and other practices than to participate in ethnic ceremonies. Support 
for violence is also stronger among respondents with higher levels of positive in-group 
attitudes (religiocentrism), more agreement with pluralism and more agreement 
with a hermeneutic interpretation of Holy Scriptures. These findings reveal the 
importance of religion in Indonesia, contrary to its limited role in Western, more 
secular societies. Previous studies have already pointed to the increasing role of 
religion in the political landscape of Indonesia since the 1990s (Van Bruinessen, 1996; 




the construction of individual identities, but can also lead to religious intolerance in 
society as a whole. Our findings show that ethno-religious identification influences 
support for intergroup violence directly or indirectly. However, we have not 
investigated the relationship between ethno-religious identification and intragroup 
violence, i.e. violence within religious groups. So far, few studies have focused on this 
phenomenon, although it has dramatically increased in recent years, for instance in 
the conflicts between mainstream Muslim groups such as Muhamadiyah, Nahdlatul 
Ulama, Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) on the one hand and 
Ahmadiyah and Shiah on the other.       
Religion and nationalism
Since we have found that lower levels of nationalism induce support for intergroup 
violence, it would be worthwhile to explore the relationship between religion and 
nationalism. Recent studies of Indonesia have discussed the increasing importance 
of religious identity (Van Bruinessen, 1996; Hefner, 2011), and the decline of 
nationalism since the reformation (Anderson, 1999; Bertrand, 2004), but the 
relationship between these issues has been paid little attention (Menchik, 2014). 
So, a future study could explore the religious factors that make nationalism stronger 
or weaker among different groups. We could test the relationship between ethno-
religious identification and nationalism in the context of regionalism and globalism. 
It would be interesting to know whether ethnicity or religion determines nationalism 
in Indonesia. Such a study should expand research samples in representative areas 
of Indonesia. 
 
Ethno-religious identification and peace-making
Future research could also address the relationship between ethno-religious 
identification and peace-making. Our findings show that support for intergroup 
violence is present both in Yogyakarta and Ambon. We have learned that perceived 
group threat, religiocentrism (i.e. positive in-group attitudes), pluralism, nationalism, 
salience of ethnic identity and favouring a hermeneutic interpretation of sacred texts 
mediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for 
violence. We also predict that conflict will decline when conditions for the support 
for intergroup violence are reduced. Nonetheless, it would be meaningful to set up 
systematic research for conflict prevention and resolution. Many efforts have been 
made by academics and social workers, such as the revitalization of local wisdom 
regarding peace- or trust-building between conflicting groups, but with limited effect 
(Bräuchler, 2009; Subagya, 2009). Besides exploring the tradition of peace-making 
within communities, we should look into potential variables that not only reduce 
prejudice and hostility against the out-groups, but also develop trust between 
























153. The migration of people of 
different religious groups to my 
community is a threat to my own 
religious groups
.71 .91 .75 .95
152.  I am afraid that customs of my 
group will be lost due to the 
presence of other religious 
groups
.59 .84 .53 .78
154.  I am worried that job prospects 
for members of my group would 
decline due to the presence of 
other religious groups
.64 .81 .71 .83
158.  I am worried that the security in 
my neighbourhood will decline 
due to the presence of other 
religious groups
.64 .75 .69 .59
156.  I am worried that security in my 
university will decline due to 
the presence of other religious 
groups
.64 .68 .62 .78
159.  The religious practices of people 
from other religious groups 
threaten our own way of life
.59 .64 .55 .54
155.  I am worried that study grant 
opportunities will decline due to 
the presence of other religious 
groups
.54 .56 .59 .73
163.   The chances of getting space in a 
boarding house will decline due 
to the presence of other groups
.41 .47 .54 .61
160.   People from other religious groups 
are given preferential treatment 
by the authorities
.67 .78 .64 .80
161. Members of other religious 
groups are in control of business 
opportunities
.59 .75 .74 .81
Initial eigenvalues 5.66 1.11 5.93 1.13
% variance of squared loadings 
extraction




Factor correlation matrix (Muslims)
Factor Political economy Socio-cultural
Political economy 1.00 .57
Socio-cultural .57 1.00
Factor correlation matrix (Christians)
Factor Political economy Socio-cultural












Ethnicity Religion Ethnicity Religion
260.  My ethnic identity has a great 
deal of influence on how I 
make important decisions
.59 .76 .56 .76
259.  My ethnic identity has a great 
deal of influence in my daily 
life
.56 .76 .64 .80
261.  My ethnic identity has a great 
deal of influence on how I 
relate with others
.52 .70 .45 .64
257. My ethnic identity is very 
important to me
.42 .64 .39 .62
258. I see myself as a committed 
member of my ethnic group
.29 .55 .42 .65
43.     My religious beliefs have a great 
deal of influence on how I 
make important decisions
.64 .89 .67 .82
42.   My religious beliefs have a great 
deal of influence in my daily 
life
.77 .81 .58 .78
44.   My religious beliefs have a great 
deal of influence on how I 
relate with others
.56 .73 .46 .64
Initial eigenvalues 3.18 2.03 3.38 1.70
% variance of squared loadings 
extraction
34.01 20.63 36.33 15.82
Reliability .81 .84 .82 .77



















Quality of contact Quality of contact
1* 2* 3* 1* 2* 3*
133.  How much do you cooperate 
with your board/ dorm/ 
housemates from other 
religious groups?
.76 .91 .55 .70
 131. How much do you cooperate 
with your neighbours from 
other religious groups?
.64 .88 .44 .48
 121. How close are you with your 
neighbours from other 
religious groups?
.63 .83 .56 .69
 135. How much do you cooperate 
with your relatives from 
other religious groups?
.75 .83 .60 .61
 123. How close are you with your 
board/dorm/housemates 
from other religious groups?
.67 .80 .63 .70
134. How much do you cooperate 
with your close friends from 
other religious groups?
.78 .79 .70 .82
 124. How close are you with your 
close friends from other 
religious groups?
.78 .66 .69 .78
 117. How would you rate your 
contact with them? As 
classmates
.88 .92 .64 -.77
119. How would you rate your 
contact with them? As close 
friends
.84 .89 .81 -.83
116. How would you rate your 
contact with them? As 
neighbours
.86 .89 .79 -.80
120. How would you rate your 
contact with them? As 
relatives
.79 .89 .76 -.78
118. How would you rate your 
contact with them? As 
board/dorm/housemates
.80 .86 .77 -.78
129. How equal would you say you 
are with your close friends 
from other religious groups?
.89 -.96 .76 -.81
127. How equal would you say you 
are with your classmates 
from other religious groups?
.88 -.92 .75 -.81
128. How equal would you say you 
are with your board/ dorm/ 
housemates from other 
religious groups?
.85 -.88 .68 -.75
 126. How equal would you say you 
are with your neighbours 
from other religious groups?
.76 -.85 .75 -.82
130. How equal would you say you 
are with your relatives from 
other religious groups?
.81 -.81 .74 -.78
Initial eigenvalues 13.31 1.73 1.12 10.53 2.07 1.79
% variance of squared loadings 
extraction
65.47 7.96 4.53 51.06 8.95 7.36
Reliability .97 .95
*1= closeness and cooperation; 2= evaluation; 3= equality
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Factor correlation matrix (Muslims)




Evaluation .68 1.00 -.64
Equality -.80 -.64 1.00
Factor correlation matrix (Christians)




Evaluation -.55 1.00 .38








58a. Did any acts of ethno-religious violence 
occur in the province where you came 




59a. In your family, did you talk about ethno-
religious violence that happened in your 
province?
60a. Did you witness violence, for example 
fighting or rioting (related to ethno-
religious conflict), in the past 10 years?
61a. Have you suffered any kind of physical 
injury due to the violence in the past 10 
years?




70a. Were any of your immediate family 
members injured due to the violence in 
the past 10 years?
71a. Did any of your immediate family members 
lose their lives due to the violence in the 
past 10 years?
72a. Were any of your relatives injured due to 
the violence in the past 10 years?
73a.  Did any of your relatives lose their lives 
due to the violence in the past 10 years?
74a. Were any of your close friends injured due 
to the violence in the past 10 years?




75a.  Did any of your close friends lose their lives 
due to the violence in the past 10 years?
76a. Were any of your neighbours injured due 
to the violence in the past 10 years?
77a. Did any of your neighbours lose their lives 
due to the violence in the past 10 years?
All questions .86 .85 .85
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Public Private Public Private
190. Limitations on access to government 
subsidy
.62 .83 .66 .76
199. Limitations on access to job market .62 .80 .72 .77
201. Limitations on recruitment as a civil 
servant .52 .76 .77 .97
188. Limitations on freedom of expression .49 .74 .59 .69
191. Limitations on freedom to choose a 
place of residence
.55 .71 .56 .62
203. Limitations on attaining higher 
positions in government offices
.53 .69 .75 .94
189. Limitations on celebration of group’s 
ceremonies .49 .66 .55 .68
196. Limitations on access to the housing 
market
.55 .65 .67 .57
202. Limitations on running of religious 
schools
.45 .62 .70 .87
193. Limitations on participation in the 
local market
.59 .61 .66 .56
200. Forced observance of religious laws 
of other group
.30 .57 .61 .82
192. Limitations on dress .69 .84 .74 .84
194. Limitations on behavior .58 .72 .59 .73
Initial eigenvalues 6.54 1.30 8.16 1.09
% variance of squared loadings extraction 46.76 7.09 60.23 5.88
Reliability .91 .95



























48. When it comes to religion. 
Christians are less tolerant /54. 
Muslim
.70 .84 .72 .90
50. Christians are often the cause of 
religious conflict/56. Muslim
.62 .79 .48 .64
46. Christians only talk about doing 
good deeds without practicing 
them/52. Muslim
.44 .64 .47 .65
45. Muslims respond to God the 
most faithfully/51. Christian
.51 .77 .41 .68
49. Muslims are best able to talk 
meaningfully about God/55. 
Christian
.64 .72 .85 .89
47. Thanks to their religion. Most 
Muslims are good people/53. 
Christian
.16 .32 .35 .47
Initial eigenvalues 2.80 1.16 2.95 1.16
% variance of squared loadings 
extraction
39.55 11.71 42.20 12.56
Reliability .80 .62 .78 .74
Factor correlation matrix (Muslims)
Factor Negative out-group Positive in-group
Negative out-group 1.00 .48
Positive in-group .48 1.00
Factor correlation matrix (Christians)
Factor Negative out-group Positive in-group
Negative out-group 1.00 .50
Positive in-group .50 1.00
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Pattern matrix h2 
Factor loadings
Pattern matrix
Pluralism Monism Pluralism Monism
83. All religions are equally valid 
paths to liberation .59 .68 .57 .72
85. Differences between religions 
provide more knowledge of 
God
.40 .64 .37 .61
88. Differences between religions 
are a source of spiritual 
development
.39 .64 .40 .63
89. At the deepest level. all 
religions are the same .54 .63 .39 .59
86. Everything what is said about 
God in other religions has the 
same values
.47 .61 .33 .57
80. All religions are equally valid 
ways to ultimate truth .51 .59 .42 .63
82. Differences between religions 
are a basis for mutual 
enrichment
.33 .58 .29 .53
84. The truth about God is found 
only in my religion .55 .71 .64 .79
81. Other religions do not provide 
as deep a God-experience as 
my religion
.51 .69 .52 .72
78. Compared with other 
religions. my religion offers 
the surest way to liberation
.31 .57 .43 .65
87. Compared with my religion. 
other religions contain only 
partial truths
.31 .56 .54 .73
Initial eigenvalues 3.94 2.09 3.42 2.55
% variance of squared loadings 
extraction
31.15 13.64 26.02 18.59
Reliability .83 .74 .80 .81





























62. Everything in the Sacred Writing 
is absolutely true without 
question
.75 .86 .81 .90
63. The Sacred Writing should 
never be doubted. even when 
scientific or historical evidence 
outright disagrees with it
.52 .72 .75 .87
65. The truths of the Sacred Writing 
will never be outdated. but will 
always apply equally well to all 
generations
.34 .60 .32 .55
66. The Sacred Writing is the only 
one that is true above all Holy 
Books
.29 .54 .25 .50
68. The meanings of the Sacred 
Writing are open to change 
and interpretation
.21 .46 .30 .54
69. The Sacred Writing holds a 
deeper truth which can only be 
revealed by personal reflection
.21 .45 .42 .56
Initial eigenvalues 2.40 1.20 2.61 1.27
% variance of squared loadings 
extraction
32.17 7.02 36.97 10.61
Reliability .77 .33 .78 .40
Factor correlation matrix (Muslims)
Factor Intra-textual Hermeneutic interpretation




Factor correlation matrix (Christians)
Factor Intra-textual Hermeneutic  interpretation


















140. Renewing national ideas 
is our national task
.48 .69 .55 .74
138. I should respect my nation 
and its tradition
.48 .69 .33 .57
139. I should always put natioal 
interest above ethno-
religious group interest
.30 .55 .41 .64
141. I would rather be a citizen 
of Indonesia than of 
any other country in the 
world
.23 .47 .24 .46
142. I should support my 
district even if my district 
is wrong
.47 .68 .55 .73
144. I should always put district 
interest above national 
interest
.34 .59 .41 .64
Initial eigenvalues 2.08 1.42 2.09 1.51
% variance of squared loadings 
extraction
24.66 13.82 25.15 16.45
Reliability .67 .57 .66 .62


















209. On the whole one can trust 
Christians*
210. On the whole one can rely on 
Muslim*
211. On the whole one can rely on 
Christians*
212. It is better to be careful if one is 
dealing with Muslims
213. It is better to be careful if one is 
dealing with Christians
214. Most Muslims would exploit me if 
they had the opportunity
215. Most Christians would exploit me if 
they had the opportunity
216. Most of the time, Muslims attempt to 
act in their own interest
217. Most of the time, Christians attempt 
to act in their own interest






Ethno-religious identification and support for violence
Table 1 Ethnic self-definition and support for violence 
Ethnic  self-definition
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Javanese 1.69 344 1.56 102 3.25 345 2.93 103
Sundanese 1.57 35 2.50 2 3.17 36 2.50 2
Madurese 1.89 36 3.25 36
Minangkabau 1.76 17 3.06 17
Ambonese 1.69 235 1.80 322 3.28 237 3.04 322
Buginese 1.90 10 3.30 10
Makassarese 1.50 2 2.00 1 3.50 2
Buton 1.78 94 3.26 94
Toraja 1.65 20 3.15 20
Minahasa 1.20 5 3.20 5
Chinese 2.00 1 1.77 43 3.00 1 3.02 43
Batak 1.50 2 1.74 35 2.00 2 3.23 35
Other ethnic groups 1,69 42 1.70 56 3.33 43 3.02 56
Total 1.71 818 1.74 586 3.25 823 3.03 587
Sign Sign Sign Sign







Table 2  Ethnic languages use and support for violence 
Ethnic  Languages*
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Never 1.75 277 1.84 321 3.24 279 3.01 320
One - two occasions 1.71 266 1.73 88 3.26 268 3.08 89
Three – four  occasions 1.66 80 1.61 65 3.19 81 3.09 65
Five-six occasions 1.68 216 1.60 128 3.31 216 3.01 128
Total 1.71 839 1.75 602 3.26 844 3.03 602
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.





*The occasions : at home;  in family gatherings; in university; in dealing with government offices;  
in the community of residence  and talking with  close-friends.  
Table 3 Friends by ethnicity and support for violence 
Friends by ethnicity
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
None to Some 1.78 59 1.88 34 3.20 59 3.06 34
Relatively many 1.65 254 1.73 130 3.23 256 3.00 130
Almost all 1.70 337 1.76 216 3.28 337 3.08 217
All 1.81 119 1.62 131 3.19 120 3.00 131
Total 1.71 769 1.72 511 3.24 772 3.04 512
Sign Sign Sign Sign











Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
No knowledge 1.64 90 1.74 114 3.04 91 2.90 113
I do not participate in it and 
neither does my family
1.66 238 1.72 170 3.27 239 3.05 170
I do not participate in it but 
my family does 
1.71 286 1.72 138 3.29 286 3.06 139
I do participate 1.77 117 1.67 64 3.28 118 2.95 64
Total 1.70 731 1.72 486 3.25 734 3.01 486
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.









Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
No 1.73 663 1.74 474 3.25 666 3.02 473
Member 1.59 148 1.74 85 3.29 149 3.16 85
Total 1.70 811 1.74 559 3.26 815 3.04 558
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.












Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Never 1.47 19 1.88 8 2.89 19 2.75 8
Only on special days  1.57 89 1.66 47 3.26 89 3.15 47
At least once a month 1.64 14 1.94 16 3.43 14 3.56 16
Once a week  and more  than 
once a week
1.76 29 1.89 18 3.63 30 3.06 18
Total 1.60 151 1.78 89 3.31 152 3.17 89
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F .82 .49 .92 .44 3.28 .03 2.77 .05
Linearity 9.19 .00 .84 .36
Deviance .83 .48 3.73 .03
R .24
Eta .30
Religious identification and support for violence 
Table 7 Religious self-definition and support for violence 
Religious self- definition 
Harm Demonstration
Mean N Mean N
Muslim 1.71 839 3.26 844
Christian 1.75 602 3.03 602
Total 1.73 1.441 3.16 1.446
Sign. Sign.




Participation on religious activities and support for violence 





Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
I do not participate in it and 
neither does my family
1.71 14 1.57 7 2.79 14 2.57 7
I do not participate in it but 
my family does
2.00 16 2.14 7 2.81 16 2.57 7
I do participate but for non- 
religious reasons
1.94 34 1.81 89 3.18 34 3.00 90
I do participate for religious 
reasons 1.68 749 1.73 466 3.28 754 3.06 465
Total 1.70 813 1.74 569 3.26 818 3.04 569
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F 2.82 .04 1.10 .35 3.82 .01 1.57 .20
Linearity 3.79 .05 10.79 .00





Table 9 Religious practices and support for violence
Religious practices
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Only on feast days or special 
holy days 
1.59 22 1.88 16 3.05 22 3.25 16
Once  a month to once a 
week
1.73 94 1.85 59 3.28 95 2.93 59
More than once a week 1.70 102 1.72 75 3.18 103 2.92 75
Once a day 1.60 60 1.76 82 3.33 60 2.89 82
Several times a day 1.63 103 1.74 27 3.30 104 3.19 27
Total 1.67 381 1.77 259 3.26 384 2.96 259
Sign Sign Sign Sign










Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Never 1.83 23 1.33 9 2.83 23 3.11 9
Only on feast days or special 
holy days 
1.76 165 1.92 60 3.11 167 3.017 60
At least once a month 1.65 254 1.68 169 3.33 256 3.08 170
Once a week 1.71 369 1.78 303 3.30 370 3.03 302
Total 1.70 811 1.75 541 3.26 816 3.04 541
Sign Sign Sign. Sign.







Friends by religion and support for violence 
Table 11 In-group friends and support for violence 
In-group friends
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Some 2.47 17 1.85 26 2.82 17 3.08 26
Relatively many 1.74 112 1.70 177 3.29 112 2.94 177
Almost all 1.65 376 1.77 230 3.22 377 3.11 231
All 1.72 325 1.69 151 3.32 329 3.02 151
Total 1.70 830 1.73 584 3.26 835 3.03 585
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F 8.32 .00 .71 .55 2.81 .04 1.31 .27
Linearity 3.23 .07 3.50 .06
Deviance 10.861 .00 2.46 .09
R .07
Eta .17 .10
Table 12 Out-group friends and support for violence 
Out-group friends
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
None 1.78 180 1.83 23 3.24 182 3.17 23
Some 1.70 384 1.78 259 3.31 385 3.01 259
Relatively many 1.59 160 1.69 235 3.18 160 3.06 236
Almost all 1.86 29 1.66 56 2.65 29 3.16 56
Total 1.70 753 1.73 573 3.24 756 3.05 574
Sign. Sign Sign. Sign.
F 2.75 .04 .84 .50 6.88 .00 .52 .72
Linearity 2.42 .12 7.07 .01





Religious organization and support for violence




Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
No 1.72 466 1.76 344 3.22 469 3.01 344
Yes 1.71 352 1.72 231 3.33 353 3.07 230
Total 1.72 818 1.75 575 3.27 822 3.04 574
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.










Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Never 1.71 35 1.83 24 3.26 35 2.75 24
Only on special days  1.65 152 1.64 75 3.32 152 3.13 75
Once a month to once a 
week
1.85 79 1.64 67 3.15 80 3.10 67
More than once a week 1.64 78 1.87 62 3.49 78 3.25 61
Total 1.70 344 1.72 228 3.31 345 3.11 227
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.







Social position and support for violence
Table 15 Gender and support for violence
Gender
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Men 1.74 419 1.77 337 3.31 419 3.11 337
Women 1.67 406 1.68 257 3.21 411 2.91 257
Total 1.70 825 1.73 594 3.26 830 3.03 594
Sign Sign Sign Sign









Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
No 1.70 10 2.05 22 3.40 10 2.82 22
Yes 1.71 829 1.74 580 3.26 834 3.04 580
Total 1.71 839 1.75 602 3.26 844 3.03 602
Sign Sign Sign Sign







Table 17 Parent’s education and support for violence 
Parent’s education
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Low 1.80 158 1.71 49 3.31 159 2.98 49
Middle 1.67 255 1.79 204 3.30 258 2.94 203
High 1.65 147 1.68 151 3.19 147 3.15 152
Total 1.71 560 1.74 404 3.28 564 3.02 404
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.





Table 18 Parent’s occupational status and support for violence  
Parent’s occupational status
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Self employee 1.77 367 1.81 188 3.29 370 2.98 187
Labour/ officer 1.63 168 1.70 172 3.21 168 3.06 173
Informal worker 1.67 120 1.66 64 3.13 121 3.00 64
Unpaid worker 1.65 17 1.89 9 3.59 17 3.11 9
Total 1.71 672 1.75 433 3.25 676 3.02 433
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.







Table 19 Parent’s occupation and support for violence
Parent’s occupation
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Manager/ executive 1.20 5 2.00 1 2.60 5 2.00 1
Professionals 1.80 5 1.00 6 3.00 5 3.17 6
Technicians and Associate 
Professionals
1.85 13 1.60 15 3.31 13 3.00 15
Clerks 1.67 91 1.78 123 3.08 91 3.11 124
Service Workers and Shop 
and Market Sales Workers
1.88 25 1.96 27 2.96 26 3.30 27
Farmers. Forestry Workers 
and Fishermen
1.85 239 1.84 84 3.35 240 2.96 83
Trades and Related Workers 1.65 136 1.74 105 3.27 138 2.94 105
Plant and Machine Operators 
and Assemblers
1.71 38 1.71 14 3.18 38 3.07 14
Laborers and Unskilled 
Workers
1.62 37 1.61 18 3.30 37 3.00 18
Special Occupations (specify) 1.68 19 1.80 30 3.16 19 2.77 30
Dead/absent 1.33 6 1.60 5 3.00 6 3.20 5
Total 1.74 614 1.77 428 3.24 618 3.02 428
Sign Sign. Sign. Sign.







Table 20 Household income and support for violence
 Household income
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Low 1.71 303 1.87 159 3.26 306 2.97 159
Middle 1.76 364 1.75 289 3.25 365 3.05 288
High 1.58 146 1.54 127 3.25 146 3.09 128
Total 1.71 813 1.74 575 3.26 817 3.04 575
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F 3.46 .03 7.04 .00 .02 .98 .85 .43
Linearity 1.96 .16 13.54 .00
Deviance 4.97 .03 .53 .47
R -.15
Eta .09
Intermediary variables and Support for violence 
Table 21 Perceived group threat and support for violence
Perceived Group threat
Muslims Christians Muslims Christians
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Totally disagree 1.41 116 1.38 98 3.06 116 2.95 98
Disagree 1.67 479 1.75 367 3.19 481 3.00 367
Neither disagree nor agree 1.92 186 1.99 104 3.44 189 3.10 104
Agree 1.93 29 2.69 13 3.69 29 3.62 13
Total 1.70 810 1.75 582 3.25 815 3.02 582
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F 15.67 .00 20.16 .00 10.74 .00 2.81 .04
Linearity 44.15 .00 56.89 .00 30.85 .00 5.24 .02
Deviance 1.42 .24 1.75 .17 .68 .51 1.60 .20




Salience of identities and support for violence  
Table 22 Ethnic salience and support for violence 
Ethnic salience
Muslims Christians Muslims Christians
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Disagree 1.56 124 1.72 89 3.02 125 2.83 89
Neither disagree nor agree 1.72 367 1.72 286 3.19 370 2.94 286
Agree 1.77 196 1.92 112 3.40 197 3.17 112
Totally agree 1.89 37 1.87 39 3.35 37 3.38 39
Total 1.71 724 1.78 526 3.23 729 3.01 526
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F 3.46 .02 2.20 .09 7.22 .00 6.37 .00
Linearity 9.26 .00 19.16 .00 18.37 .00
Deviance .56 .57 1.26 .29 .37 .69
R .11 .16 .18
Eta
Table 23 Religious salience and support for violence 
Religious salience
Muslims Christians Muslims Christians
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Totally disagree 1.40 10 1.60 5 3.30 10 2.80 5
Disagree 1.76 34 1.39 28 2.97 34 2.96 28
Neither disagree nor agree 1.71 119 1.66 94 3.13 119 2.97 94
Agree 1.79 194 1.79 144 3.33 195 3.02 144
Totally agree 1.68 280 1.81 204 3.31 283 3.15 203
Total 1.72 637 1.75 475 3.26 641 3.06 474
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.







Actual intergroup contact and support for violence 
Table 24 Quantity of contact and support for violence
Quantity of contact
Harm Demonstration
Muslims Christians Muslims Christians
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Never 1.77 276 1.78 69 3.30 277 3.12 69
Almost once a month 1.68 93 1.71 65 3.24 93 2.86 65
Once a week 1.73 85 1.58 96 3.08 85 2.93 96
More than once a week 1.59 32 1.98 43 2.91 32 3.23 43
Once a day 1.73 33 2.03 29 3.21 33 3.10 29
Several times a day 1.57 51 1.62 107 3.12 51 2.97 107
Total 1.72 570 1.72 409 3.21 571 3.00 409
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F 1.13 .35 3.07 .01 2.43 .03 1.48 .20
Linearity .17 .68 6.08 .01
Deviance 3.80 .01 1.52 .20
R -.10
Eta .19
Table 25 Quality of contact and support for violence
Quality of contact
Harm Demonstration
Muslims Christians Muslims Christians
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Negative 1.85 86 1.75 8 3.21 86 3.25 8
Neither negative nor positive 1.73 213 1.67 150 3.11 215 3.04 151
Positive 1.86 69 1.98 124 3.19 69 3.06 124
Total 1.78 368 1.81 282 3.15 370 3.05 283
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.







Individual memory of violence and support for violence 
Table 26 Individual memory of violence and support for violence 
Memory of violence *
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
No memory 1.75 273 1.82 108 3.32 275 290 109
One occasion 1.68 165 1.63 123 3.16 165 2.99 123
Two occasions 1.67 180 1.69 140 3.26 183 2.96 140
Three occasions 1.73 205 1.77 205 3.22 205 3.15 205
Total 1.71 823 1.73 576 3.25 828 3.02 577
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.





*Memory: place and witness
Table 27 Direct violence and support for violence 
 Direct violence 
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
No experience 1.69 599 1.75 377 3.24 603 2.99 378
One experiences 1.79 57 1.79 63 3.42 57 3.05 63
Two occasions 1.78 73 1.69 62 3.23 73 3.03 62
More than three occasions 1.77 89 1.71 82 3.30 89 3.16 81
Total 1.71 818 1.74 584 3.26 822 3.02 584
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.





*Physical injury; family injury; family lost; relative injury; relative lost
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Table 28 Indirect violence and support for violence 
Indirect  violence 
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
No experience 1.20 626 1.73 391 3.26 630 2.99 391
One occasion 1.74 87 1.72 76 3.28 87 2.93 76
Two occasions 1.73 67 1.73 74 3.31 68 3.23 74
Three and four occasions 1.80 41 1.94 53 3.17 41 3.13 53
Total 1.71 821 1.75 594 3.26 826 3.03 594
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.





*close friend injury; close friend lost; neighbor injury; and neighbor lost




Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Totally disagree 1.42 217 1.40 131 3.37 217 3.21 131
Disagree 1.73 510 1.78 334 3.22 515 2.95 334
Neither disagree nor agree 2.18 91 1.97 100 3.19 91 2.98 100
Agree 2.33 6 2.00 15 3.67 6 3.00 15
Total 1.70 824 1.73 580 3.26 829 3.01 580
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F 32.49 .00 14.56 .00 2.71 .04 3.36 .02
Linearity 95.41 .00 39.11 .00 3.55 .66 4.61 .03
Deviance 1.03 .36 2.27 .11 2.29 .10 2.73 .07




Religiosity and support for violence 
Religiocentrism and support for violence 
Table 30 Positive in-groups and support for violence 
Positive ingroup
Harm Demonstration
Muslims Christians Muslims Christians
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Totally disagree 1.31 13 1.26 23 3.00 13 3.13 23
Disagree 1.78 83 1.67 140 3.01 83 3.12 139
Neither disagree nor agree 1.68 291 1.71 222 3.22 294 2.97 222
Agree 1.74 155 1.88 77 3.39 155 2.81 78
Totally agree 1.80 102 2.04 49 3.35 102 3.22 49
Total 1.72 644 1.74 511 3.25 647 3.02 511
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F 2.21 .07 6.18 .00 3.89 .00 2.87 .02
Linearity 20.91 .00 12.47 .00 .65 .42
Deviance 1.27 .28 1.03 .38 3.61 .01
R .20 .14
Eta .15
Table 31 Negative out-groups and support for violence 
Negative outgroup
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Totally disagree 1.42 84 1.52 79 3.04 84 3.20 78
Disagree 1.66 353 1.76 242 3.21 354 2.97 243
Neither disagree nor agree 1.76 267 1.84 206 3.32 269 3.06 206
Agree 1.91 57 1.91 22 3.54 59 3.14 22
Totally agree 2.05 20 1.82 11 3.30 20 3.64 11
Total 1.70 781 1.76 560 3.26 786 3.06 560
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F 7.49 .00 2.85 .02 4.31 .00 2.68 .03
Linearity 28.35 .00 8.37 .00 13.68 .00 .50 .48
Deviance .54 .66 1.01 .39 1.18 .32 3.40 .02




Attitudes towards plurality and support for violence 
Table 32 Monism and support for violence 
Monism
Harm Demonstration
Muslims Christians Muslims Christians
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Totally disagree 1.72 18 1.24 63 3.11 18 2.95 63
Disagree 1.58 111 1.76 246 3.01 111 2.97 245
Neither disagree nor agree 1.80 320 1.76 210 3.13 323 2.94 211
Agree 1.69 157 1.62 29 3.47 157 3.24 29
Totally agree 1.59 46 2.27 15 3.66 47 3.87 15
Total 1.72 652 1.71 563 3.23 656 2.99 563
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F 2.74 .03 11.20 .00 11.41 .00 5.16 .00
Linearity .00 .99 19.58 .00 38.64 .00 7.33 .01
Deviance 3.65 .01 8.41 .00 2.33 .07 4.44 .00
R .18 .24 .11
Eta .13 .27 .19
Table 33 Pluralism and support for violence  
Pluralism
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Totally disagree 1.58 52 1.00 3 3.19 53 2.33 3
Disagree 1.68 198 1.78 32 3.31 200 3.00 32
Neither disagree nor agree 1.75 389 1.79 263 3.24 389 2.97 263
Agree 1.80 87 1.82 73 3.34 87 3.03 73
Totally agree 1.71 14 1.75 40 3.00 14 3.28 40
Total 1.73 740 1.78 411 3.26 743 3.01 411
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.







Fundamentalism and support for violence 
Table 34 Intra-textual fundamentalism and support for violence 
Intratextual
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Totally disagree 2.50 4 1.08 13 2.50 4 3.00 13
Disagree 1.76 25 1.61 69 2.96 25 3.07 68
Neither disagree nor agree 1.75 130 1.76 192 3.09 132 2.98 193
Agree 1.87 134 1.69 81 3.36 135 3.01 81
Totally agree 1.64 250 1.88 98 3.31 251 3.26 98
Total 1.74 543 1.73 453 3.25 547 3.06 453
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F 3.79 .01 3.90 .00 3.99 .00 1.86 .12
Linearity 5.12 .02 8.86 .00 11.05 .00
Deviance 3.35 .02 2.25 .08 1.64 .18
R -.10 .14 .14
Eta .17
Table 35 Hermeneutic interpretation and support for violence 
Symbolic Fundamentalism
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Totally disagree 1.73 26 1.67 6 2.81 26 2.67 6
Disagree 1.60 96 1.68 34 3.22 98 3.00 34
Neither disagree nor agree 1.72 303 1.82 165 3.15 304 3.02 164
Agree 1.76 236 1.81 200 3.29 237 2.99 201
Totally agree 1.76 74 1.62 107 3.64 74 3.16 107
Total 1.72 735 1.76 512 3.24 739 3.03 512
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.







Nationalistic attitudes and support for violence 
Table 36 National pride and support for violence
National pride
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Not proud at all 1.71 14 1.31 13 3.00 14 3.15 13
Not proud 1.74 38 1.72 68 3.21 38 3.34 68
Neither proud nor not 1.68 223 1.71 186 3.32 223 3.00 186
Somewhat proud 1.78 249 1.87 172 3.17 250 3.02 173
Very proud 1.75 167 1.78 80 3.33 168 3.13 79
Total 1.74 691 1.76 519 3.26 693 3.07 519
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F .73 .58 2.36 .05 1.85 .12 2.48 .04
Linearity 4.25 .04 1.37 .24
Deviance 1.73 .16 2.86 .04
R .04
Eta .14
Table 37 Nationalism and support for violence
Nationalism
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Disagree 2.05 22 1.58 12 2.86 22 3.17 12
Neither disagree nor agree 1.71 228 1.79 221 3.15 230 2.93 220
Agree 1.84 208 1.89 155 3.22 209 2.97 156
Totally agree 1.65 105 1.56 68 3.55 105 3.18 68
Total 1.76 563 1.78 456 3.24 566 2.99 456
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F 3.47 .02 3.66 .01 8.78 .00 1.77 .15
Linearity .94 .33 .94 .33 22.93 .00





Table 38 Regiocentrism and Support for violence 
Regiocentrism
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Totally disagree 1.34 140 1.40 90 3.31 140 3.12 90
Disagree 1.65 409 1.70 257 3.19 413 3.02 257
Neither disagree nor agree 1.93 205 1.88 177 3.35 206 2.99 177
Agree 2.04 50 2.09 53 3.18 50 3.04 53
Totally agree 2.58 12 2.21 14 3.58 12 3.00 14
Total 1.70 816 1.76 591 3.26 821 3.03 591
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F 27.36 .00 11.30 .00 2.29 .06 .39 .82
Linearity 106.07 .00 43.98 .00
Deviance 1.13 .34 .41 .75
R .34 .26
Eta
Table 39 Intergroup distrust  and support for violence 
Distrust out-group
Harm Demonstration
Muslim Christian Muslim Christian
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Disagree 1.60 471 1.68 332 3.21 474 2.98 332
Neither disagree nor agree 1.89 302 1.87 230 3.27 304 3.03 230
Agree 1.70 60 1.61 31 3.57 60 3.52 31
Total 1.71 833 1.75 593 3.26 838 3.03 593
Sign. Sign. Sign. Sign.
F 17.09 .00 4.79 .01 5.51 .00 5.95 .00
Linearity 18.50 .00 3.02 .08. 7.87 .01 6.91 .01
Deviance 15.67 .00 6.55 .01 3.14 4.99 .03







Table 1 Support for harm to persons and properties
Model 1 2a 2b
2c 3 4
Before After Before After Before After







-.12 -.09 -.14 -.06 -.09 -.07 -.07 -.06 .18
Madurese Muslim .20* .24* .18 .23 .22* .01 .08 .09 -.04
Ambonese 
Muslim
.00 .04 .10 .11 .03 -.07 -.02 .33 -.04
Buton Muslim .09 .10 .12 .21 .12 -.06 .13 -.61 .09
Muslim Rest .04 .10 .12 .14 .06 -.02 .11 -.65 .13
Javanese Christian -.13 -.11 -.12 -.04 -.15* -.18 -.07 .02 .10
Ambonese 
Christian
.12* .07 .22* .17 .11* .04 .13 -.57 .03
Chinese Christian .08 .07 .27 .32* .06** -.27 .07 -.12 .23
Batak Christian .06 .06 -.16 -.09 .02 -.10 -.03 -.38 .05
Christian Rest -.01 .05 -.09 -.18 -.02 -.11 -.06 .40 -.01
2 Ethnic language use 
(not use = ref.) 
One to two 
occasions
-.05 .11
Three to four 
occasions
-.07 .08
Five - Six 
occasions
-.04 .10
Friends by ethnicity 
(none to  some 
as ref.)
Relatively many -.16* -.13





I do not 
participate in it, 
and neither does 
my family
.08 .06
I do not 
participate in it 
but my family 
does
.09 .07







Model 1 2a 2b
2c 3 4
Before After Before After Before After




both I and my 
family = ref.)
I do not 
participate in it 
but family does
-.01 .39
I do participate 
for non religious 
reasons
-.04 .35





(only on feast days 
or special holy days 
= ref.)
Once a month to 
once a week
.16 .19
More than once 
a week
.12 .13





rites de passage 
(never as ref.)
Only on feast days 
or special holy 
days
.01 -.15
At least once a 
month
-.13 -.29
Once a week .03 -.16
In-group friends of 
the same religion 
(some = ref.)
Relatively many .14 .13 .36** .39* .32* .42 .10
Almost all .26 .27 .41** .41* .32* .06 .17
All .26 .23 .44** .44* .36* .09 .17
Out-group friends 
of the same 
religion (none = 
ref.)
Some .01 .11
Relatively many -.11 -.07
















Model 1 2a 2b
2c 3 4
Before After Before After Before After





Officer -.03 -.13 .33 -.17
Informal worker -.24* -.18* .24 -.17*
Unpaid worker -.25 -.21 -1.03 -.19
Parent’s occupation
Manager -.57* -.55* -.63*
Profesional -.54* -.52* -1.63* -.66*
Technician -.05 -.00 -.45*
Clerk -.16 -.09 -.83* -.32*
Serviceworker -.00 -.10 -.08 -.22
Trader -.17* -.20* .40 -.28*
Operator -.08 -.16 .40 -.05
Laborer -.37* -.23* -.27*
Special -.05 -.06 .44 -.13
Dead/ Absence -.41 -.40 .13 -.57
Household income 
(High = ref.)
Low .12 .06 -.22
Medium .22* .17* -.56
Salience of ethnic 
identity
.20






Quantity of contact .13
Quality of contact -.05




















R2 .11 .14  25 .29 .15 .28 .24 .84 .45
Adjusted R2 .01 .02 .06 .09 .02 .08 .06 .71 .20
*p < .05  ** p < .01
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Table 2 Support for public criticism and demonstration
Model 1 2a 2b
2c 3 4
Before After Before After Before After







-.08 -.14 -.21 -.13 -.07 -.02 -.11 -.42 -.17
Madurese Muslim .00 .07 .17 -.07 .10 .06 .02 -.35 .05
Ambonese 
Muslim
.04 .07 .03 .14 .04 .21* .03 .59 -.08
Buton Muslim .01 .07 .01 .07 .02 .01 .03 -.19 -.04
Muslim Rest -.02 -.05 -.17 -.25 -.06 -.06 .02 .44 -.07
Javanese Christian -.31** -.23* -.43** -.38* -.28** -.20 -.27* -.46 -.16
Ambonese 
Christian
-.20** -.16* -.24* -.11 -.18* -.08 -.16* -.65 -.26*
Chinese Christian -.22* -.11 -.32* -.18 -.19 -.35 -.29* -.60 -.27
Batak Christian -.02 .15 -.06 .21 .02 -.21 -.03 -.33 -.15
Christian Rest -.21* -.21 -.22 -.19 -.18* -.03 -.13 .52 -.05
2 Ethnic language use 
(not use = ref.) 
One to two 
occasions
.12* .11
Three to four 
occasions
.08 .37*
Five - Six 
occasions
.21** .35**
Friends by ethnicity 
(none to  some 
as ref.)
Relatively many -.12 -.12
Almost all -.05 -.08
All -.17 -.27






.13 .11 .10** .23** .14** .51* .11**
Religious practices 
(only on feast days 
or special holy days 
= ref.)
Once a month to 
once a week
-.04 .05
More than once 
a week
-.10 .05





rites de passage 
(never as ref.)
Only on feast days 
or special holy 
days
.02 .02
At least once a 
month
.30 .37
Once a week .22 .21
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Model 1 2a 2b
2c 3 4
Before After Before After Before After
Constant 3.25** 3.06** 2.38** 2.20** 2.58** 2.34** 2.64** .34 2.03**
Participation in 
rites de passage 
(never as ref.)
Only on feast days 
or special holy 
days
.02 .02
At least once a 
month
.30 .37
Once a week .22 .21
In-group friends of 
the same religion 
.05 .04
Out-group friends 







.11 .12 .10* .08












Officer .03 .03 .41 .08
Informal worker -.11 -.11 -.51 -.14
Unpaid worker .26 .53* 1.24 .45*
Parent’s occupation
Manager -.81* -.80* -.65
Profesional -.41 -.35 -1.06 -.57*
Technician -.28 -.24 -.20
Clerk -.30* -.25 -.63 -.35*
Serviceworker -.10 -.08 -.42 -.28
Trader -.14 -.16* .11 -.08
Operator -.28 -.29* .53 -.31*
Laborer -.07 -.07 -.19
Special -.22 -.42* -.82 -.39*
Dead/ Absence -.32 -.25 -2.22* -.43
Household income 
(High = ref.)
Low -.28* -.17* .01 -.15
Medium -.03 -.01 .05 .01









Quantity of contact .13




Model 1 2a 2b
2c 3 4
Before After Before After Before After




















R2 .15 .20 .27 .34 .18 .29 .26 .83 .34
Adjusted R2 .02 .04 .07 .11 .03 .08 .07 .69 .12
*p < .05 ** p < .01
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Nadat in Indonesië vanaf 1990 op grote schaal etnisch-religieus geweld uitbrak, kreeg 
dit collectief geweld relatief snel veel wetenschappelijke aandacht. In de talrijke 
publicaties over etnisch-religieuze conflicten in Indonesië werden de gewelddadige 
feiten en hun concrete aanleidingen niet alleen gedetailleerd beschreven, maar 
werd ook gezocht naar de complexe oorzaken tegen de achtergrond van brede 
theoretische kaders. Deze studie voegt nieuwe inzichten aan deze literatuur toe 
door zich te richten op de relatie tussen etnisch-religieuze identificatie en de steun 
voor het geweld tussen etnisch-religieuze groepen (‘intergroepsgeweld’) onder 
islamitische en christelijke studenten.
In deze studie wordt gebruik gemaakt van theorieën aangaande etnisch-
religieuze identificatie en exclusionaire attitudes (‘exclusionary attitudes’) die reeds 
eerder zijn getest en gedeeltelijk gevalideerd in westerse samenlevingen. Deze 
studie past deze theorieën toe op het specifieke thema van steun voor geweld onder 
Indonesische jongeren, en stelt de vraag naar de relevantie van deze theorieën voor 
de Indonesische samenleving. Dat wil zeggen: worden deze theorieën in deze context 
bevestigd of afgewezen? Het belangrijkste voorbeeld is de etnische groep conflict 
theorie die herhaaldelijk is getest door verschillende wetenschappers in vele landen. 
De belangrijkste stelling is dat competitie tussen groepen op zowel individueel als 
contextueel niveau de mechanismen van sociale identificatie en contra-identificatie 
versterken, met exclusionaire attitudes als resultaat. Een andere theorie die ik heb 
getest is de zogenaamde (inter-groep) contact theorie die zich richt op de invloed 
van feitelijk contact tussen leden van groepen op attitudes ten opzichte van 
anderen. Verder is gekeken naar mogelijke de invloed van de saillantie van identiteit, 
van de herinnering aan en eerdere ervaringen met geweld, van gepercipieerde 
discriminatie, van religieuze opvattingen (met name houdingen tegenover pluraliteit, 
religiocentrisme en fundamentalisme), van nationalistische houdingen en van het 
vertrouwen, respectievelijk wantrouwen tussen groepen.
Deze studie maakt gebruik van een cross-cultureel vergelijkend onderzoek 
onder islamitische en christelijke respondenten uit verschillende etnische groepen in 
twee onderzoeksgebieden. Het ene gebied, Ambon, wordt geplaagd door frequente 
uitbarstingen van geweld tussen groepen, terwijl het andere gebied, Yogyakarta, 
relatief rustig is. In Ambon wordt het dagelijkse leven bepaald door sociale segregatie 
van moslims en christenen en een haast strikte scheiding van hun woongebieden. 
Beide groepen hebben duidelijke grenzen ten opzichte van elkaar vastgesteld en 
communiceren intern relatief intens over hun etnische en religieuze identiteit en 
daarmee samenhangende solidariteit. De etnisch-religieuze identificatie is zo sterk dat 
deze heeft geleid tot toenemende verschillen tussen groepen, tot grotere spanningen 
tussen moslims en christenen, en zelfs tot herhaaldelijk geweld. In tegenstelling 
tot Ambon is de relatie tussen de etnisch-religieuze groepen in Yogyakarta relatief 
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vreedzaam. Hoewel er af en toe geschillen hebben plaatsgevonden (en nog steeds 
plaatsvinden), hebben deze in Yogyakarta niet geleid tot massaal geweld tussen 
groepen.
In dit onderzoek is gebruik gemaakt van een mix van kwantitatieve en 
kwalitatieve benaderingen. We hebben gebruik gemaakt van een groot dataset 
voortkomende uit een enquête en kwalitatieve interviews. De steekproef voor 
de enquête werd willekeurig getrokken uit de studentenpopulatie van zes 
universiteiten. Zowel in Ambon als in Yogyakarta werden een christelijke universiteit, 
een islamitische universiteit en een staatsuniversiteit gekozen. In totaal maakten 
1.500 respondenten, gelijkmatig verdeeld over deze universiteiten, deel uit van de 
steekproef. De belangrijkste informanten voor de interviews werden geselecteerd 
uit zowel de respondenten als non-respondenten van de enquête. De interviews met 
respondenten van de steekproef werden afgenomen nadat ze waren uitgenodigd 
om verdere uitleg te geven over hun verklaringen. Ze werden gevraagd om hun 
antwoorden uit te breiden en extra uitleg te geven over de onderzoeksthema’s.
Tijdens de voorbereiding van het onderzoek is gezocht naar eerder gevalideerde 
en betrouwbare meetinstrumenten. We hebben deze meetinstrumenten zo 
nodig herzien en aangepast aan de Indonesische context alvorens ze naar het 
Indonesisch werden vertaald. Belangrijke punten die onderbelicht bleven in het 
kwantitatief onderzoek werden uitgewerkt via de ontwikkeling van een topiclijst 
voor de interviews. De lijst werd gebruikt om verdere relevante onderwerpen uit te 
werken en naar eventueel aanvullende verklaringen van ondersteuning van geweld 
te zoeken. De resultaten van de enquêtes en de interviews werden ook onderling 
vergeleken (triangulatie).
De onderzoeksvragen zijn zowel van beschrijvende als verklarende aard De 
beschrijvende vragen gaan over de aanwezigheid van etnisch-religieuze identificatie 
en de mate van steun voor geweld onder moslims en christenen in Ambon 
en Yogyakarta; alsmede over de concrete manieren waarop etnisch-religieuze 
identificatie en steun voor intergroepsgeweld waarneembaar zijn onder moslims en 
christenen in de genoemde twee steden.
De verklarende vragen richten zich op drie punten. Het eerste punt betreft de 
relatie tussen etnisch-religieuze identificatie en de (steun voor) geweld tussen groepen. 
Het tweede punt gaat over de invloed van sociale kenmerken zoals geslacht, het beroep 
van de ouders of gezinsinkomen op deze relatie, en het derde heeft betrekking op de 
invloed van intermediaire factoren op deze relaties, zoals gepercipieerde competitie 
en groepsdreiging, saillantie van identiteit, intergroepscontact, herinneringen aan 
geweld uit het verleden, gepercipieerde discriminatie, religiositeit (bestaande uit 
verschillende houdingen ten opzichte van religieuze pluraliteit, religiocentrisme 
en fundamentalisme), nationalistische houdingen en wantrouwen. De verklarende 
vragen kunnen als volgt worden geformuleerd:
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1. In hoeverre is er een relatie tussen etnisch-religieuze identificatie 
onder moslims en christenen in Ambon en Yogyakarta en steun voor 
intergroepsgeweld?
2.  In hoeverre is er een relatie tussen etnisch-religieuze identificatie 
onder moslims en christenen in Ambon en Yogyakarta en steun 
voor intergroepsgeweld, rekening houdend met andere individuele 
determinanten?
3. In hoeverre kunnen we de relatie tussen etnisch-religieuze identificatie 
en steun voor intergroepsgeweld verklaren met behulp van intermediaire 
determinanten?
We hebben de etnisch-religieuze identificatie met een set van metingen 
in kaart gebracht. Deze omvatten etnische taalgebruik, deelname aan etnische 
ceremonies, het aantal vrienden uit de eigen etnische groep (in-group) en andere 
etnische groepen (out-groups), lidmaatschap van etnische organisaties, deelname 
aan collectieve religieuze rituelen, rites de passage, religieuze praktijken, het aantal 
vrienden uit de religieuze in-group en de religieuze out-group, en lidmaatschap van 
religieuze organisaties. Bij vrijwel alle respondenten behoort etnische identificatie 
tot een belangrijk onderdeel van de identiteit, maar moslims tonen een sterkere 
etnische identificatie dan christenen. Ze spreken hun etnische taal vaker en wonen 
etnische ceremonies vaker bij. Meer moslims zijn ook lid van etnische organisaties. 
Ten aanzien van religieuze identificatie, nemen moslims vaker dan christenen deel 
aan collectieve rituelen. Ze bidden en wonen religieuze diensten ook vaker bij. Alleen 
wat betreft rites de passage is de participatie van moslims lager. Degenen die wel 
aanwezig zijn op de ceremonies doen dit vooral om niet-religieuze redenen, zoals 
solidariteit met de buren, of om de uitnodiging van hun familieleden te respecteren. 
Moslims hebben ook meer vrienden die tot de religieuze in-group behoren, en 
minder relatief minder vrienden die tot de religieuze out-group behoren.
De kwalitatieve gegevens ondersteunen de bevindingen van de kwantitatieve 
analyses. Etnische identificatie onder moslims is sterker dan onder christenen. 
In Ambon spreken moslims hun etnische taal vaker dan christenen. Dit is vooral 
het geval tijdens de traditionele ceremonies in islamitische dorpen. Christenen 
gebruiken het standaard Indonesisch vaker dan hun etnische taal. De kwalitatieve 
gegevens tonen ook aan dat religieuze identificatie in zowel Yogyakarta als Ambon 
sterker is dan etnische identificatie. Uit de interviews blijkt dat religieuze praktijken 
en persoonlijke religieuze expressie de afgelopen tien jaar steeds belangrijker zijn 
geworden. Het merendeel van de geïnterviewden bevestigde dat zij deelnemen aan 
traditionele ceremonies en religieuze rituelen en gaven daarvoor religieuze redenen 
op. In rites de passage is veelal sprake van een mengeling van religieuze en etnische 
aspecten, met name in huwelijks- en funeraire rituelen. De deelname hieraan is 
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zodoende ook gebaseerd op niet-religieuze motieven. In vergelijking met christenen, 
zijn moslims meer betrokken bij religieuze organisaties en religieus gelieerde politieke 
organisaties. Enkele christenen zeggen ook lid te zijn van religieuze organisaties, maar 
deze organisaties hebben primair politieke belangen. Zowel de kwantitatieve als 
kwalitatieve gegevens bevestigen dat religieuze identificatie sterker en belangrijker 
is dan etnische identificatie, en dat over het algemeen moslims sterkere religieuze 
identificatie tonen dan christenen.
De tweede onderzoeksvraag, over steun voor intergroepsgeweld, wordt ook 
beantwoord via zowel kwantitatieve als kwalitatieve analyses. De meting van de steun 
voor geweld onderging een strikte procedure van factor analyse(s). Ik vond dat steun 
voor geweld twee dimensies heeft: steun voor openbare kritiek en demonstraties; en 
steun voor het berokkenen van schade aan personen en goederen. In het algemeen 
hebben de respondenten de neiging om openbare kritiek en demonstraties te 
ondersteunen, maar weigeren ze om schade aan personen en goederen goed te 
keuren. Vergelijking tussen moslims en christenen toont aan dat moslims meer 
steun verlenen aan protest en demonstraties dan christenen. Onze interviews 
ondersteunen de resultaten van de kwantitatieve analyses. In Ambon drukten alle 
informanten, zowel moslims als christenen, hun steun uit voor het veroorzaken van 
schade, met name degenen die sterke herinneringen aan het gewelddadige verleden 
hebben en persoonlijke ervaringen met geweld hebben gehad. De meeste van hen 
bevestigen ze dat ze deze steunbetuiging zien als een daad van zelfverdediging of 
verdediging van de belangen van de groep. De data-triangulatie bevestigt dat zowel 
moslims als christenen openbare kritiek en demonstraties meer ondersteunen dan 
het berokkenen van schade aan personen en goederen.
Wat betreft de relatie tussen religieuze en etnische zelfdefinitie en steun voor 
geweld, de eerste verklarende vraag, blijkt dat in de meeste etnisch-religieuze 
groepen, Sundanese moslims en Javaanse christenen uitgezonderd, het berokkenen 
van schade meer kans heeft om gesteund te worden dan onder Javaanse moslims. 
De meeste steun wordt gegeven door Madurese moslims en Ambonese christenen. 
Inzake demonstraties, vertonen moslims van niet-Javaanse afkomst meer steun voor 
demonstraties, terwijl de christelijke etnische groepen minder ondersteunend zijn 
dan de Javaanse Moslims.
De tweede verklarende vraag is beantwoord door het testen van de relatie tussen 
de etnisch-religieuze identificatie en steun voor intergroepsgeweld. Dit onderzoek 
stelt vast dat de steun van de respondenten voor het berokkenen van schade wordt 
beïnvloed door het aantal vrienden binnen de eigen religie. In tegenstelling tot onze 
verwachting, laten degenen die veel vrienden van dezelfde religie hebben minder 
steun zien voor het veroorzaken van schade. Inzake steun voor demonstraties, vond 
ik dat deelname aan collectieve rituelen en lidmaatschap van religieuze organisatie 
sterk bepalend zijn. Hoe actiever de mensen aan de collectieve rituelen deelnemen, 
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hoe meer ze demonstraties steunen. Bovendien geven degenen die lid zijn van 
religieuze organisaties meer steun voor demonstraties dan niet-leden.
Individuele determinanten, zoals opleiding en beroep van ouders of geslacht 
van de respondenten, beïnvloeden de relatie tussen etnisch-religieuze identificatie 
en steun voor geweld niet aanzienlijk. De resultaten zijn voor alle etnische en 
religieuze groepen vergelijkbaar zowel wat steun voor het veroorzaken schade als 
steun voor demonstraties betreft. De respondenten van wie de ouders boeren 
zijn, tonen meer bereidheid tot steun dan respondenten van wie de ouders als 
managers, bedienden, handelaren, fabrieksarbeiders of handarbeiders werken. 
Respondenten met relatief hogere inkomens tonen meer steun dan mensen met 
lagere inkomens. In het algemeen tonen de bevindingen aan dat steun voor geweld 
slechts gedeeltelijk kan worden verklaard door de sociaal-economische status van 
de respondenten. Etnisch-religieuze identificatie blijft een sterke determinant nadat 
met deze individuele kenmerken rekening werd gehouden.
De derde onderzoeksvraag werd beantwoord door het testen van de 
invloed van de intermediaire variabelen op de relatie tussen etnisch-religieuze 
identificatie en steun voor geweld. Deze variabelen werden afgeleid uit diverse 
theorieën, en bestonden uit gepercipieerde groepsdreiging, saillantie van identiteit, 
intergroepscontact, herinnering aan geweld, gepercipieerde discriminatie, religiositeit 
(bestaande uit houdingen ten opzichte van religieuze pluraliteit, religiocentrisme en 
fundamentalisme), nationalisme en wantrouwen. Wat steun voor schade betreft, 
vonden we dat gepercipieerde groepsdreiging, religiocentrisme (meer specifiek 
positieve in-group attitudes), pluralisme en nationalistische houding van invloed zijn 
op de relatie. Hoe meer mensen zich bedreigd voelen en hoe positiever de houding 
ten opzichte van de in-group is, des te groter de kans dat ze het berokkenen van 
schade aan personen en goederen steunen. In tegenstelling tot onze verwachtingen 
tonen mensen met een pluralistische religieuze visie meer steun voor het aanbrengen 
van schade. Steun voor schade is ook sterker wanneer het nationalisme relatief 
laag is. Wat de steun voor demonstraties betreft, zijn de relevante intermediaire 
determinanten saillantie van etnische identiteit en acceptatie van hermeneutische 
interpretaties van de Heilige schrift. Hoe meer saillantie van etnische identiteit de 
respondenten accepteren en hoe meer ze het erover eens zijn dat de Heilige Schrift 
(respectievelijk koran en bijbel) een hermeneutische interpretatie nodig heeft (in 
tegenstelling tot fundamentalisme), hoe meer ze demonstraties steunen.
Over het algemeen ondersteunen de bevindingen de belangrijkste theorieën 
en voegen ze inzichten toe aan de bestaande theorieën die we in deze studie 
gebruikten. De studie bewijst het gelijk van de sociale identiteitstheorie die stelt dat 
mensen altijd proberen een  positieve sociale identiteit te ontwikkelen door zich met 
de positieve kenmerken van de in-group te identificeren, en zich van de out-groups 
te onderscheiden (Tajfel, 1978; 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Phinney and Ong, 
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2007). Er bestaat een sterkere identificatie met religie dan met etniciteit. Wanneer 
we de onderzochte groepen vergelijken, tonen moslims echter een grotere etnisch-
religieuze identificatie dan christenen. Deze bevindingen bieden een bevestiging van 
eerdere studies in Indonesië die de groei van religieuze identificatie, vooral onder 
moslims, sinds de jaren 1990 laten zien (van Bruinessen, 2003; Sidel, 2006; Heffner, 
2011).
De bevindingen van de gepercipieerde groepsdreiging valideren de etnische 
groep conflict theorie waarin dreiging de sterkste determinant is voor schadelijke 
en exclusionaire attitudes ten opzichte van out-groups (Scheepers et al., 2002a; 
Gijsberts et al., 2004; Coenders et al., 2007; Savelkoul et al., 2011). Dit toont aan dat 
deze theorie, die in staat is gebleken om exclusionaire attitudes in westerse landen 
te verklaren, ook van toepassing is op de Indonesische samenleving. In deze studie 
is evenwel weinig aandacht besteed aan het contextuele niveau dat deel ook deel 
uitmaakt van voornoemde theorie en de invloed van daadwerkelijke competitie, 
migratie en relatieve groepsomvang (meerderheids- versus minderheidsstatus) in 
rekening brengt.
De uitkomsten bewijzen ook de verwachtingen betreffende de rol van 
religiocentrisme (Sterkens en Anthony, 2008). Een positieve evaluatie van de 
religieuze in-group heeft te maken met groepsidentificatie, en kan gepaard kan 
met een denigrerende houding ten opzichte van out-groups. Echter, wat betreft de 
religieuze houding ten opzichte van pluraliteit, zijn onze bevindingen in tegenspraak 
met eerdere studies. Terwijl deze studies hebben aangetoond dat het pluralisme 
vooroordelen en vijandigheid jegens out-groups vermindert (Sterkens, 2001; 
Anthony et al., 2015), toont deze studie aan dat mensen die tot een religieuze groep 
behoren en een pluralistische religieuze visie hebben, wel degelijk geweld kunnen 
ondersteunen. Blijkbaar kan pluralisme evenzeer een indicator zijn voor religieuze 
identificatie als monisme.
Onze bevindingen komen overeen met stellingen betreffende nationalistische 
houdingen (Coenders, 2001; Todosijevic, 2001), die suggereren dat toenemende 
etnisch-religieuze identificatie nationalisme vermindert (waarbij nationalisme wordt 
gezien als inzet voor de nationale Indonesische staat en daarmee verzet impliceert 
tegen oproepen tot meer regionale autonomie). Lagere niveaus van nationalisme 
leiden in ons onderzoek tot meer steun voor geweld. Men dient zich daarbij te 
realiseren dat het geweld in onze onderzoekscontext vooral gerelateerd is aan de strijd 
voor emancipatie van specifieke etnisch-religieuze groepen en de ondersteuning van 
regionale (lokale) belangen. De bevindingen ondersteunen daarom de theoretische 
stelling dat de minder nationalisme heeft bijgedragen aan het uitbreken van etnisch-
religieus geweld (Bertrand, 2004).
Op het lagere niveau van steun voor intergroepsgeweld, dat wil zeggen steun 
voor protesten en demonstraties, bleken etnische saillantie en hermeneutische 
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interpretatie relevante intermediaire bepalende variabelen te zijn. Het onderzoek 
bevestigt de uitkomsten van eerdere studies die een significantie correlatie tussen 
etnisch-religieuze identificatie en etnische saillantie laten zien: hoe groter de 
saillantie van etnische identiteit, hoe hoger de kans op steun voor geweld. Bovendien 
verhoogt de acceptatie van hermeneutische interpretaties van de tekstuele bronnen 
van religieuze tradities ook steun voor geweld. Deze vaststelling staat haaks op een 
eerdere studie, die suggereert dat alleen fundamentalistische interpretaties van 
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